VZCZCXRO4942
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0151/01 0421446
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111446Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7522
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS KDEM PREL CG
SUBJECT:  EU Special Envoy meets Nkunda 
 
Ref:  A. Kinshasa 144 B. 06 Kinshasa 1405 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  In a meeting at Kirolirwe with EU Special Envoy 
Roeland van de Geer February 9, Laurent Nkunda affirmed his 
commitment to the Kivus conference Acte d'Engagement.  He said that 
the future of Tutsis in Congo could only be assured through the Goma 
peace process rather than through continued armed conflict. 
However, he said, the Congolese government had vitiated the Acte 
with Kabila's decree of February 2.  Van de Geer said that it was 
possible to view the decree as creating a superstructure, only 
superficially linked to the Acte's Technical Commission, which would 
still be autonomous and Kivus-based and include strong involvement 
of the international community.  Van de Geer said he would attempt, 
on returning to Kinshasa, to clarify the matter with the Minister of 
Interior. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary, continued:  Nkunda said he was preparing a 
six-year implementation proposal (in contrast to the 40-day 
timetable proposed by Vice-Admiral Etumba) but he had no 
interlocutor in the government.  Van de Geer said that he foresaw 
establishment of a task force in Goma for implementing the Acte, 
similar to that which now existed for the Nairobi process.  Nkunda 
said that he foresaw brassage within two to three years, much more 
quickly if the FDLR were dealt with sooner.  Brassage for his forces 
would take place within the Kivus.  Van de Geer said that Nkunda had 
a negative image that could be improved only if he acted more 
forcefully to deal with human rights abuses.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Laurent Nkunda received EU Special Envoy Roeland van de 
Geer February 9 at a farmhouse overlooking the village of Kirolirwe 
and its adjacent MONUC operating base, where van de Geer and an 
international delegation had arrived by MONUC helicopter.  The 
meeting lasted four and a half hours.  Nkunda, dressed in a simple 
black safari suit, was accompanied by several non-Tutsis, including 
CNDP Secretary General Deogratias Nzabarinda and humanitarian and 
health affairs chief Dr. Alexis Kasanza, Col. Claude Mucho and 
lower-ranking military officers.  Van de Geer was accompanied by 
MONUC-Goma political affairs director Gernot Sauer, van de Geer's 
political adviser Jean-Michel Dumont, EUSEC Lt. Col. Tim King, and 
Poloff Haywood Rankin. 
 
------------ 
Preceding Meeting with Nkunda's Team 
------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Bishop J. M. Runiga's account of his meeting with Nkunda 
February 6 (ref A) suggested that Nkunda was on the brink of 
rejecting the Goma process, mainly on account of Kabila's February 2 
decree setting up a "Peace Program" for the Kivus.  A meeting 
February 8 in Goma between several of Nkunda's key advisors and 
MONUC and international facilitators (not including van de Geer, who 
was in transit) confirmed that Nkunda appeared to be on the verge of 
walking away from the peace process. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The CNDP team, composed of political spokesman Rene Abandi, 
military spokesman Seraphin Mirindi, political advisors Bertrand 
Bisimwa and Desire Muiti, and Col. B. Masuzera, said that CNDP had 
no choice but to go to the media with an absolute rejection of the 
February 2 decree.  They said that the decree vitiated the Technical 
Commission under the Acte d'Engagement.  In the decree, they said, 
the Steering Committee was the supreme organ and gave no role to the 
international community or CNDP, and they cited many other 
objectionable aspects.  They said that they felt that the CNDP had 
been duped.  MONUC SRSG Chief of Staff John Almstrom and the EU's 
Dumont urged the CNDP to wait at least a few days before going to 
the media with a rejection of the decree. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The CNDP team said that they took particular umbrage at a 
recent communique of the DRC and Ugandan defense ministers, in 
which, it claimed, CNDP was mentioned as a negative force that had 
to be eliminated.  They claimed that FARDC was moving tanks, troops, 
and ammunition into North Kivu, and they objected to MONUC's 
reinforcements and redeployments, because the Acte did not call for 
such redeploments until establishment of the Technical Commission. 
MONUC Eastern Division commander General Bikram Singh told the CNDP 
team (which included two lawyers, Abandi and Bisimwa) not to be 
over-legalistic.  He assured them there was no rearming by the FARDC 
going on, and he urged them to understand that MONUC's redeployments 
were essential to protecting the ceasefire. 
 
------------ 
On the Hilltop 
------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Nkunda said that he was very happy to receive this 
 
KINSHASA 00000151  002 OF 004 
 
 
important international delegation and grateful that the 
international community had played a tireless and decisive role in 
bringing about the "Goma Accord."  That accord, he said, aimed at 
addressing the future of DRC, while the Sun City accord had only 
divided up spoils.  President Kabila "and the extremists around 
him," Nkunda believed, had not wanted a Kivus Conference nor the 
Acte d'Engagement and, without the determined intervention of the 
international community, these would not have come about. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Nkunda said that his focus was on protecting his Tutsi 
community (although he also stressed that the CNDP was a 
multi-ethnic party and pointed out that the staff around him were 
non-Tutsi, just as the CNDP delegation to the Kivus Conference had 
been predominantly non-Tutsi), and he said that he realized that in 
the long term he could not assure that objective through military 
means.  "There is a big difference between winning a battle and 
finishing a war."  He said that with the signing of the Acte he had 
felt his work was "almost finished."  He said that Abandi had 
advised him not to sign the Acte, as Abandi had seen too many 
potential pitfalls in the Acte for the CNDP, but Nkunda said he had 
decided to go forward anyway, and he said he was fully committed to 
what he (through his delegation) had signed. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Nkunda said that the Kivus Conference and the Acte had 
seemed to imply a rapid establishment of the Mixed Technical 
Commission for Peace and Security, so that at last the CNDP would 
have a direct interlocutor with the government.  For too long, the 
CNDP had been isolated, including by MONUC, which had refused to 
meet him except at a mid-grade military level and had refused to 
give CNDP an airing on Radio Okapi.  Now had come the decree of 
February 2.  (Nkunda brought out a copy of the decree and read 
through parts.)  The decree established a Steering Committee with no 
Kivu or CNDP participation and no role for the international 
signatories of the Acte. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Article 8 stipulated that the Technical Commission would 
be under control of the Kinshasa superstructure, and it set out a 
list of participants in the Technical Commission (including 
"representatives of the government" without saying how many) that 
had not been previously discussed nor foreseen in the Acte.  It 
provided for participation of all the Mai Mai signatories of the 
Acte, when it was well known that they were fabricated by the 
government.  There were provisions for provincial institutions that 
seemed to have no relationship to the Acte and gave the governors of 
North and South Kivu undue power.  It created a vast bureaucracy 
that seemed to be designed to divert millions of dollars into 
Kinshasa pockets. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In sum, the decree kidnapped the Acte, and the decree 
therefore had to be withdrawn or fundamentally changed.  Meanwhile, 
Nkunda lamented that Defense Minister Chikez, in the meeting at Beni 
with his Ugandan counterpart, had called for the destruction of the 
CNDP, in violation of the Acte. 
 
------------ 
Human Rights and Image 
----------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Van de Geer said that Nkunda had a very negative image 
both among the Congolese population and elsewhere and that he needed 
to take actions and to make public declarations that would improve 
it.  Van de Geer cited instances of rape and use and recruitment of 
child soldiers.  He said that there had been a report, as yet not 
confirmed, that CNDP had badly mutilated sixty prisoners of war (ref 
B). 
 
¶13. (SBU) Nkunda responded that he had moved forcefully to reduce 
the incidence of rape by his soldiers.  The CNDP high command had 
instituted the death penalty for collective rape and had already 
carried out that sentence when such cases arose.  Unfortunately, the 
CNDP had attracted many troops from the FARDC, where the habit of 
rape was widespread.  Similarly, Nkunda said, CNDP had inherited 
child soldiers from RCD-Goma and FARDC, and it had worked with 
Caritas to demobilize over 2,500 of them since 2004.  Unfortunately, 
these child soldiers tended to come back, due to the poor conditions 
of their demobilization.  He was now arresting officers who allowed 
them to return.  CNDP did not recruit child soldiers, Nkunda 
asserted. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Nor, he said, did it mutilate prisoners, some of whom 
preferred to stay with CNDP.  ICRC had access to prisoners, and 
MONUC knew perfectly well there had never been any such mutilation. 
Separately, MONUC's Sake base commander Col. Chand Saroha affirmed 
that he had never seen any mutilated prisoners.  (Note:  These 
reports appear to have been the result of conclusions drawn by 
 
KINSHASA 00000151  003 OF 004 
 
 
Belgian military officers from observation of soldiers hospitalized 
in Kinshasa.  In fact, we have confirmed that an unusually high 
number of medical amputations were performed on FARDC wounded in the 
aftermath of the December fighting.  This could well be the source 
of the confusion.  End note.) 
 
¶15. (SBU) As for public declarations about CNDP's policies on human 
rights, Nkunda lamented that MONUC had denied CNDP access to Congo's 
most important radio station, Radio Okapi.  Sauer stated that he 
would discuss the matter with his hierarchy but thought it likely 
that CNDP would be allowed access to Radio Okapi. 
 
------------- 
Viewing the Decree Two Ways 
------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Van de Geer acknowledged that Kabila's February 2 decree 
had come as a surprise and contained many confusing elements.  The 
Steering Committee indeed did not include the CNDP and the 
international community.  However, van de Geer said, the structure 
elaborated by the decree could be interpreted as involving two 
virtually unconnected parts, the first part relating only to the 
government's role in Kinshasa with an emphasis on attracting donor 
money for the Kivus, and the other dealing with the Technical 
Commission to be located in the provinces.  Rather than call for the 
outright withdrawal of the decree, it would be better to 
"reinterpret" it. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Nkunda agreed that outright withdrawal might be difficult. 
 However, he feared that it might also be impossible to go forward 
with the decree, however much it was reinterpreted.  Van de Geer 
said that he would return to Kinshasa in the coming days to try to 
clarify the matter with the government.  Nkunda cautioned him not to 
fall into the trap in which the international community had found 
itself during the pre-election Transition, in which the 
international community was meant to be guarantor of the transition, 
but constantly faced the belligerence from the Kabila-led 
government. 
 
¶18. (SBU) What was essential, in Nkunda's view, was that the 
Technical Commission not be fettered by the government.  It needed 
to be autonomous, with the international community as guarantor, as 
spelled out in the Acte.  It would have to have executive authority. 
 Its membership would need to have a balance between the government 
and CNDP, for example, fifty percent participation of government, 
forty percent CNDP, and ten percent the various Mai Mai groups. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Moreover, Nkunda said, all the commissions created to 
address issues in the Acte would need to spring from the Technical 
Commission.  It was especially important that the military and 
humanitarian sub-commissions work at roughly the same pace, since it 
was as important to prepare society to accept the Tutsis as it was 
to integrate CNDP forces into the Congolese army; these two efforts 
had to go hand in hand. 
 
-------------- 
Long-Term Proposal -- No Brassage with FDLR Still a Threat 
-------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Nkunda said that the CNDP's concept of a timeline, in 
stark contrast to the government's (as exemplified by Vice-Admiral 
Etumba's 40-day timetable), was of a six-year program, renewable. 
CNDP would not present this Proposal for Pacification and Security 
until the Technical Commission was established in accordance with 
the Acte.  CNDP, he said, was not interested in fictional deadlines, 
such as the March 15 deadline imposQ on DRC by the Nairobi 
communique. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Nkunda said that he would never risk integration of his 
forces into the Congolese army so long as the FDLR remained a threat 
to his people or to his forces.  Unfortunately, the reality was that 
the FDLR had long been a tool of the government and remained so. 
Rwanda did not want the FDLR back in Rwanda and the DRC needed and 
used the FDLR and did not want to push FDLR's combatants back into 
Rwanda.   Nkunda recognized the importance of the provision in the 
Nairobi communique allowing the FDLR to resettle in DRC far from the 
border, but the break-up of the FDLR would be difficult and take 
time.  As for other key elements of the Acte, Nkunda particularly 
focused on the return of refugees.  He scoffed at the idea that 
their return could adequately be prepared in anything like the 40 
days contemplated in Etumba's calendar. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Nkunda said that his proposal would propose 
confidence-building measures, with elements of the mixage process 
that had been attempted in 2007.  He described mixage as having been 
 
KINSHASA 00000151  004 OF 004 
 
 
a good idea in concept, but one on which the government never 
followed through.  In any case, brassage could only take place step 
by step, with confidence-building measures and, in particular, clear 
progress on dismantling the FDLR and assurance of security.  The 
faster FDLR was addressed, the faster brassage would take place. 
Nkunda said his forces were attached to the Kivus and would expect 
to remain there.  Moreover, he would advocate mixing only those 
forces that had equivalent training. 
 
-------------- 
No One to Talk To 
-------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) Van de Geer asked whether, in formulating his proposal, 
Nkunda had any interlocutor with the government.  Nkunda said there 
was "only an absence."  He had had the visit of Bishop Runiga, and 
his people in Goma had met with MONUC and the international 
facilitators but, otherwise, there was nothing.  He hoped, at least 
as an interim measure until the Technical Commission could be 
acceptably established in accordance with the Acte, that a "modality 
of concertation" be established between CNDP, FARDC, MONUC, and the 
international facilitators.  He lamented that Etumba had been sent 
to Goma in lieu of senior political figures capable of taking 
decisions.  He advocated also establishing a Wise Men's Committee 
alongside the co-presidency of the Technical Commission. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Meanwhile, Nkunda said, he was putting two of his staff 
permanently in Goma, but he remained very concerned about their 
security.  Van de Geer thought that the Goma process would be well 
served by a task force on similar lines to the one now functioning 
in Goma under the Nairobi process.  It was essential, in van de 
Geer's view, that there be close coordination between the two 
processes. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Nkunda said that the Kinshasa aspects of the February 2 
decree were of no interest to him.  Going to Kinshasa was all about 
collecting per diem.  Essential was the establishment of an 
autonomous body with decision-making capability in Goma.  Nkunda 
said that he preferred that the Technical Commission meet in a 
"neutral zone."  Perhaps MONUC could erect a tent near Sake and 
Kimoka where such meetings could be held.  Meanwhile, he advocated 
also that patrols of MONUC's North Kivu Brigade include elements of 
CNDP and FARDC, and even PARECO in those areas where PARECO was 
operating, in order to "promote a better image" of these patrols. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Sauer asked whether any credence should be put in reports 
of a split in the CNDP.  Nkunda asserted that Colonel Sultani 
Makenga remained in the high command and had willingly accepted the 
Acte. 
 
------- 
Van de Geer and SRSG Doss 
------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) On return to Goma, van de Geer gave a briefing to SRSG 
Alan Doss, who was on a stop-over from Bukavu to Kinshasa.  Van de 
Geer said that he had concluded, from his conversation with Nkunda, 
that Nkunda was prepared not to reject the February 2 decree 
outright but give the international community a chance to persuade 
the government to "reinterpret" it.  He said he would change his 
plans and return to Kinshasa, with the object of joining Doss in a 
meeting with Minister of Interior Kalume.  Most essential would be 
to persuade the government to start implementing the Acte at the 
provincial level as soon as possible, with creation of an autonomous 
commission there with a substantial role for the CNDP.  Van de Geer 
said that it was essential for the international community to commit 
itself to the Goma process with experienced full-time political 
staff in Goma.  The work would be immense. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Doss said that MONUC was in full tilt ramping up its 
military and political presence in North Kivu.  He agreed that 
Kalume needed to understand that if the government tried to hijack 
the Goma process it would wind up with less than nothing. 
 
------------ 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶29. (SBU) The van de Geer-Nkunda meeting was their first direct 
contact in North Kivu, and the first political contact between MONUC 
and Nkunda for some years.  Nkunda was dispassionate, logical, 
articulate, and well-prepared.  From start to finish, he was an 
impressive interlocutor.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK