VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #0090 0311547
ZNY EEEEE ZZH
R 311547Z JAN 08
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3638
INFO RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0250

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000090 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO/UNP, WHA/CCA AND DS/DSS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OFDP ASEC CU UN
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CUBANS ON MISSION SECURITY 
 
REF: 07 USUN 1088 
 
¶1.  This message is sensitive but unclassified - please 
protect accordingly. 
 
¶2.  Following a meeting of the UN's Committee on Relations 
with the Host Country called by Cuba (septel) to complain 
that the host country was not taking the Cuban Mission's 
security concerns seriously enough, NYC Commissioner for the 
UN Marjorie Tiven called a meeting at which NYPD Deputy 
Commissioner David Cohen briefed the Cubans on what the NYPD 
considers an upgraded security response more in keeping with 
the sort of threat faced by the Cuban Mission (and certain 
unnamed other diplomatic missions) at the current time.  USUN 
and DS/NYFO representatives were also present. 
 
¶3. Cohen emphasized that the NYPD has not in fact withdrawn 
police protection from the Cuban Mission - instead "we have 
changed it and made it better".  A police officer sitting in 
a security booth outside the mission provides "extremely 
limited" coverage which "may not really be appropriate for 
the times".  Instead of an officer on duty around the clock, 
the NYPD stated that it has put into place a security plan 
consisting of four elements.  (1) An unmarked car with two 
plainclothes detective specifically trained to think about 
protection matters will visit the Cuban Mission at least once 
a day, and the detectives will check in personally with the 
Mission's security officer.  If the Cubans believe more than 
one stop-by is necessary on any given day, it will be 
arranged.  Cohen added that it is possible that there had not 
yet been a meaningful dialogue in this respect because the 
Cubans "did not know what was going on".  (2) an "Operation 
Hercules" team consisting of heavily armed officers 
accompanied by an intelligence officer will visit the mission 
on a regular but random basis.  Their purpose is to undertake 
surveillance activity and show force as a deterrent.  (3) a 
"Critical Response Vehicle" - a marked radio car with 
uniformed officers will go to the Cuban Mission several times 
a day on different days of the week.  USUN officers have 
recently seen this vehicle parked in front of the Cuban 
Mission.  (4) On Deputy Commissioner Cohen's determination, 
the 17th NYPD precinct will place an officer at the police 
booth which remains near the corner of 38th and Lexington in 
front of the Mission.  Such a decision will depend on the 
threat assessment at that location at any given time.  If a 
demonstration is planned, additional resources will be 
deployed, both uniformed and plainclothesed.  Cohen concluded 
his presentation by arguing that the new procedures in place 
were "by far stronger" as well as more costly than the 
officer in the police booth, and that an extremely important 
aspect of the procedures was the daily interface with the 
Cuban Mission. 
 
¶4.  Cuban Security Officer Victor Alvarez and Legal 
Officer/Host Country Coordinator Anet Pino stressed that the 
Mission remained concerned at the loss of 24/7 police 
coverage, but did not explicitly reject Cohen's position that 
the new measures were inadequate or inappropriate for the 
times.  They did express concern that the guidelines for 
demonstrations set forth in a USUN diplomatic note dated June 
1995 - and particularly the areas into which participants in 
those demonstrations would be placed - had not been followed. 
 The NYPD, which had signed off on the 1995 note, took the 
position that it could not expect to be bound by an agreement 
that is now almost 13 years old and it was up to the police 
to control the location of demonstrators in accordance with 
their numbers, the threat they posed to the Mission, 
constitutional guarantees, the safety and security of passing 
vehicles and pedestrians, and the facts and circumstances 
regarding the particular demonstration. 
 
¶5.  Not surprisingly, the Cuban Mission asked that USUN 
inform it in writing of the new security procedures to be put 
in place as well as confirmation that the provisions included 
in the 1995 note are no longer valid and what provisions will 
replace them.  After coordination with the Department, USUN 
would prepare a draft, but we expect that NYC and NYPD 
officials will not agree to be bound by anything. 
 
KHALILZAD