VZCZCXRO2898
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0236 0512130
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 202130Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1037
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3975
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0358
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0368
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7706
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5805
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1622
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000236 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, PM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 
TAGS: BR PREL MARR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOBIM 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 93 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 175 
 
¶1.  (C)  Ambassador Sobel met with Brazilian Minister of 
Defense Nelson Jobim Feb. 13 to discuss Jobim's upcoming 
visit to Washington, regional security and progress on 
defense cooperation.  Jobim agreed with Ambassador Sobel's 
outline of possible areas for discussion during his March 
visit to Washington, including further discussion of a 
defense cooperation agreement.  He also signaled that Brazil 
would be open to discussions regarding negotiation of a 
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) 
and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), similar to that 
concluded with France.  Chief of Ministry Staff Murilo 
Marques Barboza said that a GSOMIA had been discussed in the 
past, but had broken down over arrangements for "inspections" 
of Brazilian facilities.  This probably reflects Brazilian 
sensitivities over allowing U.S. access to military 
facilities, even with reciprocal access to those in the U.S. 
Jobim and Barboza indicated openness to renewing a dialogue 
on a GSOMIA, but in order to complete such an agreement, the 
"inspections" will need a clearer characterization as 
reciprocal visits.  Jobim also expressed interest in 
technology transfers, particularly as they could apply to 
Brazilian plans to modernize its military. Ambassador Sobel 
acknowledged that we were aware of Brazilian interest in U.S. 
submarine technology and were preparing what we hoped would 
be a constructive response. 
 
¶2.   (C)  In a separate meeting with MOD Chief of Staff 
Barboza, DATT was told that the MOD's response to the U.S. 
was aimed at reaching consensus with the USG that could gain 
President Lula's support as a deliverable for Jobim's visit 
to Washington, circumventing MRE obstruction.  This was the 
tactic that led to completion of the SOFA with France earlier 
this year.  Barboza indicated that the French SOFA used 
language that did not provoke constitutional onjections as 
previous proposals for U.S.-Brazil SOFAs have.  He counselled 
observing the reaction of Brazil's Congress to the French 
SOFA (and completing the DCA) before working on a U.S.-Brazil 
version. Barboza also expressed caution on the possible 
GSOMIA, noting that no other information sharing arrangment 
to which Brazil is a party would involve visits.  He did, 
however, leave the door open to exploration of a formula that 
could work for both sides. 
 
¶3.  (C)   Jobim told Ambassador Sobel that the Brazilian 
government shared the Ambassador's concern about the 
possibility of Venezuela exporting instability.  He believed 
that President Chavez has been saber rattling to distract 
from internal problems.  Brazil supports creation of a "South 
American Defense Council" to bring Chavez into the mainstream 
of the continent and provide reassurance that there is no 
security threat.  Jobim believed that isolating Venezuela 
would lead to further posturing from Chavez and a greater 
risk of spreading instability among neighboring countries. 
 
¶4.  (C)  EMBASSY COMMENT: However impractical the suggestion 
may seem, it follows the traditional Brazilian policy of 
trying to be everyone's friend by attempting to incorporate 
Chavez' idea for defense cooperation into a supposed 
containment strategy. 
SOBEL