VZCZCXRO7757
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0225/01 0450659
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 140659Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9960
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000225 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: SIGNED AND SEALED, BUT 
DELIVERED? 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 184 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) UNAMID and GoS officials finally signed a Status of Forces 
Agreement on February 9 in Khartoum.  The SOFA is comprehensive in 
scope and contains all of the core provisions sought by the UN, 
including full freedom of movement, unimpeded use of communications, 
expedited procedures (visas, permits, licenses) for UNAMID personnel 
and contractors to carry out their mandated tasks and provision of 
land and services for UNAMID facilities, among other key 
arrangements. The lead UN negotiator for the SOFA expressed 
satisfaction with the agreement but conceded that practical 
implementation - where the GoS regularly fails - will have to be 
coordinated at the field level.  An early test of the GoS commitment 
to the agreement will be whether or not it rapidly grants visas to 
the U.S. military and police personnel slated to join UNAMID. 
 
 
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OVERVIEW OF KEY PROVISIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) At a February 9 ceremony in Khartoum, AU-UN Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Special Representative (JSR) 
Rodolphe Adada and GoS Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor signed 
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that supplements the legal 
framework in which UNAMID operates.  It covers the activities of 
UNAMID military (including military observers and military liaison 
officers), civilian and police personnel, as well as associated 
contractors.  The SOFA also addresses UNAMID property, 
communications capabilities, accoutrements, travel and transport, 
privileges and immunities, basing and services provision, safety and 
security of UNAMID personnel, uniforms and arms, entry to and exit 
from Sudan, liability and dispute settlement, among other topics. 
 
¶3. (SBU) This cable is not a legal assessment of the SOFA but rather 
an initial analysis of select aspects of the agreement and their 
potential operational or political implications for UNAMID.  The 
focus is on those provisions that are most critical to ensuring the 
effective functioning of the peacekeeping force and that might have 
a direct impact on U.S. contributions (e.g., U.S. military officers 
assigned to UNAMID). 
 
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SCOPE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The SOFA clearly extends the scope of its authorities 
throughout "Darfur and in other parts of the Sudan including at 
points of entry and exit at which UNAMID is operating" (para 2). 
The implication - elaborated more concretely in various provisions 
throughout the agreement - is that UNAMID personnel (including 
contractors) nd euipment will be exempt from the range of 
licenses, permits, fees, customs, and other restrictions that 
consistently bottlenecked the flow of critical peacekeeping gear and 
material into the country in the past. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The agreement further stipulates that "UNAMID, its members 
and contractors, together with their property, equipment, 
provisions...vehicles, vessels and aircraft...shall enjoy full and 
unrestricted freedom of movement without delay throughout Darfur and 
other areas of Sudan where UNAMID is operating...without the need 
for travel permits or prior authorization or notification" (para 
12).  In a February 10 conversation with Poloffs, senior UN legal 
negotiator for the SOFA Stadler Trengove expressed satisfaction with 
the "travel and transport" provisions, observing that the UN "got 
everything it wanted," though he cautioned that the proof of this 
would be in actual implementation on the ground. (Note: Both the 
Darfur Peace Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1769 
require freedom of movement for peacekeepers, though the GoS has 
repeatedly violated this principle in the past.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Trengove further explained that certain operational 
contingencies - such as night flights - were deliberately left out 
of the SOFA so as not to bog down negotiations (and therefore 
jeopardize other gains made by the UN during negotiations) and allow 
such procedures to be worked out between UNAMID and GoS authorities 
in Darfur (reftel).  It was with this eventuality in mind, he 
remarked, that the agreement specifically provides the possibility 
for the JSR and GoS to conclude supplemental arrangements (para 
59). 
 
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FREEDOM TO COMMUNICATE 
 
KHARTOUM 00000225  002 OF 003 
 
¶8. (SBU) Confronting the contentious issue of basing, land and 
resource rights, the SOFA holds that the GoS "shall provide without 
cost to UNAMID when possible and in agreement with the Joint Special 
Representative for as long as may be required such areas for 
headquarters, camps or other premises as may be necessary for the 
conduct of the operational and administrative activities of 
UNAMID..." (para 16).  The GoS is further committed to making 
available key resources, including water and electricity, "free of 
charge, or, where this is not possible, at the most favourable 
rate..."  (Comment: Availability of adequate land for basing and 
access to water or other resources continues to stymie the 
deployment of UNAMID, which is of course also plagued by its own 
challenges in force and equipment generation and civilian 
recruitment.  End Comment.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) The SOFA specifically addresses the status of military 
observers and military liaison officers (paras 28 and 36), positions 
that may be more likely to be filled, in some cases, by non-African 
countries than the national peacekeeping battalions.  The relevant 
provisions require that UNAMID provide the names of military 
observers and liaison officers to the GoS, an arrangement that could 
potentially formalize the GoS' ability to "veto" nominees, 
especially from Western countries.  The SOFA also requires that the 
GoS facilitate "without delay and free of charge" multiple entry 
visas to all UNAMID military, police and civilian personnel, 
including contractors.  Military observers and liaison officers are 
authorized to carry weapons (para 39) - an obstacle that created 
some concern for potential contributions of U.S. military personnel. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶10. (SBU) Based on an initial analysis of the document and the 
feedback of UN lead legal negotiator Stadler Trengove, the SOFA, on 
paper at least, appears to be a sufficiently strong and broad 
document to enable UNAMID to carry out its mandated tasks.  The 
lynchpin, of course, will be its implementation - and the GoS' track 
record in this department does not bode favorably.  That the 
agreement does not define the specifics of certain key procedures - 
for instance, those relating to UNAMID movements, night flights or 
notification of imported materials (para 15) - leaves open the 
possibility that the GoS will exploit these technicalities to impede 
the force's effective functioning. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Equally important in the agreement's application will be 
UNAMID's ability to competently and consistently coordinate its 
activities with the GoS.  Trengove observed that no formal 
coordination mechanism currently exists between UNAMID and the GoS 
(not to mention within the various arms of the UN in Sudan - UNMIS, 
JMST, DDDC, etc.) - a necessity that the international community 
should push JSR Adada to establish.  Furthermore, implementation 
will hinge on accountability; the UN Security Council must 
vigilantly monitor the execution of the SOFA and be prepared to 
respond decisively to any violations or attempts to undermine the 
agreement. The jury is still out on the efficacy of the SOFA, but 
the results of UNAMID's efforts to address the recent fighting in 
West Darfur and the outcome of the nominations of non-Africans, 
including Americans, to civilian and/or military posts may provide 
an early litmus test of the GoS' willingness to follow through on 
 
KHARTOUM 00000225  003 OF 003 
 
 
its commitments.  Another key initial test of GoS sincerity will be 
whether or not it rapidly grants visas to the eight U.S. military 
and ten police personnel slated to join UNAMID. 
 
POWERS