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Viewing cable 08ANKARA332, TURKEY: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ANKARA332 2008-02-22 12:32 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0332 0531232
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221232Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5311
INFO RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 3908
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS ANKARA 000332 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ECON ASEC PREL ETTC TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY:  CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT 
 
REF: STATE 6461 
 
1. (SBU) A strict reading of the criteria outlined in reftel 
paras 2 and 8 could lead to the conclusion that Turkey does 
not possess critical infrastructure (CI) or key resources 
(KR) whose incapacity or destruction would have a 
"debilitating impact on (U.S.) security, national economic 
security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters."  However, there are several 
key elements of infrastructure that are relevant to note in 
this context. 
 
2. (SBU) Turkey has two pieces of critical infrastructure 
through which seven percent of the world's oil supply moves 
each day: 
1) The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline carries up to 1 
million barrels of oil a day; the terminal at Ceyhan has a 
holding capacity of 300,00 tons of crude. 
2) The Turkish Straits, comprised of the Strait of Canakkale 
(Dardanelles), the Sea of Marmara and the Istanbul Strait 
(Bosphorous) are among the most hazardous, crowded, difficult 
and potentially dangerous natural waterways in the world. 
Ships carrying 137 million metric tons of petroleum products, 
including 95 million metric tons of crude oil, transit the 
straits every year. 
 
The closure or disruption of either of these critical 
infrastructures would impede the flow of significant amounts 
of crude oil to world markets. 
 
3.  (SBU) Separately, Habur Border Gate is the primary 
Turkey-Iraq border crossing point.  Approximately 3 million 
gallons per day of gasoline and diesel fuel for the Iraqi 
people and 25 percent of the sustainment fuel for coalition 
forces cross into Iraq through Habur Border Gate.  Incapacity 
or destruction of Habur Border Gate would impact U.S. 
national security interests by degrading our military and 
humanitarian efforts in Iraq. 
 
4. (SBU) While reftel para 10 excludes from this report "war 
fighting facilities managed by other agencies," we note that 
Incirlik Air Force Base is a major air cargo hub supporting 
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Over 50% of air 
cargo into Iraq transits Incirlik.  Up to ten KC-135 tanker 
aircraft based at Incirlik support refueling operations for 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, have 
run over 2800 refueling sorties and have delivered over 192 
million pounds of fuel.  The incapacity or destruction of 
Incirlik would have a significant short-term effect on 
coalition operations in Iraq and, thus, on U.S. national 
interests. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON