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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM161, UMMA PARTY LEADER PREDICTS NCP "CRASH LANDING" IF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM161 2008-02-03 13:49 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8203
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0161/01 0341349
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031349Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9864
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000161 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PREL SU
SUBJECT: UMMA PARTY LEADER PREDICTS NCP "CRASH LANDING" IF 
POLICIES DON'T CHANGE 
 
REF: 07 KHARTOUM 1873 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: CDA Fernandez met with Umma Party Chairman 
Al-Sadiq Al-Mahdi January 30 along with Umma party members 
Balghis Badri and Professor El-Sheikh Mahjoub.  Al-Mahdi said 
the NCP's unpopularity and divided leadership is the basis 
for its provocative attitude towards the international 
community and the USG in particular. Al-Mahdi characterized 
the NCP's provocations as "bluff" and predicted they will 
cause the party and even the country to "crash land," sooner 
or later, possibly leading to exploitation by opportunistic 
Islamic extremists inside Sudan and by Sudan's neighbors. 
CDA Fernandez told Al-Mahdi that the current U.S. 
administration has sufficient time to carry out its goals and 
that ending the violence in Darfur is critical to improving 
Sudanese-American relations. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) CDA Fernandez noted that the National Congress Party 
(NCP), lacking the trust of the people and outside world, 
seems bent on a strategy of increased provocation aimed at 
many in the international community.  He asked about 
Al-Mahdi's recent discussions with the NCP and President 
Al-Bashir. Al-Mahdi said they were motivated by concerns for 
Sudan's future because the current actions of the NCP will 
lead to a "political crash landing" if they are not 
corrected.  He predicted this would lead to a power vacuum 
that Sudan's internal enemies (Al-Qa'ida-like radicals) as 
well as her neighbors might exploit. Al-Mahdi said that the 
NCP realizes they have no credibility with the people and 
therefore are scared and looking for a way out.  This has 
prompted the Umma Party's much publicized engagement with the 
NCP Al-Mahdi expected two to three more weeks of discussion 
to see if the NCP is at all interested in Umma's help in 
securing a "soft-landing". 
 
3. (SBU) Al-Mahdi said there are four issues that if not 
properly managed could lead to problems: implementation of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA); implementation of 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); guarantees for basic 
freedoms; and institution of a new electoral law. Al-Mahdi 
said the Umma Party is ready to advocate for these objectives 
but complained that the U.S. had "bilaterally excluded 
Sudanese civil and cultural society from the discussions" 
over the past few years, preferring to deal with only two 
parties (NCP and SPLM). 
 
4. (SBU) CDA said that after UNSCR 1769, the NCP could have 
easily prevented the current predicament and changed the 
relationship with the international community and the USG by 
simply implementing the resolution.  They continue to 
obstruct deployment and provoke the international community 
by a whole range of obstacles, including refusing to permit 
Thai and Nepalese troops to join UNAMID, and by threatening 
to expel the UNAMID Chief of Staff.  Al-Mahdi called these 
provocations a "bluff."  He claimed the NCP has told him they 
have no hope of winning the elections and proposed to him 
that the NCP and the Umma Party should act together to 
postpone the elections. 
 
5. (SBU) Al-Mahdi observed that the NCP is divided and there 
is no one in charge, not even party leaders such Nafi Ali 
Nafie and Ali Osman Taha. Al-Mahdi also claimed the NCP uses 
more than half of all oil revenues to buy off possible army 
challenges to its authority. He said the NCP leadership 
miscalculated when it signed the CPA -- though obviously at 
the time they saw it as the only alternative to a long war. 
However, the CPA has not delivered the political benefits 
they imagined, and now they are bound by the CPA and see no 
way out. 
 
6. (SBU) Al-Mahdi said that the NCP leadership is not truly 
independent and claimed they are still partnered with Islamic 
fundamentalists. He said the fundamentalist ideology prevents 
the NCP from acting wisely for the benefit of the Sudanese 
people.  He claimed Islamic "terrorists" are working with the 
NCP to watch the opposition parties as well as others within 
the NCP.  Asked if he saw other signs of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Sudan, for example in universities or 
elsewhere, Al-Mahdi claimed that in Sudan it's difficult for 
Islamic radicalism to take root.  "It has been tried but only 
as an avenue to reject other possibilities." 
 
7. (SBU) Other Umma Party members present said the NCP is 
full of false bravado, thinking that the Americans have their 
hands full elsewhere (Iraq and Kenya).  Al-Mahdi said that 
Iraq is a false analogy. "You do not have to do that here, it 
wouldn't require much but a failed Sudan would be a 
nightmare."  Al-Mahdi asked CDA if the USG is working with 
 
KHARTOUM 00000161  002 OF 002 
 
 
the SPLM to pressure the NCP.  CDA noted that SPLM is in a 
trap; they know the smart move is to work with other parties 
such as the Umma Party, but they remain with the NCP because 
of the CPA and because of the money that the NCP can provide. 
 Intellectually the SPLM knows better but cannot totally free 
themselves from this dependence on money. 
 
8. (SBU) Al-Mahdi said the USG should not only look at 
Sudanese politics as a North/South problem. "It's only a 
North problem - this is a totalitarian regime."  CDA agreed 
and said the USG needs to see more of the leaders in the 
North.  However, CDA Fernandez said any discussions need to 
take into account the priority of solving Darfur because that 
is what the West (and the U.S.) is most focused on now.  The 
Internally Displaced People (IDPs) are at the heart of the 
matter. The USG needs to be able to say definitely that "the 
genocide is over."  Without that the US will never be 
satisfied, nor should it be. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment: Al-Mahdi sought to portray his recent 
dealings with the NCP in the most possible positive light but 
even many in his own party are disturbed by the widely 
publicized overtures to Umma by President Al-Bashir.  His 
assertion that the NCP is still closely tied to Islamic 
fundamentalists doesn't track with our observations - the NCP 
is cynically interested in money and power not ideology. 
Despite his current marginalized role, Al-Mahdi is the 
biggest fish (other than the SPLM) with whom the NCP may 
attempt to ally itself during elections. However Al-Mahdi 
will play his cards carefully since one of his objectives 
will be to retain his opposition party credentials and he 
does not want to be seen as being closely allied with the 
NCP. He is already paying a political price for this public 
flirtation. 
FERNANDEZ