VZCZCXRO0869
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHBUL #0398/01 0491307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181307Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2867
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000398 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS AND THE FUTURE OF 
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
KABUL 00000398  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development's (MRRD) National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an 
Afghan success story, fostering local development through 
Community Development Councils (CDCs), including in some of 
the most insecure parts of the country.  The Ministry 
proposed transitioning the CDCs from a civil society role to 
become the constitutionally-mandated governing body at the 
local level, but the government decided not to do so.  The 
CDCs will remain informal consultative groups as part of 
civil society, while the Independent Directorate for Local 
Governance (IDLG) led by Jelani Popal implements the 
Constitution's provision for formal district and village 
councils.  CDCs will depend largely on donor support and are 
vulnerable to other, expanding local initiatives under the 
IDLG.  Until elected councils are established some time after 
2010, effective counter-insurgency in Afghanistan requires 
both the community-based development delivered by the NSP, as 
well as engagement of local leaders through representative 
councils.  The efforts of both the IDLG and NSP merit the 
full support of donors to help the Afghan government succeed 
in this critical and coherent local governance agenda. 
 
The NSP Program and Community Development Councils 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development's (MRRD) National Solidarity Program (NSP) is an 
Afghan development success story.  Working through 24 NGO 
facilitating partners, the program has established over 
20,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) in every 
province and most districts.  The first phase of the program 
(NSP I) established the first 17,000 Councils, each of which 
was elected informally from communities of at least 25 
families and received a block grant of up to $200 per family 
for small-scale, community planned and managed development 
projects.  The second phase (NSP II), currently underway, is 
expanding the number of Councils to 24,000, covering 95 
percent of Afghan villages by the end of 2009 (some Councils 
span several villages).  The Rural Development Ministry and 
the World Bank are currently planning the third phase (NSP 
III), which will focus on sustainability by providing second 
round block grants to established Councils able to 
demonstrate that they used their first-round funds 
effectively, thereby helping them sink deeper and more 
permanent institutional roots in their communities.  (Through 
the end of 2007, donors to the Afghanistan Reconstruction 
Trust Fund (ARTF) have earmarked $349 million for the NSP, 
including $50 million from the United States.  USAID plans to 
allocate $10 million to the NSP from its regular 2008 budget 
and an additional $40 million from the 2008 budget 
supplemental.) 
 
¶3. (SBU) Solid data on CDC performance have not been 
collected, according to the World Bank, but substantial 
anecdotal evidence suggests that they perform well, even in 
some highly insecure areas.  The Councils foster community 
ownership, which tends toward higher quality projects that 
are better tailored to local needs, less prone to corruption, 
and less vulnerable to insurgents.  According to NSP 
executive director Wais Barmak, only one of the approximately 
2,350 schools built by NSP has burned down.  CDCs are also 
popular; only six communities approached to form a Council 
have declined. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Councils face several operational challenges. 
Their community scope is a strength as well as a weakness, 
fostering ownership but also limiting the scale of projects. 
The NSP's district level analogue, the National Area-based 
Development Program (NABDP), is working to cluster CDCs into 
District Development Assemblies (DDAs) to help them leverage 
funds toward larger-scale projects, but brokering these 
cross-community collaborations has proven difficult and 
 
KABUL 00000398  002.4 OF 004 
 
 
resource intensive.  As the CDCs extend into new communities, 
the World Bank and NSP continue to develop models for working 
in highly insecure areas.  As of September 2007, due to 
insecurity the NSP had suspended its program in over 700 
communities, including much of Helmand and parts of Kandahar. 
 (They recently established CDCs in Musa Qala district.) 
However, the program has also shown that the Councils can be 
effective in some of the most dangerous areas that are 
inaccessible to NGOs and other programs, often because local 
traditional leaders (including Taliban sympathizers) allow 
the programs to continue. 
 
Better at Development than Representation 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The government formalized the Councils' development 
project facilitation role through a bylaw enacted by 
presidential decree in November 2006.  CDCs have functioned 
as informal consultative groups, but the government has 
considered expanding their role.  The Afghan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) Secretariat has reached out to 
the CDCs to play a limited development planning role, making 
some efforts to include the CDCs' local development 
priorities in the Provincial Development Plans (PDPs).  The 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development has also 
proposed that the CDCs play a political representational role 
analogous to elected provincial councils, which triggered 
reactions from several quarters within the government. 
 
¶6. (SBU) While Afghans appreciate the Councils' development 
role, they do not regard them as representative bodies. 
Research by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
(AREU) in six provinces found that communities tend to have 
little awareness of the Councils except as a means to access 
NSP funds.  When the funds run out the Councils no longer 
meet.  The Councils are not well known or understood outside 
their membership, since only those serving on the Councils 
have received training about their purpose.  There is also 
historic skepticism about community councils, as the last 
government-sanctioned local councils set up under the 
Mohammad Daud Khan regime (1973-78) evolved into propaganda 
tools under the Communists, prompting local Afghans to rely 
even more on their traditional leaders.  Afghans continue to 
rely on community leaders such as maliks, who address 
problems within the communities, help the government collect 
taxes, and connect citizens to government services.  AREU 
found that these traditional leaders rarely serve on the 
Councils, which often span areas that do not correspond with 
natural political units.  These are the leaders that Local 
Governance Director Popal is deliberately working to engage. 
 
CDCs to Remain Civil Society, Not Government 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The funding requirements of NSP III and the creation 
last August of the Independent Directorate for Local 
Governance (IDLG) forced the government to confront the 
question of the future of its NSP program and the CDCs it 
created.  IDLG director Popal inherited from the Ministry of 
Interior policy oversight and administrative authority over 
the provincial councils, and ultimately over the elected 
district, municipal, and village councils required by the 
Constitution.  The IDLG's strategy documents call for a 
legislative framework by 2010, and for elections to take 
place soon thereafter.  (Rumors that the government plans to 
hold municipal, district, and village council elections in 
2009/10, are probably not accurate.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) Popal understands the Councils better than most 
Afghans and is sympathetic to their goals.  He served as a 
Deputy Minister of Finance under Ashraf Ghani, who originally 
invited the World Bank in 2002 to set up the NSP. 
Immediately prior to his appointment as Local Governance 
director, Popal had spent several years running a large NGO 
in Southern Afghanistan that worked with the Rural 
 
KABUL 00000398  003.4 OF 004 
 
 
Development Ministry as one of the facilitating partners for 
the Councils.  His deputy Barna Karimi shared on several 
occasions that while they support the Councils' development 
work, Popal's first-hand experience is that the Councils are 
not representative of local power dynamics.  Karimi stressed 
that the IDLG can learn valuable lessons from the CDCs and 
draw from their membership for district and village councils, 
but that they are not composed of the local political leaders 
that Afghans regard as legitimate and with whom the IDLG 
needs to work to advance the government's counter-insurgency 
goals. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Keen to preserve and institutionalize the CDCs, 
Rural Development Minister Mohammad Zia proposed to the 
Cabinet last fall that the CDCs transition from civil society 
entities to formal parts of the government.  He proposed that 
the government develop the CDC bylaws into legislation 
designating the CDCs -- and their district level 
counterparts, District Development Assemblies -- as the 
formal village and district councils required by the 
Constitution.  Zia held a conference from November 11-15 of 
about 500 CDC members from across Afghanistan ostensibly to 
share best practices, but also as a show of public support. 
Popal attended the conference, but withdrew his support as a 
co-sponsor, and asked President Karzai to refer the issue to 
the Cabinet Legislative Committee for a decision in late 
November.  With the sole exception of Zia, the rest of the 
committee -- including its chair, Second Vice President 
Khalili, and its other members Independent Election Chairman 
Ludin, Finance Minister Ahady, and Justice Minister Danish -- 
decided against designating the Councils as government 
entities, but rather to remain as informal consultative 
bodies (i.e. part of civil society, not government). 
Concerns with the integrity of the informal elections that 
established the Councils, the financial sustainability of 
future block grants, and a strict interpretation of the 
Constitution reportedly figured into these ministers' 
positions.  (Popal's ability to prevail in this important 
internal policy debate also speaks to his clout within the 
Karzai administration.) 
 
Future of NSP Open to Debate, Exposed to Opponents 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The CDCs will continue in their current role as 
informal consultative bodies that work with the government on 
rural development (like NGOs) under the authority of the 
Ministry of Rural Development.  Popal's IDLG plans to 
implement the Constitution's local governance provisions in a 
staged approach, first by establishing appointed district 
councils to engage local leaders in the government's 
counter-insurgency efforts, and later to replace the 
appointed councils with elected district, village, and 
municipal councils as required by the Constitution. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The decision exposes the NSP to those in the 
government who oppose further funding for the Councils and 
makes them dependent upon continued donor support.  Finance 
Minister Ahady remains the staunchest opponent to further 
funding for the CDCs.  As Finance Minister, his instinct is 
to tame the large, donor-driven program in the interest of 
fiscal sustainability, other spending priorities, and a 
unified Afghan National Development (ANDS) planning process. 
Politically, the massive program, which funnels development 
funds to projects chosen by 20,000 communities across the 
country, offers little to Ahady and his Afghan Millat party's 
power base among urban Pashtuns.  (Popal is Ahady's deputy in 
the party, but the two are reportedly rivals for party 
leadership.) 
 
¶12. (SBU) President Karzai and much of his Cabinet 
reportedly support the NSP, as does most of the international 
community.  A World Bank representative suggested that donors 
could help fend off Ahady's opposition by making clear that 
NSP funding is not fungible; the unique program's success 
 
KABUL 00000398  004.4 OF 004 
 
 
merits funds that would otherwise not be available for other 
purposes.  Failing that, the World Bank representative 
suggested that Ahady could be given a larger political stake 
in the program by setting up urban CDCs, but cautioned that 
urban Councils could draw funds away from NSP III and 
replicate the role of municipalities, which have clear 
revenue raising authority and service delivery roles. 
(Municipal revenue is raised and spent locally, making it the 
only government revenue that does not flow through the 
Finance Ministry, providing Ahady with another reason to 
assert control.)  Local Governance deputy Karimi is working 
with USAID to develop a program to strengthen municipal 
operations and oversight, and to expand services to urban 
Afghans.  Apart from NSP funds, USAID's Local Governance and 
Community Development program continues to consult CDCs and 
support their development priorities. 
 
NSP and IDLG Set The Local Governance Agenda 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) The dynamics between the Rural Rehabilitation and 
Development Ministry's efforts to use the Community 
Development Councils to continue delivering local development 
while sinking more permanent institutional roots, and Popal's 
efforts to fully implement the Constitution's local 
governance provisions, will shape the local governance debate 
in the Afghan government for the near future.  Until 
Constitutionally mandated district and village councils 
supplant the CDCs (not likely until well past 2010), an 
effective Afghan counter-insurgency requires both the 
community-based development best delivered by the NSP as well 
as stronger bonds between the central government and local 
leaders through the appointed representative bodies being set 
up by Popal.  Success depends upon a strategic commitment by 
the donors.  NSP III should be funded.  The IDLG also merits 
financial and political support for its appointed councils, 
as well as its efforts to increase service delivery through 
municipalities and other strategic opportunities like its 
role coordinating the government's follow-up to the military 
success in Musa Qala.  These efforts collectively constitute 
a coherent local governance agenda and a critical component 
of the Afghan government's counter-insurgency strategy. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The National Solidarity Program poses an 
interesting dilemma for the government.  It is a successful 
governmental program that is run largely by non-governmental 
entities.  It enfranchises local leaders but does not connect 
directly to local government.  It is a national development 
program, but separate from the national development strategy. 
 And it works.  We expect that it will continue to work, and 
that the government will continue to wrestle with the 
ambiguities of its structure. 
 
WOOD