VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0088/01 0291535
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291535Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0987
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) 
NSC FOR SMITH 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF  U.S. 
2007 PRIORITIES AND NEW PRIORITIES FOR 2008. 
 
REF: A. REF: A) 07 STATE 9682 B) 07 THE HAGUE 104 C) 07 
 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 2034 
 
This is CWC-02-08 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U) At the end of the tenth anniversary year of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), most U.S. 
priorities at the OPCW for 2007 were advanced if not 
fully achieved.  An Executive Council (EC) chairman 
very supportive of the U.S. was elected in May. 
Article VII implementation moved forward, although 
not reaching the "20-in-10" milestone.  The Director 
General's zero nominal growth (ZNG) budget for 2008 
was approved on schedule by EC-50 in September. 
Although some ground was lost when the Director 
General (DG) acknowledged the Russian Federation's 
destruction of 20 percent of its stockpile based on 
first stage destruction only, the Del has worked to 
educate WEOG and other colleagues on the issues of 
principle behind the "end point of destruction" 
debate. 
 
¶2. (U) As preparations for the Second Review 
Conference (RevCon) continued, the U.S. submitted a 
number of national papers to inform the initial round 
of discussions, broadly organized along the lines of 
the report from the First RevCon.  The Technical 
Secretariat (TS) is quietly continuing to work on its 
 
SIPDIS 
ability to investigate allegations of CW use.  The EC 
took a decision concerning "timely submission of 
declarations" (EC-51) and approved the first U.S. 
industrial facility agreement (EC-50), both U.S. 
priorities for 2007.  And in October, the U.S. 
successfully hosted the first EC visit to a 
destruction facility, setting the standard for future 
visits, including the next such visit to Russia. 
 
¶3. (U) Politically, 2007 also saw a sharp increase in 
the activities of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
within the OPCW.  The NAM has become increasingly 
active in consultations and negotiations, and has 
shown a tendency to be more proactive and coordinated 
than most, if not all, of the regional groups, 
although it is clear that NAM "positions" and papers 
tend to be representative of the views of only a 
small clique of the most radical NAM members 
(including Iran, India, Cuba).  The Iranian 
delegation continues to be in a class of its own, 
stymieing progress across the board, with such 
unreasonable demands as to isolate it even among 
fellow NAM delegations.  An Iranian proposal to 
establish a network for the victims of chemical 
weapons, proposed last-minute at the end of 2007 and 
poorly handled from a process standpoint, threatens 
to bog down the ongoing Article X facilitation.  The 
expected Iraqi accession to the CWC in 2008 will 
further provide ample opportunity for Iranian 
political grandstanding. 
 
¶4. (U) In general, the Del sees the upcoming year as 
one in which the Second RevCon will dominate 
activities during the first six months.  Prior 
thereto, it will be difficult to pursue issues 
outside of the RevCon context.  Following the RevCon, 
an assessment of possibilities for the remaining 
months will be more feasible.  However, there are 
several issues that can and should be pursued 
throughout the year.  The paragraphs below cover 
these issues, in addition to the Del's assessment of 
progress on and recommendations for future actions 
related to priorities and "other important issues" 
from 2007.   This cable follows the priorities cable 
from 2007 (Ref A), the Del's 2007 mid-term report 
(Ref B), and the Del's assessment and recommendations 
 
for the RevCon (Ref C). 
 
------------------------- 
REVIEW OF 2007 PRIORITIES 
------------------------- 
 
EC CHAIR 
-------- 
 
¶5. (U) Iranian interest in becoming the EC Chair was 
firmly but quietly deflected.  Philippine Ambassador 
Romeo Arguelles, who has worked well and closely with 
the U.S. Delegation, was the Asian Group candidate 
elected EC Chairman in May (Ref B). 
 
¶6. (SBU) When it became clear late in 2007 that the 
Chair of the Second RevCon would be chosen from the 
Asian Group, further efforts were successful in 
identifying agreeable candidates before Iran had a 
chance to pursue any possible interest in the 
position.  In mid-January 2008, the Asian Group 
officially announced that it would nominate the Saudi 
Ambassador. 
 
 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶7. (U) Although progress was made in 2007, it was 
limited and fell significantly short of the "20-in- 
10" goals.  Many States Parties have questioned the 
continuing emphasis on Article VII as outreach 
efforts slowed significantly due to funding 
constraints.  However, a positive note was achieved 
in the successful cooperation between Japan and 
Australia this year on major outreach efforts that 
worked toward "20-in-10" goals in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Malaysia. 
 
¶8. (U) During 2007, the Del also witnessed 
significant attacks by Iran and others on Article VII 
as an ongoing priority.  In many ways, this was a 
transparent effort on their part to set up a trade- 
off scenario to get what they wanted on Articles X 
and XI.  That balance certainly played out during the 
CSP, when decisions on all three issues were 
negotiated as a package by Iran. 
 
¶9. (U) Looking ahead:  We expect that Japan and 
Australia will continue to partner in their outreach 
within Asia, and other States Parties will be focused 
on training (e.g., France and the UK).  The CSP 
decision regarding Article VII should allow the 
European Union and its member states to continue to 
provide voluntary contributions to keep alive 
outreach efforts by the TS.  Iran and other non- 
aligned states will use the RevCon as their 
opportunity to argue that sufficient progress has 
been made on Article VII and push instead for an 
Action Plan for Article XI, much as was done with 
Article VII at the First RevCon.  The Del proposes 
continued emphasis of Article VII at the RevCon and 
behind-the-scenes efforts with the TS and other 
States Parties, which may ultimately be more 
effective than public statements in the policy-making 
organs. 
 
 
2008 BUDGET 
----------- 
 
¶10. (U) The DG's budget proposal for 2008 provided a 
third consecutive year of zero nominal growth (ZNG). 
It also increased inspector training and equipment 
upgrading.  Intense opposition from China and several 
NAM countries halted efforts for adding increased 
OPCF inspections to the budget, with inspection 
numbers being maintained at the 2007 level.  To the 
 
credit of intensive work by co-facilitators Diana 
Gosens (Netherlands) and Donggy Lee (South Korea), 
consensus on the budget was achieved in September 
during EC-50, only the second time in the OPCW's 
history that the EC completed its deliberations on 
the budget before the annual CSP.  The CSP, in turn, 
approved the budget without any discussion in 
November. 
 
¶11. (U) Looking ahead:  Pressure to increase the 
budget is growing, both from NAM countries wanting to 
expand OPCW assistance programs and from WEOG 
countries wanting to increase inspections.  The Del 
urges early identification of U.S. budget priorities 
so that we can proactively work with the TS to get 
them into the DG's proposed budget before the 
political fighting over specific line items begins 
after the budget's initial release.  The 2009 budget 
consultations will most likely focus on the balance 
between destruction and assistance; the U.S. and 
like-minded States Parties will have to work hard to 
insure the budget is not held hostage by delegations 
fixated on greatly increasing funding for assistance 
programs. 
 
¶12. (U) During the budget negotiations in September, 
OPCW staff and several delegations noted the growing 
difficulty of continuing ZNG budgets, particularly as 
they actually represent reductions year-on-year in 
real terms, having no allowance for inflation.  Some 
WEOG delegations (notably the Swiss) raised the 
possibility of moving from ZNG to Zero Real Growth 
(ZRG) to at least allow for the budget to keep pace 
with inflation.  While the Del will continue to work 
with the TS and other delegations to guarantee 
leaner, improved programming, the Del believes that 
any priority increases in inspections or other areas 
will require a carefully controlled and monitored 
shift away from ZNG budgets. 
 
 
RUSSIAN 20 PERCENT DESTRUCTION DEADLINE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) 2007 saw several important milestones for the 
Russian CW destruction program.  First, Russian 
claims to having reached 20 percent, based on 
completing the first stage of destruction 
(neutralization) of VX nerve agent in large caliber 
munitions at the Maradykovsky destruction facility, 
were upheld by the TS.  Although the DG's statement 
announcing this accomplishment was heavily caveated 
to indicate the necessity of completing the second 
stage (incineration of the reaction mass), 
concurrence in OPCW documents and presentations with 
the Russian destruction figures have removed much if 
not all political impetus for Russia to firmly commit 
to second stage destruction as an Article IV 
requirement. 
 
¶14. (U) Second, after painstaking negotiations with 
Russia, the TS agreed in the draft facility agreement 
and verification plan for Maradykovsky to grant 
credit for destruction after the first stage in 
return for Russian acceptance of verification of the 
second stage.  U.S. and Allied concerns have hardly 
been assuaged by continued delays in putting the 
second stage incinerator into operation; the reaction 
mass for all agent Russia claims to have destroyed 
there is currently in storage in a number of holding 
tanks, awaiting further processing.  Perhaps of 
greater concern have been the provisions in the 
documents for what many deem to be inadequate steps 
taken for mutilation of the munitions, again an 
"interim" solution to gain quick credit until the 
metal parts furnace is operational. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The vast majority of delegations are simply 
 
not knowledgeable or engaged enough to understand or 
care about the issue.  Many, including those who have 
taken the time to educate themselves, view it as yet 
another U.S.-Russia bilateral dispute; several 
delegations have acknowledged that verification of 
the second stage addresses their primary concerns. 
Even the Allies, having pressured the U.S. to adopt a 
hard line definition of destruction years ago, seem 
equivocal as to the real risk posed by developments 
at Maradykovsky. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The Allies do agree that the DG's actions 
have made it considerably more difficult to hold 
Russia to a strict definition of what constitutes the 
"end point of destruction," and that close work with 
the TS will be appropriate to ensure that a similar 
opportunity is not lost as Russia approaches its 45 
percent deadline.  The difference with Russia is in 
fact a fundamental one, and all attempts to elicit a 
commitment from Russia to second stage destruction as 
an Article IV requirement have been unsuccessful. 
The U.S. has continued to block approval of the 
Maradykovsky documents, in return for which Russia 
has held up most U.S. documents, only joining 
consensus on the unrelated Pine Bluff Chemical Agent 
Disposal Facility modifications at the last EC 
session as a gesture of "extreme flexibility." 
 
¶17. (SBU) Looking ahead:  While the historical 
question of defining the end point of destruction is 
unlikely to receive a clear-cut political or 
technical answer, continued reciprocal deferral of 
Russian and U.S. documents for two-stage destruction 
processes has become counterproductive.  Whereas 
destruction at all facilities continues in accordance 
with draft agreements, lack of formal approval could 
be seen as undermining the value of the EC's 
oversight role in approving facility related 
documents. 
 
¶18. (SBU) While Russia is certain to balk at any 
stark interpretation of the treaty's provisions on 
destruction, some flexibility may be found in 
welcoming Russia's verbal commitment on several 
occasions to verification of, and financial 
responsibility for, both stages of the destruction 
process at any future destruction facilities.  The 
Del recommends considering revised draft decision 
language for the Maradykovsky facility agreement and 
verification plan that incorporates these elements, 
focusing on the real interest of ensuring that the 
second stage will remain under verification at all 
Russian facilities as opposed to the fundamental 
difference in interpretation of the treaty's 
provisions on destruction.  There is also broad 
support for the DG's statement on the matter to EC- 
49, welcomed most recently by the EU in its EC-51 
statement.  Highlighting the clear difference in 
Russian and TS interpretations of the Maradykovsky 
verification plan may also be useful. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Recent discussions with TS officials have 
also indicated a Russian desire to backslide in the 
area of mutilation of metal bodies following draining 
of the munitions at its Leonidovka destruction 
facility (still under construction).  Russian 
officials have apparently demanded credit for 
destruction even before the munition bodies have been 
thermally treated, and seem to view mutilation in the 
same category as destruction of the reaction mass: a 
transparency measure, as opposed to a treaty 
requirement.  Although the Del currently senses no TS 
inclination to compromise on this point, the Del will 
continue to follow the issue closely and report on 
any developments. 
 
¶20. (SBU) According to the terms of the CSP-11 
decision on EC visits to destruction facilities, 
 
Russia is also obligated to accept a visit to one or 
more of its facilities in 2008.  The Russians have 
been reticent on the subject, but the heavy schedule 
through the RevCon in April may well result in a 
visit scheduled for the second half of the year. 
There seems to have been a tacit agreement between 
France and Germany that, as France represented the 
WEOG on the visit to the Anniston destruction 
facility in October 2007, Germany will represent the 
WEOG on the first visit to Russia.  However, the U.S. 
will have a separate place on the delegation, which 
will require some thought as to what expertise might 
best be placed on a delegation that is likely to 
otherwise consist of diplomats from The Hague. 
 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (U) The Chair of the open-ended working group 
(OEWG) for the Second RevCon (UK Ambassador Lyn 
Parker) pursued a measured pace of work through 2007 
with a series of broadly themed meetings and 
solicitation of national statements and comments. 
Meetings were characterized more by general 
statements than lively debate.  In late November, the 
DG issued a 105-page "Note" reviewing the CWC since 
the First RevCon.  That document, along with the 
draft report language that the UK delegation (in its 
capacity as OEWG chair) and the TS will be passing, 
seriatim, to delegations are forming the basis for 
continuing discussions in preparation for the RevCon. 
 
¶22. (U) Looking ahead:  Although new initiatives have 
not yet been proposed, the Del expects battles over 
national implementation, economic and technological 
development, and disarmament versus non-proliferation 
to develop along traditional North-South fault lines. 
Cuba, as NAM coordinator, has produced a group 
statement with strong language on 1) destruction as 
the major focus of the RevCon; 2) a declaration that 
the OPCW has no mandate for non-proliferation in the 
convention; and 3) views on issues such as OCPF site 
selection methodology, inspection frequency and 
challenge inspections.  The Del will need to work 
with like-minded delegations to counter all of these 
points and/or to offer constructive solutions. 
 
¶23. (SBU) The NAM statement is inflammatory but not 
surprising.  It does, however, highlight a trend of 
early hardening and shoring up of coordinated NAM 
positions, leaving it to the U.S. and more like- 
minded delegations to pull the eventual outcome back 
to the center.  The UK has already made clear that it 
will in large part have to sacrifice its traditional 
leadership role in OPCW negotiations for the sake of 
maintaining neutrality as OEWG Chair.  It will be 
critical for WEOG and other like-minded delegations 
to be just as proactive as the NAM in coordinating 
and advocating positions.  The Del believes the U.S. 
may be most effective working actively behind the 
scenes (e.g., through other delegations) to avoid the 
natural suspicion that greets any U.S. initiative. 
However, a more public role for the U.S. may be 
necessary, depending greatly upon the issue at hand 
and the willingness of colleagues to draw clear lines 
on issues of mutual importance. 
 
¶24. (U) In March 2007, the RevCon OEWG circulated a 
list of "open issues," which range in level of 
activity from dormant (some dating from the 
Preparatory Commission) to active (with facilitators 
holding periodic consultations).  The Del understands 
that the Bureau can and has updated this list 
already, removing a number of the issues that are no 
longer under "active consideration" by the policy- 
making organs.  The Del recommends that in addition 
to painstaking negotiation of the report and 
 
political declaration, the RevCon be used where 
possible to actually take stock of issues, both on 
individual merit and as components of the various 
"clusters" of issues (e.g. Industry) in order to 
assess progress and chart a course for further work, 
if necessary. 
 
¶25. (U) More detailed Del recommendations for the 
RevCon can be found in Ref C. 
 
ALLEGED USE OF CW 
----------------- 
 
¶26. (U) The TS continues to improve its readiness to 
conduct an investigation of alleged use, and provided 
several updates on its capabilities in conjunction 
with Article X consultations and the recent Industry 
and Protection Forum in November 2007.  In 2007, the 
TS focused on reviving the concept of a list of 
 
SIPDIS 
qualified experts, to be called upon, based on their 
specific areas of expertise, in the case of an 
investigation of alleged use.  The TS received 85 
nominations from States Parties, and by end of year 
was planning to narrow this list down to a group of 
twenty "core experts."  Some thought has also gone 
into developing the OPCW's capability to analyze 
biomedical samples, and the ninth session of the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) recommended holding a 
confidence-building exercise as a first step. 
 
¶27. (U) Looking ahead:  The TS noted last year that 
it plans to begin training the group of core experts 
in January 2008.  The confidence-building exercise 
for analysis of biomedical samples is also 
tentatively being planned for some time in 2008, and 
the TS is also assessing techniques to analyze 
biomedical samples with the equipment in the labs 
that are currently designated.  The DG's background 
paper for the Second RevCon makes clear that 
improvements in this particular area, and in others 
that could increase the TS's readiness to conduct an 
investigation of alleged use (e.g., procurement of 
lighter, more portable equipment), depend greatly on 
the availability of financial resources in the 
future.  The Del will continue to work quietly to 
assess TS progress. 
 
 
OCPF SITE SELECTION 
------------------- 
 
¶28. (U) The DG's well-intentioned issuance of a TS 
note in the first half of 2007 modifying certain 
technical aspects of the OCPF site selection 
methodology could have been handled more smoothly. 
While it provides an improvement over the existing 
system, the way in which it was announced generated 
questions from delegations, a substantial amount of 
ill-will, and the resignation of the facilitator. 
NAM delegations continue to call for resumption of 
consultations, but it seems unlikely that someone 
will step forward to serve as facilitator. 
 
¶29. (U) Looking ahead:  Given that the TS's modified 
approach went into effect at the beginning of 2008, 
the Del does not recommend renewed consultations at 
this point.  However, if this becomes necessary 
because of the insistence of the NAM and others, the 
Del proposes that any new consultations on this topic 
be limited to a discussion of VA Part IX para 11(c) 
(proposals by States Parties), while affording the 
new TS methodology at least a one-year "breaking-in" 
period.  Any immediate return to the full discussion 
of selection methodologies seems a recipe for further 
disaster. 
 
¶30. (U) At the request of delegations during earlier 
consultations, the TS is currently drafting a paper 
 
regarding "improvements" to OCPF declaration 
requirements, which is expected to go to the DG for 
review and sign-off by the end of January.  The paper 
includes two sets of recommendations: (1) a proposal 
on how product group codes (PGC) could be modified, 
based on existing categories in use elsewhere, to 
better describe the declared industries, a major goal 
of which is to better identify those smaller 
industries whose activities are of lesser relevance 
to the object and purpose of the CWC (and thus give 
those sites less consideration for inspection); and 
(2) a proposal on new data elements that could be 
added to the declaration regime that would give 
additional technical characteristics, the goal again 
being to improve the ability to better select the 
most relevant sites for inspection. 
 
¶31. (U) The TS acknowledges that the first proposal 
is not likely to be very controversial and could 
possibly be implemented through a simple Note from 
the DG.  Assuming the first part of the TS paper is 
acceptable technically, the Del recommends reviewing 
it closely in light of U.S. ability to implement it 
within the industry declaration regime already in 
place.  If possible, the U.S. could speak up in 
support of this action by the DG as a possible way to 
cut-off NAM arguments opposing additional OCPF 
inspections.  However, the second proposal will be 
much more difficult for the U.S. and many other 
States Parties to fully endorse, as it presents 
significant legislative and implementation hurdles 
and increases the declaration burden for these sites. 
The proposal could lie fallow until such time as 
delegations see a compelling need to consider its 
implementation. 
 
 
NIL DECLARATIONS 
---------------- 
 
¶32. (U) Efforts early in the year to achieve a 
decision implementing "nil declarations" were 
unsuccessful.  However, under U.S. facilitator Larry 
Denyer, an alternative decision was reached by EC-51 
(EC-51/DEC.1, dated 27 November 2007).  This "stand 
alone" decision went into affect immediately and 
works toward leveling the industrial playing field 
by: (1) closing the loop on those States Parties 
which have yet to put in place measures to enable 
timely declarations; (2) requiring States Parties who 
have declarable industry, but have yet to submit 
annual declarations, to do so on time; and (3) 
requiring States Parties who anticipate late 
submission of their declarations to notify the TS in 
advance to allow possible resolution of problems. 
 
¶33. (U) Looking ahead:  The EC-51 decision requires 
the EC to keep focusing on this issue (and progress 
made under this decision) and allows further measures 
to be undertaken if deemed necessary.  This would 
allow further measures to be considered if the 
current decision does not sufficiently address the 
issue of late declarations. 
 
 
---------------------- 
OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES 
---------------------- 
 
OUTREACH ON U.S. CW DESTRUCTION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶34. (U) With the approval in 2006 of the U.S. request 
to extend its final destruction deadline to April 29, 
2012, the year 2007 saw a more resigned attitude in 
The Hague to projected delays in the U.S. destruction 
program well beyond 2012.  The timing of information 
released in January 2007 as part of the Nunn-McCurdy 
E 
 
submission to Congress was unfortunate in its 
references to completing destruction as late as 2023, 
and the general reaction locally has been one of 
genuine disbelief that a country as wealthy and 
powerful as the U.S. might miss the final deadline by 
eleven years largely due to less than 10 percent of 
its stockpile. 
 
¶35. (SBU) While the commotion over U.S. destruction 
delays has died down somewhat, Iran has certainly not 
missed any opportunity throughout the year to 
highlight a potential U.S. violation of the CWC.  The 
Iranian delegation held up several seemingly non- 
controversial, factual documents and played its usual 
procedural games, refusing to note various documents 
on the basis of a U.S. extension request and 
destruction program so clearly "inconsistent with the 
treaty."  The extension of Albania's CW destruction 
program beyond its own requested deadline became a 
proxy fight between Iran and much of the EC (with 
Russia showing an unfortunate tendency to side with 
Iran through its own legalistic view of the Albanian 
delays), designed to set a punitive precedent for the 
U.S. in 2012. 
 
¶36. (U) Despite continued expressions of concern from 
Iran and other NAM delegations at the slow pace of 
destruction in the two major possessor states, the 
U.S. decision to volunteer to host the first EC visit 
was greeted with enthusiasm, and the feedback from 
all members of the visiting delegation was extremely 
positive.  The U.S. policy of transparency, rather 
unpopular in 2006, has proved most effective in 2007. 
It continues to set a positive precedent for Russia 
and others, for which many colleagues have expressed 
appreciation.  U.S. destruction of 45 percent of its 
stockpile six months ahead of the December 2007 
deadline was another clear demonstration to States 
Parties of the continued U.S. commitment to treaty 
goals and obligations. 
 
¶37. (U) Looking ahead:  The Del recommends careful 
management of statements and other messages, 
especially in the run-up to and during the RevCon, to 
avoid the perception that the U.S. has moved on to 
other priorities after the granting of its extension 
request in 2006.  The Del will also track carefully 
and counter any attempts by the NAM to use the RevCon 
to explore in any detail possibilities to deal with 
"U.S. non-compliance" in 2012.  Based on statements 
at recent RevCon OEWG sessions, the Del anticipates 
strong support from others in insisting upon a 
balanced approach to all Articles of the Convention. 
 
 
STATUS OF CW DESTRUCTION IN OTHER POSSESSOR STATES 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶38. (U) As referenced above, in 2007, Albania found 
itself in the unfortunate position of not only being 
unable to meet its final destruction deadline, but 
also having passed the final date (April 29, 2006) by 
which it could have requested a further extension. 
Its situation was complicated by the proxy battle, 
noted above, to set a punitive precedent for the U.S. 
in 2012.  Negotiations to take appropriate measures 
were further characterized by a self-serving Russian 
desire to ascribe blame to States Parties assisting 
Albania.  An extraordinary extension request was 
deemed by the TS Legal Advisor to be outside the 
bounds of the Convention.  In the end, the EC simply 
called upon Albania to take measures to redress the 
situation as soon as possible, which Albania did in 
July 2007 when it became the first State Party to 
destroy its chemical weapons stockpile. 
 
¶39. (U) After a request in 2005 for U.S. assistance 
in destroying its CW stockpile, Libya decided in 2007 
 
to terminate its agreement with the U.S., citing 
disagreements on the indemnification clause and other 
legal aspects of the contract with a U.S. company. 
In July 2007, Dr. Hesnawy of the Libyan CWC National 
Committee appeared in The Hague to submit the 
detailed facility information for a new CW 
destruction facility designed by an Italian 
engineering firm.  Hesnawy also indicated that Libya 
would be unable to meet the deadline for conversion 
of its former CW production facility at Rabta, the 
date of which was established by the technical change 
that enabled Libya to submit a request for conversion 
beyond the deadlines originally envisioned by the 
CWC. 
 
¶40. (U) In later meetings, the Libyans were vague as 
to the real reasons for the delays in conversion. 
Presentations by Libya in the latter half of 2007 
tended more toward propaganda promoting the 
pharmaceutical plant into which the facility is being 
converted than actual details on the progress of 
conversion.  Libya has also indicated a desire to 
retain a sandbag wall formally scheduled for 
destruction as one of the distinctive features of the 
former production facility. 
 
¶41. (U) Looking ahead:  In July 2008, Libya's 
conversion deadline will expire.  Based on the 
general lack of concern accompanying delays in 
Russian and Indian CW production facility 
destruction/conversion, the response to the 
expiration of this particular deadline will probably 
not be remarkable.  The Del expects Libya to present 
a final version of a draft "correction" to the 
conversion plan for EC approval some time in the next 
several months, although Libya and the TS have 
indicated a desire to have U.S. approval prior to 
distributing the request.  EC sessions may continue 
to provide a valuable opportunity for bilateral 
interaction with the Libyans, and to track 
developments in Libyan CW destruction and production 
facility conversion progress. 
 
 
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS 
--------------------- 
 
¶42. (U) The TS continues to make steady progress on 
improving its readiness to conduct a challenge 
inspection, conducting at least one internal exercise 
each year as well as accepting invitations to 
participate in exercises hosted by other States 
Parties.  The spring 2007 internal exercise involved 
not only planning and preparation by headquarters 
elements, but assembling and palletizing the 
equipment itself in the Rijswijk facility.  TS staff 
were generally pleased with the results, which they 
believe indicated an ability to deploy both equipment 
and personnel rapidly in response to a request for a 
challenge inspection. 
 
¶43. (U) In September, the Dutch-hosted event at an 
industrial facility in Delft provided a unique 
opportunity for members of all regional groups to 
observe the conduct of a mock challenge inspection. 
As exercises in the past have been conducted almost 
solely in WEOG countries, this was an excellent 
opportunity to "demystify" the concept of a challenge 
inspection, and delegations from across the regional 
groups expressed their appreciation and participated 
actively in the exercise debrief.  Unfortunately, 
many of the usual opponents of challenge inspections 
also took te opportunity to reiterate their national 
positins and generally question the validity of this 
prticular tool in the verification regime.  The 
Duch initiative to conduct an exercise of the EC'srole in this inspection scenario was met with such 
strong political opposition that it was eventualy 
 
dropped. 
 
¶44. (U) Looking ahead:  The outlook for 2008 seems to 
be much the same.  No real effort is being made to 
replace the previous facilitator for challenge 
inspection consultations.  Most delegations agree 
this is for the best, and ad hoc meetings convened to 
discuss the results of exercises and seminars are far 
more useful than rehashing differences over the role 
of challenge inspections in the verification regime 
and the importance of resolving the "unresolved 
issues." 
 
 
OPCW TENTH ANNIVERSARY 
---------------------- 
 
¶45. (U) A variety of activities commemorated the 
tenth anniversary year of the CWC's entry into force, 
including a high-level event in September at the 
United Nations with over forty foreign ministers 
attending, and the "Symposium on Effective 
Multilateralism as Exemplified by the OPCW" in 
October at Columbia Law School in New York, organized 
by Amb. Javits.  The OPCW produced copies of the DVD 
of that symposium for broad distribution among 
delegations and soon will have a television public 
service announcement about the CWC available for 
broadcast. 
 
¶46. (U) Looking ahead:  Several delegations, but 
particularly the Dutch, have urged the continuation 
of the other fora that were held in The Hague in 
conjunction with the tenth anniversary of the CWC, as 
important avenues for networking and sharing 
information.  Iran has emphasized repeatedly that 
these were one-time events, not to be continued. 
While we would not want to create new mandates for 
the OPCW, similar events would provide a convenient 
venue for experts from academia, non-governmental 
organizations, and industry to meet occasionally on 
specific issues. 
 
 
INSPECTOR TRAINING 
------------------ 
 
¶47. (U) Although the U.S. has made a formal offer of 
on-site inspector training at a U.S. industrial plant 
site, the TS has not found itself in a position to 
make use of that to date.  However, with increased 
funding in the 2008 budget for inspector training, 
the Del will encourage the TS to find a way to take 
advantage of the U.S. offer of assistance. 
 
 
OTHER INDUSTRY ISSUES 
--------------------- 
 
¶48. (U) Sampling and Analysis at Schedule 2 
facilities:  The U.S. experienced the first 
utilization of sampling and analysis activities 
during a routine Schedule 2 inspection in November. 
The TS experienced a number of logistical and 
technical glitches that were overcome with U.S. 
assistance.  However, a number of policy issues 
surfaced unexpectedly during the inspection, despite 
previous meetings TS staff and assumed agreements. 
In discussions with other delegations, the Del 
learned that similar technical, logistical, and 
policy issues surfaced during their sampling and 
analysis inspections. 
 
¶49. (U) The U.S. intends to pursue two parallel sets 
of discussions to address both logistical and policy 
lessons learned from this inspection.  The Del 
expects that the practical application of sampling 
and analysis activities during routine inspections 
 
will also be discussed as part of the RevCon and 
beyond.  The 2008 OPCW budget provides for the 
possibility of continued use of sampling and analysis 
during routine Schedule 2 inspections in 2008, 
however without some of the constraints of the "trial 
period" (e.g., only one sampling and analysis 
inspection per State Party). 
 
¶50. (U) Finalizing the U.S. Industry Schedule 2 
Facility Agreement:  At EC-50 in September, the first 
U.S. industry facility agreement was approved.  This 
capped several years of broad negotiations with the 
TS and was finalized because of the strong desire of 
 
SIPDIS 
the specific Schedule 2 plant site to have such an 
agreement in place.  With an agreed format in place, 
the Del will continue to work with the TS to have an 
approved agreement in place for the one U.S. 
industrial Schedule 1 facility in 2008. 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ISSUES 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶51. (U) Employment of U.S. citizens and OPCW 
recruiting:  During budget consultations, the TS 
reported on its efforts to speed up the recruitment 
process, an important step that we have advocated in 
order to attract and retain the interest of highly- 
qualified candidates.  The Del has also encouraged 
improved communication between OPCW Human Resources 
and potential candidates to avoid the unfortunate 
outcome of candidates accepting positions elsewhere, 
under the assumption that the OPCW was not interested 
in their applications.  Over the past year, the U.S. 
has also improved its ability to elicit qualified 
candidates for OPCW TS positions.  A notable outcome 
of our engagement during 2007 was the selection of a 
U.S. citizen as the new head of Media and Public 
Relations.  While the position previously had been 
held by another U.S. citizen, there was strong 
competition, particularly with intensive lobbying by 
the German delegation on behalf of three German 
candidates. 
 
¶52. (U) Impact of tenure policy:  The increasing rate 
of turnover of TS staff continued, in large part due 
to the tenure policy.  The Inspection and 
Verification divisions appear to be most impacted by 
tenure as their most experienced staff are forced to 
leave without suitable replacements available to fill 
the void.  While much of the effect of these 
departures is anecdotal, quantifiable data shows that 
the OPCW is spending increasing amounts of money on 
separation and recruiting costs.  This issue will 
continue to impact budget and management 
considerations during 2008. 
 
¶53. (U) Implementing Results-Based Budgeting:  While 
the TS continues to slowly implement RBB standards, 
more work is needed to fully achieve it, as the 
Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters 
(ABAF) noted in its assessment of the 2008 budget and 
program of work.  The Del will continue to push for 
greater implementation of RBB in the 2009 budget and 
program of work, and would appreciate guidance on key 
U.S. priorities in this area. 
 
 
OPCW OFFICE IN AFRICA 
--------------------- 
 
¶54. (SBU) The DG's proposal at EC-50 packaged current 
programs for African states and shifted the dialogue 
away from discussion of a bricks and mortar office. 
While the EC decision called for renewed 
consultations focusing on the Program for Africa, 
there seems to be little interest among African 
countries, or others, to take on the role of 
 
facilitator.  In the meantime, this issue is moving 
slowly, with no new proposals for funding -- just as 
we would like it. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
DELEGATION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2008 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶55. (U) The Del expects much of the second half of 
2008 to take shape based on the outcome of the 
RevCon, particularly if any new action plans or 
initiatives are adopted.  However, in addition to 
steps forward, captured under "looking ahead" for 
specific issues covered in the preceding paragraphs, 
there are two broad categories of issues that could 
be addressed in parallel and throughout the year: the 
functioning of the organization and oversight of TS 
activities. 
 
¶56. (U) The past several years have seen a decline in 
real oversight of intersessional activities, and the 
combination of this change with the tendency of 
several key delegations to hold up progress at every 
opportunity has meant a sharp decrease in the 
productivity of consultations and a situation in 
which behind-the-scenes work with the TS is almost 
always more effective than allowing an issue to 
become bogged down in consultations.  With the RevCon 
report making some reference to the oversight role of 
the EC Chair and Vice-Chairs, the Del believes this 
could be a good year to re-energize the Bureau and 
encourage a more active process of ambassadorial 
shepherding of key issues from one EC session to the 
next. 
 
¶57. (U) In line with another U.S. objective for the 
RevCon, the Del recommends work throughout the year 
on making better use not only of the SAB's 
recommendations, but also of the SAB itself by 
working through the DG to provide guidance and focus 
for the SAB's work.  The Del believes that 
institutionalizing a more effective system for 
requesting, considering and acting on SAB 
recommendations should be another goal for 2008. 
 
¶58. (U) The Del also believes that, particularly in 
light of recent battles over OPCW budget allocations 
and the "full implementation" of Article XI, the work 
of the International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) 
Division could benefit greatly from closer oversight 
by States Parties.  A constructive initial step in 
this respect is a Dutch initiative to better 
coordinate donor activities (focusing on those States 
Parties making some sort of voluntary contribution to 
the OPCW, particularly to ICA).  The Del looks 
forward to improved engagement with the ICA Division 
as a possible result of this coordination. 
 
¶59. (U) Javits sends. 
Schofer