VZCZCXRO9703
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAH #0178/01 0361042
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051042Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0209
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0010
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 3429

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASHGABAT 000178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP (E. HOLMES), SCA/CEN (R. SNELSIRE) 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO (R. BROWN) 
ASTANA FOR LEGATT (H. LEADBETTER) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CVIS CPAS CMGT KFRD TX
 
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY: ASHGABAT, Q4 2007 
 
REF:  (A) 07 STATE 171211 (B) MOSCOW 150 
 
¶1.  (U) Sensitive but unclassified.  Not for public Internet. 
 
¶2.  (U) Embassy Ashgabat submits this quarterly consular fraud 
report for the period October through December 2007 as requested in 
reftel A. 
 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Turkmenistan is experiencing important social, political 
and economic changes following the December 2006 death of Saparmurat 
Niyazov, the autocratic president who had ruled since before its 
independence in 1991.  Despite these changes, Turkmenistan remains 
behind its CIS counterparts in terms of modernization of its 
economic, banking, communications, and technological capabilities. 
Turkmenistan is moving to catch up with the 21st century, but has a 
way to go.  Unemployment is high, and salaries are low, even by 
regional standards.  For example, a middle-class professional 
(teacher, doctor, government official) would be expected to have a 
monthly salary of about $150-$200 USD. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Following a coup attempt in 2002, Niyazov ordered a freeze 
on the issuance of email accounts.  Public Internet access, apart 
from American Corners and other cultural venues sponsored by foreign 
governments, did not exist.  While a number of public Internet cafes 
have opened in the last year, the general public remains fairly 
"unplugged" and unfamiliar with the Internet in general.  Most visa 
applicants are unable to fill out their electronic visa applications 
without assistance, often paying for this help. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Turkmenistan remains a cash-based economy, making it very 
difficult to assess applicant's relative net worth and income.  Most 
Turkmen do not use banks to store their savings or manage their 
business finances.  Often, applicants open bank accounts for one 
day, right before their visa interviews, for the sole purpose of 
having the bank issue a statement letter for their interviews. 
These letters are basically worthless as evidence of bona fide 
assets.  Tax records are available, but only slightly more helpful 
than the one-day bank statements, since local tax authorities are 
often corrupt and income is generally underreported or unreported 
altogether. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) For many bona fide students, payment of SEVIS, TOEFL and 
other fees poses an additional logistical hurdle, as credit cards 
are not widely used in Turkmenistan, and Western Union claims it can 
only transfer money to a person, that it is prohibited by local law 
from transferring money to a corporate entity or an organization. 
Peace Corps volunteers have reported paying SEVIS and TOEFL fees for 
their students using their own personal credit cards, because none 
of their parents had cards of their own. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The majority of fraud cases come from Lebap province 
bordering Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, with applicants from Ashgabat 
coming in a close second. There are relatively few fraudulent 
applicants from Mary, Dashoguz, Ahal and Balkan provinces.  The 
level of nonimmigrant visa fraud is medium, while levels of other 
types of fraud discussed below are low. 
 
NIV FRAUD 
 
¶8. (SBU) The vast majority of NIV fraud cases are refused under 
section 214b of the Immigration and Nationality Act, however, Post 
continues to investigate these cases for possible ties to labor 
traffickers and other criminal elements.  Post is currently 
compiling information on U.S. notaries suspected of providing false 
letters of invitation to applicants.  In some cases, refused 
applicants have said they've paid as much as $400 per letter, which 
is between two and four times the average monthly salary of these 
applicants. In some cases, a search of the inviter's records in 
PIERS shows that the biodata and/or signature on the letter does not 
match the name of the real American Citizen whose name is listed, 
suggesting possible identity theft.  The changes in biodata from the 
actual AmCit's information suggest an attempt to make the 
relationship more believable - for example, changing the birth year 
(but not the month and day) to match the "schoolmate" applicant's, 
or changing the country of birth to Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan. 
Post is also investigating several illegal overstays from 
Turkmenistan who are believed to be involved in providing false 
documentation to applicants, possibly in conjunction with labor 
traffickers in the United States, and possibly in collaboration with 
 
ASHGABAT 00000178  002 OF 004 
 
 
the notaries being investigated. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The most common fraud pattern seen on the visa line would 
be an applicant requesting a B1/B2 visa to visit a friend, family 
friend or family member living in New York City.  The inviters were 
usually born in Uzbekistan, Ukraine, or Azerbaijan.  Some claimed to 
be legal permanent residents, others were American Citizens.  The 
applicants' stories about how they knew or were related to the 
inviters were usually factually improbable, if not impossible.  The 
most common scripts heard include the following: "We became friends 
while serving in the Soviet military/studying in a third country 
during Soviet times" (because the applicant had never traveled to 
the inviter's native country); "Our fathers served together in the 
Soviet military"; "His relative was my neighbor and he used to come 
visit"; and, for ethnic Turkmen, Muslim applicants asked about their 
relationship to ethnic Ukrainian Jewish or Russian Jewish inviters, 
"His/her grandmother, who immigrated to Kiev/Moscow from 
Turkmenistan, was my grandfather's cousin."  On several days, 
separate applicants have applied claiming to be related to the same 
inviter, yet have claimed not to know each other.  No matter how 
distant the claimed relationship, the applicants uniformly claim 
that they talk on the phone "all the time" with the inviter, and 
often have pictures that they say are of the inviter and his or her 
family.  The similarities suggest coaching and facilitation.  These 
cases have been referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit's (FPU) 
ongoing investigation of the notaries involved. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Another common fraud pattern involves applicants claiming 
they want to go to New York City to study English as a second 
language (ESL).  While there are many legitimate ESL students from 
Turkmenistan who qualify for student visas, a large number of 
prospective ESL students are suspected of using the non-competitive 
open Internet enrollment policies of some private language 
institutes to try to go work in New York City.  Validation studies 
from previous years show a high rate of overstay for ESL students 
attending New York language centers not linked to degree-granting 
institutions of higher learning.  A typical fraudulent ESL student 
is a male, 22 to 40.  The younger applicants in this pool have just 
finished their term of compulsory military service and are 
unemployed.  The older applicants are either small businessmen or 
low-ranking government officials.  In both cases, these applicants 
make credibility-defying arguments about how learning English is a 
logical step in their professional and personal development.  In a 
handful of cases, these students have presented suspect account 
statements from banks located in the Baltics. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Post sees small numbers of petition-based nonimmigrant 
visa applicants, apart from U.S. government-sponsored Js.  Summer 
Work and Travel (SWT) is not a large program in Turkmenistan, in 
part because it is unclear that local universities would meet the 
standards for their students to be eligible.  There are no known SWT 
recruiters working in Turkmenistan.  All SWT applicants in 2007 were 
students enrolled at foreign universities - the vast majority were 
studying in Turkey.  A large proportion of these students had no or 
extremely poor English-language skills and most had very poor ties 
to Turkmenistan.  A validation study of 2006 SWT issuances showed 
that 90% appear to have overstayed illegally in the United States. 
 
 
IV FRAUD 
 
¶12. (SBU) Post does not process immigrant visas.  Immigrant visas 
for citizens of Turkmenistan are processed by the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow. See reftel B. 
 
DV FRAUD 
 
¶13. (SBU) Post does not process immigrant visas.  Diversity visas 
for citizens of Turkmenistan are processed by the U.S. Embassy in 
Moscow.  See reftel B. 
 
ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD 
 
¶14. (SBU) During the reporting period, Post had no cases of 
suspected ACS or U.S. passport fraud, nor have there been any cases 
in recent memory.  Because of the low numbers of legal immigrants 
from Turkmenistan in the United States, there are few dual nationals 
who return to Turkmenistan to request citizen services.  Over the 
past several years, Post has had several cases related to 
American-citizen males who wish to transmit U.S. citizenship to a 
child born out of wedlock to a Turkmen mother.  Under local law, the 
 
ASHGABAT 00000178  003 OF 004 
 
 
father of an out of wedlock child must be present at the time of 
registration of the birth for the father's name to be listed on the 
birth certificate and for the child to be allowed to use the 
father's surname.  In cases where the father is out of the country 
at the time of the birth, this creates difficulties in terms of 
creating proper documentation of the parentage of the child. 
 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
 
¶15. (SBU) Post does not process immigrant visas.  Immigrant visas 
for children adopted from Turkmenistan are processed by the U.S. 
Embassy in Moscow.  See reftel B.  Post is unaware of any cases in 
the last several years of adoptions from Turkmenistan by Americans 
or other Westerners. 
 
USE OF DNA TESTING 
 
¶16. (SBU) Post has not, in recent memory, utilized DNA testing to 
resolve concerns about a consular or visa case. Polygamy is not 
legal.  Nevertheless, common law polygamy is practiced, especially 
in rural areas.  Post has seen a few cases where Turkish businessmen 
living in Turkmenistan have applied for NIVs for their children and 
common-law wives.  These businessmen had legal wives and families 
living in Turkey.  While the relationships with the common-law wives 
were not legally documented, the children of these unions had local 
birth certificates that listed the Turkish citizen as the father and 
the children usually had Turkish passports as well. 
 
ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
 
¶17. (SBU) Post has not processed any Visas 92/93 cases.  There have 
been no cases of requests to replace lost or stolen I-551s in recent 
memory.  Based on anecdotal evidence, Post suspects a high level of 
fraudulent asylum claims.  During the Niyazov era, most people with 
a strong claim to political persecution were unable to leave 
Turkmenistan.  One recent returning student, who had previously made 
what appears to be a frivolous claim for asylum, told the 
interviewing consular officer that he had been "recruited" by other 
Turkmen students to file his petition in order to make theirs more 
credible.  He said that the immigration lawyer assisting him assured 
him that no immigration judge would ever refuse an asylum case from 
Turkmenistan.  The student said he abandoned the case because he 
wanted to return home to see his family.  In several other cases, 
visa applicants who wanted to visit asylee relatives in the United 
States have volunteered information suggesting that the relatives' 
decision to request asylum was based solely on economic factors, and 
that they "won't be able to return to Turkmenistan to visit us until 
they get their U.S. passports." 
 
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORIST TRAVEL 
 
¶18. (SBU) As mentioned above in the discussion under non-immigrant 
visa fraud, Post suspects that there are several criminal rings at 
work providing fake "letters of invitation" to nonimmigrant visa 
applicants and providing false documentation to erstwhile ESL 
students at institutes with rolling, non-competitive, Internet 
enrollment.  During the reporting period, Post received one credible 
report by a local woman that her husband, an illegal overstay, had 
been working in the United States under trafficking-type conditions. 
 She reported that his periodic phone calls home had stopped and she 
feared for his safety.  The RSO interviewed the woman and reported 
the case through DS channels for further investigation. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Turkmenistan is not considered to be a center for illegal 
transit of aliens en route to the United States or other Western 
countries. 
 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
 
¶20. (SBU) As mentioned in para. 17, the RSO section interviewed one 
woman who claimed that her husband was a victim of labor trafficking 
and forwarded its findings through DS channels for further 
investigation.  During the reporting period, the consular section 
did not refer any cases for RSO field investigation.  However, the 
consular chief regularly discusses cases of suspected fraud with the 
RSO section and the RSO and ARSO have, on occasion, assisted with 
consular fraud interviews.  The RSO and ARSO both have extensive 
visa and passport fraud experience, which provides a positive 
resource for the consular section. The consular chief and RSO are 
preparing to investigate several cases jointly during the first 
quarter of 2008. 
 
ASHGABAT 00000178  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
 
¶21. (SBU) Passports, identity documents and civil registry 
certificates are fairly reliable and not generally subject to 
counterfeiting and falsification.  The Turkmenistani passport is 
used primarily as an identity document, even by the majority of 
citizens who have not traveled outside the country.  The passport of 
Turkmenistan does not have an expiration date and passports cannot 
be issued or extended abroad.  Travelers who lose their Turkmen 
passports can be issued a travel letter for return by the 
appropriate Embassy or Consulate of Turkmenistan. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Instances of fake passports or passports obtained under 
false pretenses are rare, however, Post is aware of one.  In summer 
2007, the consular section found one instance where a student visa 
applicant applied for a visa with a passport listing an alternate 
birth date than he had listed in a previous application.  After an 
investigation, the consular chief interviewed the applicant, who had 
won a partial athletic scholarship for tennis.  The applicant 
admitted that his father, a government official, had obtained for 
him a real passport based on a fake birth certificate that listed 
him as two years younger than he was, allowing him to compete in a 
different age bracket at tennis tournaments.  The initial fraud had 
occurred years before, when the applicant was a minor, but the 
applicant had continued to use the passport to apply for visas for 
several years after becoming an adult, and had submitted the bad 
passport for the pending application.  In a separate interview, the 
father initially denied that the birth date in the passport was 
false, then insisted that he knew nothing about how his son obtained 
the false passport, finally changing his story to cast blame on the 
son's former tennis coach. 
 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
 
¶23. (SBU) Post has not, in recent memory, formally collaborated with 
host government authorities on a fraud investigation.  However, 
consular and RSO staff have been successful in getting material 
information, on an informal basis, from host-government contacts. 
The RSO reports a decent level of host government cooperation on 
investigations.  Post anticipates working with host government law 
enforcement on a more formal basis during the coming year. 
 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
 
¶24. (SBU) The consular section takes every opportunity to inform 
applicants that letters of invitation (LOIs) from a U.S. resident 
are not a required element of a nonimmigrant visa application. 
Applicants were advised of this fact at the time they made 
appointments.  The consular section's information campaign appears 
to have paid off, as the percentage of B1/B2 applicants presenting 
LOIs has dropped noticeably. 
 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
 
¶25. (SBU) The consular section consists of one Consul, who serves as 
section chief and fraud prevention manager (FPM), and two 
locally-engaged staff (LES).  All staff are expected to support 
anti-fraud programs.  Training and anti-fraud experience for each 
consular team members follows: 
 
- Elizabeth Webster, Consular Chief, FPM: 
-  ConGen (2001); Advanced Namechecking Class (2002); Advanced 
Consular Course (2006); Consular Section Chief Basics (2006); CLDC- 
2002, 2006 
-  FPM, U.S. Embassy, Abu Dhabi, 2001-2003 
  -  Gozel Arazmedova, Visa Assistant: 
- Primary LES responsibility for anti-fraud work 
- Consular FSN Training, RSC Frankfurt, 2003 and 2007 
- Regional Consular LES Workshop, (EUR) 2005 
- TDY training with FPU, Consular Section, Istanbul, 2006 
- Ogulbagt Bapbyeva, Consular Assistant: 
- Consular FSN Training, RSC Frankfurt, 2000 and 2002 
- Regional Consular LES Workshop, (EUR)2001 
- Moscow Consular Conference, 2003 and 2004 
- NIV FSN Workshop, FSI, 2005 
 
HOAGLAND