VZCZCXRO9940
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0180 0361606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051606Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9895
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: NCP CLAIMS SPLM OBSTRUCTION OF ELECTIONS LAW 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) The SPLM is employing a strategy to delay passage of the 
elections law, claimed NCP political executive committee negotiator 
Dirdeiry Ahmed Mohammed.  During a meeting with polchief February 4, 
Dirdeiry claimed the SPLM agreed months ago to a 60/40 direct vs. 
proportional voting system in parliamentary elections, and that SPLM 
negotiator (and Governor of Blue Nile State) Malik Agar signed an 
agreement on those percentages with the NCP in September 2007.  He 
said the SPLM later flip-flopped in favor of a 40/60 direct vs. 
proportional system, and now would concede a 50/50 split, but only 
if the 25 percent of women required in the legislature will be 
included in the proportional seats.  He claimed the NCP would like 
the women to be elected directly but did not explain how this would 
work. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Dirdeiry explained that the main reason for the NCP's 
support for 60 percent direct voting is that this corresponds to the 
270 historical voting constituencies in Sudan (60 percent of a 
450-member parliament is 270).  To get around this impasse, Dirdeiry 
claimed the NCP offered to increase the parliament to 500 members 
and reduce direct seats to 55 percent, which would mean creating 
five new constituencies (55 percent of 500 corresponds to 275 
seats).  He claimed the SPLM dismissed this plan as "too expensive" 
due to the salary expenses of the new MPs. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Dirdeiry said another example of SPLM stall tactics on 
elections are the timelines for the electoral law.  He claimed that 
in recent NCP-SPLM political executive committee meetings, the NCP 
had proposed shortening some of the timelines so that an election in 
2009 will be possible.  For example, instead of taking three weeks 
to review the elections law, the parliament should take only one 
week, and the President should not need an additional week to sign 
the law.  He claimed the SPLM had rejected this proposal, citing the 
need for greater consultation. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Dirdeiry said he believes the SPLM changed its position on 
voting percentages not just to delay, but also because it realized 
that a large percentage of directly-elected seats may not be in the 
party's interests.  He claimed this is because the SPLM would lose 
its ability to put SPLM insiders in the parliament and is worried 
that Nuer and Shilluk and other minority politicians who are 
difficult to control will gain more power and visibility under a 
majority direct voting system.  "The SPLM's objective is to maintain 
Dinka hegemony," accused Dirdeiry. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Dirdeiry said the political executive committee has not 
discussed Abyei at all because the issue was referred to the 
Presidency.  However, he said the Presidency also has not made any 
progress on the issue.  Dirdeiry acknowledged that to leave this 
issue unresolved is dangerous due to the possibility of conflict. 
He claimed the NCP would like to resolve Abyei because "the SPLM can 
keep that card in their back pocket and use it for blackmail" by 
creating a crisis whenever they need to. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: As the NCP's lead negotiator on Abyei (and as a 
Misseriya from southern West Kordofan state) Dirdeiry has strong 
feelings on the subject and is not being honest when he says the NCP 
would like to resolve the issue (unless of course the outcome is 
that Abyei goes to the North).  More likely, the NCP would like to 
use Abyei as a bargaining chip to tempt the SPLM into a ruling 
alliance past the 2009 elections to keep the current regime in 
place.  However, Dirdeiry's comments regarding SPLM intransigence on 
elections are partially credible.  The question becomes which party 
fears elections more.  Although the SPLM is more democratic and 
transparent than the NCP in some ways, elections may carry a greater 
risk of creating tribal instability in the South.  Though it also 
has an interest in delaying elections (and certainly has an interest 
in excluding Darfur from elections) the NCP can test the SPLM's 
commitment to unity by pursuing national elections - and may seek to 
undermine the CPA depending on what alliances it makes with northern 
parties following elections.  The international community may have 
to encourage the SPLM toward elections, as the majority of the South 
and many in the SPLM are looking primarily toward the 2011 
referendum on southern self-determination, and have less appetite 
for the 2009 national elections which many believe will be stolen 
anyway by the NCP.  However, the SPLM knows that it cannot avoid 
elections without endangering the CPA, the full implementation of 
which is the greatest security of all for the South. 
 
FERNANDEZ