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O 280823Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ADDIS FOR AMBASSADOR COURVILLE 
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/FO, INR/AA, AND DRL 
DEPT FOR DS/IP/AF/E RMEDRANO 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KDEM PHUM PINR CN
 
SUBJECT: Mission to Anjouan - Bacar Still Intransigent 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Anjouan renegade Colonel Mohamed Bacar remained 
intransigent before an international delegation delivering an 
ultimatum February 27.  The delegation later informed Union 
President Ahmed Sambi who was unsurprised,  disappointed, and intent 
on a military solution to restore the Union.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The five person international delegation to Anjouan 
February 27 comprised:  Ambassador Mourad Taiti, AU Representative 
to Comoros; Ambassador Christian Job, French Ambassador to Comoros; 
Abdul Hakin El Rifai, Arab League Political Counselor; LtCol Let 
Dieng Gueye, Senegalese military officer seconded to AU; and George 
Sibley, U.S. Charg d'Affaires. 
 
Ultimatum Delivered 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Riding between the airport and the meeting, life in 
Anjouan appeared normal with no outward signs of tension or overt 
military preparations.  Colonel Bacar, sitting in the "Presidential 
Seat," was accompanied by five of his associates.  Bacar did not 
introduce them, but one was his island Interior Minister and one was 
his choice as "interim island President" in 2007.  AU ResRep Mourad 
told Bacar the delegation had come to deliver an ultimatum and 
expected a reply before they left.  He emphasized the African Union 
had decided to address the Comoros crisis and approved of "friendly 
nations" helping the Union Government.  Mourad said Tanzania, 
Senegal, Sudan and Libya were preparing with Union forces for the 
military option. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Mourad explained the AU mandate in the Comoros had been 
expanded to include elections organization, imposition of sanctions 
on Anjouan, and restoring legitimate Union authority.  Mourad told 
Bacar that he had three choices: 1) He could allow elections under 
the conditions indicated by the MAES mandate, participating as a 
candidate; 2)  He could go into exile; 3)  Or, he could choose the 
path of confrontation in which case he, Bacar, would be responsible 
for the outcome. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  Mourad asked each member of the Mission (except the 
Senegalese) to speak in turn.  Ambassador Job pointed out that 
France had pushed for a negotiated solution, but was now presenting 
an ultimatum.  Job indicated the same three options with some slight 
differences.  In terms of exile, he made it clear that it was 
not/not the preference of France that Bacar seek exile there. 
However, he also indicated that if Bacar specifically requested 
asylum there the French, reluctantly, would probably accept him. 
Job said his government was concerned that France had been wrongly 
portrayed as supporting Bacar.  Accepting him in exile might - in 
some minds at least - reinforce that impression.  In addition Job 
noted that if Bacar remained intransigent, France would not only 
give up on the negotiated solution, but would actively assist in the 
logistics of moving friendly African forces into the region to 
displace him. 
 
¶6.  The Arab League's El Rifai echoed Mourad and Job, also asking 
Bacar to consider the suffering the people of Anjouan and of the 
Comoros would endure if he did not accept elections or exile. 
 
¶7.  Charge Sibley spoke last, making the point that U.S. policy so 
far supported a peaceful and democratic outcome.  However, if Bacar 
did not accept either elections or exile, U.S. policy would no 
longer stand in the way of a military solution to the crisis.  The 
Charge then appealed to Bacar's wisdom and compassion to choose the 
path to peace, possible even at this late date. 
 
Bacar Replies 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Bacar replied emotionally, personally attacking AU ResRep 
Mourad and AU Special Envoy Madeira who he deemed as biased and 
unacceptable to bring him messages.  (Note:  Madeira did not go 
along for the reason that his own relationship with Bacar was 
difficult.  End Note).  Charg Sibley advised Bacar not to 
personalize the issue and to understand that this ultimatum was 
agreed by all AU members with the full support of the international 
community. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Bacar surprised no one with his intransigence; Mourad and 
Job left the room having taken the answer as "no."  El Rifai and 
Charge Sibley stayed briefly to encourage Bacar to choose peace. 
 
ANTANANARI 00000157  002 OF 003 
 
 
Bacar launched into legalistic complaints - as is his wont - about 
Sambi's violations of the constitution.  He said Union and island 
responsibilities must be discussed.  Charg Sibley agreed such 
discussions were needed, but that Bacar was not legitimately elected 
and thus could not represent Anjouan at such talks.  On Bacar's 
"legalistic argument," the Charg replied on principle:  elections 
must be free, fair, and transparent; Bacar's were none of these. 
 
¶10. (SBU)  In the end it was fruitless.  The Charg left the window 
open for Bacar to choose exile; perhaps coming to his senses when he 
sees the forces arrayed against him. 
 
Read-Out To President Sambi 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11.  The members of the delegation to Anjouan, plus AU Envoy 
Madeira, briefed Union President Sambi soon after their return to 
Moroni.  South African Ambassador Mabeta also attended.  The Comoros 
side included Foreign Minister Jaffar, Defense Minister Dossar, and 
Presidential Advisor Nakchami.  Members provided a detailed account 
of the mission to Anjouan. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  President Sambi listened, then wondered aloud if Bacar 
were not mentally deranged in some way.  Sambi  appeared surprised 
Bacar had made such a personal attack on Mourad and Madeira.  He 
could not understand why Bacar would remain defiant even as 
international forces aligned against him.  President Sambi said he 
was both sad and relieved.  He was sad, in that he hoped that we 
might have been successful and thereby prevented bloodshed in the 
Comoros.  He was relieved, in that any remaining ambiguity regarding 
how to handle Bacar's intransigence seems to have evaporated.  All 
interested parties now agree that Bacar will not budge except by 
military force.  Sambi expressed appreciation to all present for our 
support and for the effort that we had made to resolve the problem 
peacefully. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Next, Sambi spoke of the need for rapid military action. 
 He described how expensive it was for him to keep his troops in 
Mohel.  Sambi said the Union troops were impatient, the second 
helicopter was operational, and he was "95 percent ready to go." 
Sambi expressed confidence his Union Army for National Development 
could defeat Bacar alone and they wanted to prove their worth to the 
Comoran people. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  That said, Sambi acknowledged that a more robust force, 
reinforced by the Tanzanians and the Senegalese, might be even more 
successful.  "If I can save just one life, it is worthwhile," he 
said.  Charg Sibley reinforced that notion.  He announced that the 
United States is providing 5,000 pounds of medical supplies for 
dealing with casualties; adding our hope these supplies might end up 
having peacetime uses instead of treating casualties of war.  Charg 
Sibley urged Sambi to be patient enough to allow an overwhelming 
force to be assembled, one that Bacar's forces would likely run away 
from rather than fight against. 
 
¶15. (SBU)  Sambi accepted this argument, but with some reluctance. 
Then Jaffar spoke up to urge swift arrival into the Comoros of at 
least some portion of the foreign troop reinforcements.  He pointed 
out that this would allow the Comoran Government to point to 
tangible progress on the road to the military solution and thereby 
defuse some of the pressure for immediate action.  In this regard, 
Jaffar looked directly to the French Ambassador to seek prompt 
action by the French in fulfilling their commitment to provide the 
logistical assistance to move the troops.  Ambassador Job took note 
of the request and promised to refer it to Paris forthwith. 
 
COMMENT: 
- - - - - 
 
¶16. (SBU)  Bacar remains confident he can call the AU's bluff; after 
all, it has worked for eight months.  This may change given the 
force Tanzanian Foreign Minister Membe intends to amass to both help 
Comoros and establish AU credibility.  Embassy suggests the 
Department consider encouraging South Africa or France to keep the 
door open for exile if Bacar finally blinks. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  COMMENT CONTINUED:  No one, including Sambi, is 
confident the AND can succeed alone.  Nor does anyone really think, 
with friendly forces arriving to help, that Sambi would decide to 
try it alone.  Still, Sambi's urgency is very real as is his 
 
ANTANANARI 00000157  003 OF 003 
 
 
expectation that significant Tanzanian and other troops will arrive 
and take action in the near future.  END COMMENT. 
 
CASEBEER