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Viewing cable 08BELGRADE131, SERBIA: AS CAMPAIGN CLOSES, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TOO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BELGRADE131 2008-02-01 17:33 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Belgrade
VZCZCXRO8608
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBW #0131/01 0321733
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011733Z FEB 08 ZDK CTG PARIS 9879 0350746
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2142
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000131 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SR
SUBJECT:  SERBIA:  AS CAMPAIGN CLOSES, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS TOO 
CLOSE TO CALL 
 
REF: A) Belgrade 118 B) Belgrade 111 C) Belgrade 95 D) Belgrade 95 
 
BELGRADE 00000131  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) As Serbia's presidential election campaign drew to a close, 
both candidates made their final pitch to voters in an effort to 
secure what could be a narrow victory or a contested win on Sunday's 
election day.  In a televised debate and rallies, Boris Tadic 
promoted his European agenda, and urged democratic unity against 
Radical Tomislav Nikolic, despite a lack of support from his 
government coalition partner.  Nikolic used the final days to go on 
the offensive, playing up government corruption and trying to 
portray a more European platform.  Poll numbers and analysts predict 
that Tadic could win by a slight margin.  If Tadic wins, it will be 
by a hair's breadth, and no thanks to what has been a poorly 
conceived and implemented campaign.  End summary. 
 
Tadic and Nikolic Face Off In Debate 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Democratic Party (DS) candidate, President Boris Tadic, and 
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) candidate, Tomislav Nikolic, faced off 
on January 30 in the only debate of the campaign.  In the televised 
debate, the candidates each spoke on Kosovo, the EU, the military, 
and the economy.  A confident appearing Tadic, said the elections 
were a referendum on Serbia's future.  He focused on integration 
with Europe and improving Serbia's economy.  Tadic also reminded 
voters that a vote for Nikolic was a vote for isolation and a return 
the grim past of the nineties.  Tadic repeatedly referred to Nikolic 
as "head of the Serbian Radical Party, the party of Vojislav 
Seselj." 
 
3. (U) Nikolic, appearing rambling and rude, stressed that Serbia 
needed a change, with few specifics.  Tadic, he said, had failed to 
deliver and had done little to defend Serbia.  Throwing verbal jabs 
and addressing Tadic as "Mr. Former President," he accused Tadic of 
supporting corruption, stating, "The criminals are your people." 
Nikolic said Serbia would accept its friends in the EU as well as 
Russia and that the EU would cooperate with Serbia whoever won the 
election. 
 
4. (SBU) Analysts and papers said the debate was a clear win for 
Tadic.  Newspapers "Blic" and "Politika" said on January 31 that 
Nikolic wasted an opportunity to present his program and instead 
attacked Tadic.  According to a poll by Blic after the debate, 
viewers agreed Tadic won.  Zoran Lucic, Executive Director for the 
Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID), told emboff and 
other diplomats on January 31 that Tadic appeared confident of his 
victory and in his plan for Serbia while Nikolic was rude and 
aggressive and offered no plan for the future. 
 
Democratic Party Recreates Mood of the Milosevic Opposition 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Both candidates held their final rallies in Belgrade on 
January 31, just before the start of the February 1 media blackout. 
Tadic addressed a crowd of mostly urban students and professionals 
in their twenties through forties at his open-air rally in 
Belgrade's Republic Square.  Sports and entertainment celebrities 
and political figures, including DS, G-17+ and Social Democratic 
Party of Sandzak ministers, shared the stage with Tadic.  He urged 
voters to vote for their future and remain united behind democratic 
forces.  He gave a three-point plan for EU integration, including 
signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU 
in a matter of weeks, visa-free travel for Serbs to the EU by the 
end of 2009, and EU candidate status by the end of 2009.  Tadic 
opened and closed his speech with references to Kosovo and spoke 
about his visit earlier in the day to a Serb enclave in Kosovo. 
After the speech, Tadic led approximately 3,000 rally-goers on a 
"walk through the streets," reminiscent of the daily protest rallies 
of the winter of 1996, following Milosevic's refusal to accept the 
results of the local elections.  Several participants held signs 
from the opposition movement that helped bring down Milosevic.  A DS 
party leader told poloff on January 31 that Tadic's closing rally 
was a great success that excited the voters. 
 
Radicals Shows Their True Colors 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) On the other side of the city, approximately 10,000 
middle-aged rural men and younger (probably unemployed) men attended 
Nikolic's rally at the Belgrade Arena.  Many were bused in from 
other areas of Serbia, and the atmosphere was chaotic, with alcohol 
and a lively marketplace to purchase Seselj pins, SRS flags, and 
posters of Hague indictees Mladic and Karadzic.  In his speech, 
Nikolic said he did not oppose Europe and supported European values 
and EU investment in Serbia.  He called on the EU, "to not touch 
Kosovo and Metohija."  He again attacked Tadic on corruption and 
economic performance. 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000131  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Little Support to Either Candidate from Other Parties 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) After much anticipation, Tadic received no support from his 
main government coalition partner Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) 
leader, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, In a press conference on 
January 30, Kostunica and Nova Serbia (NS) party leader, Velimir 
Ilic, announced that they would not support Tadic.  Kostunica said 
DSS and NS based their decision on Tadic's refusal to sign 
Kostunica's proposal to amend the coalition agreement to reject 
signing an SAA if the EU sends a mission to Kosovo (ref A). Of the 
other parties fielding candidates in the first round, only the 
Coalition of Vojvodina Hungarians supported Tadic (ref A).  Also on 
January 30, Novi Pazar mayor and head of the List for Sandzak 
coalition, Sulejman Ugljanin called on his supporters to vote for 
Tadic. 
 
8. (U) The other parties declined to support anyone.  Ceda 
Jovanovic's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) issued a press release on 
January 30, calling on supporters to vote their own conscience (ref 
A).  In a press conference in Novi Sad on January 30, the League of 
Vojvodina Social Democrats asked its supporters to vote against 
Nikolic, although League head Nenad Canak earlier actively supported 
Tadic's campaign.  The Socialist Party of Serbia issued a press 
release on January 30 announcing that it would not support any 
candidate. 
 
Albanians Will Not Vote--A Missed Opportunity? 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (U) With neither candidate actively courting their vote, ethnic 
Albanians are not expected to participate in the second round of the 
elections.  An estimated 40,000 ethnic Albanians in southern Serbia 
would not vote, but there would be no official boycott, Party for 
Democratic Action (PDD) official Shaip Kamberi told Vranje Press 
agency on January 30.  Kamberi said his party and local Albanians 
were disappointed that Tadic had not addressed their requests in his 
campaign--demilitarization of the region, opening of a teachers' 
college, and reorganization of the Coordination Body for Southern 
Serbia.  Tadic, as a pro-European democratic candidate, should have 
considered the importance of voters from all minorities.  PDD 
considered supporting a Radical candidate "out of the question," but 
Albanians could not give their votes without something in return, 
Kamberi said. 
 
Predictions of a Tadic Win 
-------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Local pollsters and analysts predicted a high turnout and 
a close win for Tadic.  CeSID's Lucic told diplomats on January 31 
that he predicted record-breaking turnout of 80% (4.4 million) with 
Tadic winning by 100,000 to 150,000 votes over Nikolic.  Lucic 
anticipated that even without Kostunica's support, DSS voters would 
nonetheless vote for Tadic, particularly if Kostunica and Ilic voted 
early in the day.  CeSID's polling data indicates 50% of DSS voters 
would vote for Tadic while 20% would support the Radicals.  Lucic 
said Kostunica's announcement of non-support signaled the beginning 
of his downfall, which could culminate in a polarized two-party 
system pitting the DS against the Radicals.  Although optimistic of 
a narrow win for Tadic, CeSID Director Marko Blagojevic told poloff 
on January 30 that the Radicals might try to contest election 
results shortly after the polls close on February 3 (septel). 
 
11. (SBU) Ivan Vejvoda, director of the respected Balkan Trust for 
Democracy and former DS official, told poloff January 30 that he was 
confident Tadic would be reelected.  He said that the voters had a 
choice "between certainty and uncertainty" and that "unrefined" 
polling did not accurately reflect the concern Serbians had about 
returning to the 1990s with the Radicals' policies.  Vejvoda said 
that the citizens remembered how the Serbian financial markets had 
plunged when Nikolic was briefly elected as Parliamentary speaker in 
May 2007.  He said that Tadic had "finally made his voice heard" on 
making the election a referendum on Serbia's European future after 
months of compromising with the DSS to preserve his government 
coalition.  Vejvoda said that Kostunica had "poured cold water" on 
the dream of EU integration by trying to link the SAA with the EU 
Mission to Kosovo and that Tadic had strengthened his position by 
rejecting Kostunica's support contingent on this policy.  Vejvoda 
said that the majority in the government--the pro-EU DS and G17 
Plus--could now "speak with authority" on making European 
integration the primary objective for the country, after a Tadic 
victory. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
12. (SBU) After several stumbles, Tadic's final campaign message 
came across clear and more confident--putting Serbia squarely on the 
path to EU while protecting Kosovo as well.  In his final pitch to 
voters, Tadic aggressively reminded voters of the Radicals' ugly 
past.  Tadic's confident attitude and references to the nineties may 
 
BELGRADE 00000131  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
pull in some voters who were planning to stay home, despite his lack 
of support from Kostunica.  Nikolic's final campaign strategy tried 
to muddy the differences between his and Tadic's platforms, but his 
rough demeanor may have scared away the votes he was seeking. 
Although Tadic seems slightly favored, any win will be slim and 
could result in a contested election, following a flawed campaign. 
End Comment. 
 
BRUSH