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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM290, Minawi to S/E Williamson: Weak and Isolated, SLM Still

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM290 2008-02-28 06:07 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9681
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0290/01 0590607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280607Z FEB 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0057
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF S/E WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y   GARBLED TEXT, MISSING PARA 3 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MARR MCAP MOPS SU
SUBJECT: Minawi to S/E Williamson: Weak and Isolated, SLM Still 
Striving to Transform Itself 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000290  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  While the lack of DPA implementation has left the 
SLM weak and isolated, it continues to strive toward transforming 
the movement from a fighting force to a political party, Senior 
Assistant to the President and SLM leader Minni Minawi told S/E 
Williamson in Khartoum.  He suggested that DPA implementation focus 
on increasing security for civilians and enhancing the ability of 
the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) to deliver 
services to the population.  UNAMID and the UN/AU mediation have 
neglected the SLM and, rather than utilizing its understanding of 
the local political dynamics in Darfur, have pursued a strategy that 
has further splintered the rebel groups, according to Minawi.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------------- 
All Alone with Nothing To Do 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The lack of implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) has left the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) isolated in 
Khartoum "with nothing to do," Senior Assistant to the President and 
SLM Chairman Minni Minawi told S/E Williamson on February 26. 
Despite their weakened position, Minawi said the SLM leadership is 
trying to "civilize the fighters" and transform the movement from a 
"military mentality" to a political body, and he requested broader 
support from the international community for this effort. 
Increasing security for civilians and enhancing the ability of the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) to deliver services 
remain the movement's top priorities, according to Minawi.  He 
contended that much of the current violence in Darfur stems from 
inter-ethnic conflict and greed rather than Government versus rebel 
confrontations and that there is no political will to address this 
instability because Khartoum prefers to exclude Darfur from the 2009 
elections. 
 
---------------- 
DPA: "Expensive" 
---------------- 
 
3. (SBU) One of Minawi's senior aids, Mohammed El Tijani, asserted 
that while 45 percent of the DPA is implemented, the core issues 
remain unresolved: peace and security, education, power-sharing, and 
wealth-sharing.  While expressing gratitude for the USG-funded 
political party training program through the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), El Tijani urged the U.S. to play a 
larger role in DPA implementation to help the SLM "shift from war to 
building peace."  The leader of the SLM caucus in the National 
Assembly, Ali Traio, said that implementation of the DPA would 
restore credibility to the now-marginalized SLM.  "The DPA has been 
expensive," he said, "and has cost us our fighters and our popular 
support." 
 
------------------------ 
UNAMID, JMST Neglect SLM 
------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Responding to a question from S/E Williamson, Minawi said 
that the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) had failed to engage and 
consult with the SLM, despite the fact that the DPA forms the basis 
of UNAMID's mandate.  He said that the SLM has initiated all 
previous meetings with Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada 
and Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai and that he has not spoken 
to either of them in over one month.  "We know Adada, but we don't 
even know who the key figures are in UNAMID," lamented Minawi, 
explaining that there is no working-level coordination between 
UNAMID and the SLM.  El Tijani said that Adada "is not even aware of 
c6Q establish 
an "implementation team" within UNAMID. 
 
5. (SBU) Minawi also characterized the UN/AU Joint Mediation Support 
Team (JMST) as aloof and said that it has not utilized the SLM's 
understanding of the dynamics in Darfur to advance the political 
track.  El Tijani reported that the JMST never responded to a letter 
from the SLM stating its position on the peace talks held in Libya 
in November 2007.  Minawi argued that limited implementation of the 
DPA and the JMST's approach has encouraged rather than mitigated 
fragmentation of the rebel movements and predicted that the UN/AU 
will confront myriad challenges in producing a peace agreement among 
the 27 rebel factions now active in Darfur. 
 
6. (SBU) "All they've done is hold meetings without substance," 
added El Tijani.  Traio said that the UN/AU has put the SLM in the 
position of being an obstacle to peace even though it continues to 
strive for an end to the conflict.  The UN/AU should promote the DPA 
as the underlying solution to the conflict and adjust the agreement 
to accommodate the concerns of the non-signatories, concluded 
Minawi. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000290  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
7. (SBU) S/E Williamson asked if the SLM had official representation 
in New York to facilitate consultation with the UN.  El Tijani 
responded that the SLM requested some level of diplomatic 
representation at selected Sudanese missions but never received a 
response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Presidency. 
"If we were a full member of the Government, it would happen," he 
said. 
 
8. (U) S/E Williamson did not have an opportunity to clear this 
message. 
 
FERNANDEZ