VZCZCXRO1800
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0154/01 0381320
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071320Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9992
INFO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0912
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 DAKAR 000154 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT PASS TO KCC 
PARIS FOR DHS/ICE 
ECOWAS POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CVIS KFRD CPAS CMGT ASEC KSTC KCOR SG
SUBJECT: DAKAR FRAUD SUMMARY - FIRST QUARTER FY2008 
 
REF: A. 08 STATE 171211 
     ¶B. 07 STATE 2417 
 
¶1.  Following is Embassy Dakar's quarterly fraud reporting cable for 
the first quarter of FY 2008. Responses are keyed to Ref A. 
 
¶2.  A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Senegal is a secular republic with a 
strong presidency, weak legislature, a compliant judiciary, and 
multiple weak political parties.  The country is predominantly rural 
with limited natural resources.  Between 60 and 70 percent of the 
Senegalese workforce relies on agriculture, either directly or 
indirectly, to earn a living.  In 2007, Senegal recorded an 
estimated five percent growth rate, but its economy is highly 
vulnerable to variations in rainfall and fluctuations in world 
commodity prices.  As a result, increasing numbers of young 
Senegalese are moving to the cities to seek employment.  With a 45 
percent unemployment rate (and a very high underemployment rate), 
many Senegalese seek work opportunities in the U.S. and Europe.  In 
2007, over 30,000 Africans - including many Senegalese - attempted 
to migrate to Europe via clandestine fishing boats bound for Spain's 
Canary Islands. 
 
In 2007, formal sector remittances from Senegalese living and 
working overseas were estimated at almost USD 1 billion, and the 
flow of money to Senegal through informal channels is estimated to 
equal or surpass that amount.  A single Senegalese worker in Europe 
or the U.S. can provide significant disposable income for an 
extended family, or even a small village.  Consequently, many young 
adults are encouraged to emigrate illegally by heads of household or 
community leaders. 
 
There is growing concern that high volumes of illegal narcotics are 
transiting through West Africa, perhaps including Senegal.  This 
dynamic also raises concerns about increasing levels and 
sophistication of corruption, money laundering, and other financial 
crimes which could exacerbate consular-related fraud in the region. 
 
Dakar is a high fraud post.  Senegal serves as a regional airline 
hub for West Africa, has daily direct flights to New York, 
Washington, and Atlanta, and is used by many West Africans to 
transit to the U.S.  Airport and airline officials frequently 
intercept travelers with legitimate documents, but whose identities 
they question. 
 
It is easy in Senegal to obtain fraudulent civil documents, such as 
false birth and marriage certificates. Senegalese are also able to 
easily obtain genuine documents, including Senegalese passports, 
using false identities.  Imposters with authentic travel documents 
are a recurring problem. 
 
In general, Senegalese place a high value on extended kinship 
networks.  It is common for families to take in their nieces and 
nephews and to treat these children as their own.  Affluent family 
members are expected to share their wealth, influence, and 
opportunities with all those who ask.  Many Senegalese, including 
wealthy ones, view travel to the U.S. as an opportunity to earn 
money to send home and/or obtain free medical care. The obligation 
to family and friends trumps all other obligations in the Senegalese 
value system. Many Senegalese see nothing wrong with submitting a 
fraudulent visa application or with assisting a family member or 
friend with a fraudulent application. 
 
¶B.  NONIMMIGRANT (NIV) FRAUD: The most common type of NIV fraud 
involves applicants submitting fraudulent documents as part of their 
B1/B2 visa applications.  These documents include false bank 
statements, invitation letters, employment letters, hotel 
reservations, and passport stamps.  The quality of the fraudulent 
documents is generally poor and, therefore, relatively easy to 
detect.  Consular officers routinely refuse these cases under INA 
section 214(b) rather than refer them to the Fraud Prevention Unit 
(FPU). 
 
NIV applicants often obtain genuine, but backdated Senegalese 
immigration entry and exit stamps in order to cover up previous 
overstays in the U.S. or to create fraudulent travel histories.  As 
a result, adjudicating officers must carefully scrutinize applicants 
with previously issued NIVs.  We have recently seen fake Chinese and 
Indian visas as well; however, they were of very poor quality and 
easy to detect.  Applicants often present passports with fake entry 
and exit stamps from Dubai, Morocco, Senegal, and - increasingly - 
China. 
 
Post has encountered several genuine Senegalese passports issued 
with false biodata.  Interviewing officers refused all these cases 
under INA section 214(b), and discovered the identity fraud upon 
reviewing the subsequent IDENT check.   A significant number of 
 
DAKAR 00000154  002 OF 005 
 
 
these cases involve applicants who were first refused an NIV using a 
Gambian identity.  Ref B describes this trend in detail. 
 
Post also sees a number of unqualified applicants added to 
legitimate delegations or performance groups.   During a January 
2007 American passport application, we discovered that an 
applicant's Senegalese mother went to the U.S. on a B1 visa as a 
personal assistant to a high-level Senegalese government official in 
2004 and stayed in the U.S. where she later gave birth.  In 
addition, a government-sanctioned delegation in 2007 included a 
woman who had previously been refused under INA section 214(b) in 
Mauritania, using a Mauritanian identity, before she was refused in 
Dakar using a Senegalese identity. 
 
Senegal has seen few indications of terrorist and criminal 
activities. 
 
In FY 2007, post received reports of 14 lost passports containing 
valid U.S. visas. 
 
¶C.  IMMIGRANT VISA (IV) FRAUD: Post processes IVs and Fianc Visas 
(K1 Visas) for the following countries: The Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.  Post 
processes Asylee/Refugee Following- to-Join family members (V92/93) 
for residents of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau.  Adjudicating officers 
refer approximately 40 percent of these applications to the FPU.  Of 
the cases referred to the FPU, approximately 50 percent involve 
fraud. 
 
Relationship fraud is rampant in IV and K1 applications.  In all 
seven countries listed above, applicants can easily obtain genuine 
civil documents with false information.  As a result, DNA testing is 
often the only means to confirm a biological relationship.  In 
addition, the FPU conducts extensive interviews, CCD and LexisNexis 
checks, document verifications, and field investigations.  The FPU 
often relies on other posts to conduct field investigations. 
 
Post recently conducted an evaluation of 91 FY2006 K1s from Sierra 
Leone.  Of these cases, 53 were referred to FPU.  In 29 cases 
sufficient fraud was found to justify the return of the petition to 
NVC. The most important fraud indicators in these cases include: a 
chance meeting during the petitioner's return trip to Sierra Leone, 
only one meeting in person since 2000, an age difference of more 
than 10 years, and a divorce immediately preceding the petition.  Of 
cases fitting one or more of these conditions, 58 percent were 
referred to the FPU, and 32 percent have been returned or will be 
returned to NVC. 
 
Post rarely sees fraud by applicants for employment-based IVs. 
 
Many IV and K1 applicants attempt to hide previous overstays in the 
U.S. by obtaining genuine, but backdated entry and exit stamps from 
Senegalese immigration officials.  It is very easy to obtain genuine 
backdated entry and exit stamps, with some Senegalese immigration 
officials providing them free of charge as a favor to friends and 
family.  As a result, adjudicating officers cannot rely on 
Senegalese entry and exit stamps as evidence of travel to and from 
the U.S. 
 
In the first quarter of FY2008 Post returned 40 petitions to USCIS 
for review with the recommendation that they be revoked; in FY2007, 
132 petitions were returned.  In FY2007, Post refused 29 IV 
applicants under INA section 212 (a)(6)(C)(1), including 15 because 
of identity fraud.  In all 15 cases, the Consular Consolidated 
Database (CCD) revealed that the applicants had previously applied 
for immigrant and non-immigrant visas under different names and 
dates of birth. 
 
¶D.  DV FRAUD: DV applicants frequently present forged high school 
degrees or falsified work records to qualify for DV status.  Other 
DV applicants claim to be newly married after being notified that 
they were selected to continue the DV process.  Because the issuance 
of Baccalaureates (the Senegalese high school equivalent) is 
strictly controlled, the majority of forged and counterfeit 
documents are easily detected. 
 
Post has been unable to verify the authenticity of Gambian documents 
because the Gambian government charges a fee to verify documents. 
As a result, it has been difficult to verify educational credentials 
submitted by Gambian DV winners.  DV applications from Guinea also 
pose special problems; all requests for baccalaureate verifications 
that have been sent to Guinea have been positively verified.  As a 
result, Post takes greater care to interview these applicants 
thoroughly to confirm that their level of knowledge is consistent 
with their claimed education. 
 
 
DAKAR 00000154  003 OF 005 
 
 
In FY2007, post issued 80 DV1s and their families, and refused 58 
cases.  40 of these were refused under INA Section 212(a)(5)(A) 
during the initial interview, and 17 were referred to the FPU for 
further investigation.   Five of the 17 cases were resolved before 
the end of the year, including two that were found ineligible under 
INA 212 (a)(5)(A) and three under INA 212 (a)(6)(C)(1). 
 
¶E.  ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD:  The most common form of passport fraud 
encountered is attempts to document imposter Senegalese children as 
American citizens.  In FY2007, only one application for a Consular 
Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) was refused due to a false claim of a 
biological relationship by an American citizen.  However, DNA 
testing was recommended and not performed in 13 cases (15 percent of 
FY2007 CRBA applications). 
 
In 2007 a young woman holding a fraudulently obtained U.S. passport 
was refused boarding in Dakar by Delta Airlines security officials 
and referred to the Embassy.  The young woman claimed she had lived 
in the U.S. until age 12, when she was sent to live with relatives 
in The Gambia.   The FPU interviewed the young woman and determined 
that she had never lived in the U.S. and the passport was 
fraudulently obtained.  Working together with the RSO's office, we 
determined that she and her alleged mother in the U.S. had both 
obtained legitimate U.S. passports through fraudulent claims. 
Diplomatic Security has continued to pursue the alleged mother's 
case in the U.S., and the young woman's passport was canceled in 
Dakar. 
 
¶F.  ADOPTION FRAUD: While post processes IVs for adopted orphans 
from seven West Africa countries, most of our adoption cases 
originate in Sierra Leone.  Adoption fraud is rampant in Sierra 
Leone.  The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children's 
Affairs determines whether a child is adoptable and provides a 
written recommendation to the High Court of Sierra Leone.  The 
Ministry appears to have no guidelines for making these 
determinations and has done little to force orphanages to adopt 
transparent procedures for selecting children who should be eligible 
to be adopted abroad.  Although Sierra Leonian law requires the 
Ministry to investigate the whereabouts of biological parents 
alleged to have disappeared, the Ministry appears not to do so. 
 
Sierra Leone birth and identity documents are extremely unreliable. 
As a result, Freetown's local fraud investigator has to interview 
individuals in villages to confirm factual information. 
 
Since April 2005, the Mission has requested that the U.S.  Embassy 
in Freetown conduct field investigations when an orphan adoption 
case has one or more fraud indicators.   In the majority of these 
cases, the investigation has revealed that the children were not 
orphans.   In several cases, birth parents were not aware their 
children were being adopted, or they believed their children were 
going to the U.S. for education and would return at age 18. 
 
¶G.  USE OF DNA TESTING:  Post uses DNA testing most frequently in 
IR2, family preference IVs, V92s, and CRBA cases.  Legitimate 
documents based on fraudulent information are easily obtained, and 
therefore we cannot rely heavily on local birth certificates.  Panel 
physicians in Dakar collect DNA samples locally, and the results are 
sent directly to us. 
 
¶H.  ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Most of post's V92/93 cases 
involve applicants from Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Liberia.  Relationship fraud is rampant, and DNA is often requested 
to confirm the relationship. 
 
Embassy Dakar sees a steady stream of applicants who claim to have 
lost their I-551s (Green Cards).  In many of these cases, the FPU 
has established that the applicants had abandoned their legal 
permanent residence status by remaining outside of the U.S. for more 
then one year. 
 
¶I.  ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: 
 Post has seen little hard evidence of alien smuggling or 
trafficking among visa applicants.  While there are terrorist groups 
and organized crime in the region, this does not appear to effect 
our consular operations. 
 
¶J.  HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS,AND CIVIL REGISTRY: 
At the end of December, 2007, the Senegalese authorities began 
issuing regular passports containing an electronic chip. The 
consular section has not yet received an official exemplar, but has 
seen the passports.  Senegal issues four types of passports: 
regular, diplomatic and official (passeport de service), and a 
special passport that is used exclusively for the Hajj (passeport 
pour le pelerinage).  There are at least two iterations of each 
passport that are currently valid and in circulation. Regular, 
 
DAKAR 00000154  004 OF 005 
 
 
diplomatic, and official passports all contain 32 pages and an image 
of the Senegalese seal that is only visible under ultraviolet light. 
 All passports have separate book numbers and passport numbers.  A 
basic description of each passport follows: 
 
Regular passports: From 2002 to 2007, Senegal issued biometric 
passports. These passports have a dark green cover and light green 
pages with depictions of African animals and a baobab tree 
watermark, and are usually valid for four years.  The biodata page 
is on page 2.  The cover has a gold seal of Senegal that includes a 
lion and a baobab tree.  The passport should contain a stamp on page 
3 showing that the fee had been paid, and this should be stamped and 
signed by a police official.  The new electronic passports are 
maroon and feature the same seal on the front.  The biodata page is 
on the inside of the front cover and is covered with a hologram that 
says "Republique du Senegal" on the top and includes a series of 
baobab trees, a turtle, and the Senegalese seal. The interior pages 
are blue at the top and bottom and fade to a pink color in the 
middle, include a number of small baobab trees and a watermark on 
each page that is consistent with the front cover.  Post will send 
an exemplar to CA/FPP as soon as one is available. 
 
Diplomatic passports: Since approximately 1997, Senegal has issued 
dark blue diplomatic passports that have a round seal on the front 
with a baobab tree. The pages are cream colored with red and brown 
threads that form a sunburst pattern around a lion watermark.  These 
passports are hand-written and valid for one year, with the 
possibility of multiple annual renewals.  The bearer's photo is 
glued on page 5 and covered with a thin laminate that is then dry 
sealed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Around 2002, the 
government also started issuing biometric diplomatic passports that 
are blue.  However, both iterations may still be valid, as many 
individuals repeatedly renew their non-biometric book many times. 
Diplomatic passports are often issued to non-diplomats, such as 
prominent business owners and their families and religious leaders. 
Post carefully interviews B1/B2 applicants holding diplomatic 
passports to determine visa eligibility. 
 
Official passports: Since approximately 1997, Senegal has issued 
brown official passports that have a round seal on the front with a 
baobab tree. The pages are cream colored with brown threads that 
form a sunburst pattern around a lion watermark.  These passports 
are hand-written and valid for one year, with the possibility of 
multiple annual renewals.  The bearer's photo is glued on page 5 and 
covered with a thin laminate that is then dry sealed by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.  Around 2002, the government also started 
issuing biometric official passports that have a reddish brown 
cover.  However, both iterations may still be valid, as some have 
renewed these one-year passports many times. 
 
Hajj passports: These one-year, reddish passports are rarely forged 
by Senegalese and are used exclusively for travel to Mecca. As such, 
they are very short (fewer than 10 pages).  The passport includes a 
photo that is glued on and covered with laminate. 
 
Genuine documents with false information, including marriage, death, 
and birth certificates, and passports are all easily obtained.  Fake 
documents are easily obtained as well, but are usually of poor 
quality and can be identified due to inconsistent paper quality, 
inconsistencies apparent in the document's information, and the 
"official" stamp. Post has seen several cases of applicants with 
valid passports that are either based on false biodata (i.e. based 
on a fake birth certificate) or inconsistent biodata (i.e. benign 
variations in name and/or date of birth).  In 2006, Senegal began to 
produce national identity cards that include an electronically 
scanned photo.  All Senegalese were compelled to apply for the new 
cards, and anyone claiming to be Senegalese should be able to 
produce this card if he or she has been in Senegal since 2006. 
 
¶K.  COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The host 
government cooperates well in fraud matters and requests for 
document verifications.  However, because of the high incidence of 
fraud, post always submits "blind" verification requests, providing 
authorities with only a minimum of data on the document and 
requesting that the authorities provide the rest.  Senegalese 
authorities do not always have the ability to verify documents due 
to the incompleteness of records. 
 
Not all forms of visa fraud are regarded as serious offenses in 
Senegal, and even government officials are at times willing to use 
their positions to help friends and relatives obtain visas.  While 
the GOS does prosecute serious perpetrators, particularly foreign 
scam artists, it will often drop criminal charges if the perpetrator 
pays restitution to his/her victims.  A January 2007 news story 
alleged that high level government officials, including the Foreign 
Minister, have colluded to issue legitimate Senegalese diplomatic 
 
DAKAR 00000154  005 OF 005 
 
 
passports to non-diplomats.  Because Senegalese diplomatic passport 
holders do not need visas to visit France and other Schengen 
countries, there is a high demand for this type of passport.  These 
allegations have not/not been substantiated. 
 
¶L.  AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: K1, CR-1, and IR-1 visa fraud are 
very common in Senegal.  Almost 80 percent of K1 applicants are 
referred to the FPU for investigation, and approximately 30 percent 
are returned to the Department of Homeland Security with a 
recommendation for revocation. Advance fee fraud and dating scams 
are common in Senegal and post regularly receives emails or calls 
from Amcits who have fallen victims of the scam. 
 
¶M.  STAFFING AND TRAINING: 
 
1) Yvane K. Clark, Consular Associate, full-time Fraud Unit 
Coordinator. She attended the following training courses in 2007: 
the All-Africa Fraud Prevention Conference (Ghana), Fraud Prevention 
for Consular Managers (FSI), and an FBI-sponsored Interviewing 
Techniques Workshop (Cape Verde). 
 
2) Moussa Sy, Locally Engaged Staff, part-time Local Fraud 
Investigator. FSN Fraud Prevention  Course (PC-542, FSI, Nov. 2007) 
 
 
3) James Loveland, Consular Section Chief, part-time Fraud 
Prevention Manager (FPM).  No formal fraud prevention training. 
 
 
SMITH