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Viewing cable 08CAIRO172, COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR THE UPGRADE OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08CAIRO172 2008-02-03 05:05 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0172/01 0340505
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030505Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8020
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS CAIRO 000172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA (IRWIN) AND PM (ARCHETTO) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR THE UPGRADE OF 
AN/ANVS-6(V)1 NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVG) IAW ASAM# 
GEN-07-ASAM-02 
 
REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST 
        07/AF/155 05 SEPT 07 
     B. U.S. ARMY AVIATION SAFETY ACTION MESSAGE (ASAM) 
        MAINTENANCE MANDATORY RCS CSGLD-1860 
        (R1)UPDATED INFORMATION ON NIGHT VISION 
        DEVICES (NVD) GEN-07-ASAM-02 MSG DTG 
        041510Z APR 07 
     C. ADDENDUM TO GEN-07-ASAM-02 
 
1.  (SBU) Description:  In Ref A (TAB A), the GOE requested 
the modification and upgrade of all existing Type 3 NVGs to 
type 4 in support of the operational flying requirements of 
the Egyptian Air Force (EAF).  These upgrades are essential 
for the safe execution of night flying operations and must be 
completed immediately to remain in compliance with U.S. Army 
Safety policy and guidance (Ref B, page 3, para 7.2.1, TAB 
B).  The Government of Egypt,s (GOEs) stated position 
regarding night flight operations is to align with the U.S. 
Army,s regulations, policies and procedures.  This allows 
the GOE to maintain its current readiness level and negates 
the necessity of developing a separate Air Worthiness Release 
(AWR) in country. 
 
2.  (SBU) Reason the customer desires upgrade.  The EAF 
currently maintains 94 sets of NVGs for night flying 
operations and requests to upgrade these systems prior to 
October 2008 in accordance with applicable regulations, 
policy letters and directives (See references).  These 
AN/ANVS-6(V)1 NIGHT VISSION GOGGLES (NVGs) will become 
obsolete in 2008 and must be upgraded to remain in compliance 
with U.S. sustainability requirements defined in ASAM# 
GEN-07-ASAM-02 (Ref B).  This required upgrade was discussed 
in detail at the Chinook PMR #9 (September 2007).  The 
AN/ANVS-6(V)1 NVG was identified by the U.S. Army and the 
Apache Program Manager for upgrade/replacement.  This action 
will assist in the modernization of the EAF to ensure safe 
flight operations, individual aviator proficiency and the 
overall readiness of assigned rotary wing squadrons.  The 
Type 4 NVGs will improve the EAF capability to operate with 
U.S. Forces in a coalition environment.  These systems are 
also more easily sustainable through the U.S. supply system 
(Ref C, Pg 2 Table, TAB C). 
 
3.  (SBU) How the NVGs will affect Egypt's force structure: 
There will be no increase in force structure; however there 
will be an increase in EAF capability to operate effectively 
at night. 
 
4.  (SBU) How the NVGs would contribute to both U.S. and 
Egyptian defense/security goals: NVG sales are consistent 
with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the 
territorial security of regional states.  It also supports 
two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt: 
(1) enabling allies and partners, and (2) protecting U.S. and 
partner interests.  This NVG upgrade will also support two of 
CENTCOM's Security Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) for 
Egypt: 
 
-- SCDE 3.2 "Support the defense modernization and 
transformation of allies or partners to reduce their 
vulnerability to external aggression and coercion" 
 
-- SCDE 4.2 "Improve their capability to operate 
independently or as part of a coalition with U.S. Forces" 
 
5.  (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of NVDs 
requested:  94 sets of AN/ANVS-6(V)1 NIGHT VISSION GOGGLES 
(NVGs) are consistent with the quantity of systems NVDs 
required within the U.S. Army based on the number of assigned 
aircraft and rotary-wing aircrews within the EAF.  This 
quantity would allow the EAF to equip each aircrew (AH-64 x 
34, UH-60 x 8 and CH-47 x 18) with minimum night vision 
capability and provide sufficient spares for night aviation 
operations.  In addition, a recent CTA was approved (November 
07) for the procurement sixty-six (66) Night Ranger Viewers 
(AN/PVS-7B NVG) and associated spare parts to support two (2) 
ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry 
Class Frigates. The AN/PVS-7B NVGs provide the Egyptian Naval 
Forces with a NVG capability that is equal to or greater than 
the requested upgrade for the EAF. 
 
6.  (SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the 
introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation 
or region:  Combatant Commander's concurrence will be 
provided separately. 
 
 
7.  (SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations: 
The upgrade of these NVGs should not impact the regional 
balance of power or cause negative reactions from any of 
Egypt's neighbors.  This upgrade does not introduce new 
technology to Egypt (or the region) and will not impact 
Israel's qualitative military edge. 
 
8.  (SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, 
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles:  The 
Egyptians have demonstrated the intent and ability to protect 
sensitive, classified military technology over an extended 
period.  Egypt signed a General Security of Information 
Agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and 
protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons 
systems.  Egypt has procured night vision technology in the 
past to include the AN/ANVS-6(V)1 and has met all previous 
security and End Use Monitoring (EUM) requirements. 
 
9.  (SBU) Training required either in-country or in the U.S. 
and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. 
trainer,s in-country:  No additional Mobile Training Teams 
will be required for the upgrade of these NVGs.  There is no 
additional presence that will be required beyond normal U.S. 
interaction and training (TAFTs) with the individual EAF 
aircrews. 
 
10.  (SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the 
proposed acquisition:  Egypt plans to upgrade NVDs utilizing 
Foreign Military Financing and has already allocated 
sufficient funds within their FY08/09 funding priority 
listing to finance this upgrade requirement.  In addition, 
the EAF requests approval to purchase Type 4 NVGs as 
necessary when individual systems are no longer serviceable 
or no longer cost effective to maintain.  The end-state is 
that the EAF modernizes its existing NVG inventory to Type 4, 
AN/ANVS-6(V)1 for sustainability and compliance. 
 
11.  (SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the 
proposed acquisition: None. 
 
12.  (SBU) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for 
compliance verification:  The Office of Military Cooperation 
(OMC) Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program.  The Golden 
Sentry point of contact, working in close coordination with 
the security assistance program officer, will review and 
maintain copies of the customer,s physical security and 
accountability control plan.  All parties will maintain a 
serial number list of all NVGs within the inventory or 
transferred, and will conduct the mandated and inspections as 
required.  The Egyptian military currently has over 2500 
Night Vision Devices of various configurations in-country and 
has maintained accountability and security of those devices 
without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date. 
 
13.  (SBU) Operational Plan and specific end-users: The 
operational plan for the NVGs states that the devices will be 
issued to applicable flying squadrons conducting night 
rotary-wing operations.  The EAF will increase its 
interoperability with U.S. Forces as demonstrated by combined 
training exercises Bright Star.  The extent of aviation 
operations and anti-terrorism missions may include countering 
border intrusions by a conventional threat or asymmetrical 
terrorist threat through territorial waters (the Suez Canal). 
 In addition, these systems will significantly enhance the 
EAFs ability to respond to regional humanitarian relief 
efforts and the Egypt,s National Search and Rescue (SAR) 
capability.  The GOE has indicated a willingness to meet U.S. 
guidelines for accountability and security of NVGs, and the 
Office of Military Cooperation will conduct EUM of the 
devices if the upgrade is approved. 
 
14.  (SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve the 
transfer of NVGs: The country team recommends USG approval 
for transfer of the NVGs.  This is a coordinated mission 
position. 
JONES