VZCZCXRO3508
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0251/01 0521016
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211016Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9992
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000251 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID: "BALL IS IN OUR COURT" 
 
REFERENCE: (A) KHARTOUM 246 
(B) KHARTOUM 225 
(C) KHARTOUM 219 
(D) KHAROTUM 184 
(E) KHARTOUM 158 
(F) KHARTOUM 5 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Fifty days after transition, UNAMID top officials 
briefed the diplomatic community on progress and challenges.  UN/AU 
Special Representative Adada noted that a political solution is 
needed to resolve the Darfur situation and, while UNAMID is not a 
panacea, the changing political landscape made UNAMID more important 
than ever. Force Commander Agwai said that while AMIS' African 
soldiers arrived with only a rifle and a uniform, the same African 
soldiers will now be expected to be self-sustaining force capable of 
conducting long range patrols. Police Commissioner Fryer said that 
police are improving security in the IDP camps but more needs to be 
done, including recruiting additional police for the FPUs. 
Operations Chief Medili said that challenges remain in recruiting 
civilian staff and providing infrastructure. Humanitarian 
Coordinator Bajulaiye appealed to the international community to 
urge the GOS to permit the UN protective access, particularly to the 
IDPs. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Top UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) officials 
on February 20 updated the diplomatic community in Khartoum about 
its progress fifty days after the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) transition of authority to UNAMID.  UN/AU Special 
Representative Rudolphe Adada told ambassadors that with the 
transition from an AU mission to a UN lead mission, it is the 
international community that is in charge of the situation in 
Darfur. Adada said that as a UN mission, UNAMID has successfully 
completed negotiations on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (ref 
B), which but has not yet reached agreement on the Non-African 
forces that would comprise the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). 
He added that the Non-African forces not accepted yet by Khartoum 
(Thai and Nepalese units) comprise only 1,000 out of the projected 
26,000 UNAMID military and police. 
 
ADADA: UNAMID MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Adada cautioned the diplomats that UNAMID is not a panacea 
as the real solution to the problems of Darfur is a political one. 
Adada said that the current Chad and Sudan conflict has exacerbated 
the already difficult political situation.  He said that both Chad 
and Sudan, notably Darfur, have a long-standing history of 
interference and conflict in each other's territory and that while 
Chad sees itself as a regional actor, it is Darfur that has 
historically played a role in Chad instability.  He recalled that 
FROLINAT, the Chadian rebel group that produced former Chadian 
President Hissene Habre was founded in Nyala, Darfur in 1966. Blood 
ties between the Chadian regime and some Darfur rebels (both of them 
Zaghawa) were stronger than political ties. He noted the possibility 
that the powerful Darfur rebel group of SLA/Unity could split 
between those Darfur rebels who support Deby and those who are 
purely Darfur-focused.  Given this confusion in rebel ranks and 
cross-border, decades-long history of mutual interference, he 
reasoned that UNAMID is more important than ever. 
 
AGWAI: CHALLENGE IS FIELDING A SELF-SUSTAINING FORCE 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Force Commander Lt. General Martin L. Agwai said that 
UNAMID successes to date include the deployment of the newly 
instituted Bangladeshi Formed Police Unit (FPU) which has 
spearheaded increased patrols in the Internally Displace Persons 
(IDP) camps, particularly at the turbulent Kalma IDP camp, one of 
the largest in Darfur.  He noted that while AMIS has successfully 
transitioned into UNAMID, the UNAMID troops are still largely the 
same AMIS troops who arrived with only their rifles and their 
uniforms. 
 
¶5. (SBU) UNAMID briefer Col. Murdo Urquhart said that in planning 
for transition AMIS intended to transition from being a light 7,000 
troop force which did not have the capability to provide its own 
communication, aviation support, and operational support to a more 
robust 26,000 troop force capable of sustaining itself in the field, 
with its own UN-supplied integrated support services, communications 
and aviation.  Urquhart said that UNAMID currently has 7,485 troops 
of which the largest contingents are African, e.g. Nigerian (2,906) 
and Rwandan (2,588). Non-Africans, with 192 troops, compose only 2.5 
percent of the force, with the largest being the Chinese engineering 
contingent currently with 143 troops. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Urquhart said that UNAMID's future challenges include 
 
KHARTOUM 00000251  002 OF 004 
 
 
upgrading the existing 600-troop battalions to UN standard 800-troop 
battalions and to develop the capability for UNAMID troops to 
sustain itself in the field by providing their own integrated 
transport, food, and to maintain their own generators and water 
supplies.  Urquhart acknowledged that UNAMID is still in the 
transitional phase and there are difficulties such the problem of 
transitioning from AMIS communications to the UN standard 
communications system. Nonetheless, UNAMID has conducted more 
patrols, convoys now move their own fuel and supplies, and most 
notably UNAMID conducted verification patrols into the Northern 
Corridor, the road north the El-Geneina to Sirba and Abu Suraj 
immediately after recent fighting.  He summed up UNAMID's attitude 
"to do the little you can with the little you have and you push 
forward". He added that the phase one transition has succeeded in 
integrating the force, setting up the HQ and transitioning from 8 to 
3 sectors. The two additional battalions added in October had been a 
success. Failures had been the slowness of the Heavy Support Package 
and Hybrid units that should have deployed by December 31st, 2007. 
 
UNAMID ENHANCES POLICE CONTACT WITH IDPS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Police Commissioner Michael Fryer said that UNAMID's police 
presence has been established and is improving.  He said that of the 
19 planned Formed Police Units (FPU), nations have committed to 
provide 12, and that one FPU has been already deployed (the 
Bangladeshis). Seven units have yet to be identified.  Fryer said 
that of the 3,772 planned individual police officers, there are 
1,380 AMIS police officers waiting to be transitioned into UNAMID 
and that there are 225 UNAMID police officers. All 1,605 officers 
are deployed. 
 
¶8. (U) Fryer said that the Bangladeshi FPU is still constructing its 
camp and has only been partially deployed but is having a very 
positive effect on the ground.  He noted that its equipment arrived 
in Darfur only two months after the Bangladeshi's arrival in the 
country.  He said that TCCs have pledged 12 FPUs with the last 
pledged contingent (Pakistani) expected to arrive in July 2008.  He 
noted that UNAMID police are currently 95 percent African. 
 
¶9. (U) UNAMID police achievements include FPU patrols into the Kalma 
IDP camp from 8 AM to 6 PM and improved relations between the IDPs, 
the Government of Sudan, and the various militia movements.  Fryer 
said that UNAMID's long-term plans include providing 24/7 FPU 
presence in the IDP camps, establishing basic police procedures 
among the Sudanese police, constructing community police stations 
near camps to provide a safe zone for IDPs, and introducing 
community policing concepts. UNAMID will also try to establish 
police for rebel movements that have signed the DPA (SLM-Minawi and 
others) but these movements really don't have formal police, at 
least not yet. 
 
¶10. (U) Future challenges for UNAMID policing include recruiting 
additional seven 140-troop FPU squads and generating an additional 
1,167 individual police officers to bring them up to the mandated 
3,772 police officers.  In addition, UNAMID needs to transport, 
house and provide offices for the 11 FPUs that are expected to 
arrive within the next three months. Fryer noted the deep IDP 
mistrust of Sudanese police as a significant challenge he hoped to 
overcome. This is especially true at Abu Shook and Kalma camps. 
 
OPERATIONS CHIEF: MUCH DONE; CHALLENGES REMAIN 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) UN/AU Deputy Special Representative for Operations Hocine 
Medili said that UNAMID has undertaken a number of extraordinary 
steps to facilitate a quick start including transferring UN staff 
from other locations and expedited procurements such as the 
unprecedented letting of a no-bid contract for PAE.  However, he 
cautioned that such extraordinary measures raised issues of 
accountability within the UN system, so some of the special measures 
will end on March 31. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Medili said that UNAMID has 15 helicopters and one 
fixed-wing in Darfur and has an additional 13 civilian MI-8 
helicopters being prepared in Khartoum. He said that the UN, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are working on 
improving air fields that would permit positioning additional 
aircraft in Darfur. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Challenges include adjusting to overly optimistic 
budgetary assumptions that 70 percent of UNAMID employees could live 
off the economy, outside of camps.  He noted that living in Darfur 
is harsh and difficult, housing rents are high, and there is limited 
office space. For example, while UNAMID has recruited only 1,597 of 
its authorized 5,571 civilians, there is only sufficient office 
 
KHARTOUM 00000251  003 OF 004 
 
 
space for 900 staff and UNAMID housing for 245.  Medili said that 
insufficient supplies and equipment, ranging from cleaning and 
office supplies, furniture, and computers, is a serious problem and 
if even if they possessed them, UNAMID lacks sufficient hard-wall 
warehouses space. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Communications challenges include deficiencies in 
allocation of High Frequency and Very High Frequency (HF/VHF) radio 
frequencies, incompatible equipment, and lack of tactical equipment. 
 He noted that the UN usually does not provide internet and 
telephone service for troops, and the practice is not covered under 
UNAMID's self-sustainability concept. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Medili said that additional civilian staffing is needed. 
He said that of the 5,551 authorized, UNAMID has recruited only 
1,597 or 29 percent of required personnel. He noted that additional 
UNAMID housing and offices need to be constructed and that many of 
the staff will need to live and work in a possibly hazardous active 
construction site. He added that he hoped to work with the GOS to 
facilitate customs clearances for supplies and visa issuances for 
incoming staff. 
 
UNAMID HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) UNMIS Deputy Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Oluseyi 
Bajulaiye said that UNAMID and UNMIS have worked closely with GOS 
humanitarian agencies, but that GOS restrictions on access and 
issues of protection remain an issue. Currently, the UN humanitarian 
effort is focusing on the situation in West Darfur. Baljulaiye said 
that the UN and humanitarian NGOs sought access when GOS began its 
attacks in West Darfur on February 9. It was not until Feb 11 and 12 
that the UN and the NGOs were able to go to the affected areas, but 
NGOs successfully providing food and medicine to a number of 
refugees. On February 18, the GOS restricted humanitarian aid 
flights and launched attacks against JEM rebel-held towns north of 
Selea, along the Northern Corridor.  In the following days, between 
attacks NGOs were able to distribute food for 82,000 of the 
estimated 160,000 affected persons. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Bajulaiye said that the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
and Humanitarian Communique were intended to provide unlimited 
access for protection. He appealed to the international community to 
urge the GOS permit the UN protective access, particularly to the 
IDPs. He said that the situation requires 24 hour patrols but 
acknowledgedi+jJQ"|6es. Finally, Bajulaiye said that the 
GOS has established a new procedure that promises to speed NGO 
document processing and had extended the Moratorium for NGOs for an 
additional year until January 2009. 
 
¶18. (SBU) In responding to questions about reports of possible 
abductions of young boys in the aftermath of recent conflict in West 
Darfur, Humanitarian Coordinator Bajulaiye said that half of the 
displaced in the recent conflict were children, so it possible for 
many to be unaccounted for.  He said that the UNAMID and UNICEF are 
working on investigating these reports that boys may have 
intentionally been separated from their families. 
 
STATUS OF UNAMID CHIEF OF STAFF STILL UNKNOWN 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) In response to CDA Fernandez's question on the rumored 
expulsion of Chief of Staff Patrick David Houston, Adada said that 
UNAMID received a note verbale notifying them of the expulsion but 
with no specific deadline. UNAMID attempted to negotiate with the 
GOS but the attempts were rebuffed.  While UNAMID have been 
negotiating with the GOS on David-Houston's expulsion, he has gone 
on leave and has now returned to Sudan without any problems, and 
UNAMID remains uncertain on when or if he will go. 
 
ROLES OF THE CEASEFIRE COMMISSION AND JMST UNDER UNAMID 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) In response to questions about the status of the Ceasefire 
Commission (CFC), Agwai said that the CFC is currently not 
operational as all members of the CFC must be present at 
investigations and approve the report. As the JEM has been thrown 
out of El-Fasher, they cannot participate in the CFC.  As a result, 
said Agwai, "the CFC exists only on paper, so we need a new way for 
the CFC to operate."   He added that UNAMID investigates as much as 
it can and has conducted patrols along the Northern Corridor, the 
road north of El-Geneina, to the towns of Sirba, Selea, and Abu 
Suraj.  Told by the SAF that Jebel Moon was unsafe, UNAMID did not 
 
KHARTOUM 00000251  004 OF 004 
 
 
attempt to patrol there, but intends to go there when in is safe (in 
the next few days).  However, when UNAMID wanted to go to a Sudanese 
Liberation Army (SLA) controlled area, the SAF also told UNAMID it 
was unsafe.  Undaunted, UNAMID said it would go anyway provided the 
SAF agreed not to fire upon UNAMID patrols.  The SAF agreed and the 
patrol was successfully conducted. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Agwai noted that UNAMID's freedom of movement is still 
limited. The Sudanese Government is mostly not to blame.  He said 
that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) does not include everyone and 
both signatory and non-signatory movements have weapons, which 
inhibits overall security.  In addition, UNAMID does not have the 
capacity to do long range patrols and cited the lack of Meals Ready 
to Eat (MRE) for the incapacity to venture far from their bases. 
To develop this, Agwai said that he intended to have a brainstorming 
session on ways to better implement the DPA. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Asked about the role of the Joint Mediation Support Teams 
(JMST) under UNAMID, Agwai said that the JMST is part of the UNAMID 
negotiating team.  He said that UNAMID plans to contract with the 
JMST and then second them to the AU Special Envoy. 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT WAR CRIMES ARREST REQUESTS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) In response to questions about the SOFA and media reports 
calling for arrest of individuals wanted by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), Adada said that the use of the SOFA for the 
purposes of the ICC is not appropriate.  He added that UNAMID is not 
under any mandate by the ICC. 
 
AGWAI: WE NEED TO EMPHASIZE THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Asked about the interaction with rebel movements, Agwai 
said that UNAMID is increasing its contacts with the movements, 
which see themselves increasingly as more military movements than 
political ones.  Agwai said that as a priority in the next three 
months, he wanted to move the process forward politically rather 
than militarily. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Agwai commented on the difficulties of the Sudanese 
political process.  He said that there can be no progress without 
interacting with all of the parties, and that in Sudan there are 
simply too many parties. Unlike most peacekeeping situations where 
the government has collapsed giving the UN a relatively unimpeded 
field to work in, the GOS is one of the parties, is a relatively 
efficient and present government and must be consulted. 
 
¶24. (SBU) He noted that he has been handicapped by GOS requirements 
for UNAMID to notify the SAF of air flight times and locations, 
discovering that rebels unsurprisingly fail to meet them at 
locations that SAF knows about.  He added that he has not been 
meeting with the JEM but will meet with the others. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Comment: While Adada stated UNAMID's accomplishments at 
the end of fifty days, he also noted the number of challenges amid a 
changing political and military landscape, and commented to the 
diplomats that UNAMID's success or failure was mostly in their own 
hands.  The sense was of slow progress, accelerating in the spring 
with the arrival of additional military and police units, of 
Sudanese Government obstruction, brutality and lack of coordination, 
but also of an operation most of whose problems and limits are 
largely internal in nature. End comment. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ