VZCZCXRO4401
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0143/01 0420652
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 110652Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7503
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000143 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PHUM CG
SUBJECT:  Final Interim Technical Committee meetings in Bukavu and 
Goma 
 
Ref: Kinshasa 124 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Vice-Admiral Etumba, who is likely to continue to 
play a leading role in the military commission created by the Goma 
accords, pressed ahead with interim meetings with armed groups in 
Bukavu February 4-5, CNDP in Goma February 6 and other armed groups 
in Goma February 7.  All parties were confused by the presidential 
decree February 2 establishing a "Peace Program" for the Kivus. 
Armed groups, especially the CNDP, objected to not being consulted 
in advance; Mai Mai groups objected to "special treatment" for the 
(Tutsi) CNDP and FRF.  Etumba could not fully explain how the 
structure he was advocating during his interim meetings would fit 
into the "Peace Program."  But he pressed ahead anyway, and 
succeeded in gaining acceptance from all sides, with many caveats. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Naval Forces Chief of Staff Vice-Admiral Didier Etumba 
extended his stay in North and South Kivu well beyond his original 
expectations February 4-7, carrying on with his effort to "sell" 
armed groups on a structure and timetable for the Peace and Security 
Technical Commission called for in the Kivus conference Acte 
d'Engagement of January 23.  The anticipated visit of a senior 
political figure to participate in this effort never materialized, 
so Etumba carried the burden alone.  (Note:  Interior Minister Denis 
Kalume and National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe turned up with 
a delegation in Bukavu February 5, but were there to inspect damage 
from the February 3 earthquake.  End note.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Etumba thought he had squared away the North Kivu armed 
groups in meetings January 28-31, but CNDP reopened debate and 
Etumba conducted another meeting with them February 6, and with the 
others February 7.  He had met South Kivu armed groups, minus the 
Banyamulenge FRF, in Goma on February 2 and gained their preliminary 
acceptance (sweetened by handing over $10,000).  However, he deemed 
it necessary to meet all the South Kivu groups in their own 
province, which he expected to accomplish February 4. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Meanwhile, without forewarning to any party in the Kivus 
including Etumba himself, President Kabila issued a decree February 
2 elaborating a "Programme Amani" (Peace Program) for the Kivus. 
Articles 9-12 of the decree sets up the Mixed Peace and Security 
Technical Committee as contemplated by the Acte d'Engagement. 
Article 9 states that that the Technical Commission is composed of 
representatives of the government, two delegates each from CNDP and 
FRF, and one from each of the other armed groups signatory to the 
Acte, as well as representatives of the international community. 
Etumba had billed his Kivus meetings as an ad hoc effort to prepare 
the way for the establishment of the Technical Commission, but now 
he had to carry on with meetings after the Technical Commission was 
already established -- with many question marks hanging over it. 
 
----------- 
Meetings in Bukavu 
----------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) On February 4, a MONUC helicopter carried Etumba, General 
Bikram Singh (Commander of MONUC's Eastern Division, now based in 
Goma), John Almstrom (MONUC Chief of Staff, now delegated to oversee 
post-conference developments in the Kivus), and international 
facilitators (EU, UK, U.S.) to Bukavu.  Many of the residents of 
South Kivu's capital had spent the night outdoors, fearing 
aftershocks from the earthquake of the day before; however, damage 
was not widespread in the areas of the city through which the 
delegation drove. 
 
¶6. (SBU) A principal objective of the trip was aborted when it was 
learned that the Banymulenge dissident group known as FRF 
(Republican Front for Federalism) or Group of 47 was not going to 
appear.  Etumba nonetheless went ahead with the day's meeting with 
the 13 assembled Mai Mai groups, with the hope of meeting the FRF 
the following day.  (It was not clear whether FRF was playing hard 
to get or whether there had been a simple failure of communication 
between FRF and MONUC, but MONUC was confident that FRF would appear 
at the helicopter pick-up point in Minembwe the following day for 
transport to Bukavu, and in fact this did occur.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Undeterred by news he had just received of the issuance of 
the presidential decree of February 2, Etumba proceeded, as he had 
done in all his meetings the previous week in Goma, to describe and 
solicit acceptance of a structure ("organigram") and timetable 
("chronogram") for implementing the Acte.  His organigram called for 
two sub-commissions (one military, the other humanitarian and 
social) under a co-chairmanship, each divided into North and South 
Kivu sections, and each of those sub-divided into "cells."  His 
 
KINSHASA 00000143  002 OF 004 
 
 
chronogram set forth an extremely ambitious schedule (elaboration of 
a disengagement plan within nine days, assembling of armed groups in 
transit centers in 28 days, departure for brassage or demobilization 
in 37 days, return of IDPs and refugees and presentation of lists of 
detained persons in 40 days), but now, at Almstrom's and Singh's 
insistence, Etumba hastened to say that his timetable was merely 
"indicative."  (Note:  In Singh's analysis, which he provided later 
to the international facilitators, this timetable was both totally 
unrealistic and designed to trap the international community into 
putting pressure on CNDP and FRF.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) The South Kivu Mai Mai groups' acceptance of the structure 
and timetable was not in doubt, but they used the occasion to speak 
at length about their grievances.  These included:  objections to 
Kabila's "Amani" decree naming two CNDP and two FRF to the Technical 
Commission while other armed groups had one representative apiece 
("we are all just as much political-military organizations as they 
are"), insistence that there be a careful census of refugees with 
participation of traditional chiefs (on the ground that many 
refugees were not, they claimed, Congolese), urging that freeing of 
detained persons be placed further forward in the timetable, and 
requesting more logistical and monetary help.  Almstrom noted that 
while a de facto ceasefire in South Kivu had existed for many 
months, MONUC hoped that in the event of any violence all parties 
would contact the MONUC focal point for immediate investigation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The delegation again helicoptered to Bukavu on February 5. 
The meeting with six representatives of the FRF/Group of 47 followed 
similar lines with a similar result:  guarded acceptance of the 
structure and timetable, on the understanding that these were 
notional.  FRF representatives went through an even longer list of 
their own grievances:  creating a separate territory of Minembwe, 
assuring amnesty prior to the establishment of the Technical 
Commission, suppressing hate-mongering, dealing with FDLR, removing 
rival Banyamulenge Colonel Pacifique Masunzu as deputy commander of 
the 10th Military Region, inquiry into massacres, return of 
refugees, assuring appropriate ranks for their officers upon 
brassage (a process to be overhauled), and economic development of 
the Minembwe High Plains region.  Many of these reflected 
longstanding demands of their allies among Kinshasa-based 
Banyamulenge politicians. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Etumba, who had downplayed the naming of two FRF 
commission representatives the previous day, emphasized it in this 
meeting.  He went through all the FRF's grievances, explaining that 
most of them could not be addressed at this stage but later when the 
Technical Commission and other commissions began their work. 
Almstrom urged that FRF stay in constant contact with MONUC, noting 
that MONUC would act at once to reinforce its base in the 
Banyamulenge area. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Norbert Basengezi Katintima, a key leader of the Kivus 
Conference and former governor of South Kivu who was accompanying 
Kalume and Kamerhe on their earthquake trip, briefly stopped by 
MONUC-Bukavu and told international facilitators that he anticipated 
that Etumba would be appointed as the government's key figure on the 
Technical Commission. 
 
----------- 
With CNDP in Goma 
----------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) At CNDP's request, Etumba met a CNDP military delegation 
at MONUC headquarters in Goma on February 6.  The delegation 
included senior CNDP member Col. Moses Kambala (an English-speaking 
Ugandan), military spokesman Major Seraphin Mirindi, and Captain B. 
Masuzera (who had attended the meetings the previous week); no CNDP 
political members were present.  Mirindi presented at length the 
CNDP's own organigram and proposal for representation on the 
Technical Commission and its sub-commissions (reftel), which CNDP 
had conveyed to FARDC and MONUC on February 3.  Mirindi thanked 
Etumba for having expeditiously ordered the release of two CNDP 
members who had been arrested in Goma two days' previously. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Etumba expressed perplexity at CNDP's organigram.  He said 
that CNDP had approved of his organigram and timetable at the 
meeting on January 31 and now they seemed to be throwing everything 
into question.  He urged the CNDP to realize that these meetings 
were only preliminary, with nothing set in concrete.  On security, 
he said that he was determined to address CNDP's concerns.  He 
admitted that there were "extremist elements" in the police and 
military forces, but 8th Military Region commander Vaiqueur Mayala 
(sitting beside him) would carry out his clear orders to curb such 
extremists. 
 
KINSHASA 00000143  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Mirindi said that CNDP had difficulty with the way in 
which the government had proceeded, by not engaging CNDP in adequate 
advance discussions.  In particular, it objected to the issuance of 
the presidential decree February 2 with no advance warning.  The 
CNDP representatives were only now receiving a hard copy, thanks to 
the international facilitators.  Mirindi said that when the CNDP had 
met Kamerhe during the Kivus Conference, he had promised that the 
structure, timetable, and decree would all be carefully discussed in 
advance with CNDP.  CNDP appreciated that Etumba was now 
characterizing his timetable as "adaptable," which had not been the 
case at first.  Mirindi said that CNDP would need to have its 
logistical needs taken care of. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Etumba responded that the government had not given him any 
wherewithal for such a purpose, but he promised "the means will be 
there."  (Note: Etumba evidently took for granted a willingness of 
the international community to pay any costs.  End note.)  As for 
CNDP's listing of positions to be filled by CNDP at the "cell" and 
"sub-cell" levels, Etumba said such decisions would be made by the 
Technical Commission once it was established.  He emphasized that 
decisions would be consensual, so it should not matter whether a 
given party was outnumbered on any committee.  Mirindi said that 
consensuality was very important to the CNDP.  Almstrom pointed out 
that MONUC had its own misgivings about Etumba's proposed timetable 
-- for example, it seemed very doubtful that 14,000 armed men could 
be integrated into the army or reinserted into society, or even 
depart for such integration or reinsertion, within 37 days.  Singh 
assured CNDP that MONUC's monitoring system would be immediately 
reinforced with officers capable in French and Swahili, and urged 
the importance of bringing all ceasefire violations immediately to 
the attention of the MONUC focal point or nearest MONUC base. 
 
¶16. (SBU) After a long break for internal discussion among the CNDP 
delegation, Mirindi said that CNDP accepted both Etumba's organigram 
and timetable, with the understanding that they were provisional. 
He said that CNDP would have to ponder further the issue of 
participants in committees.  Security continued to be a serious 
concern for CNDP, such that the CNDP delegation in Goma felt that it 
would have to be continuously protected either by its own forces or 
by MONUC.  Etumba repeated that FARDC, under his strict orders, 
would protect CNDP, with MONUC's help. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Mirindi said that CNDP took strong exception to a recent 
DRC-Ugandan communiqu which, he claimed, called for the elimination 
of negative forces with specific mention of CNDP.  Etumba said he 
knew nothing about it, there had to be a misunderstanding, and in 
any case, the work of the conference and Acte d'Engagement took 
precedence over any possible mispronouncement in a communiqu. 
Etumba's comment, however, appeared to mollify the CNDP 
representatives. 
 
 
¶18.  Note:  The reference is possibly to a communique issued by the 
Ugandan and Congolese defense ministers following a meeting the week 
before in Beni.  It alluded to negative forces but not to CNDP 
specifically.  Separately, Mgr. J. M. Runiga, who has acted as an 
informal intermediary of Kabila's to Nkunda, also said that the CNDP 
was quite angry about the DRC-Uganda communiqu.  End note. 
 
--------- 
Meeting with North Kivu Mai Mai 
--------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Prior to finally leaving Goma for Kinshasa midday February 
7, Etumba convened the North Kivu Mai Mai groups at MONUC-Goma.  The 
Mai Mai were supposed to have returned to their home areas to 
sensitize their cadres about the Acte, but were evidently hanging 
around Goma to get the latest information and seeking an audience to 
vent their mounting anger.  Seven of eight North Kivu Mai Mai 
signatories of the Acte were present.  Etumba displayed less 
patience than in previous meetings, but gave them the floor. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Sounding a similar theme to that of the CNDP, the Mai Mai 
representatives lamented that the presidential decree establishing 
the "Peace Program" had not been discussed with them in advance. 
Some of them had picked up a rumor that a new decree had been issued 
in Kinshasa -- with equal lack of forewarning -- naming personnel to 
specific posts in the "Peace Program," inluding the Mixed Technical 
Commission for Peace and Security.  (Note:  MONUC/Goma had similar 
infomation, but no specifics, while Etumba professed inorance of 
any new decree.)  The Mai Mai represetatives were particularly 
upset that the decree ad awarded CNDP and FRF two delegates to the 
Technical Commission but other signatory armed groups oly one -- 
 
 
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