VZCZCXRO1579
OO RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHKV #0461/01 0601329
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291329Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5104
INFO RHEBAAA/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KYIV 000461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/UMB,EB/ESC/IEC - GALLOGLY/WRIGHT 
DOE PLEASE PASS TO LEKIMOFF, CCALIENDO 
USDOC FOR 4231/IEP/OEENIS/NISD/CLUCYK 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EPET EFIN ECON ENRG UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: GAZPROM AGAIN THREATENS UKRAINE OVER DEBT, 
INTERMEDIARIES 
 
REF: A) KYIV 451 
 B) KYIV 162 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified.  Not for Internet Distribution. 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  Gazprom has indicated it had grown tired of 
Ukraine's inability to sign and implement the February 12 gas 
agreement announced by Putin and Yushchenko and threatened to reduce 
gas supplies to Ukraine by 25 percent beginning on March 3, moving 
up a previously announced deadline of March 14.  As has become 
familiar in gas disputes between the two countries, Gazprom says the 
debt is not fully settled, whereas Ukrainian politicians and 
NaftoHaz disagree.  The Gazprom threat came on the heels of 
statements by Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko's government that 
Ukraine doesn't need the type of new joint venture that is supposed 
to replace gas intermediary UkrHazEnerho (UHE) in accordance with 
the agreement announced by Yushchenko and Putin.  Tymoshenko's 
government made the announcement shortly after her February 20-21 
meetings with Putin and Gazprom in Moscow, where she apparently 
failed to get Russian support for her vision of the Ukrainian gas 
market.  Tymoshenko's actions place her in direct contradiction to 
Yushchenko and his agreement with Putin.  Many commentators are 
arguing that Gazprom is not in reality pressuring Ukraine on the 
debt issue, but rather because of Tymoshenko's open resistance to a 
new domestic intermediary that would give Gazprom direct and 
increased presence in the Ukrainian market.  As the gas dispute with 
Russia evolves, the lack of a coordinated approach between 
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko will weaken the Ukrainian position and dim 
its hope to secure better conditions for both the delivery of gas 
and the structure of intermediaries.  End summary. 
 
Gazprom Again Threatens Ukraine with Supply Reductions 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 26, Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov 
announced that Ukraine must meet the conditions of the February 12 
Putin-Yushchenko agreement (ref A), or 25 percent of gas supplies to 
Ukraine would be slashed on March 3.  This brought forward the March 
14 debt repayment deadline issued by Gazprom last week.  Embassy 
contacts at NaftoHaz and other local observers professed to be 
unworried about an actual reduction, arguing the dispute would 
likely be resolved soon.  Technical experts told us a 25 percent 
reduction in supplies to Ukraine was unlikely to pose major danger 
to the stability or performance of the gas supply network.  During 
their February 12 meeting in Moscow, Yushchenko and Putin reached a 
last-minute agreement that avoided Gazprom's then threatened cut off 
of gas supplies to Ukraine.  They agreed on the repayment of 
Ukraine's debt and on the replacement of intermediaries RosUkrEnergo 
(RUE) and UkrHazEnerho (UHE) with two new joint ventures, each 
equally owned by Gazprom and NaftoHaz.   The debt repayment plan did 
not articulate the scope and schedule of repayment, and talks 
between Gazprom and NaftoHaz have stalled over disagreements on the 
exact terms of the new deal.  Contributing to the impasse is an 
apparent difference in approaches between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko 
towards resolving the most recent gas crisis. 
 
Total of Gas Debt Still in Dispute 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U)  Gazprom has repeatedly claimed that Ukraine owes $1.5 
billion through January.  Ukraine has acknowledged a debt of $1.072 
billion dollars for 2007 gas deliveries, with agreement on the 
amount and schedule of payment for January deliveries to be made by 
the end of February. Naftohaz has begun paying the debt to 
UkrHazEnergo (UHE) as Yushchenko accused the Tymoshenko-led 
government of sabotaging the agreement with its delay in making 
payments.  First Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Turchynov, however, 
blamed the delay in repayment on RosUkrEnergo (RUE) and UkrHazEnerho 
(UHE), the existing intermediaries, for not having presented 
documents that clearly articulate the calculations for the gas 
debts. 
 
Yushchenko Claims 2007 Debt Repaid in Full 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) On February 27, President Yushchenko claimed that the debt 
for 2007 had been paid in full.  He said about UAH 3.8 billion of 
the UAH 5 billion debt (around $1 billion) Naftohaz owed to 
UkrHazEnerho had been paid back in cash.  The remaining UAH 1.2 
billion (about $240 million) would be offset by dividends that 
UkrHazEnerho owes to NaftoHaz but has never paid.  UHE immediately 
countered that using anticipated dividends to pay off the debt was 
illegal and stated that NaftoHaz still owed UHE $270 million for 
2007 supplies.  Gazprom, while acknowledging progress, pointed out 
 
KYIV 00000461  002 OF 003 
 
 
that the debt for 2008 remained and was continuing to grow. Gazprom 
and NaftoHaz representatives will meet in Moscow on February 29 to 
continue talks; however, it remains unclear whether the payment by 
NaftoHaz was sufficient to defer the March 3 deadline, or whether 
the deadline stands.  Gazprom's CEO Alexei Miller said in a press 
interview that Gazprom sees the debt repayment as a start to the 
resolution of the problem. 
 
Gas Market Restructuring Also Contentious 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) A strident proponent of the removal of intermediaries in 
the Ukraine-Russia gas trade, Tymoshenko had already advocated 
dismantling the existing gas supply system prior to the 
Putin-Yushchenko summit.  Rhetoric from her camp suggested a vision 
that, in particular, did not see the necessity of a Joint Venture 
(JV) with Gazprom to replace UHE.  It came as no surprise then that, 
prior to Tymoshenko's February 20th meetings with Russian Prime 
Minister Viktor Zubkov and Putin in Moscow, there was speculation 
that Tymoshenko hoped to alter the course of the gas debate that had 
been initiated by the two presidents a week earlier.  Her deputy 
Turchynov went so far as to say that, because Moscow had proposed 
unacceptable terms and conditions, Tymoshenko would have to start 
negotiations "from scratch."  Not only did the idea of a fresh start 
receive pushback from the Russians, who succeeded in keeping it off 
the agenda, but also from President Yushchenko as well, who insisted 
that PM Tymoshenko act in concert with the agreement with Putin. 
 
Gazprom's Proposed Agreement Revealed 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) The newspaper Kommersant revealed the contents of a draft 
agreement purportedly prepared by Gazprom, the terms of which 
appeared to be very unfavorable to Ukraine.  According to the draft, 
the new RUE Joint Venture (tentatively named RosUkrHaz) would no 
longer have the right to re-export Central Asian gas to the Eastern 
European market, a key element of its profitability.  A recent press 
report indicates that Gazprom has given the existing RUE permission 
to re-export 3-8 bcm of Central Asian gas annually to Europe for at 
least two more years, a proposition that could entail annual profits 
ranging from $500 million to $1.3 billion.  An energy expert 
suggested to us that this is likely a concession made to avoid a 
legal tangle over broken contracts, and looked very similar to the 
old structure.  According to a Gazprom source quoted in the Russian 
press, in other respects the new JV would change very little; it 
would continue to be based in Switzerland with familiar faces in 
management, including Gazprom board member Konstantin Chuychenko. 
 
Russia and Ukraine Disagree on UHE Replacement 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (U) The terms for the UHE replacement proposed in Gazprom's 
reported draft agreement also appear to be disadvantageous to 
Ukraine.  In addition to the agreed upon doubling of Gazprom's 
ownership stake to 50 percent, the proposal reportedly would expand 
the new JV's customer base to include all segments of the domestic 
market, stipulate signing long-term contracts with Ukraine's 
ultimate consumers until 2028, require prepayment when buying gas, 
and extend the joint venture's control beyond UHE's current ambit to 
include the sales of all gas on the domestic market, including 
Ukrainian gas produced by NaftoHaz. 
 
¶8. (U) The proposed expansion of the new JV's role stands in direct 
contrast to both rhetoric and actions from Tymoshenko's camp aimed 
at developing a more substantial role for NaftoHaz (ref B).  On 
February 6 Tymoshenko's Cabinet annulled the January 2006 resolution 
on the creation of UHE and instructed NaftoHaz to liquidate the 
intermediary.  It also named NaftoHaz as the sole supplier of gas to 
the industrial sector.  Following her return from Moscow last week, 
Tymoshenko indicated that UHE would be eliminated from the market in 
the first quarter of 2008.  She also commissioned the Cabinet 
members to prevent government-connected entities from signing 
contracts with UHE and not to allow customs clearance for gas 
supplied by UHE to Ukraine.  The Prime Minister indicated that there 
will be "another contractual model."  It seems likely that 
Tymoshenko's contractual model, which she considers consistent with 
the Presidents' framework agreement, will be difficult to reconcile 
with the Joint Venture proposed by Gazprom. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment:  The Putin-Yushchenko agreement increasingly 
appears to bring only a slight change to the existing gas 
arrangements, likely more beneficial in the long run for Russia than 
Ukraine.  Tymoshenko, who had intended to drastically change the gas 
supply mechanism, appears to be losing this struggle with the 
 
KYIV 00000461  003 OF 003 
 
 
Yushchenko camp.  However, until Yushchenko and Tymoshenko are able 
to reconcile their positions, Russia will maintain an advantage in 
negotiations in which unwelcome positions are countered with renewed 
threats of a gas cutoff.  End comment. 
TAYLOR