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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0999
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000089 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING JANUARY 25, 2008 
 
 
This is CWC-03-07. 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) for 
Preparations for the Second Review Conference 
(RevCon) began its work on the draft report in 
earnest this week.  Many delegations offered 
substantive interventions on "Block 1" of the 
Chairman's draft text, drawing early lines on the 
relative importance of disarmament and non- 
proliferation, the role of the Scientific Advisory 
Board (SAB), and other points as captured below. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The WEOG met in its expanded format 
(including members of the EU, Japan and Korea).  Most 
interventions were made by WEOG members, although 
Slovenia spoke on behalf of the EU.  In a private 
conversation later, the UK indicated its concern that 
EU members are too hesitant to speak individually in 
support of a common position, a tactic the NAM 
continues to use effectively to add weight to its 
statements. 
 
¶3. (U) Although an Article XI consultation was added 
last-minute to the OPCW calendar, the schedule in 
general remains fairly open, indicating that the 
focus of delegations has in large part shifted to 
preparations for the RevCon. 
 
--------------------- 
EXPANDED WEOG MEETING 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) The expanded WEOG meeting on January 22 
included non-WEOG EU member states, Japan and Korea 
and lasted longer than regular WEOG meetings owing to 
extensive discussion on a number of subjects. 
Discussion started on "Block 1" of the OEWG 
Chairman's draft text.  Most delegations agreed that 
the text appeared to be balanced and neutral.  The UK 
noted that while the Chairman's text differs from the 
UK national position on certain issues, it is not in 
a position to take the lead in proposing significant 
changes but would be able to support others who did. 
The UK also reported that there had been debate in 
the Bureau about whether to produce two separate 
RevCon documents -- a Report and a Political 
Statement -- or one consolidated report; in his 
capacity as OEWG Chair, UK Amb. Parker feels that 
having two documents is important to keep a sole 
report being held hostage by certain delegations. 
 
¶5. (U) A number of delegations raised issues they 
would like to be added to or expanded in the Chair's 
draft text.  Canada and the UK both stated their 
desire for strengthening the role of the SAB.  Citing 
the reference to Albania's landmark completion of 
destruction of its CW stockpile, Canada also 
suggested including a reference to Libya's accession 
as a possessor state since the First RevCon.  Germany 
indicated its desire to highlight destruction 
deadlines, including intermediate ones, though it 
admitted that this might be problematic vis-a-vis 
Russia.  Referring to its national paper on measures 
to be taken in the event of chemical crises, Japan 
raised the issue as a possible RevCon discussion 
topic. 
 
¶6. (U) Turning to the NAM's RevCon statement, Amb. 
Javits characterized it as unbalanced and clearly a 
position from which the NAM will try to negotiate. 
He also pointed out a number of contradictions within 
the text, suggesting that they could be good points 
for the WEOG to focus on.  Many other delegations 
agreed with the U.S. assessment, with the Netherlands 
and Japan both citing their concern at the NAM's 
 
apparent interest in focusing on increased 
assistance.  Canada and Sweden both noted that the 
NAM's claim that non-proliferation is not part of the 
CWC is flawed, particularly as the First RevCon 
report set the stage for non-proliferation (Sweden) 
and the OPCW's budget specifically lists non- 
proliferation as a core objective (Canada).  Spain 
agreed with the U.S. suggestion that moderate NAM 
members might be more inclined to WEOG positions than 
those of the most-vocal and radical NAM delegations. 
 
¶7. (U) Speaking in its EU Presidency capacity, 
Slovenia said that it plans to increase EU 
coordination in the run up to the RevCon.  It plans 
to host a conference in Ljubljana with the goal of 
formulating common EU positions on a number of areas, 
including the General Purpose Criterion, verification 
regime, and universality. 
 
¶8. (U) Amb. Lak (Netherlands) reviewed his donor 
coordination initative, as reported last week.  He 
stressed that the initiative's goal is to be forward- 
looking and to involve concrete plans for current or 
future assistance.  Slovenia noted that the EU -- as 
a major contributor of voluntary funds to the OPCW -- 
wants to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of 
assistance programs to determine the focus for future 
EU support.  Among others, Germany expressed its 
support for Amb. Lak's plan, saying that donor 
coordination and unity was necessary to set the 
OPCW's assistance and international cooperation 
priorities and to combat the NAM's apparent push 
solely for a "proliferation of ICA funding." 
 
¶9. (U) On sampling and analysis, Germany suggested 
discussing it during the Industry Cluster meeting on 
February 19, especially as they plan to have a German 
expert from Berlin in attendance.  The UK, which also 
plans to have an expert from London at the meeting, 
agreed that discussions either during or on the 
fringes of the meeting would be beneficial.  Japan 
recommended focusing discussion on how to implement 
sampling and analysis as, in its view, the TS has 
already exhibited the technical capacity to carry it 
out.  However, the Netherlands noted that it would be 
premature to look at implementation before discussing 
the broader principle of sampling and analysis. 
 
¶10. (U) Picking up on a topic from last week's WEOG 
meeting, Australia said that it also had been 
approached by the TS to arrange a visit to "inspect" 
Australia's offers of assistance under Article X. 
Like many of the other countries already approached 
by the TS, Australia said that its offer of 
assistance had been very general and that there was 
nothing concrete for the TS to inspect.  It emerged 
that the TS's motivation for visiting Article X 
donors may in part be driven by a need to spend EU 
Joint Action voluntary funds before they expire. 
 
--------- 
ARTICLE X 
--------- 
 
¶11. (U) As reported last week and above, the TS has 
approached a number of SPs to "inspect" their offers 
of assistance made under Article X, as provided for 
in Article VIII, paragraph 39b.  On January 22, at 
the request of Gennadi Lutay (Head, Assistance and 
Protection Branch (APB)), Delreps met with him and 
Christina Rodriguez, another member of APB.  Lutay 
spent quite a while extolling the virtues of the 
initiative described above.  He explained that in a 
number of cases, the request for a visit has acted as 
a catalyst for States Parties to withdraw or update 
their original offers, often made ten years ago 
following entry into force.  While this is certainly 
a valuable exercise, Del questions whether actual 
 
visits to capitals are necessary to accomplish this. 
 
¶12. (U) As expected, Lutay eventually indicated an 
interest in visiting the U.S.  Delreps noted the 
general nature of the U.S. offer (medical 
antidotes/treatment as needed), and inquired as to 
what precisely the TS would hope to "inspect" or gain 
by such a visit.  Lutay and Rodriguez were unable to 
clearly articulate a purpose, although they 
eventually suggested that perhaps the U.S. could 
consider a presentation or demonstration of a 
representative sample of medical antidotes that we 
might provide.  Lutay also pointed out that it would 
be difficult for the TS to justify excluding the U.S. 
from this initiative; the broader concept of 
excluding a number of States Parties whose offers 
would not benefit from inspection did not seem to 
catch on with APB as a viable alternative.  Delreps 
reiterated the need for a clear purpose for the 
visit, but committed to discuss the matter with 
Washington. 
 
¶13. (SBU) COMMENT: The most important question is 
clearly whether or not this is an appropriate and/or 
effective use of OPCW funds.  However, the effort 
raises additional questions as to the ability of the 
TS staff involved in the effort to analyze individual 
 
SIPDIS 
offers in this context. END COMMENT. 
 
¶14. (U) Iranian Proposal Regarding Victims of 
Chemical Weapons:  Jitka Brodska, the facilitator for 
Article X, informed Delrep that Iran has requested 
she circulate its paper regarding victims of chemical 
weapons prior to the next consultation scheduled for 
February 18.  She is willing to do so but wants to 
avoid creating a separate agenda item and plans to 
allow the proposal simply to be brought up under the 
discussions regarding readiness to provide 
assistance.  Brodska noted that the Iranians are 
insistent on making the issue a topic on the agenda 
of the RevCon and expressed an interest in hearing 
how the U.S. would like to see the issue handled in 
the coming weeks. 
 
---------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (U) On January 22, Delrep met with Bill Kane 
(Head, IVB) at his request to discuss the current 
state of the Industry Cluster.  Amb. Dani (Algeria), 
in his capacity as EC Vice-Chair for the Industry 
Cluster, is considering holding a session during the 
February 19 Cluster meetings on the status of the 
Cluster's work and goals for the future.  In advance 
of that, Amb. Dani asked Bill Kane to touch bases 
with several delegations who are most involved in the 
work of the Cluster. 
 
¶16. (U) The basis for the discussion was the "List of 
Issues Formally Open" that was prepared for the 
RevCon OEWG (dated 23 March 2007).  In the end, the 
TS position on many of these issues is similar to 
 
SIPDIS 
that of the USG.  The TS sees no value in opening or 
re-opening issues that have little chance of forward 
progress.  Of course, the TS acknowledges that they 
will be criticized by some delegations for the long 
list of open items coming from the First RevCon, but 
they are also realistic about the prospects for true 
progress.  A few topics that Kane expects to be of 
particular concern to some include: 
 
-   Low concentration thresholds for Schedule 2A/2A*: 
Kane understands that the U.S. position on this issue 
is not the most extreme; that distinction seems to 
belong to Germany.  Without some effort to resolve 
the concerns of Germany, Japan, and the U.S., this 
issue will not move forward. 
 
 
-   OCPF site selection:  The TS believes that the 
newly modified methodology the TS has begun using 
this year gives most delegations exactly what they 
wanted in distributing OCPF inspections in a more 
balanced way based on the size of their domestic 
industry.  The TS would prefer to let the new 
methodology have at least one year of application to 
assess its true impact.  So, if delegations continue 
to insist that consultations resume on this matter, 
the TS preference is that they focus only on VA Part 
IX para 11(c) ("proposals by States Parties") for the 
time being. 
 
¶17. (U) Kane also mentioned briefly the OCPF 
declaration "upgrade" which is the subject of an 
upcoming TS paper.  The TS does not see a need to 
start consultations on this necessarily.  The TS sees 
the option of handling this in a way similar to site 
selection.  Although we might agree with the options 
available to the DG, we will need to withhold 
judgment on the matter until the TS paper has been 
thoroughly reviewed. 
 
¶18. (U) Another issue that Delrep discussed with Kane 
in a later setting came from the introduction to the 
list referred to in paragraph 16 above -- the fact 
that the EC Bureau took a decision on March 1 to 
delete certain entries and no longer consider them to 
be formally open.  The presumption is that this was 
done because these items had been resolved in some 
other way.  Kane said he would consider the value of 
the TS doing a further review of the issues in the 
March 23 List to see if there were other items that 
might be proposed to the Bureau for removal for 
similar reasons.  This could ease the backlog that 
would need to be discussed at the RevCon. 
 
------------ 
WEOG MEETING 
------------ 
 
¶19. (U) The January 24 meeting of the WEOG was 
uneventful.  The purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss delegations' positions going into the OEWG 
meeting.  Del shared the general aspects of its 
comments on the first section of the draft RevCon 
report.  The only other delegations to share their 
positions were the UK and Germany, whose points 
overlapped the U.S. points substantially. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
OEWG: PREPARATIONS FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (U) On March 24, Amb. Parker (UK) chaired the 
seventeenth meeting of the OEWG to date.  The agenda 
items were: (1) draft provisional RevCon agenda; (2) 
the first section of the draft RevCon report; and (3) 
participation of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in the RevCon. 
 
¶21. (U) Prior to beginning the agenda, Amb. Parker 
briefly discussed the history of the issue of 
rotation of the Chair of the RevCon between regional 
groups.  He noted that an amendment to the rules of 
procedure appears to be needed to address this issue 
for this RevCon and into the future.  The Legal 
Advisor is drafting an opinion on the matter, which 
the DG will circulate soon in a note.  Also, Parker 
gave some time to the Pakistani delegation, in their 
role as chair of the Asian group, to announce the 
group's agreement to nominate Saudi Arabian 
Ambassador El Khereiji to serve as the RevCon chair 
(given the assumptions already explained). 
 
¶22. (U) On the topic of the draft provisional agenda, 
there was significant discussion on the following 
 
items: 
 
-   item 9(c)(vi):  Consultations, cooperation and 
fact-finding including the relationship with other 
multilateral efforts.  This topic met with a number 
of questions from delegations.  India encouraged a 
discussion about Article IX, apart from other 
organizations.  Russia suggested that discussions 
about other organizations might fit better under item 
9(e): the functioning of the OPCW. 
 
-   item 9(c)(viii):  Economic and technological 
development and steps to the full implementation of 
Article VII and Article XI.  This topic also met with 
a number of questions from delegations.  India and 
Algeria suggested that Article XI be given separate 
consideration on the agenda. 
 
-   There was also some discussion on the best place 
on the agenda to discuss terrorism, given the limited 
mandate of the OPCW in this area. 
 
¶23. (U) On the first section of the report text, most 
delegations limited their comments to general 
observations, committing to giving specific textual 
changes to the Chair directly.  Iran was the first to 
intervene, mentioning many of its pet interests: 
"delicate balance," CWC primarily as a disarmament 
instrument, caution over the introduction of "new" 
terms (e.g., preferred use of "verification of 
activities not prohibited" over "non-proliferation"), 
focus on destruction and deadlines, replacement of 
"regions of tension or instability" in the 
universality discussion with "those whose non- 
adherence is a cause for serious concern," and adding 
the idea of "free trade." 
 
¶24. (U) India shared many of these same points, 
adding their concern for how the discussions on 
terrorism and reference to the SAB are handled. 
South Africa announced that their comments would 
focus on the reference to UNSCR 1540 and being more 
proactive on many areas, including assistance and 
protection.  Germany noted the importance of balance 
between destruction and other matters, and questioned 
why the SAB is singled out amongst the several boards 
that function in conjunction with the TS.  On 
destruction, the Netherlands cautioned against too 
congratulatory a tone in this area, and the UK 
pointed out that some intermediate deadlines have not 
yet been met.  Del deployed general points, drawing 
on the revised text received from Washington, and has 
submitted specific suggestions in writing to the 
Chair. 
 
¶25. (U) The use of the term &non-proliferation8 was a 
common theme throughout the meeting.  After several 
interventions (including Iran,s), Canada expressed 
surprise and confusion at the debate in a well timed 
intervention that included a reference to previous 
agreement to non-proliferation as a core objective in 
the annual budget.  Sweden also noted that the term 
appears throughout the report of the First RevCon. 
Germany introduced the term &confidence in non- 
proliferation8 and Mexico questioned the need for, 
relevance of, or the chance of a healthy debate on 
nonproliferation v. disarmament, as they saw it as 
much too early to narrow the many ways this balance 
could be achieved. 
 
¶26. (U) On the topic of the participation of NGOs, 
India expressed its concern over the poor 
geographical distribution of NGOs that participated 
in the summer 2007 event and whether another event 
would yield significantly different results.  South 
Africa noted that, although they did not question the 
removal of certain NGOs from the summer event, they 
would like to see as complete a list as possible this 
 
time before invitations are sent out. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE XI 
---------- 
 
¶27. (U) On January 25, Li Hong (China) led a 
consultation on Article XI ("fostering of 
international cooperation for peaceful purposes in 
the field of chemical activities").  The facilitator 
acknowledged that he had neither a particular agenda 
for the meeting nor any particular expectations.  As 
a result, he achieved exactly what he set out to do. 
He did, however, ask delegations for their thoughts 
on whether consultations should move forward with 
substantive work at this point or instead focus on 
preparations for the RevCon and then resume 
afterward.  There was a general consensus expressed 
that work should move forward now based on the 
mandate from CSP-12. 
 
¶28. (U) The facilitator referenced the working paper 
distributed by Cuba on behalf of the NAM and China at 
CSP-12 (C-12/NAT.1, dated 6 November 2007), along 
with, as an afterthought, other older national papers 
distributed by countries such as Switzerland and New 
Zealand.  He encouraged delegations to look at these 
as a source of ideas for substantive work by the 
group.  Del intervened to state that, although many 
of the ideas presented in the NAM paper could serve 
as a good basis for the work of the consultation, 
this should not be interpreted as an endorsement of 
the paper as a whole, which presents these as 
"indicative elements of a plan of action."  The Cuban 
delegation intervened to state that they shared the 
U.S view of the mandate and work of the group, at 
least at this time.  Iran, however, felt it necessary 
to note that, even though the mandate was clear, they 
still had hope that "dynamic" positions might shift 
over time to allow the eventual undertaking of an 
action plan.  Del views substantive work in the time 
leading up to the RevCon as a way to reduce the 
urgency of calls for an action plan during the 
RevCon. 
 
--------------- 
IRAQI ACCESSION 
--------------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) Delrep met with Director of Verification 
Horst Reeps and UK Delrep Wolstenholme on January 25 
to provide imagery forwarded by Washington and share 
general thoughts on the progress of accession and 
steps to take in advance of and following Iraq's 
submission of its initial declaration.  Reeps has 
heard nothing further from Baghdad, but expressed his 
desire to convene a short-notice trilateral 
(U.S./UK/TS) meeting in The Hague, preferably 
involving experts from capitals, to review the newest 
version of the Iraqi declaration upon receipt.  (Del 
rep did hear directly from Iraqi Amb. Banaa that he 
expects accession to occur "any day" but, as his 
predictions have tended toward the overly optimistic 
in the past, does not necessarily take this as an 
indicator that accession is imminent.) 
 
¶30. (SBU) Reeps mentioned a recent conversation with 
the Iranian delegation, who indicated an Iranian 
desire for some sort of full admission of guilt 
regarding the use of CW in Iran immediately following 
accession.  Reeps also noted that a number of 
delegations have been inquiring about the general 
possibility of coalition forces having discovered old 
CW rounds. 
 
¶31. (SBU) In terms of steps following accession, 
Reeps still recommends that the Iraqis introduce 
their declaration at the EC session following their 
 
accession.  He and the DG also believe it would be 
preferable for the Iraqis themselves to state up 
front that they are unable to guarantee the safety 
and security of an inspection team, thus justifying 
postponing initial inspections until the situation 
improves significantly.  The UK delegation expressed 
concern that Iraq has no concept of the political 
difficulties it is likely to encounter from Iran 
following accession. 
 
¶32. (U) Javits sends. 
 
Schofer