VZCZCXRO1161
OO RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0409/01 0500932
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 190932Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2876
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 7212
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000409 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NEW DELHI FOR CODEL BIDEN 
STATE FOR SCA FOR A/S BOUCHER AND PMOON 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MSHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON PTER EAID AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF CODEL BIDEN TO AFGHANISTAN 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Last year produced solid gains on the battlefield 
against the insurgency, on the economy, on local governance 
and on reinvigorated army and police train and equip 
programs.  These gains reflect a surge in U.S. assistance in 
FY 2007 (more than in FY 2002-2006 combined) as well as a 
more targeted and coordinated approach.  Regional 
Command-East (RC-East), where U.S. commands ten of the 12 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, has demonstrated that a 
coordinated civilian-military effort, backed up by sufficient 
resources and increasingly close collaboration with local 
Afghan officials, gets results.  In RC-East, military and 
civilian assets (and assistance) are coordinated through the 
PRTs to support and reinforce indigenous security, governance 
and development efforts.  The approach is recognized by the 
United Nation's Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and others as 
the model of how the international effort should work to pull 
together the scattered elements that are working into a more 
coordinated and effective effort. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Greater investment by our partners and better 
international coordination are needed to expand the model 
beyond RC-East to other regions and to address outstanding 
challenges: an increase in terrorist attacks, narcotics 
production and trafficking, lack of capacity in the central 
government, endemic corruption and widespread frustration 
over the Karzai's government's failure to meet expectations. 
This frustration feeds the political and ethnic tensions that 
are developing in the run-up to presidential and 
parliamentary elections during the 2009-2010 window. 
President Karzai's recent criticism of the international 
community reflects, in part, his need to share blame for the 
government's performance and, in part, his need to show he is 
in control of the relationship. 
 
Progress Requires International Coordination and Investment 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The international effort in Afghanistan suffers 
from a lack of coordination, a lack of investment, and 
certain donors' preference for writing new plans rather than 
supporting the development of sustainable Afghan institutions 
and initiatives.  We continually urge our partners to invest 
in military and police training, central and local 
governance, rule of law, elections, and development.  An 
immediate priority is the appointment of a strong new UN 
Special Representative (SRSG) whom the Afghans (including 
Karzai) will accept as a partner.  We will push for the new 
SRSG to be in place before the April NATO summit, as that 
will be a critical opportunity for force generation and a 
more coherent approach by the Allies.  Afghanistan's March 
submission of its development strategy to the World Bank 
(including energy, roads, justice and health sectors in 
detail) will provide raw material for the important 
Paris-based donors conference in late spring or early summer. 
 
 
Security:  Our continuing Number One Priority 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Security remains our highest priority.  Under 
COMISAF General Dan McNeill's leadership, ISAF is bringing 
the fight to the enemy and creating new space for political, 
economic and social development.  Unrelenting ISAF pressure 
on the Taliban through the winter, the infusion of U.S. 
Marines in April, and a greater role for an increasingly 
capable Afghan National Army are being focused on the 
districts where the majority of significant events (i.e., 
attacks, suicide bombers and IEDs) are taking place.  New 
Pakistani engagement against extremists on that side of the 
border augers well for 2008.  Some allies' a la carte 
approach and narrow focus on local responsibilities means the 
U.S. will need to continue to shoulder country-wide 
responsibility for the hardest part of the job. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Recognizing that the Afghan police remains the weak 
link, in late 2007, the U.S. military launched the Focused 
District Development (FDD) program to retrain and re-equip 
entire police units, district-by-district.  Over the coming 
 
KABUL 00000409  002 OF 004 
 
 
year, better trained and better equipped units will return to 
their home districts to assume duties.  Coordination with the 
Afghan government (including the Independent Directorate for 
Local Governance), ISAF, USAID, and the international 
community will facilitate governance and development 
initiatives to complement enhanced policing.  The goal is 
sustainable security improvements introduced in the most 
critical districts in the country. 
 
Governance:  Our Toughest Challenge 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Afghanistan's fragile institutions are under 
constant stress.  President Karzai's cabinet represents a 
cross-section of Afghanistan, but it is not necessarily 
united, loyal or effective, and he relies heavily on a close 
circle of informal loyal advisors.  Mujahadin commanders and 
warlords continue to hold both appointed and elected 
positions and often put tribal and ethnic interests ahead of 
the nation's.  Strong leadership in key ministries 
(Education, Health, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and 
Finance) has produced significant achievements in some 
sectors.  Other ministries continue to suffer from both weak 
leadership and capacity.  USAID's Capacity Development 
Program works with several ministries, and we support the 
World Bank's work with the Civil Service Commission to 
develop a national network of training institutes. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The weak legal system reflects decades of internal 
conflict and neglect.  The system is afflicted by corruption 
at all levels, from the police (under the Ministry of 
Interior), to the prosecutors (under the Attorney General), 
to the judges (under the Supreme Court), to corrections 
(under the Ministry of Justice.  Both defendants and their 
political patrons or supporters are able to exert undue 
influence---either through bribes or violence or the threat 
thereof---at every stage of the process.  U.S. efforts are 
being directed to improve the training and infrastructure for 
all of the above judicial system actors, guided in large part 
by decisions and commitments made at the July 2007 Rome 
Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Karzai's ongoing tug of war with an increasingly 
contentious parliament complicates decision making.  Tajik 
Speaker of the Lower House Qanooni would like to challenge 
Karzai for the presidency but, recognizing the odds against a 
non-Pashtun being elected president, is now focused on 
pushing for constitutional changes that would result in a 
figurehead (Pashtun) president and (Tajik) prime minister. 
We are pushing the Palace and the Parliament to come to 
agreement on a calendar consistent with the constitution for 
the upcoming elections.  We also urge passage of a new 
election law in time to use the Paris donors conference to 
get pledges to support Afghanistan's second round of national 
elections since Bonn.  Half of U.S. support for the elections 
($100 million) is included in the 2008 Supplemental Budget 
Request. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) We encouraged and support Karzai's breakthrough 
initiative to strengthen local governance as a means of 
reaching out to the population.  Motivated in part by his 
need to win votes in the next election, Karzai established 
the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) in 
late 2007, charging it with strengthening provincial and 
local governance to provide services, development, and 
security.  We are seeing results, including better 
appointments, coordination, and accountability at the 
provincial level.  We are encouraging other donors to support 
this initiative, which represents a well-received, home-grown 
Afghan counterinsurgency program. 
 
Development and Economic Growth:  Necessary for Success 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Afghan economy grew by 13 percent in 2007, 
thanks in large part to high agricultural yields as a result 
of good snowfalls.  This winter, there have been record 
snows, which augurs well for a second good agricultural year, 
 
KABUL 00000409  003 OF 004 
 
 
though there have been hundreds of human deaths and thousands 
of farm and burden-carrying animals lost due to the hard 
winter conditions and the high price of grains.  We have 
responded to the government's appeal for food assistance by 
providing 30,000 metric tons of grain through the World Food 
Program.  We in turn support the strong Finance Minister as 
he resists calls to buy commodities at high market prices or 
to introduce anti-market measures to control food prices.  In 
April, the IMF will meet to determine its response if 
Afghanistan has not closed the current gap on revenue 
collection for the current year and meet its structural 
reform targets. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Our development priorities are energy and roads. 
USAID is working on four major power projects (including 
Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province) and a number of smaller-scale 
projects in key districts.  We continue road-building, the 
most popular form of development assistance, which 
facilitates access to markets and helps secure areas.   We 
seek to maximize the use of Afghans in our projects -- to 
create jobs, to cut costs, and to train the work force  Much 
of our assistance is coordinated with the government and 
local populations through the PRTs, which support the 
official provincial planning process. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) A development proposal that will help Afghanistan 
rebuild its economic infrastructure will be considered by 
Congress in late spring/early summer.  We are poised to 
support Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) which, along 
with a strategy to encourage increased trade and economic 
activity along the Afghan-Pakistan border, will prompt Afghan 
policymakers to improve labor standards, cut down on 
cross-border smuggling, and provide employment opportunities 
to Afghans.  The bill will grant duty-free treatment for 
goods produced in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
 
Counter narcotics:  Afghanistan's Special Problem 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) In its report for 2007, the UNODC reported that 
Afghanistan's poppy crop reached record levels, with some 
193,000 hectares under cultivation.  Favorable weather 
compounded the problem by making the crop particularly 
productive, resulting in Afghanistan alone producing 8,200 
tons or 93 percent of the world's opium.  In its Rapid 
Assessment Survey, released in February 2008, the UNODC is 
predicting 2008 will see Afghanistan-wide cultivation levels 
similar to or slightly lower than 2007. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Successes in reducing production in certain 
provinces in the East and North and the links between the 
insurgency and continuing high levels of production in the 
South are reflected in a growing segmentation of Afghan poppy 
production.  We are seeing positive results of efforts by 
committed governors in Nangarhar and other provinces where 
security allows counter narcotics campaigns.  Both the UNODC 
and the U.S. predict continue success in reducing production 
in Nangarhar Province, where cultivation increased by 285 
percent in 2007, but is on target to decrease by 50 percent 
or more in 2008.  Improved security and government control 
nation-wide are needed for counter narcotics efforts to 
succeed in all regions.  The new Local Governance Directorate 
plans to hold governors accountable for poppy production in 
their provinces, but the government must also be prepared to 
support more strident eradication measures, including the 
provision of force protection and possible use of chemical 
spray.  The government has committed to providing army units 
for force protection this year, but nothing tangible has been 
put forward.  President Karzai, on the advice of his cabinet, 
decided against the use of chemical spray for eradication in 
¶2008. 
 
Regional Dynamics:  A Complicating Factor 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Afghanistan's efforts to build a secure and stable 
state are complicated by its relationships with its 
neighbors.  We supported the cross-border peace jirga that 
 
KABUL 00000409  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Afghanistan hosted in Kabul in August 2007, which was a first 
step in a bilateral effort to address the cross-border flow 
of insurgents and eliminate safe havens in Pakistan's 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas.  The jirga began a 
dialogue on a series of bilateral initiatives and helped 
temper heated public rhetoric between Karzai and Musharraf. 
Both presidents have new appreciation of the difficulties the 
other faces at home.  Afghans are concerned about increased 
Iranian meddling and reports of arms being provided to the 
Taliban, but they underline the importance of cultural ties 
to, assistance from, and commerce with Iran. 
WOOD