VZCZCXRO6007
PP RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0461/01 0560530
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250530Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2973
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4395

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 000461 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/RA, AND SCA/A 
DEPT PASS AID/ANE 
DEPT PASS USTR FOR GERBER AND KLEIN 
DEPT PASS OPIC FOR ZAHNISER 
DEPT PASS TDA FOR STEIN AND GREENIP 
USOECD FOR ENERGY ATTACHE 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
TREASURY FOR LMCDONALD, ABAUKOL, BDAHL, AND MNUGENT 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
COMMERCE FOR DEES, CHOPPIN, AND FONOVICH 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID OTRA SNAR PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN - JCMB VII DISCUSSES AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY AND 
COUNTER-NARCOTICS FEBRUARY 5 AND 6, 2008 
 
REF: Kabul 0455 
 
¶1.  SUMMARY:  Convened in Tokyo, Japan, the Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board (JCMB) held its second session at the Political 
Directors' level (JCMB-PD) on February 5, and its seventh regular 
session (JCMB-VII) on February 6, 2008.  The Political Directors 
considered a discussion paper that urged consideration of a more 
comprehensive strategy to stabilize Afghanistan (reported reftel). 
At the regular session, counter-narcotics was the main theme, as the 
participants confirmed an action paper drafted by the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) with assistance from the 
U.S. and U.K. Embassies.  We achieved our main aims when the JCMB as 
a whole recognized the nexus between the insurgency and narcotics 
production, called for immediate decisive action against narcotics, 
endorsed a goal for 2008 of eradicating 50,000 hectares of poppies, 
and reconfirmed the 12 action principles of the Policy Action Group. 
 In addition, JCMB-VII approved an increase in the Afghan National 
Army force structure from 70,000 to 80,000, and acknowledged that -- 
depending on a study now being conducted by the Combined Security 
Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) -- further increases might 
be required.  The discussion of the "Actions and Decisions" portion 
of the agenda revealed considerable donor frustration with the lack 
of Afghan government leadership in the anti-corruption and 
counter-narcotics areas.  The theme for the next meeting (JCMB-VIII 
will be held in Kabul sometime this spring) will be governance, 
especially sub-national governance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  On February 5, on the margins of the G-8 political directors 
meeting, the JCMB met at the Political Directors level in Tokyo, 
Japan to discuss broad security issues.  The U.S. delegation to that 
meeting, and to the JCMB-VII (the Regular Session) held the 
following day, consisted of State/SCA Bureau Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Patrick Moon, who was joined by Amb. Christopher Dell 
 
SIPDIS 
(Deputy Chief of Mission, AmEmbassy Kabul) and Amb. Thomas Schweich 
(PDAS State/INL Bureau).  That meeting is reported reftel. 
 
 
Countering the Flow of Narcotics: JCMB-VII's Theme 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  On February 6, 2008, Bo Asplund, the Acting Senior 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), opened the JCMB seventh 
regular session (JCMB-VII).  Setting the stage for the 
counter-narcotics discussion, Asplund noted that there is a marriage 
of convenience between the Taliban and drug lords, with the 
complicity of corrupt Afghan officials.  Drug lords might use their 
illicit earnings to buy either election to the Parliament or Afghan 
parliamentarians, thus subverting democracy.  Implicitly rebuking 
those such as New York University professor Dr. Barrett Rubin (a 
colleague of tenured NYU professor and current Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy Director Dr. Ishaq Nadiri) who argue that 
"nothing can be done now about poppy growing -- only a long-term 
alternative livelihood plan stretching over decades can reduce poppy 
cultivation," Asplund asserted strongly that "we must start 
treatment now if the patient is to survive" for the longer term. 
 
Afghans Pledge Stronger CN Action 
 
¶4.  In an atmosphere of broad consensus, the GIRoA and its 
international partners approved a plan at the JCMB-VII on expanding 
implementation of the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) and 
endorsing all 12 counter-narcotics (CN) action points previously 
agreed in Kabul by the Policy Action Group (PAG).  The Afghan 
government recognized the great scale of the narcotics problem 
(Afghanistan produced 93 percent of the world's opium poppy in 2007) 
and took account of narcotics' symbiotic connection to the 
 
KABUL 00000461  002 OF 006 
 
 
insurgency and the threat drug money poses to the country's fragile 
democratic institutions. 
 
¶5.  Both Afghans and the international community affirmed that the 
NDCS already offers a sound CN strategy and that strong 
implementation -- not another strategy -- is the key for turning the 
corner on narcotics.  In the newly agreed implementation plan, the 
Afghans committed to: 
 
-- 1) undertake more vigorous eradication by eradicating 50,000 
hectares of poppy in 2008 while also providing force protection to 
eradicators; 
-- 2) restructure the slow-performing Counter Narcotics Trust Fund 
(CNTF); 
-- 3) redesign and, if funding allows, expand alternative livelihood 
programs; 
-- 4) increase interdiction and arrests of narcotics traffickers and 
corrupt officials; 
-- 5) undertake comprehensive CN planning on a provincial basis and 
hold governors accountable for results; 
-- 6) expand regional CN cooperation and place Afghan CN liaison 
officers in some neighboring countries; and 
-- 7) "mainstream" CN as a priority in the planning of all relevant 
ministries. 
 
For the next JCMB, the Afghan government agreed to provide a 
proposal for restructuring the CNTF; Deputy Interior Minister 
General Daoud also said the government would present the next JCMB 
with a record of its actions in arresting and prosecuting high-level 
narco-traffickers. 
 
Cautious Optimism on 2008 Narcotics Developments 
 
¶6.  UNODC director Antonio Maria Costa described a slightly improved 
outlook for poppy cultivation in 2008.  While Costa predicted 
another large opium crop on the scale of last year's, he said it was 
a positive development that poppy cultivation will be mainly 
confined to five contiguous provinces in Afghanistan's south and 
southwest. About a dozen of Afghanistan's 34 provinces will probably 
remain poppy-free in 2008, Costa said.  Costa predicted continued 
success in Badakhshan and a major reduction in cultivation in 
Nangarhar, which was Afghanistan's second largest poppy producing 
province in 2007.  UNAMA and UNODC officials noted that these 
positive developments stood in contradiction to the usually 
pessimistic picture painted by the international press. 
 
Afghans:  Give Us More Alternative Livelihood Funding 
U.S.:  Funding Cannot Be a Pre-Condition for Action 
 
¶7.  GIRoA representatives unanimously called for donation of 
substantial new funds to provide alternative livelihoods (AL) to 
farmers who choose or are forced to abandon poppy cultivation.  "The 
Afghans are ready," ANDS Director Ishaq Nadiri challenged, "but the 
international community must support us."  Nadiri and Minister of 
Finance Ahady argued that meeting the implementation plan's 
commitment to eradication will entail from $250 million to $500 
million a year in new funds.  So far, Ahady declared, AL assistance 
has failed to stem the narcotics tide.  The GIRoA hoped that a 
reformed Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund would provide the mechanism 
for delivering the new aid; however, they did not speculate about 
the possible sources for this new AL assistance.  (Note: USAID 
delivered about $280 million in AL programs in Afghanistan in 2007.) 
 
 
¶8.  On the eve of the JCMB session, the U.S. and U.K. delegations 
negotiated to forestall a last-minute attempt by Afghan National 
Development Strategy officials to insert language into the JCMB's 
 
KABUL 00000461  003 OF 006 
 
 
Counter-narcotics Implementation Plan stating that non-negotiated 
eradication "will cause a popular uprising" in Helmand.   Minister 
of Counter-narcotics Khodaidad and Deputy Minister of Interior for 
Counter-narcotics Daoud opposed this language, and by working with 
those officials, Amb. Schweich obtained GIRoA agreement for less 
inflammatory language stating that eradication in Helmand will be 
undertaken in areas where alternative livelihoods are available in 
order to minimize the risk of popular discontent.  Schweich also 
successfully pressed back on the GIRoA's attempt to make new AL 
funding a precondition for eradication and other CN activities.  In 
response, the Afghans moderated their position, saying that strongly 
increased AL should go hand in hand with more effective eradication. 
 The U.S., the World Bank, and other donors also headed off Afghan 
demands that massive crop subsidies and price supports be deployed 
for AL. 
 
UNODC and U.S. Point to Narcotics' Strategic Threat 
 
¶9.  UNODC Director Costa conditioned his mildly positive assessment 
by describing the strategic threat posed by Afghanistan's narcotics 
industry, particularly in regard to its connection with the 
insurgency.  More than three-quarters of Afghanistan's poppy is 
grown in areas beyond government control.  Costa estimated that the 
Taliban will collect close to $100 million by taxing narcotics in 
2008, in addition to money raised by running heroin labs and drug 
exports.  Costa claimed that, while farmers sold off opium stocks as 
prices fell, the Taliban stockpiled as much as 3 million tons of 
surplus opium in 2007 to finance future anti-government operations. 
Costa lamented the Afghan government's poor record on CN 
implementation to date and said that, "though the situation is not 
yet desperate, time is not on the right side."  He warned that the 
Afghan government should not be allowed to use its opium problem to 
leverage more financial assistance from donors.  Costa also noted 
the recent expansion of cannabis production in many parts of the 
country could lead to a new record of as much as 70,000 hectares of 
cannabis cultivated in 2008. 
¶10.  DCM Dell bolstered Costa's remarks by describing the strong 
consensus that now exists regarding the insurgency-narcotics nexus 
and the need to take decisive action now rather than letting the 
problem grow worse.  He applauded the Afghan government's commitment 
to provide force protection to eradicators in 2008 and welcomed the 
Afghan implementation plan's new emphasis on doing CN planning at 
the provincial level. 
 
Aid Effectiveness and Support to 
Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  Minister of Finance Ahady provided an economic brief, pointing 
out how the GIRoA has improved its financial situation, doubling tax 
revenues over the past three years; he noted, however, that the 
GIRoA is currently behind its FY 1386 (ending 21 March 2008) 
domestic revenue target of $715 million by $30 million, he remained 
optimistic that the government could make up the difference and meet 
the domestic revenue target.  He also asserted that the GIRoA was 
improving its ability to spend its budget allocations (mostly 
foreign funds), and urged donors to channel more aid through the 
Finance Ministry.  Implicitly asking for the help of the 
International Community, he asserted that the GIRoA is committed to 
a market economy, though many Afghans are asking for subsidized food 
and fuel.  Ahady thanked USAID for providing emergency food aid for 
Afghanistan's poor who cannot afford high-priced food. 
 
 
Task Force on Police Review 
--------------------------- 
 
 
KABUL 00000461  004 OF 006 
 
 
¶12.  Ministry of Interior (MoI) Deputy Minister Daoud reported on 
efforts, in cooperation with the Combined Strategic Transition 
Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A), to train the Afghan police.  He 
thanked Germany and the European Union (EU), and singled out the 
U.S. Government for special thanks for our aid.  Incompetent and 
illiterate police officers, including 40 police generals, are being 
fired, and new, educated officers are replacing them.  However, MoI 
lacks sufficient equipment for demining and unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) operations. 
 
 
National Justice Program, Elections, Anti-Corruption 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶13.  Justice Minister Danish reported on efforts to build on the 
August 2007 Rome Rule of Law (ROL) conference to improve justice in 
Afghanistan through improved infrastructure (courthouses) and the 
implementation of new and updated laws.  The challenge of the 
National Justice Program (NJP) is that poor security hinders justice 
delivery, and ROL capacity in the countryside is lacking.  He asked 
for more funding to carry out the ambitious National Justice Program 
goals.  The cabinet has approved the draft election law, which is 
now before the Parliament, and a joint commission will soon create a 
good timeline for elections.  The Parliament approved the United 
National Convention on Anti-Corruption (UNCAC), and the government 
is now preparing a package of bills for the Parliament modifying 
existing Afghan legislation to conform to the UNCAC's requirements. 
On the Senior Appointments Mechanism, Danish said that the Senior 
Appointments Board and its Terms of Reference should be established 
soon, and should identify competent candidates for senior positions. 
 
 
¶14.  Responding to Danish's presentation, Asplund proposed a 
discussion in Kabul of the concept that donor countries should pool 
their NJP and ROL money into a common fund, rather than having each 
country work in different sectors.  The EU pointed out that the 
GIRoA needs to mainstream human rights protection through passage of 
a media law that supports freedom of the media.  The European 
Commission (EC) threatened to introduce conditionality into the Law 
and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) as it feels that police 
and ROL reform efforts had been insufficient.  Donors requested one 
simultaneous election for both president and parliament, which would 
be possible if parliament dissolved itself one year earlier than 
scheduled, and also asked that political parties be encouraged 
rather than hindered.  Many donors cited their readiness to provide 
immediate funding for voter registration and elections, as soon as 
the GIRoA take key actions.  Many also supported a census prior to 
the election to both support drawing of electoral districts and 
assist in delivering Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 
services, and asked for sufficient funding to hold the census in 
August 2008.  The U.S. countered that while we supported a census in 
principle, undertaking one should not become a reason for delaying 
electoral preparations. 
¶15.  Responding to the international community's criticisms, 
Minister for the Disbanding of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) 
Mohammed Masoom Stanekzai stated that any cost-benefit study should 
balance the efficiency of outside foreign experts performing 
government services versus the benefit of Afghans performing them in 
a "learning by doing" approach that would build and improve on 
capacity in the Afghan Government. 
 
 
Endorsement of Proposed JCMB VII Actions/Decisions 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶16.  In general, discussion of the proposed JCMB VII "Actions and 
Decisions" provoked heated discussion, and also revealed 
 
KABUL 00000461  005 OF 006 
 
 
considerable pent-up international community frustration with the 
seeming unwillingness of the GIRoA to tackle the difficult problems 
of corruption and counter-narcotics.  Several international 
community delegates called for greater "political will and strong 
leadership" on corruption and narcotics, a thinly veiled criticism 
of President Karzai. 
 
Pillar one - Security 
 
¶17.  The EC representative, Ambassador Kretschmer recommended 
language which called on the Interior Ministry to report to 
JCMB-VIII on efforts to reduce internal corruption, and to have 
salary paid only to police who are actually working.  He also 
recommended textual changes to approve the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) force structure increase of 10,000 (16,000 including the 6,000 
person training float), calling for an assessment of fiscal 
sustainability of any further force structure increases.  These 
recommendations were adopted by the JCMB. 
 
Pillar Two - Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights 
 
¶18.  The EC representative also proposed several entirely new 
"decisions" and proposed modifying others.  For the item on 
anti-corruption, he called for "meaningful progress" by the GIRoA on 
anti-corruption by JCMB IX (roughly six months from now, in late 
summer/early fall of 2008).  A proposed eighteen month extension in 
the deadline for modifying domestic anti-corruption legislation to 
conform to the U.N. Anti-Corruption Convention, was trimmed to a 
twelve month extension, which the explicit intention of increasing 
pressure on the GIRoA to act promptly on this issue.  Implicitly 
referring to a recent incident where a journalist has been sentenced 
to death for insulting Islam, a new "decision" was adopted calling 
on the GIRoA to approve quickly a media law consistent with freedom 
of expression enshrined in the Afghan constitution and with the 
international conventions to which Afghanistan is a party. 
 
Pillar Three - Economic and Social Development 
 
¶19.  For item 3.1 on energy development, the World Bank proposed an 
additional sentence calling on the GIRoA to accelerate restructuring 
of the national electricity bureau (DABM) as a publicly-owned 
national company with operational independence. 
 
Cross-Cutting Theme One - Counter Narcotics 
 
¶20.  The group rewrote the item on reform of the Counter-Narcotics 
Trust Fund (CNTF) to explicitly state that the international 
stakeholders are full partners in the process of suggesting CNTF 
reform "proposals" to JCMB VIII, and that the GIRoA is not/not 
authorized to implement any measures.  It also adopted an additional 
item calling on the GIRoA to submit to JCMB-VIII an updated report 
on measures that it has taken against those Afghan public officials 
linked to the narcotics industry and narco-trading. 
 
Cross-cutting Theme Two - Aid Coordination 
 
¶21.  During the discussion, the French Ambassador announced, and the 
group welcomed, that the French Government would formally propose to 
the GIRoA that it host an international donor's conference in Paris 
in June 2008 (likely during the last week of June to allow more time 
for preparation.)  By the end of the meetings, the GIRoA and the 
French Government confirmed the meeting, although the precise date 
is yet to be determined. 
 
 
Closing Remarks 
--------------- 
 
KABUL 00000461  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶22.  In his closing remarks and implicitly referring to criticisms 
of last minute preparations of JCMB documents, which left 
delegations little time to study them and refer questions to 
capitals, Asplund said that the JCMB Secretariat needs to be 
strengthened.  This question will be discussed further in Kabul. 
Asplund also suggested that JCMB-VIII focus on governance issues, 
especially those involving sub-national governance. 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶23.  This JCMB proved to be an action-forcing event that caused the 
GIRoA to focus on counter-narcotics (CN) as a key issue, which was 
our key objective at this meeting.  The GIRoA eventually reconfirmed 
the validity of the Policy Action Group's twelve CN action points, a 
question on which the GIRoA had been wavering recently, because the 
PAG 12 points called for proactive poppy eradication and for ANA 
forces under the Ministry of Defense to provide force protection for 
poppy eradication workers.  But through negotiations the GIRoA 
became convinced that it had no choice but to accept these twelve 
points.  While the adoption of a JCMB discussion paper on 
counter-narcotics that is stronger that what we were expecting even 
one month ago is a positive achievement, as several delegations 
noted, the proof will depend on the GIRoA's implementation in the 
poppy fields, and achieving the goal of eradicating 50,000 hectares 
of poppy. 
 
¶24.  Also, as the unexpectedly long debate over the "actions and 
decisions" shows, the delegates were much less diplomatic at this 
JCMB, especially concerning which is perceived as the GIRoA's 
continued lack of sufficient action on corruption and 
counter-narcotics.  Delegates were galled that Afghan government 
officials about whom there is credible evidence linking them to 
narco-trafficking and corrupt bribe-taking still remain in office. 
While the GIRoA ministers attempted to defend the President, their 
answers seemed vague and weak. 
 
¶25.  The next JCMB theme of governance highlights what is seen as a 
key weakness in the GIRoA's counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts. 
While Dr. Popal, the Director of the Independent Directorate of 
Local Government (IDLG) has made a good start at improving the 
delivery of Afghan Government services to the local level, the JCMB 
obviously feels that more needs to be done, and that directing the 
GIRoA's attention to this area will have good effects.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
WOOD