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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM274, UNAMID UNWILLING TO STOP WEST DARFUR CONFLICT BUT WILLING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM274 2008-02-25 15:37 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6505
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0274 0561537
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251537Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0031
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID UNWILLING TO STOP WEST DARFUR CONFLICT BUT WILLING 
TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN AID 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 266 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The UNAMID military component continues to 
monitor, despite limited access and visibility, recent fighting in 
West Darfur and movements of SAF troop concentrations in the region. 
 The military Chief of Staff expects an escalation in hostilities in 
West Darfur, with operations possibly shifting to western Jebel 
Marra.  Current UNAMID guidance is that the force will not/not 
directly intervene in fighting taking place in West Darfur. UNAMID's 
role, for the time being, will be confined to liaising with rebel 
groups and supporting the humanitarian community, potentially by 
providing area protection for massed IDPs.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) UNAMID peacekeepers continue to monitor the movement of 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and report on ongoing fighting in West 
Darfur.  According to both UNAMID observations and press accounts, 
SAF troops, weapons and materiel are still flowing into El Geneina, 
which provides the launch pad for SAF offensive operations in the 
region against the Chad-supported JEM rebel group (reftels).  UNAMID 
has confirmed reports that Antonov bomber aircraft, HIND attack 
helicopters and MiG-21 fighter jets targeted the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) Jebel Moon stronghold. UNAMID's Joint 
Analysis Cell (JMAC) reports that Government of Sudan (GOS) tanks, 
artillery, 12.7mm gun-trucks and troop transport trucks and an 
unconfirmed number Arab militia, estimated in the thousands, massing 
in and around El Geneina intends to maintain an offensive 
operational tempo in the coming days. 
 
3. (SBU) Before leaving for Nigeria, UNAMID Force Commander (FC) 
Martin Luther Agwai told FieldOff that the peacekeeping force "can 
do nothing to stop SAF attacks in West Darfur."  Despite FieldOff 
urging that the FC engage, even informally, with the SAF Western 
Area Commander to allow for greater UNAMID access to alleviate the 
humanitarian crisis, Agwai doubted that the SAF would heed any 
appeals.  However, Agwai pledged to continue pushing UNAMID civilian 
leadership to address the West Darfur offensive at the political 
level in Khartoum (this happened on February 24). 
 
4. (SBU) UNAMID force Chief of Staff Brigadier General Patrick 
Davidson-Houston, who has been the senior military official in El 
Fasher in the FC's absence, explicitly instructed senior staff 
officers on February 24 not/not to intervene in the fighting, "quite 
simply because we do not have the capability."  UNAMID's focus would 
be to liaise with rebel groups, monitor hostilities and combatant 
movements, support the humanitarian community, and provide 
protection for displaced civilians. 
 
5. (SBU) Chief of Staff Davidson-Houston cautioned that while the 
hostilities clearly affected humanitarian assistance, both the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army 
(SLA) factions may be "playing up the situation" to gain media 
attention to indirectly apply pressure on the GoS to scale back its 
operations - giving the rebels critical time to regroup.  The Chief 
of Staff also speculated, based on unconfirmed reporting from the 
JMAC, that more serious clashes could lie ahead as Chadian 
opposition fighters trickle back across the border south of El 
Geneina and JEM fighters, some returning from Chad themselves, move 
to reinforce positions in Darfur - essentially continuing the 
battles which raged in Chad over the past weeks inside Darfur.  Late 
February UNAMID reports of heavily armed troop convoys heading to 
Nyala via Tawila could suggest a shift in operations to the Jebel 
Marra, Davidson-Houston opined. 
 
6. (SBU) Comment: The SAF military offensive in West Darfur 
underscores at least two key security dynamics in the region. 
First, there remains a strong GOS intent to pursue a military 
solution to the Darfur crisis, especially as far as the JEM, with 
its dreams of power in Khartoum, is concerned.  Second, UNAMID's 
inability to intervene - politically or militarily - in any 
significant way reinforces the growing perception that the UN force 
is little better or more impartial than its predecessor. Taken 
together - along with analysis of SAF troop build-ups, escalation of 
attacks, allegations of new recruitment of Arab militia and the use 
of heavier weaponry - these twin dynamics suggest that the GoS will 
continue to respond aggressively to rebel attacks and that UNAMID 
will do little or nothing about it.  Furthermore, with the Force 
Commander expected to be out of Sudan until at least March 8, the 
Deputy Force Commander's continued absence (though he is expected to 
return to the field "within days") and the rare presence of Joint 
Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada in El Fasher, the UNAMID 
ship will probably continue to drift without a rudder, above all to 
the detriment of the Darfurian civilians most impacted by the 
conflict between rebel factions and the Khartoum regime. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ