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Viewing cable 08BEIJING620, COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVAL FOR EAP/K DPRK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIJING620 2008-02-21 06:33 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Beijing
VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBJ #0620/01 0520633
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210633Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5233
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0544
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1806
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8934
UNCLAS BEIJING 000620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OTRA AMGT KNNP PREL MNUC KN CH
SUBJECT: COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVAL FOR EAP/K DPRK 
UNIT CHIEF YURI KIM 
 
REF: STATE 17302 
 
1. (SBU) Embassy Beijing welcomes and grants country 
clearance February 23 - 25, 2008, for EAP/K DPRK Unit 
Chief Yuri Kim to Beijing en route to Pyongyang. 
 
2. (SBU) Political Control Officer: 
Nancy Leou, Political Officer 
Tel: (86-10)6532-3831 x6040 
Cell: (86)139-1023-4347 
Fa: (86-10)6532-6423 
Unclass E-mail: LeouNW@stae.gov 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Control officer will meet Ms. Kim at the airport and 
take her to her hotel. 
 
3.(SBU) Hotel reservations have been made at the 
Grand Hyatt Hotel. 
 
Grand Hyatt Hotel 
Beijing Oriental Plaza 
1 Dong Changan Jie, Beijing 100738 
Ph: (86-10)8518-1234 
Fax: (86-10)8518-0000 
 
------------------------------ 
Security and Threat Assessment 
------------------------------ 
 
4. (U) The threat level for all China posts is 
considered low for crime and medium for terrorism. 
 
5. (U) The Regional Security Office is not aware of 
any specific threat directed against any U.S. person 
or traveling delegation.  Should such information be 
developed, the Chinese security services are committed 
to advise the Embassy of pertinent information and to 
provide necessary security coverage. 
 
6. (U) China experiences a moderate rate of crime, 
including recent incidents ranging from petty theft to 
murder.  Pickpockets are particularly active in 
crowded markets and foreigners are often sought out as 
primary targets.  Petty theft from hotel rooms is 
uncommon, but visitors are advised not to leave 
valuables lying loose or unattended in their rooms. 
It is the policy of this Mission that employees, their 
family members and official visitors to China must not 
knowingly purchase counterfeit or pirated products 
during their stay in China.  Also, foreigners may be 
approached in tourist areas by individuals seeking to 
exchange U.S. dollars or to sell pirated or fake 
products, such as compact discs, in violation of 
intellectual property rights laws.  These transactions 
are illegal, violate post policy, and must be avoided. 
 
7. (U) All U.S. citizen personnel serving under Chief 
of Mission authority in a temporary duty status of 30 
days or more must complete appropriate overseas 
personal security training prior to travel (04 State 
66580).  Employees who have completed the Security 
Overseas Seminar Course at State's Foreign Service 
Institute (FSI) after June 1, 2000 meet this 
requirement.  All other TDYers must either 1) complete 
the approved four-day seminar at FSI entitled "Serving 
Abroad for Families and Employees (SAFE)" or 2) have 
their agency certify to the State Department Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security that the employee has undergone 
equivalent security training.  The contact for this 
certification is Assistant Director of Training, DS/T, 
at telephone (703) 205-2617.  Country clearance will 
not be granted for any traveler with planned TDY in 
excess of 30 days if this information is not 
stated/certified.  POC for additional information is 
DS_RSO, Beijing at: ds_rso_Beijing@state.gov(Note: 
Travelers from DHS/CBP, DIA, FBI, DOD, and the Peace 
Corp have been pre-certified by their agencies with 
DS.) 
 
8. (U) All/all official visitors are required to 
obtain a pre-departure, country specific 
counterintelligence briefing from their parent agency 
before departing for China.  Visitors should contact 
the security office of their parent agency.  If the 
parent agency is unable to give the briefing or needs 
assistance/guidance, the visitor should contact the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Division of 
Counterintelligence (DS/ICI/CI) at 571-345-7641, 3966, 
or 3968 to schedule a briefing.  HQ DS/CI is located 
 
at SA-20, 1801 Lynn St., Rosslyn, Virginia 20522-2008. 
Department of State personnel should contact the 
DS/ICI/CI directly to schedule a briefing. Official 
visitors may also be required to attend a post 
specific security briefing upon their arrival in 
country.  The type of briefing is contingent on the 
length of the planned visit.  Upon arrival in Beijing, 
all TDY personnel should contact the Regional Security 
Office at 6532-3831, ext. 6036 to determine level of 
briefing required. 
 
9. (U) Visitors are reminded to take necessary 
precautions in safeguarding sensitive material and 
information.  All non-USG facilities must be 
considered technically compromised and may not be used 
to discuss, process, or store classified information. 
Telephone calls, e-mail, and Internet usage are 
routinely monitored and hotel rooms searched. 
 
10. (U) All TDY U.S. citizen employees of the U.S. 
Government, civilian or military, who are under the 
authority of the Chief of Mission are subject to the 
reporting requirement stated in 12 FAM 262 regarding 
contact reports, i.e. any initial (non-business 
related) contact with a national from a country with a 
Critical threat (counterintelligence) post, as listed 
on the Department's Security Environment Threat List 
(SETL), must be reported.  In general, employee 
reporting should occur within one business day after 
such contact has occurred.  If unable to report within 
this time frame, or unsure about the need to report at 
all, employees should contact the RSO or PSO as soon 
as practicable.  If the RSO/PSO is unavailable, notify 
the Management Officer or the Deputy Chief of Mission. 
 
11. (U) Per 12 FAM 262, this reporting requirement 
generally applies whenever: 
 
(1) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to 
classified or otherwise sensitive information. 
 
(2) The employee is concerned that he or she may the 
target of actual or attempted exploitation by a 
foreign entity. 
 
(3) That national attempts to establish recurring 
contact or seems to be actively seeking a close 
personal association, beyond professional or personal 
courtesies. 
 
12. (U) Travelers should be aware that previous 
visitors have reported that their unattended computers 
have been subjected to tampering.  The efforts may be 
directed toward obtaining information on the computers, 
but problems ranging from viruses left on their 
systems to hard drives, which are no longer functional, 
have been reported.  Hotels and private Chinese 
Internet providers have in some cases given hotel 
guests "free" thumb drives for use with their 
computers.  The source and quality of these devices 
are unknown.  Such devices could contain malicious 
codes and viruses and should not be used on government 
computers.  Official visitors are reminded that non- 
inspectable electrical/electronic equipment, i.e., 
cellular telephones, laptop computers, personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), etc., may not be brought 
into the controlled access areas of the Chancery.  If 
a visitor intends to travel with USG-owned computers 
and equipment for use within the chancery, please 
contact the Regional Security Officer at 86-10-6532- 
3831 ext. 6058, or GormanB2@state.gov or 
MooreBM@state.gov, for information and guidelines. 
 
13. (U) Additionally, all classified and sensitive 
materials must be secured at the Embassy upon arrival 
in country.  All classified material must be brought 
into China via diplomatic pouch. 
 
14. (U) Travelers must contact the Embassy or nearest 
Consulate General upon arrival in China and provide 
telephone and address information while in country. 
 
15. (U) Passports and visas are required.  Americans 
arriving/transiting without valid passports and 
Chinese visas are not permitted to enter China and may 
also be subject to fines.  Visas are required to 
transit China on the way to and from Mongolia or North 
Korea. Those visitors traveling to China on a single 
entry visa should be reminded that trips to Hong Kong 
 
or Macau Special Administrative Regions are treated as 
a visit outside Mainland China.  If the traveler is 
planning to return to Mainland China after a visit to 
one of these two destinations on the same single entry 
visa, they will be denied entry.  Visitors facing this 
dilemma will be required to apply for a new visa at 
the Chinese consulate in Hong Kong to gain re-entry 
into Mainland China. 
 
RANDT