VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0590/01 0600934
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290934Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5963
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0370
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1479
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0004
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0245
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0068
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0039
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 0023
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0339
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0017
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR G/TIP, G, INL, DRL, PRM, AND NEA/RA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM PHUM KWMN SMIG KFRD ASEC PREF ELAB IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS RESPONSES 
 
REF: STATE 2731 
 
¶1. (U) This is post's summary of trafficking in persons 
activities for the period April 2007-April 2008.  Little 
progress has been noted since the previous report, and post 
strongly recommends that Iraq continue to be treated as a 
special case during this rating period.  The government of 
Iraq continues to increase its capacity to focus on difficult 
legislation and to strengthen its ministerial institutions, 
but insurgency, sectarian violence, and an imperfect ability 
to establish rule of law hinder the government's ability to 
address trafficking in persons.  The Council of 
Representatives did manage to demonstrate increased capacity 
to pass contentious legislation; the laws, however, focused 
exclusively on efforts towards national reconciliation and 
basic governmental function. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Post would like to stress that there has been no 
sustained or in-depth reporting by any source on the issue of 
trafficking in persons in Iraq, and we have no way to verify 
information or estimates of trafficking.  Through the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the country we 
were able to query local and regional governments, and local 
organizations.  However, we could not idependently verify the 
accounts we received and the reports were insufficient to 
enable us to draw accurate conclusions or identify trends. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The responses in this paragraph correspond with 
those questions in reftel paragraph 27. 
 
(A) Iraq may have been both an origin and destination country 
for international trafficking.  There were no official 
statistics and few non-governmental organizations monitored 
or reported on TIP activities.  According to our limited 
sources, children may have been trafficked by staff of 
private orphanages.  Young girls may have been trafficked to 
the Gulf States.  Women were most often trafficked within 
Iraq, but also to the Levant (Jordan and Syria) and, in fewer 
cases, to the Gulf, including Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. 
Non-Iraqi males were reportedly brought from Georgia, India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka,in some cases under the 
guise of a work contract in Kuwait or Jordan, or tricked into 
believing their travel to the Kurdish regions of Iraq was not 
actually a trip to Iraq. 
 
(B) Little has changed since the previous report; it was 
still difficult to estimate the scope of the trafficking 
problem in Iraq.  GOI and local officials deny that 
trafficking exists, or possess little understanding of the 
concern.  Journalists wrote anecdotal pieces based on 
single-source interviews that could not be verified or were 
later proven false.  The active conflict and limited economic 
opportunities have created a large pool of vulnerable 
individuals who could become victims.  We do not have solid 
evidence that trafficking incidents occurred in Iraq; we 
believe, however, that contrary to the opinion of the GOI, 
there were instances of human trafficking.  We do not believe 
the scope of this trafficking was great, but we have no 
ability to determine the degree to which it happened. 
 
Although there was some political will to address 
trafficking, the security situation consumed the majority of 
GOI resources and attention.  Various ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Human Rights and the Ministry of State for 
Women's Affairs expressed interest in running campaigns to 
address issues such as forced prostitution and marriage, but 
neither had the expertise or budget to run such programs. 
 
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) did take a few steps 
to address labor trafficking within its regional borders 
during the reporting period after foreign and domestic 
journalists published an account of Indonesian workers who 
had been tricked into fraudulant contracts.  These included a 
greater oversight of the contracts in which the companies of 
the region engaged and greater rights for those who were 
trafficked to bring their employer to court. 
We continue to know very little about the conditions into 
which the victims were trafficked.  According to our limited 
sources, both male and female and juvenile and adult 
populations may have been targeted by traffickers.  Young 
female orphans may have been forced into temporary marriages 
with orphanage staff for the purpose of sexual exploitation. 
There were also reports of women being trafficked from 
smaller towns in Kurdistan to the larger cities for the 
purpose of forced prostitution, and of women being trafficked 
from areas of Baghdad subject to extreme poverty.  Women 
reported being shamed into prostitution by being told they 
could not return home to their families because they will be 
harmed by male relatives. 
 
(C) There was no GOI agency designated as the lead on 
anti-trafficking.  The Ministries of Interior, Labor and 
Social Affairs, Human Rights, and Women were the primary 
agencies that had a role in anti-trafficking efforts. 
 
(D) The government had extremely limited ability to fully 
enforce the law anywhere in the country, making efforts to 
address the problem of human trafficking extremely difficult. 
 Many sources claim that government corruption was extremely 
high.  Funding for police and ministries was inadequate to 
reach beyond basic function; the inability to execute 
significant portions of ministerial budgets made any efforts 
less effective.  While the GOI did not lack the financial 
assets to assist victims, it neither saw trafficking as a 
high priority nor did it effectively manage other programs 
focusing on human rights and social affairs. 
 
(E) The government had no method or ability to systematically 
monitor anti-trafficking efforts.  There was no coordination 
mechanism between ministries, or between the GOI and 
regional/international organizations.  There has never been a 
government assessment of anti-trafficking efforts, likely 
because there are limited efforts underway. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The responses in this paragraph correspond with 
those questions in reftel paragraph 28. 
 
(A) Article 37(3) of the Iraqi Constitution prohibits "forced 
labor, slavery, slave trade, trafficking in women or 
children, and sex trade."  The law is not specific in its 
application to internal or external forms of trafficking. 
 
Trafficking is not directly addressed in the 1969 Iraqi Penal 
Code, however there are at least two articles that could be 
applied in certain circumstances.  Article 399 of the Penal 
Code punishes "any person who incites a boy or girl under the 
age of 18 to indulge in fornication or resort to prostitution 
as a profession or assists him or her to do so." 
 
Articles 421, 422, and 423 of the Penal Code prohibit 
unlawful seizure, kidnapping, and detention.  Article 425 
punishes "any person who provides a location for unlawful 
detention or imprisonment while being aware of the fact." 
 
Although Article 320 of the Penal Code punishes "any public 
official or agent (...) who employs slave labor," the law was 
intended to punish the misuse of public funds by government 
officials.  It was not meant as prevention or protection 
against labor trafficking and likely could not be used as 
such. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, no trafficking cases were tried 
under any law during the reporting period. 
 
(B) Article 399 of the Penal Code prescribes a prison 
sentence not to exceed ten years for "Incitement to 
Prostitution and Fornication" when the victim is under the 
age of 18.  Article 393 lists aggravating factors, such as 
the victim's age, the number of perpetrators, the victim's 
virginity, the relationship between the offender and the 
victim, and whether the victim died, became pregnant, or 
contracted a sexually transmitted disease as a result of the 
act.  If such factors exist, it appears that the court has 
the authority to increase the sentence. 
 
Although not specific to trafficking for sexual exploitation, 
Articles 421, 422, and 423, which cover unlawful seizure, 
kidnapping, and detention) could have implications for 
traffickers.  Sentences called for in these articles vary 
depending on the age and gender of the victim, but generally 
range between a maximum of 10-15 years.  Aggravating 
circumstances, such as deception, can increase the sentence, 
and any case involving sexual intercourse with the victim can 
result in life imprisonment or death.  Article 425 calls for 
a period of imprisonment not to exceed seven years for anyone 
who provides a location for unlawful detention. 
 
(C) Article 320 of the Penal Code calls for a prison sentence 
not to exceed 10 years for the crime of involuntary 
servitude.  However, this crime falls under the category of 
embezzlement and is unlikely to be effective against labor 
traffickers.  There are no laws that cover labor recruiters 
or labor agents. 
 
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) ordered a few 
companies to cease activities in response to allegations of 
labor trafficking of Filipino workers.  The KRG also forced 
all Kurdish companies to have direct contracts with the 
countries from which foreign workers come.  And the KRG has 
ordered that foreign laborers can contest their salary within 
the court system. 
 
(D) Rape is prohibited by Article 393 of the Penal Code; its 
penalty is life imprisonment or a period determined by the 
Iraqi court.  This penalty is stricter than that for those 
who commit sexual exploitation. 
 
(E) The act of prostitution is criminal in Iraq.  Brothel 
owners can be prosecuted under Article 425 in the Iraqi penal 
code under certain circumstances.  Pimps can be prosecuted 
under Article 399.  There are no laws prohibiting 
solicitation. 
 
(F) The GOI did not prosecute any cases against human 
trafficking offenders. 
 
(G) The GOI did not provide any specialized training for 
government officials to increase their ability to recognize, 
investigate, or prosecute instances of trafficking. 
 
(H) The GOI did not cooperate with other governments in the 
investigation and trafficking of trafficking cases. 
 
(I) The government did not extradite any persons charged with 
trafficking in other countries.  The government is prohibited 
from extraditing Iraqi citizens by Article 21(1) of the 
Constitution. 
 
(J) There was no substantiated evidence of government 
involvement in or tolerance of TIP. 
 
(K) Due to the response in (J), this question is not 
applicable. 
 
(L) This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
(M) Iraq continued to attract little tourism.  Religious 
pilgrimages continued to be the major portion of tourism. 
There were no reports of sex tourism within Iraq. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The responses in this paragraph correspond with 
those questions in reftel paragraph 29. 
 
(A) The GOI did not assist foreign victims of trafficking by 
providing permanent residency status or other relief from 
deportation. 
 
(B) The GOI did not have victim care facilities which are 
accessible to trafficking victims.  The country did not have 
specialized facilities dedicated to helping victims of 
trafficking.  The GOI did not offer legal, medical, or 
psychological services to victims. 
 
(C) The GOI did not provide funding or other forms of support 
to foreign or domestic NGOs or international organizations 
for services to trafficking victims. 
 
(D) There was no system for law enforcement or social 
services personnel to identify trafficking victims or to 
refer them to protective custody. 
 
(E) This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
(F) Post has no knowledge of the GOI prosecuting any cases 
against human trafficking offenders.  A few NGOs alleged that 
the arrest of 90 women in the Kurdish region indicated 
trafficking from small towns.  The KRG has not yet arrested 
anyone for pimping. 
 
(G) The GOI does not encourage victims to assist in the 
investigation or prosecution of trafficking.  There was no 
victims' restitution program. 
 
(H) The government did not provide protection for victims. 
The government does not provide shelter, housing benefits, or 
other resources to victims in rebuilding their lives.  Minors 
were placed in women's or juvenile prisons. 
 
(I) The government did not provide any specialized training 
for government officials to identify trafficking victims, 
whether adult or juvenile.  It does not provide training on 
protections and assistance to its embassies and consulates in 
foreign countries that are destination or transit countries. 
It does not urge those embassies and consulates to develop 
ongoing relationships with NGOs and IOs that serve trafficked 
victims. 
 
(J) The GOI did not provide assistance to repatriated 
nationals who have been victims of trafficking. 
 
(K) A few non-governmental organizations assisted trafficked 
victims and do not wish to be publicly identified for fear of 
persecution. 
 
The Organization for Women's Freedom in Iraq and the Asuda 
Organization for Combating Violence Against Women provided 
some assistance to trafficking victims.  They continued to 
provide shelters and some training and rehabilitation 
programs.  Neither was supported financially by the GOI and 
neither had a relationship with local authorities. 
 
American NGO Heartland Alliance provided specialized training 
for health care workers to deal with female victims of 
violence.  Heartland also continued to monitor trafficking in 
the North of Iraq - Mosul, Kirkuk, and Erbil.  It was funded 
by the USG and private donors, and receives no financial or 
material support from the GOI.  Mercy Corps also has provided 
limited training to ministerial workers in southern Iraq. 
 
The International Organization for Migration also closely 
monitored reports of trafficking within Iraq.  Though they 
are based out of Amman, Jordan, their local staff works 
within Iraq to document the scope of trafficking victims. 
The IOM has also assisted third country nationals who had 
been trafficked to Iraq by returning them to their country of 
origin. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The responses in this paragraph correspond with 
those questions in reftel paragraph 30. 
 
(A) The GOI was unaware of the existence or scope of the TIP 
problem within Iraq.  Therefore, it does not acknowledge that 
TIP is a problem.  Local governments have repeatedly insisted 
that trafficking is not a problem within their jurisdiction. 
 
(B) There were no government-run anti-trafficking campaigns 
or information disseminated by the GOI.  Though the Ministry 
of Human Rights and the Ministry of State for Women's Affairs 
have both expressed interest in running such a campaign, 
neither has done so due to budgetary constraints and a lack 
of cooperation within the GOI. 
 
(C) There was no formal relationship between GOI officials 
and organizations within the civil society community on TIP 
issues. 
 
(D) There was no formal monitoring of immigration or 
emigration patterns for evidence of trafficking.  A 
significant level of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
refugees moving within Iraq and across its borders made this 
a significantly difficult task.  Law enforcement officials 
did not screen for victims of trafficking.  The borders of 
Iraq remained generally unsecured, due to understaffing and 
limited patrol outside of border entry points. 
 
(E) There was no mechanism for cooperation or coordination 
between agencies within the GOI.  There was no working group 
or task force that focuses on TIP issues.  The Commission on 
Public Integrity was tasked with investigating cases of 
official corruption. 
 
(F) The GOI does not have a national plan of action to 
address TIP. 
 
(G) The GOI has not taken any significant measures to create 
an awareness program that educates clients of the sex trade 
or potential sex trafficking victims nor one that targets 
those who create the demand for the sex trade. 
 
(H) This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
(I) This question does not apply to the TIP report for Iraq. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Post's TIP Officer is Corey Gonzalez.  His telephone 
number is 914-822-6832 and his email address is 
GonzalezCX@state.gov. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Poloff (FS-04) spent 32 hours preparing this report. 
CROCKER