VZCZCXRO9731
OO RUEHIK RUEHPOD RUEHYG
DE RUEHTH #0216 0461602
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151602Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1216
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS ATHENS 000216 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC ECON PTER PREL PGOV ETTC EAID EFIN GR
SUBJECT: CT TASK FORCE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
REF: SECSTATE 6461 
 
¶1. (U) As requested in Reftel, this message contains Embassy 
Athens' assessment of critical infrastructure and key 
resources in Greece which, if destroyed, disrupted, or 
exploited, might have an immediate and deleterious effect on 
the United States. 
 
¶2. (U) Greek Shipping Industry: Greek companies own almost 
3,400 merchant vessels, making the Greek-owned merchant fleet 
the largest in the world. The Greek-owned fleet represents 
8.4 percent of the world,s total number of cargo ships and 
13.7 percent of the world,s tonnage.  Greek-owned ships are 
docked all over the world, and fly under a variety of flags. 
We assess that while an attack or natural disaster that 
incapacitated this industry would have a direct and negative 
impact on US commerce, the diffuse nature of the industry 
makes such events highly improbable. 
 
¶3. (U) Port of Piraeus: With an annual throughput of 
approximately 1.4 million TEUs (twenty feet equivalent 
unit),the Port of Piraeus is one of the ten busiest container 
traffic ports in Europe and the top container port in the 
eastern Mediterranean. In 2007, approximately 5,500 
containers were shipped from the port to the United States. 
The port is also the largest passenger port in Europe and one 
of the largest in the world. We assess that an attack or 
natural disaster at the port, depending upon its nature and 
severity, could have severe consequences in terms of lives 
lost and regional transport and could impact directly on US 
commercial interests. 
 
¶4. (U) Energy Pipelines: By 2013, Greece will be home to two 
of the most important energy pipelines in Southern Europe: 
The Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline and the 
Turkey-Greece-Italy gas interconnector (TGI). Damage to the 
former pipeline, which will bring Caspian crude to the Aegean 
in a way that bypasses the Bosporus, could have a moderate 
impact on international oil markets. If it were just one part 
of a joint attack or major disaster in the Straits, this 
could be a severe blow to global oil markets. A disruption of 
the TGI would have a devastating effect on the Italian gas 
market, which will be receiving 8bcm of gas through TGI. We 
assess that it would have no effect on the US gas market. 
 
¶5. (U) Souda Bay, Crete: Naval Facility Souda Bay, Crete is a 
major logistics and support base for U.S. forces flowing 
through the Mediterranean, both in and out of the Middle 
East. A catastrophic attack or natural disaster, conventional 
or unconventional, would likely have a significant, but not 
catastrophic, short term impact on US and coalition 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Although difficult to 
implement, other basing options could be quickly amended to 
ensure the maintenance of logistics support to Coalition 
Forces. An attack on US forces at Naval Facility Souda Bay 
would have a significant effect on US military operations in 
the Mediterranean, particularly U.S. Navy and Air Force. 
 
¶6. (U) Rail/Road Lines in Northern Greece: Major logistics 
support to ISAF forces flow overland via rail and road 
through Thessaloniki. A catastrophic attack or disaster on 
the rail or road lines leading into and out of Thessaloniki 
toward the North would significantly impact overland support 
to ISAF. However, there are other logistics options that 
could be implemented quickly to reestablish logistic support 
to the region. 
 
¶7. (U) Submarine Telecommunication Cables: There are a number 
of international fiber-optic telecommunication  cables that 
run through Greek territorial waters in the Mediterranean, 
most notably SEA-ME-WE-3, which provides links to Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia, and Mednautilus, which connects the 
Mediterranean region to Western Europe and the US. Though the 
destruction of one of these cables would cause significant 
damage to US communication to these areas, we assess that it 
is unlikely that terrorists would have the technical 
capability to cut these cables because of their location deep 
in the Mediterranean. We presume that the cables were 
designed to withstand natural phenomena. 
SPECKHARD