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Viewing cable 08KABUL325, Logar Province: Chromite Smuggling Undermines Afghan

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL325 2008-02-09 10:19 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO3947
RR RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0325 0401019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091019Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2740
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS KABUL 000325 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KCOR ECON EINV EMIN PK AF
SUBJECT: Logar Province: Chromite Smuggling Undermines Afghan 
Government 
 
REF: KABUL 0108 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Logar Province's Governor, Provincial Council 
(PC), and Members of Parliament (MPs) decried the widespread 
smuggling of chromite (a mineral used in the manufacture of steel 
and chemicals) by Pakistani smuggling mafias.  The officials have 
repeatedly raised the issue with Minister of Mines Adel and have 
also unsuccessfully asked the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to secure 
the mines.  Logar officials recognize that a potential valuable 
source of revenue for the GIRoA is lost.  They are concerned that 
smuggling mafias contribute to the vulnerable security situation in 
Logar and are a corrupting influence on local officials.  Governor 
Wardak, the Provincial Council (PC), and Logar MPs have agreed to 
work together to keep the pressure on the central government and are 
pushing for mine security and a transparent bidding process for mine 
exploitation. 
 
LARGE-SCALE CHROMITE SMUGGLING TO PAKISTAN 
------------------------------------------ 
2. (SBU) The Logar PC first raised the issue of wholesale chromite 
smuggling from 14 sites in five Logar districts in December 2007. 
(The five districts are Pul-i Alam, Mohammad Agha, Kharwar, Azra, 
and Baraki Barak.  Of these, Kharwar has the worst security 
situation in Logar with significant anti-Coalition militia (ACM) 
presence.  The other districts all suffer from varying levels of 
criminal activity and sporadic ACM presence.)  PC members alleged 
that Pakistani smuggling mafias organized the operations.  According 
to PC members, except during the winter when the roads are 
impassable, Pakistani smugglers pay off local authorities, 
especially the Afghan police, so they can smuggle large quantities 
of chromite.  The PC members, who regularly visit the five 
districts, estimate that the smugglers fill approximately 400 large 
trucks per month during an eight-month period of good weather.  Each 
truck can hold 20-25 tons of chromite.  These are surface deposits, 
and the smugglers use local labor to extract the mineral. 
 
3. (SBU) The PC members stated their sources told them chromite is 
sold in Pakistan for about USD 100 per ton.  The smuggling routes 
are the Azra to Pul-i Alam road, then the Pul-i Alam to Jaji 
district (Paktia province) road, and across the Paktia-Pakistan 
border.  A second route is the Pul-i Alam to Gardez (Paktia) road 
through the Tera Pass, then from Gardez to Khost through the 
Khost-Gardez Pass, and across the Khost-Pakistan border.  The 
smugglers reportedly pay off local police and border guards and 
avoid public scrutiny by moving the loads at night.  One Logar MP 
said that the smugglers had made an attempt on the life of Azra 
district's police chief in July 2007 because the police chief was 
trying to stop the smugglers.  The smugglers put an IED along the 
Azra road targeting the police chief, but missed him and instead 
killed three of his bodyguards.  According to Logar officials, the 
locals understood the smugglers' message and now abet the smugglers 
by providing local labor and/or looking the other way. 
 
4. (SBU) PRTOff made inquiries with Pul-i Alam district officials 
and with technical staff at the Ministry of Mines (MOM) to determine 
whether a survey of Logar chromite mines had been undertaken.  None 
of the officials knew of any past surveys.  PRTOff raised the issue 
with Logar Governor Wardak, who stated he is pressing the MOM to 
open an office in Pul-i Alam and name a provincial line director to 
do a technical study of chromite deposits.  PRTOff briefed the Czech 
Republic's advance team preparing to install a PRT in Logar in 
March.  The civilian head of the team committed to follow up on the 
issue and said that the Czech PRT team would include a geologist. 
 
5. (SBU) Although there is not enough information to determine the 
potential value of Logar's apparently large and easily extractable 
chromite deposits, it is clear from the smugglers' level of activity 
that it is highly profitable.  Unfortunately, until the central 
government focuses on this issue, it will continue to lose revenue 
it can ill afford to ignore.  We will raise this question with 
Minister Adel at the next opportunity, and ask how addressing these 
issues might fit into his plans for MOM activities in 2008 (ref). 
 
WOOD