VZCZCXRO0833
OO RUEHDT
DE RUEHDT #0066/01 0600915
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 290915Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3888
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0958
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0050
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1144
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1031
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3315

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000066 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TT
SUBJECT: SECURITY MISSTEPS DAMAGE DILI'S RECENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Subject:  Former Western guerilla commander discusses Timor's 
challenges 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary.  We traveled to Gleno February 28 to assess 
how events in the capital are playing in a district west of 
Dili.  Gleno was calm, markets were bustling, and its citizens 
share the same surrounding the February 11 attacks on the 
President and Prime Minister.  Possible F-FDTL operations in the 
district to assist in the capture of the 2/11 perpetrators were 
treated with caution .  An ex-FALINTIL senior commander with 
great regional stature told us the events of 2/11 were the fault 
of Timor-Leste's elites because of their preoccupation with 
infighting and lack of emphasis on real problem solving.  He 
emphasized that as long as genuine solutions are not applied to 
the core problems, turbulence will continue.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Senior defense official and political assistant 
traveled to Gleno - the administrative seat of historically 
restive Ermera District - February 28 and met with ex-FALINTIL 
Region 4 Commander Ernesto "Dudu" Fernandes, Father Enrique 
Barreto, and PNTL Ermera District Commander Sub-Inspector Mateus 
Mendes.  Each spoke of similar themes and concerns in response 
to questions about 2/11, the ongoing military petitioners saga, 
and the specter of possible F-FDTL operations in the district. 
As for Gleno itself - a town that has seen more than its share 
of martial arts groups violence, politically-fueled blood 
rivalries, and heavy fighting during the Indonesian Occupation 
-- it appeared as calm as it ever has over the course of the 
past two years.  Children were seen playing in the streets, the 
central market was bustling, and outlying areas were awash with 
normal activity. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Both Father Barreto and Sub-Inspector Mendes said 
that the district's population is wholly confused over what 
happened on 2/11, and added that their was no signal that 
something was about to occur in the days prior to the events. 
Mendes went on to say that the local community was completely at 
ease with the presence of the Reinado group, that they were 
always well-behaved, and that the local population reciprocated 
by showing them plenty of support. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  "Dudu" - Fernandes' resistance-era nom de guerre 
meaning either "to push" or "to resist" in the local vernacular 
- went into much greater detail in discussing the current 
situation, as well as its root causes.  First, he stated that he 
is as confused as everyone else about the events of 2/11.  He, 
along with Reinado, Church officials, local political leaders, 
and others had been in talks as late as February 8 to construct 
a traditional sanctuary on the grounds of the Church complex in 
Gleno for the purpose of holding a reconciliation conference 
that would involve all national political and Church leaders. 
The proposed three-day conference, planned for February 16-18, 
would have sought some form of acceptable solution regarding the 
Reinado and military petitioner issues, and to have the Church 
bless the decisions.  Dudu believes that at some point over the 
weekend, "someone definitely got to Reinado for some unknown 
reason", and 2/11 followed.  Dudu then went on to add that if 
the result of ongoing joint Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL) 
and National Police (PNTL) operations results in the death of 
the leader of the remnants of Reinado's group, Gastao Salsinha, 
the truth behind what really happened would never be revealed. 
He and the local Church have received clear indications that 
Salsinha wants to surrender, and Dudu added that they would all 
stand with Salsinha on the day he decides to turn himself in. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Dudu underscored that his and the local population's 
support of both the Reinado group and the military petitioners, 
of which Salsinha was the original spokesman, arise from 
grievances that date back to the origins of F-FDTL in 2000-2001 
following the departure of the Indonesian occupiers.  During 
that timeframe, what remained of the FALINTIL guerilla force 
that was scattered about four distinct military regions (Dudu 
was the Region 4 Commander), was brought together in cantonment 
near Aileu, just to the east of Ermera District and 45 
kilometers south of Dili.  According to Dudu, rivalries began 
almost immediately between him and then Region 1 Commander, Lere 
Anan Timur (the current F-FDTL Chief of Staff) and then Region 2 
Commander, Falur Rate Laek (the current F-FDTL Training Base 
Commander), both considered to be prominent symbols of the 
eastern (Lorosa'e) population.  He added that both Lere and 
Falur were critical of the fighters from the western (Loro'monu) 
population as they were perceived not have resisted the 
Indonesians as the easterners did.  This rivalry carried on into 
the formation of F-FDTL, which Dudu decided not to join in order 
 
DILI 00000066  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to live a normal life after so many years in the bush. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Fast forward to 2006, when President Xanana Gusmao's 
now famous (or infamous) March 23 speech managed to drive an 
even deeper wedge between the Lorosa'e and Loro'monu 
populations.  F-FDTL was on the verge of collapse following the 
desertion of almost 40% of its ranks, nearly all of whom were 
from Loro'monu districts.  Dudu asserts the power struggle 
between Gusmao and then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri caused the 
breakdown in the F-FDTL and both are guilty of using the 
Lorosa'e - Loro'monu issue for personal advantage.  Their 
struggle gave rise to the military petitioners and later to 
Reinado.  On the eve of 2/11, virtually none of the grievances 
which arose from the Aileu cantonment, and later enflamed the 
2006 crisis, had been resolved. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Moving to the present, with Reinado dead, Salsinha on 
the run and possibly on the verge of surrender, and the military 
petitioners engaging in dialogue with the government, Dudu 
affirms that there is now a golden opportunity to arrive at a 
solution.  He states, however, that solution depends on F-FDTL 
Commander Taur Matan Ruak (TMR) doing an about face from his 
oft-stated, and seemingly intractable position opposing the 
return of the petitioners to the military.  If TMR would 
compromise, and gain the support of Lere and Falur, Dudu 
believes Timor would begin to heal the Lorosa'e and Loro'monu 
conflict that began in the troubled birth of F-FDTL.  Without 
complete buy-in from the F-FDTL leadership, said Dudu, any offer 
made by the Government to the petitioners will fail and the 
Lorosa'e - Loro'monu conflict will continue. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Lastly, Dudu expressed concern regarding possible 
F-FDTL operations in pursuit of the 2/11 attackers in Ermera 
District.  As long as the soldiers conducted themselves well and 
did nothing to upset the local inhabitants, then such operations 
could occur without incident.  He expressed some confidence in 
the abilities of the commander of the ongoing field operations, 
Major Ular Rihik, and it should be noted that Ular was Dudu's 
deputy during the Indonesian occupation and knows Ermera and its 
people well (Ular is from the Lorosa'e district of Viqueque). 
However, Father Barreto said in strong terms that if F-FDTL 
soldiers found themselves in a fight with Salsinha and his men, 
the people of Ermera would unequivocally stand by the latter as 
they were their sons and symbols of a struggle which involved 
all of them. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Comment:  F-FDTL can be described as being more a 
council of tribal chiefs rather than a defense force with normal 
traits such as adherence to a chain of command.  During the 
resistance, the senior leaders of the modern-day F-FDTL were in 
many ways equal to one another, and occasionally in opposition 
to each other's interests.  This bred intense rivalries, and it 
has been said that the reason TMR was "allowed" to become the 
F-FDTL Commander is because there was a consensus among the 
other ex-FALINTIL leaders that he alone had the ability to 
conduct himself in a sufficiently civil way, commensurate with 
what is expected of a defense force chief.  Additionally, it 
should be noted that in FALINTIL, assassinations of key leaders 
did happen, and severe extrajudicial punishments to include 
killings were sometimes deemed an important component to the 
force's discipline and survival during the long, 24 year 
struggle against the Indonesian occupation.  End comment.KLEMM