VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #0414/01 0501335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD5F3479 MSI6978-695
P 191335Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2880
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0012
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4393
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3726

UNCLAS KABUL 000414 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
STATE FOR SCA/FO PATRICK MOON, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT, EUR/RPM, 
INL/CIVPOL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG, 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: USOSCE EXPLORES POTENTIAL ROLE FOR OSCE IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: 07 STATE 105316 
 
¶1. (SBU) Post welcomed the visit of Powell Moore and LTC Alan 
Hester of USOSCE on January 28 - 30 for consultations on how 
the OSCE might support U.S. and international objectives in 
Afghanistan.  Moore and Hester paid office calls on the 
Ambassador, Commander of the Combined Security Transition 
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Major General Cone and held a 
series of roundtable discussions with Embassy, USAID and 
CSTC-A personnel.  The delegation also observed elements of 
the 8-week basic police training course at the INL managed 
Central Training Center (CTC), to provide context for 
potential OSCE-managed training centers. 
 
FIVE IDEAS 
---------- 
¶2. (SBU) Over the course of the three-day visit, five areas 
emerged for possible OSCE involvement in Afghanistan which 
will require further elaboration, to include: 
 
-- Regional economic integration:  Ambassador Wood encouraged 
efforts from USOSCE representatives on promoting economic 
integration between Afghanistan and Central Asian OSCE member 
states.  As the only multilateral organization which includes 
Europe, the Russian Federation and Central Asia, OSCE is 
uniquely placed to help build regional free trade and 
commercial ties among Afghanistan and the Central Asian 
states.  This in turn could help open markets between Central 
Asia and South Asia - Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. 
 
-- Customs training:  Afghanistan has not fully exploited 
customs as a potential source of revenue and currently needs 
a national customs training center.  USOSCE,s proposal to 
provide customs and border police mentors and trainers for 
Afghanistan,s northern border crossing points, if properly 
coordinated with nation-wide standards, would be a step in 
the right direction.  But a recent study found that customs 
revenue from the three northern neighbors accounts for less 
than 20% of Afghanistan,s overall revenue since the majority 
of Afghanistan,s trade takes place with Iran and Pakistan. 
Post urges that, if the OSCE decides to engage on customs 
training, it should address national and not just regional 
requirements to build a nationally trained customs officials 
cadre. 
 
-- Afghan Border Police (ABP) training:  Neither the Afghan 
Government nor the international community have yet to 
institute a comprehensive training program for border police. 
 One option for OSCE would be to establish a national border 
police training center to train up to the authorized ABP 
strength of 18,000 (there are currently about 10,500 in the 
ABP ranks, about one third of which are untrained).  This 
would entail significant security and personnel expenses, but 
would address a key unmet requirement.  A more modest 
alternative would be for the OSCE to establish a regional 
training center in the north to serve as a counterpart to the 
future border training facility in Kabul that Germany has 
indicated it may open, and the INL-run Regional training 
Center in Gardez that focuses on basic ABP training.  Post 
believes a northern border police training facility might 
prove advantageous due to a comparatively safer security 
environment and the proximity of OSCE,s ongoing border 
management training project in Tajikistan.  In creating a 
regional center, OSCE should avoid locations that could be 
perceived to support northern warlords or favor one ethnic 
group over another. 
 
-- Integration of border security and customs regimes along 
the northern Afghan border among Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan:  The OSCE should focus on developing in depth 
 
coordinated drug-interdiction among the border and customs 
enforcement authorities and police of Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  Afghan heroin flows through these 
three neighboring countries into Europe triggering reverse 
flows of money to criminals and insurgents in Afghanistan. 
OSCE is uniquely well positioned to break that vicious cycle. 
 By enhancing Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan,s 
ability to interdict heroin and drug profits outside 
Afghanistan, OSCE would greatly assist the international 
community's enterprise inside Afghanistan. 
 
-- Niche training at a proposed National Police Training 
Center:  OSCE might consider sponsoring training at a future 
Afghan National Police Training Center which CSTC-A and INL 
are developing.  The proposed center will grow from an 
initial capacity of 1000 by fall 2008 to a capacity to train 
2000 police personnel by 2010.  While planning is still 
ongoing, it is likely that some portion of the capacity can 
be devoted to border police training programs.  Under this 
scenario, OSCE would be able to offer niche training courses 
such as border police training without the potentially 
prohibitive startup or security costs of creating a new 
training center.  OSCE might also take on the role of 
providing human rights training at the ANPTC, a role 
currently carried out by INL at the Regional Training Centers. 
 
 
CAUTIONARY NOTE:  COME PREPARED TO SUPPORT YOURSELF AND TO 
ADD NEW RESOURCES 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
¶3. (SBU) If it decides to establish a presence in 
Afghanistan, the OSCE must be prepared to provide for all its 
security, lodging and logistical requirements.  Operations in 
Afghanistan require extraordinary expense and OSCE should not 
expect security or logistical support from the United States 
or other international actors without prior agreement. 
Embassy Kabul would also oppose any proposal that would 
reduce or further divide current levels of assistance by OSCE 
participating states.  Many European OSCE members dedicate 
significant national resources to Afghanistan through 
NATO-ISAF, EUPOL, EU, UN and other contributions; any OSCE 
project here should be supported by new resources (e.g., 
ideally from member states, such as Kazakhstan, that are not 
already heavily invested in Afghanistan).  Finally, we would 
urge that OSCE limit itself to technical training that will 
not require that it have a seat in policy fora beyond what is 
required to ensure an OSCE training effort is fully 
coordinated with broader international community efforts; the 
international community currently is struggling to gain 
coherence and effective coordination, and adding another 
international organization's voice to the discussion would 
not promote greater unity of effort.  USOSCE should take note 
that the Embassy is reexamining the BMTF mission which might 
result in greater USG focus on customs and border training. 
The result of this change should be factored into the USOSCE 
draft proposal and Embassy Kabul will keep USOSCE informed of 
any changes. 
WOOD