R 082042Z JAN 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
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AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AIT TAIPEI 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 002034 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
PARIS FOR EST:H. SMITH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2033 
TAGS: MTCRE PARM MNUC ETTC KSCA TSPA FR GR
 
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): RESULTS 
OF THE NOVEMBER 5-9, 2007 ATHENS PLENARY (C) 
 
REF: 07 STATE 156270 
 
Classified By: ISN DAS Donald A. Mahley. 
Reason:  1.4 (B), (D). H). 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  At the November 5-9, 2007 Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Plenary meeting in Athens, 
the 34 MTCR Partners reaffirmed their commitment to 
strengthening missile-related export controls and thereby 
discouraging missile activities and programs of concern. 
They discussed trends in missile development worldwide, 
including the rapid changes in technology which require the 
MTCR to continuously adapt to keep pace with the evolving 
missile threat, and reiterated their concerns about the 
serious threat posed by the growing risk of the proliferation 
of WMD and their means of delivery.  The MTCR Partners noted 
that regional missile proliferation continues to be a serious 
problem and expressed particular concern over missile 
proliferation in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and South 
Asia.  They also expressed their determination to exercise 
vigilance and prevent transfers of any items, materials, 
goods and technology that could contribute to WMD ballistic 
missile programs of proliferation concern and called on all 
States to fully and effectively implement the relevant 
provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1718, 
1737, and 1747. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Partners also held in-depth discussions ) in 
both the Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) and the Plenary ) 
on a U.S. proposal to modify how the Regime controls Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles.  The  majority of 
the Partners supported the proposal, but the Partners were 
not able to agree to adopt it.  Russia led the opposition, 
proposing as an alternative a comprehensive, zero-based 
review of the Regime,s control criteria, goals, and purpose 
so that Russia and other Partners that were not present when 
the MTCR was established in 1987 could have a hand in shaping 
the basic parameters of the Regime.  Brazil and South Africa 
both continued to reserve on the proposal. 
 
¶3.  (C)  During the TEM, the Partners adopted a number of 
changes to the MTCR Annex (control list) to keep pace with 
technological advances and trends in proliferation 
procurement.  At the Law Enforcement Experts Meeting (LEEM), 
Partners exchanged information on best practices and recent 
efforts in interdiction.  They also agreed to continue their 
efforts to update the law enforcement experts handbook. The 
Partners also shared information on priority developments in 
missile proliferation and engaged in an extremely substantive 
and productive Information Exchange (IE) session. 
 
¶4. (C)  No new members were admitted to the Regime at Athens. 
 However, the Partners agreed on a broad spectrum of contacts 
with non-members concerning the missile proliferation threat 
and the MTCR's goals and activities. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶5.  (C)  KEY PLENARY OUTCOMES: 
 
--Partners agreed to exercise vigilance against the export to 
Iran of listed items, materials, goods and technology, 
consistent with UNSCRs 1696 and 1737.  They also took note of 
U.S. information on Iranian front companies relevant to these 
efforts. 
 
--Partners reiterated their support for UNSCR 1540 and agreed 
the MTCR Chair should continue to pursue contact with the 
1540 Committee. 
 
--Partners adopted a U.S. proposal on outreach to 
non-members.  Specifically, Partners were encouraged to use 
their national outreach efforts to actively encourage 
non-Partners to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a 
national basis. 
 
--Partners also agreed that the MTCR Chair, with assistance 
from the TEM Chair, should inform non-Partner countries of 
changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, with a view to 
facilitating the widest possible application of these 
documents and enabling interested non-Partners to harmonize 
their controls with MTCR standards. 
 
--Partners agreed to a 45-day silence procedure regarding a 
German proposal on suggested best practices for sharing and 
using Regime denial information. 
 
--Partners agreed to a number of changes to the MTCR Annex, 
including an amendment of the payload definition for &other 
UAVs;8 creation of a new control for an oxidizer substance 
usable in solid propellant rocket motors (Item 4.C.4.b.5); 
adoption of strengthened controls for environmental chambers; 
and clarification of the control text for two polymeric 
substances and a technical note for maraging steels. 
 
--Partners agreed on the utility of holding a joint session 
of the IE, LEEM, and TEM at future Plenary meetings. 
 
--Partners reaffirmed their agreement to update the MTCR 
Enforcement Officers Handbook.  This project will be 
coordinated by Canada. 
 
--Partners agreed to hold a Reinforced Point of Contact 
(RPOC) meeting in Paris no later than April 2008. 
 
--Partners accepted Australia,s offer to host/chair the 
Plenary in 2008 Plenary, and to serve as MTCR Chair in 
2008-2009. 
 
////////////////// 
Opening Statements 
////////////////// 
 
¶6.  (C)  Following the formal opening of the Plenary on 
November 5 by outgoing Danish Chairman Ambassador Per 
Fischer, the MTCR Partners confirmed Ambassador Eleftherios 
Danellis as the 2007 MTCR Chair.  Greek Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Secretary General for European Affairs Dimitrios 
Katsoudas then delivered opening remarks.  Portugal (on 
behalf of the EU states participating in the MTCR and 
Norway), the Russian Federation, Australia, Japan, and Turkey 
also made opening statements. 
 
¶7.  (C) During his remarks, Secretary General Katsoudas 
stressed the importance of further strengthening the MTCR as 
a means for helping to maintain regional security and 
stability, and the need for the MTCR Partners to underscore 
their commitment to implementing fully and effectively all 
missile nonproliferation-relevant UNSCRs.  He also noted the 
importance of focusing on the proliferant activities of 
non-state actors as well as countries with programs of 
concern. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The EU statement lauded the Regime for its 
contributions over the past twenty years in slowing or 
halting missile development programs around the world and its 
work in establishing a standard for responsible missile 
nonproliferation behavior.  The EU also stressed the 
commitment of all EU countries to missile nonproliferation 
and urged Partners to search for new ways to further 
strengthen the MTCR,s effectiveness.  In particular, the EU 
urged that additional emphasis be placed on outreach to 
non-members and to admitting countries with long-pending 
applications to membership in the Regime, e.g., Croatia, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia.  Finally, the EU urged enhanced support by the 
MTCR to the UNSCR 1540 Committee and recommended adoption of 
an EU proposal to give special attention to a &Watch List8 
of items of particular utility to the Iranian missile program. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Russia said that missile nonproliferation and 
strengthening the MTCR are among its top foreign policy 
priorities and cited Russia,s initiative to universalize the 
INF Treaty as an example of its commitment to missile 
nonproliferation.  Russia also wished to increase the 
Regime,s effectiveness to adapt to &new realities and 
technology challenges,8 and suggested that it might be time 
for the Regime to re-evaluate the basic parameters of the 
Regime, to assess the global missile threat, and then to 
collectively identify how to shape the Regime to address the 
threat, including by adjusting the control parameters. 
 
¶10.  (C)  Russia also noted that in its view the Regime would 
only be &functional8 when it admits those countries that 
are actively developing missile and space programs.  Russia 
therefore hoped the Regime would increase its outreach 
efforts with that goal in mind.  Additionally, Russia urged 
that Partners not try to single out any one country as a bad 
proliferator but to take a regional approach to 
nonproliferation.  Additionally, Russia reminded Partners 
that the MTCR is not a sanctions Regime and said Russia would 
not favor actions that attempt to duplicate or extend the 
work of the UN Security Council.  Finally, Russia called on 
the MTCR to continue its cooperation with the 1540 Committee. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Japan stressed the threat to international peace 
and security posed by Iran,s and North Korea,s missile 
programs.  It also underscored the need for the MTCR Partners 
to act in concert and implement the measures outlined in 
relevant UNSCRs as a way to prevent the transfer to/from Iran 
and North Korea of WMD-related goods and technology. 
 
¶12.  (C)  Turkey agreed and said it had taken note of what 
had been said about Iran and North Korea in the IE and LEEM. 
Turkey also thought the MTCR needed to have &practical 
applications8 if it were to be useful.  Additionally, Turkey 
noted that it hoped issues with Iran would be resolved by 
diplomacy, dialogue, and negotiations for peace in the region 
and the Middle East. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Australia looked forward to a productive Plenary 
and hoped the Partners would give favorable consideration to 
Australia,s proposal to host the Plenary in 2008 and serve 
as MTCR Chair. 
 
////////////////////////////////////// 
Report on the Danish MTCR Chairmanship 
////////////////////////////////////// 
 
¶14.  (C)  Outgoing MTCR Chair Per Fischer read verbatim a 
16-page, written report on his tenure (the report also was 
circulated to all Partners).  Fischer noted that the Chair 
had engaged in a number of outreach activities to promote the 
MTCR and to remind non-Partners of the need for all countries 
to implement and enforce effective missile export controls. 
The Chair's outreach activities had included leading MTCR 
missions to several non-Partner countries, as well as 
participation in seminars, regional fora, and other 
multilateral meetings. All of these activities helped to 
enhance understanding of the goals and activities of the 
Regime.  They also have helped to maintain and improve 
relations with countries like India, Israel, Pakistan, and 
China. 
 
¶15. (C)  Fischer noted that outreach was becoming 
increasingly important as more countries outside of the 
Regime become developers, producers, or traders of missile 
technology, and urged Partners to follow his lead and make 
the technical aspects of the Regime an integral part of any 
outreach activities.  Explaining to non-Partners what the 
MTCR controls and why ) and discussing how the Partners 
implement MTCR controls on a day-to-day basis ) has been 
critical to the success of the Chair,s outreach activities 
in 2007.  It also has helped build a better understanding of 
the Regime,s goals.  Finally, Fischer strongly urged 
Partners to consider systematically informing the 1540 
Committee and other interested parties of changes to the MTCR 
Guidelines and Annex directly after they have been decided at 
a Plenary. 
 
¶16.  (C)  The Plenary thanked Ambassador Fischer for his 
extremely detailed report and excellent work during the past 
year on behalf of the Regime.  However, while acknowledging 
Chairman Fischer outstanding efforts, Russia raised concerns 
about Fischer,s participation in a NATO-sponsored event in 
Lithuania.  Fischer responded that he had announced his 
intention to represent the MTCR at the seminar via his report 
to all Partners on planned outreach events.  No Partner 
raised objections.  Consequently, per established practice, 
Fischer had agreement to pursue the activities described in 
his outreach plan.  Russia thanked Fischer for the 
explanation and undertook to pay closer attention in the 
future to documents circulated by the Chair.  South Africa 
added that it would do likewise. 
 
////////////////////////////// 
Report of the French MTCR POC 
///////////////////////////// 
 
¶17.  (C)  France briefly summarized the activities of the 
MTCR Point of Contact (POC) during the preceding year.  It 
reported that the POC had circulated 274 documents to 
Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary.  The POC also had 
updated the Compendium of Consensus Decisions, and hoped to 
distribute it soon.  In addition, the POC had continued to 
develop the "ePOC" computerized document distribution system 
for the MTCR; organized five meetings of the MTCR country 
representatives in Paris; and hosted the RPOC meeting in 
April 2007. 
 
¶18.  (C)  The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report. 
They also thanked the POC ) and the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs ) for its invaluable services on behalf of 
the Regime. 
 
/////////////////////////////////// 
Report of the April 2007 Reinforced 
Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting 
/////////////////////////////////// 
 
¶19.  (C)  The POC reported on the results of the April 2007 
RPOC meeting in Paris, noting that outreach to non-Partners 
and relevant organizations had been a major focus of 
discussion.  In addition, RPOC participants had exchanged 
views on the current state of ballistic missile-related 
proliferation worldwide, with most contributors centering on 
Iran, and agreed to discuss these issues further at the 2007 
Plenary.  The RPOC also considered a German proposal on 
end-use controls and denial notifications, and agreed to 
continue discussing membership issues at the 2007 Plenary. 
Finally, the Partners confirmed Greece as the 2007 Plenary 
chair/host and subsequent MTCR Chair. 
 
¶20.  (C)  The Partners thanked France for hosting the 2007 
RPOC and endorsed the RPOC report (POC 133).  They also 
accepted France's proposal to host the next RPOC in Paris 
before the end of April 2008. 
 
//////////// 
EPOC Update 
/////////// 
 
¶21.  (C)  The POC reported on the continued development of 
the &ePOC8 computerized information distribution system for 
the MTCR.  29 of 34 MTCR countries currently can access ePOC, 
and there are 246 registered users.  This is nearly double 
the number of registered users reported at the 2006 
Copenhagen Plenary.  The POC invited all Partners to begin 
using ePOC regularly as this would increase efficiency. 
Ideally, the POC would like to see generalized use of the 
ePOC by the time of the 2008 RPOC meeting and hoped that the 
Regime will soon go paperless. 
 
¶22.  (C)  Germany thanked the POC for its continuing efforts 
to improve the ePOC.  The UK also applauded the POC,s 
Herculean efforts on behalf of the Regime and noted that HMG 
has 18 registered ePOC users.  The U.S. welcomed and 
appreciated the POC,s efforts to develop ePOC, and liked the 
idea of a paperless Regime.  However, the U.S. noted that 
ePOC can only handle documents up to the confidential level. 
Higher level documents must be circulated in paper copy. 
While the U.S. will continue to try to develop papers at the 
confidential level, the nature of the MTCR is that some 
issues are more sensitive and need to be distributed in paper 
copy.  The U.S. hoped that the POC would continue to 
circulate paper copies of such documents.  The POC responded 
that this practice would continue to be followed. 
 
¶23.  (C)  The Plenary endorsed the POC,s report on ePOC, 
inviting Partners that have not yet signed up for ePOC to do 
so soon.  The Partners also renewed the POC,s mandate to 
continue ePOC operations and agreed by consensus on the 
following: 
 
&The Plenary entrusted the POC with the mandate to continue 
ePOC operations.  The Plenary expressed its satisfaction at 
the current level of security of the ePOC, which was deemed 
to strike a satisfactory balance between security and 
user-friendliness.8 
 
///////////////////////// 
Contact with Non-Partners 
///////////////////////// 
 
¶24.  (C)  Germany, Portugal (on behalf of the EU), the ROK, 
and the U.S. reported on their bilateral and regional 
contacts with non-Partners since the Copenhagen Plenary. 
Several countries, including the United States (POC 198), 
also circulated written reports on their contacts with 
non-Partners.  However, Russia commented that too much time 
was being devoted to outreach ) a topic that Russia 
considered to be a &secondary issue8 ) and said that it 
would pay closer attention to the Plenary agenda in the 
future to ensure that outreach was given sufficient but not 
undue attention.  The Greek Chair responded that the Plenary 
would ignore Russia,s comment:  outreach is a key focus of 
the Regime and is properly placed on the Plenary agenda. 
 
///////////////////////// 
Regional Nonproliferation 
///////////////////////// 
 
Iran 
//// 
 
¶25.  (C)  Portugal, on behalf of the EU participating states, 
presented the EU states, revised proposal for an MTCR watch 
list on Iran.  NOTE:  This proposal was previously circulated 
as POC DOC 61.  It was discussed at the April 2007 RPOC, but 
failed to achieve consensus.  It was subsequently subjected 
to a silence procedure, which failed when Russia broke 
silence (POC 112).  END NOTE.  Portugal explained that the 
proposed watch list contained items that EU experts believe 
deserve special attention either because they have been 
observed to be items Iranian end-users of concern are 
attempting to acquire or because they are assessed to be 
chokepoints for the Iranian missile program.  The proposal 
was not intended to expand UNSCRs 1737 and 1747 or the MTCR 
Annex and would not impose punitive measures on Iran. 
Rather, the EU states view the watch list as a tool that 
could help MTCR Partner countries implement relevant UNSCRs. 
 
¶26.  (C)  The U.S. greatly appreciated the EU proposal as an 
effort to focus Partner attention on key technologies Iranian 
end-users of concern are seeking.  The U.S. also reminded 
Partners that the U.S. had circulated a complementary 
proposal on Iranian Front Companies as POC 190, and urged 
Partners to consider the two proposals in tandem. 
 
¶27.  (C)  Turkey supported the EU proposal.  Portugal 
expressed support for the U.S. proposal.  Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the ROK, New Zealand, and Spain all 
endorsed both proposals.  Ukraine said it supported the EU 
proposal in principal but wanted more time to review the 
watch list.  Ukraine also thought the Partners should 
consider whether to amend the MTCR Annex to control the items 
included on the proposed watch list. 
 
¶28.  (C)  South Africa appreciated the Partners, interest in 
discussing how to respond to missile proliferation and 
regional developments.  However, in South Africa,s view, the 
Regime needed to take a comprehensive approach and focus on 
broad regional issues, not just one country.  Thus far the 
Regime has been focusing on two proposals that relate to UN 
Security Council action on Iran as it pertains to WMD 
delivery systems.  However, the Security Council also has 
taken action on North Korea, so the MTCR should not focus 
only on Iran.  Additionally, South Africa said the MTCR must 
remember that it is not the UNSC.  The Security Council has 
committees that implement its resolutions, and any decision 
to expand the lists associated with the UNSCRs should be done 
by these committees.  The MTCR is on dangerous ground when it 
tries to reinterpret or add to what the Security Council has 
done. 
 
¶29.  (C)  With regard to the EU and U.S. proposals, South 
Africa noted that they relate to information derived from the 
Information Exchange (IE) and suggested the Partners simply 
take note of the relevant IE information.  In the end, South 
Africa said, all MTCR Partners have national obligations to 
implement the relevant UNSCRs.  Therefore, South Africa is 
not convinced the MTCR needs to adopt additional lists to 
build on or expand the relevant UNSCRS. 
 
¶30.  (C)  Noting that Russia is a member of the Security 
Council, Russia agreed that the MTCR should not try to expand 
the Security Council,s work.  Russia further noted that the 
UNSCRs already are obligatory and legally binding on all UN 
members, and that is sufficient.  Russia also stressed that 
the MTCR is not an implementation body of the UN and should 
not be used as such, nor should it be used as a sanctions 
body.  In Russia,s view, the MTCR is an export control 
regime and nothing more. 
 
¶31.  (C)  Continuing, Russia said its review of the EU 
proposal had uncovered no &value added.8  Instead, Russia 
had concluded that the proposal raised a number of questions. 
 In particular, Russia questioned whether the proposed watch 
list represented all items of concern with regard to the 
Iranian missile program.  Russia also wondered why the EU did 
not submit proposals to the TEM to add these items to the 
MTCR Annex.  In addition, Russia was concerned that having 
such a watch list would undermine the Regime,s catch-all 
controls.  However, in the spirit of constructiveness and 
consistency, Russia offered that it would be willing to 
combine the U.S. and EU proposals and simply take note of the 
lists of Iranian Front Companies and dual-use technologies. 
In Russia,s view, these lists then could be used to inform 
Partners, national export licensing processes. 
 
¶32.  (C)  The UK supported the U.S. and EU proposals.  It 
noted that while the MTCR is not a UN enforcement agency, it 
also does not operate in a vacuum.  Partners come to the 
Plenary to exchange information, discuss developments, and 
decide what they can do to deal with actual events taking 
place in the real world.  In the UK,s view, both proposals 
directly furthered these objectives.  Italy concurred, 
stressing that Partners understand perfectly well that the 
MTCR is not the UN but that they have a special 
responsibility as producers and exporters of missile 
technology to exercise vigilance with regard to missile 
proliferation. 
 
¶33.  (C)  The U.S. agreed that the MTCR is not a UN 
implementing body.  However, all MTCR Partners are 
responsible for implementing UNSCRs on a national basis. 
Nobody has disputed that, nor should they.  Consequently, it 
is appropriate for the MTCR Partners to consider measures, 
such as those proposed in the U.S. and EU proposals, that 
would assist Partners in their national implementation of 
missile-relevant UNSCRs.  At the 2006 Copenhagen Plenary, the 
Partners took the following decision: 
 
&Consistent with UNSCR 1696, MTCR Partners agreed, in 
accordance with their national legal authorities and 
legislation, to exercise vigilance against the export to Iran 
of any items, materials, goods, and technology that could 
contribute to Iran,s ballistic missile programs.8 
 
There is no reason why the Partners could not at least affirm 
that decision in Athens and also note that the EU and the 
U.S. had provided relevant information to the Partners to 
assist them in carrying out this undertaking. 
 
¶34.  (C)  As no consensus was emerging, the Chair deferred 
further discussion of the two proposals to the Heads of 
Delegation.  Following additional consideration by the HODs, 
the Plenary agreed to the following consensus language: 
 
&The MTCR Partners take note of the attached watch list and 
will exercise, in accordance with their national legislation 
and international obligations, vigilance against the export 
to Iran of those listed items, materials, goods, and 
technology consistent with UNSC resolutions 1696 (2006) and 
1737 (2006).  In this context, Partners also noted the 
information from the United States on front companies in Iran 
relevant to these endeavours.8 
 
North Korea 
/////////// 
 
¶35.  (C)  Japan reminded Partners that North Korea remained a 
cause for concern.  Although there had been no significant 
new developments on the North Korean missile front in the 
past year, Japan said Partners needed to maintain their 
vigilance.  Japan also urged Partners to vigorously implement 
the UNSCRs on North Korea so as to force North Korea to take 
some positive steps in the missile area. 
 
///////// 
Outreach 
//////// 
 
¶36.  (C)  The U.S. introduced its proposal on outreach to 
non-Partners (POC 187), stressing the importance of 
cooperation with non-members on missile nonproliferation 
issues.  In view of the ongoing global missile proliferation 
threat, the U.S. said outreach is a critical mission of the 
MTCR and  Partners need to work side-by-side with 
non-Partners to actively encourage their support for the 
Regime,s  efforts, including by implementing the MTCR 
Guidelines and Annex on a national basis. 
 
¶37.  (C)  Through national implementation of the MTCR 
Guidelines and Annex, non-Partners can make a significant 
contribution to the growing multilateral effort to stem 
missile proliferation worldwide.  As more countries establish 
national controls consistent with MTCR standards, it will 
become increasingly costly, difficult, and time consuming for 
programs of concern to obtain missile-useful equipment and 
technology.  In addition, by implementing the MTCR Guidelines 
and having a legally-based system to control exports of MTCR 
Annex items, non-Partner countries can help minimize the risk 
that their economies and exports (or the passage of goods 
through their territories) will be used to aid proliferant 
missile programs, either directly or indirectly.  Taking such 
action also would help to further the Regime,s longstanding 
goal of preventing the proliferation of unmanned delivery 
systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction -- 
and related equipment and technology.  It also would assist 
non-Partner countries in meeting their export control 
obligations under UNSCR 1540. 
 
¶38.  (C)  The U.S. therefore had developed a proposal that 
would have Partners agree that during their outreach 
activities in 2007-2008, they would make a more focused 
effort to encourage non-Partners to apply the MTCR Guidelines 
and Annex on a national basis, while also stressing the 
importance of taking measures to prevent the proliferation of 
missiles and missile technology.  The U.S. hoped the Partners 
would adopt the proposal in Athens. 
 
¶39.  (C)  South Africa reminded Partners that during the 
Plenary,s previous discussion on regional issues, South 
Africa talked about the need to look more carefully at the 
mandate for, and scope of, the Regime,s outreach activities. 
 South Africa believes the Partners need to be clear about 
the focus of their efforts and the focus of the Chair,s 
efforts, to include the establishment of specific goals and 
objectives.  Once the Partners have identified what they want 
to achieve, then organizing outreach activities will be 
rather straightforward. 
 
¶40.  (C)  In South Africa,s view, outreach should focus on 
export controls and the Regime,s basic documents ) the MTCR 
Guidelines and Annex.  Discussion of the missile threat or 
specific activities of proliferation concern should be 
conducted by Partners with relevant non-Partners on a 
national basis and in a confidential manner.  In addition, 
South Africa said Partners need to be careful not to create 
misimpressions or false expectations when they discuss the 
MTCR with non-members. 
 
¶41.  (C)  Brazil noted that outreach is a way for the Regime 
to pass a message to non-members.  As evident from Per 
Fischer,s detailed report, outreach has become increasingly 
important for the MTCR over the past five years, and Partners 
need to work together to convey a consistent message.  In 
this context, while Brazil does not have a systematic 
approach to national outreach activities, it is prepared to 
work with the U.S. on its proposal. 
 
¶42.  (C)  The Netherlands pointed out that the thrust of the 
U.S. proposal is what Partners can do on an individual basis 
to reach non-members.  This is a different discussion from 
the discussion of the mandate for the Chairman.  In any case, 
the Netherlands supported the U.S. proposal.  With regard to 
the Chairman,s mandate, the Netherlands thought Partners 
needed to build in some flexibility and trust for the Chair. 
 
¶43.  (C)  The ROK agreed with the Netherlands on the need to 
give the Chair flexibility.  The ROK did not want to place 
undue stress on the Chair by making his mandate too narrow 
and also wanted to give the Chair flexibility in terms of the 
composition of his delegation.  The ROK supported the U.S. 
proposal. 
 
¶44.  (C) Outgoing Chair Fischer reminded Partners that they 
had agreed on an outreach mandate for the Chair at the 
Copenhagen Plenary.  It is very clear (Fischer read it 
aloud), and should be continued.  Fischer noted that the 
mandate does not give the Chair the authority to negotiate 
with non-Partners nor does it authorize him to talk about the 
results of the IE or about the HCOC. Rather, it allows the 
Chair to update non-Partners on key issues such as changes to 
the MTCR Annex. 
 
¶45.  (C)  Fischer noted that participation in the Chair,s 
outreach activities is open to all Partners, and encouraged 
Partners to send representatives from capitals to participate 
in these events.  He further noted that the fact of the IE 
Chair,s inclusion in an outreach delegation did not mean 
that the delegation was sharing Regime-confidential 
information.  All Partners that want to participate in Regime 
outreach should be encouraged to do so.  In terms of the 
mandate and format for outreach activities, Fischer thought 
Partners should tailor their approach to each country they 
visit. 
 
¶46.  (C)  Poland supported the U.S. proposal, and agreed with 
the views expressed by the Netherlands, the ROK, and Per 
Fischer on the outreach process.  Poland also thought the 
Partners should talk more about target countries and outreach 
priorities, including perhaps inviting non-Partners to 
seminars on relevant missile issues. 
 
¶47.  (C)  Russia complained that Partners were spending too 
much time talking about outreach.  Russia wanted to discuss 
ℜ substance,8 and did not want Athens to be known as 
the &Outreach Plenary.8  Russia also disagreed that the 
Chair should have flexibility.  In Russia,s view, the Chair 
should be &imprisoned8 by his message.  The Chair must 
represent the unique voice of the MTCR and not provide 
misinformation ) as was done in the past with China ) or 
sensitive information ) as was done in the past with Israel. 
 Additionally, the Regime should prioritize outreach 
activities and develop a limited mandate, as well as specific 
modalities for outreach visits.  In Russia,s view, the 
countries that should be at the top of the list for outreach 
are countries that are important players on missile issues, 
including Belarus, China, and Kazakhstan. 
 
¶48.  (C)  Russia agreed that the general mandate for the 
Chair that was adopted in Copenhagen should continue. 
However, Russia stressed that the Chair should not be able to 
discuss issues &willy nilly8 and did not have the freedom 
to talk about HCOC, UNSCR 1540, or specific nonproliferation 
concerns.  In Russia,s view, the MTCR is a technical body 
that should stick to discussing technical issues such as 
changes to the MTCR Annex.  For that reason, Russia would 
support including the TEM Chair on outreach activities. 
Russia also believed that the Partners need to reach 
consensus agreement on each of the Chair,s outreach 
activities and to set priorities. 
 
¶49.  (C)  The U.S. thought the Copenhagen mandate for the 
Chair was adequate and should be reaffirmed.  The 
composition of specific delegations should be up to the 
Chair.  The U.S. also thought Partners needed to be 
purposeful and intentional during their outreach activities. 
 
¶50.  (C)  South Africa agreed that outreach is important.  As 
the only Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) country present, South 
Africa also wanted to point out to Partners the need to 
approach outreach with the necessary sensitivity to ensure 
the Regime is not seen poorly or seen as restricting 
technology to countries that need new technology for 
development.  South Africa supported Outgoing Chair 
Fischer,s ideas on outreach.  It also supported reaffirming 
the Chairman,s mandate established at Copenhagen.  However, 
South Africa had some concerns with regard to the composition 
of the Regime,s outreach teams.  In South Africa,s view, 
the teams must represent the MTCR, not their national points 
of view.  Therefore, it might be best to have only the Chair 
and heads of the working groups (i.e., the TEM) on the 
delegation. 
 
¶51.  (C)  South Africa said it could support the U.S. 
proposal on outreach provided the proposed outreach was 
voluntary, not mandatory.  It also requested changes to the 
proposed consensus language.  The U.S. was disappointed that 
some Partners were confusing the Regime,s interest in 
preventing missile proliferation with national positions. 
However, in the spirit of cooperation and flexibility, the 
U.S. accepted South Africa,s proposed changes.  The Plenary 
then adopted the following consensus language with respect to 
the U.S. proposal: 
 
&Partners encourage the use of national outreach efforts 
with non-Partners to actively encourage these countries to 
take steps to apply the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a 
national basis.  Partners are invited to share the results of 
these outreach efforts at the 2008 MTCR RPOC and/or Plenary 
meetings.8 
 
//////////////////////////////////// 
Outreach Priorities and Contact with 
the UN 1540 Commmittee 
//////////////////////////////////// 
 
¶52.  (C)  The U.S. said Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Malaysia, 
Panama, Singapore, and the UAE should be priorities for 
Regime outreach.  Not all of these countries have missile 
programs.  However, missile possession is not the only reason 
for outreach.  Some of these countries are now, or could be, 
potential transshipment points.  Given the Regime,s 
increased concern about proliferators using transshipment 
points to evade MTCR export controls, reaching out to these 
countries early and often will help promote the Regime,s 
broader nonproliferation goals. 
 
¶53.  (C)  South Africa reiterated its support for the 
Copenhagen mandate for the Chair and suggested that the Chair 
circulate a proposed outreach plan for Partner consideration. 
 Russia agreed.  Russia also thought that technical outreach 
by the MTCR could be helpful to countries needing assistance 
with UNSCR 1540 implementation.  South Africa said it would 
have no problem informing the 1540 Committee of relevant MTCR 
activities but would like more information on any proposal to 
enhance cooperation with the 1540 Committee.  Russia 
clarified that it was simply suggesting that it would be 
useful if the MTCR Chair could represent the MTCR community 
at seminars organized by the 1540 Committee. 
 
¶54.  (C)  After further discussion by the Heads of 
Delegation, the Partners agreed to the following additional 
consensus language with regard to outreach priorities and the 
Chair,s mandate: 
 
&Partners exchanged views on possible destinations for 
outreach activities and renewed earlier outreach mandates. 
The following destinations were proposed:  Belarus, China, 
Croatia, Egypt, Jordan, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya, 
Panama, Singapore, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
 
It was agreed that the Chair would prepare and circulate to 
Partners an outreach programme taking into consideration the 
above suggestions. 
 
The Plenary agreed that the MTCR Chair, assisted by the TEM 
Chair, as appropriate, will inform, following Plenary 
decisions, non-member states, as well as the 1540 Committee, 
of changes to the Guidelines and Annex for their information 
and use with a view to facilitating the widest possible 
application of the latest versions of these instruments and 
enabling interested non-member states to harmonize their 
controls with those of MTCR Partners.  Contacts with 
non-member states may also include information on the 
rationale for changes to the Annex, while respecting the 
principle of confidentiality within the MTCR.8 
 
¶55.  (C)  The Partners also agreed on the following consensus 
language concerning contact with the UNSCR 1540 Committee: 
 
&Partners reiterated their support for UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 and the Plenary agreed that the Chair should 
continue to pursue contact with the 1540 Committee.8 
 
//// 
HCOC 
//// 
 
¶56.  (C)  Austria, as the Immediate Central Contact (ICC) of 
the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (HCOC) gave a brief report of HCOC developments 
since the last MTCR Plenary.  It reported that HCOC 
membership stood at 127 and that Bosnia-Herzegovina was the 
current HCOC Chair.  Hungary will Chair in 2008.  Austria 
said that at their annual meeting in Vienna, the HCOC 
Subscribing States had discussed the importance of all 
participants submitting annual declarations.  There also was 
detailed discussion of prelaunch notifications and the need 
to promote universalization of the HCOC.  However, there was 
no agreement to pursue a UN resolution on the HCOC in 2007. 
 
¶57.  (C)  Russia thanked Austria for the report but objected 
to HCOC being discussed in the MTCR.  Russia said that while 
it is a strong supporter of the HCOC, the HCOC has problems, 
and these problems should be discussed at the HCOC annual 
meeting, not the MTCR Plenary.  If HCOC is discussed at all 
during Plenary week, it should be at the Information 
Exchange.  Outgoing Chair Fischer disagreed, noting that the 
Plenary needs to be aware of ongoing developments in the 
missile area. 
 
/////////// 
Membership 
////////// 
 
¶58.  (C)  The U.S. said its position on membership is 
well-established:  the U.S. does not support membership for 
China, Croatia, or Kazakhstan.  None of these countries meet 
the established criteria for membership. 
 
¶59.  (C)  Turkey said its views also are well known.  As 
stated at the last two Plenaries, Turkey does not support 
MTCR membership for Cyprus.  Greece reiterated its view that 
Cyprus should be a member of the Regime and that it is 
totally inappropriate for any Partner to oppose the 
membership of any of the EU countries that are not yet 
members. 
 
¶60.  (C)  Russia said the Partners know very well how Russia 
views the membership issues.  Although Partners think there 
is a political motivation for the Russian position, Russia,s 
position is really about strengthening the MTCR,s ability to 
control missile proliferation.  Right now, the MTCR is 
limited in its ability to do this because its membership is 
too narrow.  In Russia,s view, the Partners should open up 
the MTCR to countries that possess significant missile 
technology so that Regime members are countries that can 
really contribute to missile nonproliferation.  Russia 
therefore supports membership for China and Kazakhstan. 
 
¶61.  (C)  The ROK welcomed membership for countries that meet 
the MTCR criteria and factors for consideration established 
in 1991 and 1993, but needed more time to review individual 
applications to determine if there were any such countries. 
Brazil shared the ROK view. 
 
¶62.  (C)  Portugal reminded Partners that the EU countries 
supported membership for Croatia and all of the new EU 
countries, and had no objection to membership for Kazakhstan. 
 Ukraine associated itself with the EU position. 
 
¶63.  (C)  The U.S. noted that there clearly was not consensus 
on China and Kazakhstan and that if those were the only two 
applicants that Russia supported, then there was no consensus 
on any applications and no need for further discussion of 
this topic in Athens.  Russia agreed. 
 
¶64.  (C)  The Partners agreed on the following consensus 
language on membership: 
 
&The Plenary considered applications for MTCR membership 
submitted by Croatia, Romania, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, 
Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, 
People,s Republic of China, and Libya.  As on previous 
occasions, Partners were not in a position to reach consensus 
on these applications and agreed to continue examination of 
all candidatures on a case-by-case basis.  The Chair was 
mandated to convey to each candidate country that no 
consensus was reached in this Plenary.8 
 
/////////////////////////////////// 
UK Proposal on Payload Substitution 
/////////////////////////////////// 
 
¶65.  (C)  The UK introduced its proposal (POC 179) to amend 
the MTCR Guidelines to make the ability to augment or 
substitute authorized payloads on re-usable UAV systems for 
the purposes of the WMD delivery a factor for consideration 
when reviewing export license requests.  The UK noted that as 
the commercial market for UAVs grows, so does the risk of 
unauthorized payload substitution.  For this reason, the UK 
believes Partners should routinely consider the risk that a 
system may be misused for WMD proliferation as part of the 
licensing review process.  The UK proposal is not intended to 
impede legitimate trade but to address a proliferation 
concern. 
 
¶66.  (C)  The U.S. welcomed the UK proposal, noting that as 
the commercial market for UAVs evolves, so must our shared 
nonproliferation goals.  The UK proposal does this by drawing 
Partners, attention to another factor for consideration in 
evaluating the proliferation risk of UAV transfers.  Japan 
agreed that the proposal would help guard against the 
unauthorized use of UAVs.  Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, and Poland also supported the proposal. 
 
¶67.  (C)  Russia thought the proposal was important but 
viewed it in the context of Russia,s idea ) as mentioned in 
its opening statement ) for adapting the MTCR to meet new 
challenges.  Russia also argued that nearly everything 
envisioned in the UK proposal is already covered by the MTCR 
Guidelines.  While Russia shared the concern about UAVs 
falling into the hands of terrorists and agreed that UAVs 
would be very dangerous WMD delivery vehicles, Russia was not 
sure that adding these controls to only one class of vehicles 
was pertinent and took a very cautious approach to changing 
the MTCR Guidelines.  Such changes to the Regime,s 
&constitution8 should not be done piecemeal.  Instead, 
Russia believed the Partners needed to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the Regime,s goals and a broad 
assessment of the missile threat.  Once Partners have those 
two things, they can decide what parameters they need to 
establish to deal with the threat.  Therefore, while Russia 
thought it was good to adapt the MTCR to address new 
challenges, it did not think any action should be taken until 
there has been a comprehensive review of the Regime. 
 
¶68.  (C)  The U.S. pointed out that the Partners have been 
appropriately seized for sometime with the idea that the MTCR 
needs to adapt and change to account for modifications in 
technology, changes in the global missile threat, and the 
imaginative efforts of proliferators.  A good deal of work in 
this area has been done over the years.  More recently, the 
U.S. has worked for the past 18 months on a proposal to 
modernize Regime controls on UAVs and cruise missiles.  But 
now Russia has suggested that any proposed changes to the 
MTCR are to be held up until the Partners conduct a radical 
review of the foundations of the Regime.  That is an 
obstructionist proposal, and will put all Regime efforts on 
hold until Partners can find a least common denominator 
solution that will result in controls that are weaker than 
the current controls.  The U.S. will not support even the 
concept of such a proposal. 
 
¶69.  (C)  The ROK requested more time to study the UK 
proposal, noting that it was concerned that the UK proposal 
would be a roadblock to UAV exports for purely commercial 
uses.   The ROK would be open to revisiting the proposal at a 
later date. 
 
¶70.  (C) The UK noted that it already had been discussing its 
proposal with Partners for sometime but was willing to 
consult further.  The UK also urged Partners not to take too 
long as technology does not wait for policy initiatives, it 
keeps evolving. 
 
¶71.  (C)  Russia saw no added value to the Regime in the UK 
proposal.  At most, Russia thought the intent of the proposal 
should be covered in a &best practices8 document.  There 
certainly was not sufficient reason to change the MTCR 
Guidelines, in Russia,s view. 
 
///////////////////////////////////////// 
U.S. Proposal on UAVs and Cruise Missiles 
///////////////////////////////////////// 
 
¶72.  (C)  Remarking that it was making a &free8 
intervention inasmuch as one Partner (Russia) has made clear 
that it would oppose discussion of proposals to strengthen 
the Regime until the Partners conduct of fundamental review 
of the MTCR and its control parameters, the U.S. urged 
Partners to adopt its proposal (POC 171) for modernizing 
Regime controls on UAVs and cruise missiles.  The U.S. 
believed the proposal correctly addressed critical advances 
in technology as well as changes in how this technology is 
used.  Moreover, the U.S. has worked with Partners over the 
past 18 months to refine the proposal, and believes the 
proposal does what the U.S. intended all along.  First, it 
allows for transfers of the bigger, slower, and less lethal 
systems that have a number of commercials uses and that would 
be especially helpful in developing countries.  Second, it 
strengthens controls on highly capable cruise missile 
systems, and thereby helps to make it more costly, difficult, 
and time consuming for proliferators and terrorists to obtain 
these systems.  In short, the proposal balances 
nonproliferation concerns and commercial interests, and the 
U.S. strongly urges its adoption in Athens. 
 
¶73.  (C) Russia said it was in a very constructive mood but 
sometimes had a hard time understanding other Partners, 
positions or explaining Russian views so that Partners could 
understand them.  For example, the U.S. was critical of 
Russia,s stance on its UAV/CM proposal in the Plenary. 
However, Russia said, as there was no agreement on the 
proposal at the TEM, it cannot be adopted at the Plenary. 
But, Russia clarified, that this is not the issue.  It is no 
mystery, Russia said, that the real issue is military 
defense, not nonproliferation.  In Russia,s view, military 
defense and nonproliferation are two different things, and 
military defense needs should not be discussed in the MTCR. 
If the issue is really about using supersonic cruise 
missiles, Russia is ready to assess the cruise missile 
transfer threat and then assess how the MTCR should respond 
to it.  But what Russia cannot understand is why anybody 
would be opposed to discussing the missile threat and 
assessing ways to respond to it.  This is something the 
Partners should want to do so the best controls are in place 
to deal with the threat. 
 
¶74.  (C)  The U.S. responded that the Partners have before 
them proposals by the U.S. and the UK to modify the MTCR to 
address new and emerging threats.  The U.S. proposal has been 
worked for 18 months and has achieved the overwhelming 
support of the majority of Partners.  Those Partners 
recognize the value of the proposal, its utility, and what it 
means for nonproliferation.  The UK proposal has achieved 
even broader support.  Yet, neither proposal can be adopted 
because one Partner is insisting that the MTCR cannot adopt 
either proposal until the MTCR conducts a fundamental review 
of its control parameters.  That is not a constructive 
approach. 
 
¶75.  (C)  Poland, Sweden, and the UK all supported the U.S. 
proposal, as did Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
and Norway.  Poland reminded Partners that export controls 
are not licensing bans, and there is a real need to address 
the UAV/CM issue proactively since the IE has demonstrated 
that certain UAVs and cruise missiles are the &first 
choice8 of proliferators.  Sweden noted that the proposal 
had been reviewed extensively by the TEM and had improved 
over time.  The UK saw the proposal as a way for the Regime 
to proactively address the UAV issue. 
 
¶76.  (C)  Brazil said the issue of UAVs is of great concern, 
and the Regime has been presented with conflicting 
information on this subject.  Russia circulated a document on 
the UAV threat that raises concerns about what should be 
controlled.  On the other hand, there is enormous commercial 
potential for UAVs and a need for them in areas such as 
agriculture and forestry.  Brazil could see some merit in 
Russia,s idea of reviewing the missile threat and then 
deciding control parameters, but Brazil also could see an 
immediate need for more stringent controls on UAVs that may 
have arms.  Brazil also indicated that it can support the UK 
proposal on payload substitution for UAVs. 
 
¶77.  (C)  Brazil also appreciated U.S. efforts on UAVs and 
cruise missiles and thanked the U.S. for modifying its 
proposal to address Partner concerns.  Brazil is prepared to 
continue to work this issue bilaterally with the U.S. but 
takes a generally positive view of the proposal. 
 
¶78.  (C) As no consensus was emerging, the Partners agreed to 
discuss the U.S. and UK proposals again at future MTCR 
meetings. 
 
/////////////////////////////// 
Russian Paper on the UAV Threat 
/////////////////////////////// 
 
¶79.  (C)  Russia reminded Partners that in 2002, Russia was 
the last Partner to agree to a U.S. proposal to impose 
stricter controls on UAVs.  This was not because Russia 
opposed strict controls on UAVs, but because making such a 
change to the MTCR required Russia to make similar changes to 
its national export controls and this involves a great deal 
of work.  Nevertheless, this is serious business and as the 
U.S. pointed out at the time, UAVs represent a serious threat 
in terms of being used as a delivery vehicle for WMD.  What 
is perplexing, Russia said, is the change in the U.S. 
position.  Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 
the U.S. pushed in 2002 for stricter controls on UAVs.  Then, 
just three years later, apparently under the influence of 
commercial sales interests, the U.S. decided it wanted to 
change the rules. Russia does not support this. 
 
¶80.  (C)  Instead, Russia continues to share the concerns 
raised by the U.S. three or four years ago about the dangers 
of UAV proliferation and the ease with which terrorists could 
acquire them.  For these reasons, Russia would strongly 
prefer to keep UAVs under strict control.  This is the 
essence of the Russian paper on the UAV threat (POC 192). 
Russia hoped that Partners would analyze it very carefully 
and come to the conclusion that one Partner (the U.S.) did a 
few years ago:  nonproliferation concerns should prevail over 
commercial interests. 
 
¶81.  (C)  The UK thanked Russia for its presentation and 
commented that both the first section of Russia,s paper and 
the last sentence of the paper are in line with, and seem to 
support, the UK proposal on payload substitution. 
 
¶82.  (C)  Russia responded that it is not against the UK 
proposal per se.  The problem is that if a change were made 
to the MTCR Guidelines, Russia would need to make 
corresponding changes to its national export control laws. 
This would require explaining the situation to President 
Putin himself, and he would need a serious argument as to why 
Russia,s export controls need to be changed.  For these 
reasons, Russia does not support any changes to the MTCR 
Guidelines.  However, the essence of the UK proposal could be 
included in a &best practices8 document.  Finally, as 
stated earlier, Russia cannot support individual adjustments 
to the MTCR until after a comprehensive review of the 
Regime,s parameters. 
 
¶83.  (C)  The U.S. agreed that since the conclusions of the 
Russian paper accorded with the basic tenets of the UK 
proposal, the UK proposal should be approvable.  However, 
Russia would not approve the proposal because doing so would 
require extra work nationally.  Additionally, Russia would 
not consider individual changes to the Regime unless and 
until there is a comprehensive review of the Regime,s 
control parameters.  This in essence means that no individual 
proposals can be adopted at this time or in the near future. 
In the U.S. view, this is not a constructive approach. 
 
¶84.  (C)  Russia said it did not want to debate the issue 
with the U.S. because the tenor of the debate was reminiscent 
of the rhetoric of the 1980s.  Russia also thought the U.S. 
argument about working a particular proposal for 18 months 
was not a good one because some issues needed to be worked 
for years before being adopted. 
 
¶85.  (C)  As no consensus was emerging, the Plenary deferred 
further discussion of this topic to a future meeting. 
 
//////////////// 
Self Assessment 
/////////////// 
 
¶86.  (C)  Switzerland reminded Partners of the agreement at 
the 2003 Plenary in Buenos Aires to report on a voluntary 
basis when they have implemented in their own national export 
control systems changes to the MTCR Guidelines and Annex. 
This information is then to be compiled by the POC and the 
resulting matrix distributed as a reference document. 
Switzerland noted that it had not yet seen such a matrix and 
wondered when it would be distributed. 
 
¶87.  (C)  The POC responded that very few Partners had made 
voluntary submissions, and urged all Partners to do so at 
their earliest opportunity so the POC would have time to 
develop a matrix for distribution at the 2008 RPOC meeting. 
 
¶88.  (C)  The U.S. reported that it had provided the 
requested information to all Partners in POC 116.  The ROK 
said it also had reported via the POC on all Annex changes 
adopted by the ROKG.  Russia said that the changes adopted at 
the Madrid and Copenhagen Plenaries were implemented by 
Russia in August 2007 via a presidential decree.  Brazil 
reported that it had updated its control list in March 2007. 
 
///////////////// 
End Use Controls 
//////////////// 
 
¶89.  (C)  Germany introduced its proposal on end use controls 
(POC 200) and asked for Partner feedback.  Hungary, Italy, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the ROK, Sweden, 
Ukraine, and the UK supported the proposal.  The U.S. 
appreciated the work Germany had put into developing the 
proposal but requested additional time to study it, as did 
Brazil. 
 
¶90.  (C)  Germany thanked Partners for the response and asked 
for any additional input by the end of 2007, so the issue 
could be discussed again at the 2008 RPOC meeting in Paris. 
 
//////////////////// 
Denial Notifications 
//////////////////// 
 
¶91.  (C)  Germany presented its revised proposal on denial 
notifications (POC 199) and urged its adoption.  Ukraine 
supported the basic idea of the proposal but had questions on 
the modalities of the denial renewal process.  These 
questions eventually were resolved in bilateral side meetings 
with the German delegation. 
 
¶92.  (C)  After further consideration of the German proposal 
by Heads of Delegation, the Plenary adopted the following 
consensus language on denial notifications: 
 
&Partners agreed in principle, subject to a silence 
procedure of 45 days, to apply, consistent with their 
national legislation, the &Best Practices for sharing and 
using Denial Information8 (MTCR/ATH/PL/025) as an outline 
for denial notification and use of denial information. 
 
Partners agreed to develop the ePOC notification database in 
a way as to allow Partners to renew notifications online. 
The date of the latest renewal would appear in the database 
together with the notification concerned.  Moreover, Partners 
agree to develop the ePOC database in a way as to allow 
Partners to trace revoked denials for a period of five years 
after revocation.  The date of revocation would appear in the 
database together with the notification concerned.8 
 
NOTE:  The U.S. confirmed in side meetings on the margins of 
the Plenary that the German paper on best practices for 
sharing and using denial information is intended only as a 
suggestion or guide for Partners.  Its adoption is not 
mandatory and Partners should apply it as they choose in a 
manner consistent with national regulation and practice.  END 
NOTE. 
 
 
///////// 
Brokering 
///////// 
 
¶93.  (C)  The ROK informed Partners of the successful 
brokering seminar it co-hosted with Australia in Seoul on 
March 22-23, 2007.  The seminar focused on national and 
international responses to illicit brokering activities and 
concluded that there is a need for a sustained, multi-faceted 
response to such activities.  Australia thanked the ROK for 
organizing the workshop and commended the meeting report to 
all Partners for their review. 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////// 
Informing Non-Partners of Changes to the MTCR 
///////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
¶94.  (C)  Outgoing Chair Per Fischer reminded Partners that 
several countries outside the Regime have asked to be 
informed immediately after the Plenary of any changes to the 
Guidelines and Annex.  The Partners agreed that the Chair 
should directly inform non-member states, as well as the 
UNSCR 1540 Committee, of any changes to the MTCR Guidelines 
and Annex adopted in Athens. 
 
/////////////// 
Future Meetings 
/////////////// 
 
¶95.  (C)  INTERSESSIONAL MEETINGS:  Per established 
procedures, Partners will decide at the January 2008 POC 
meeting whether to hold an intersessional TEM. 
 
¶96.  (U)  PLENARY:  The Partners accepted Australia,s 
proposal to host the 2008 Plenary in Canberra and 
subsequently serve as MTCR Chair for 2008-2009. 
 
¶97.  (C)  RPOC:  The Partners agreed to hold a Reinforced 
Point of Contact meeting in Paris by no later than April 
2008, with specific dates to be communicated by the POC. 
 
 
////////////////////////////////////// 
LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS MEETING (LEEM) 
////////////////////////////////////// 
 
¶98.  (C)  The MTCR held its eighth LEEM on November 5-7, 
2007, with participation from customs, investigative, 
licensing, policy, and police officials.  There were 18 
presentations by seven MTCR Partner countries.  The LEEM was 
co-chaired by Mr. Klass Leenman (The Netherlands) and Ms. 
Aggeliki Matsouka (Greece).  U.S. presentations were made by 
Dave Manglos (DHS/ICE) and Scot Gonzales (Commerce 
Enforcement).  Topics discussed included case studies on 
enforcement successes, case studies on Iranian missile- and 
UAV-related procurement efforts, end-user verification 
issues, interdiction, prosecuting proliferators, 
transshipment, and ITT and deemed exports. 
 
¶99.  (C)  All LEEM participants agreed that LEEM meetings 
were beneficial and provided an opportunity to share 
information on key topics.  They also agreed on the 
importance of continued joint sessions with the IE and TEM, 
and noted that the joint session with the IE had been 
particularly beneficial, especially with regard to the 
discussion on machine tools and brokering issues. 
 
¶100.  (C)  It was reported that Canada is continuing to 
update the Enforcement Officers Handbook and hoped to have  a 
revised draft coordinated through the LEEM Co-chairs and 
circulated to all Partners before the 2008 Plenary. 
 
¶101.  (C)  Co-chair Leenman presented the final report of the 
LEEM to the Plenary on November 8.  The Plenary took note of 
the report and endorsed the LEEM Chair,s recommendations. 
NOTE:  A detailed account of the LEEM and its recommendations 
can be found in the LEEM Co-chairs, report to the Plenary 
(POC 226).   END NOTE. 
 
///////////////////////// 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE (IE) 
///////////////////////// 
 
¶102.  (C)  11 Partners submitted a total of 46 papers for the 
Information Exchange (IE) held on November 5-7, 2007.  The 
meeting was co-Chaired by the UK's John Andrews and Greece,s 
Theodora Paandreaou.  ISN/MTR,s Ralph Palmiero and Josh 
Casker were the U.S. Reps.  ONI,s Rachel Roll also presented 
for the U.S.  Topics discussed in the IE included: missile 
proliferation trends, missile-related procurement, 
procurement networks, shipping trends, maritime 
proliferation, proliferation finance, brokering, emerging 
technologies, SLV/ballistic missile interchangeability, 
machine tools, composite materials, visa screening, end-user 
checks, ITT (intangible technology transfers), and UAV 
proliferation threats.  The IE also discussed missile 
proliferation activities in the following countries and 
regions:  China, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, the Middle 
East, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Syria. 
 
NOTE:  A detailed report on these discussions can be found in 
the IE Co-Chairs' Report to the Plenary (POC 225).  END NOTE. 
 
 
¶103.  (C)  IE presentations engendered an active exchange of 
views and information.  Partners discussed at length 
ballistic missile and UAV developments in Iran, as well as 
the processes Iran employs to acquire key equipment and 
technology for its program.  In this context, Partners were 
encouraged to exercise particular vigilance with regard to 
attempts to acquire guidance and control and propulsion 
technologies.  Attention also was drawn to the increased use 
being made of the automotive industry as a cover for 
procurement efforts on behalf of Iran,s missile program. 
Finally, Partners discussed in detail the operations of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a 
key carrier of ballistic missile-related cargoes for Iran. 
 
¶104.  (C)  Missile programs in China and North Korea also 
were discussed extensively, as were the role of brokers in 
illicit procurement and proliferators, use of transshipment 
points.  Partners also were briefed on methods used in 
proliferation finance and the importance of using visa 
screening as a nonproliferation tool.  Another key focus of 
the IE discussions was emerging technologies. 
 
¶105.  (C)  The IE hosted the first ever joint session of the 
IE, LEEM, and TEM.  Subjects discussed included emerging 
technologies, machine tools, proliferation finance, and 
brokering.  Participants found the exchange highly valuable 
and urged that such joint sessions be continued, noting that 
sharing information on interdictions and national practices 
in key areas is extremely useful. 
 
¶106.  (C)  IE Co-Chair John Andrews presented the final IE 
report to the Plenary on November 8.  The Plenary took note 
of the report and generally praised the excellent work of the 
IE.  The Plenary also reiterated the importance of 
circulating IE papers on ePOC at least one month in advance 
of the Plenary.  In cases where classification does not 
permit papers to be circulated on ePOC, Partners should 
circulate a suitable synopsis. 
 
//////////////////////////////// 
Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) 
/////////////////////////////// 
 
¶107.  (C)  The TEM met November 1-6, 2007 to discuss a number 
of proposals for amending the MTCR Annex.  ISN/MTR,s Kennedy 
Wilson led U.S. participation in the TEM.  The TEM reached 
consensus on the following: 
 
--The payload definition for &Other UAVs8 was amended in 
two areas to include munitions support and deployment 
structure. 
--Terms in entries 2.A.1.B.1 and 2.A.1.b.2 were made 
consistent with other Item entries. 
--The names of fuel substances in 4.C.2.b.3, 4.C.2.b.13, and 
4.C.2.b.20 were changed to provide further precision. 
--A new entry was created for an oxidizer substance useable 
in solid propellant rocket motors (4.C.4.b.5). 
--The control text for two polymeric substances was clarified 
(4.C.5.a and 4.C.5.b). 
--An editorial correction was applied to 4.C.6.a.3. 
--Two notes were added to 4.C.6.a.5. 
--The Technical Note for maraging steels (6.C.8) was 
clarified. 
--The expression of the percentage of titanium content in 
Titanium-stabilized stainless steel was corrected (6.C.9.a.2). 
--A new text clarifying vibration test modes was adopted 
(15.B.1.a.). 
--The scope of 10.E.1 was extended to cover systems in 19.A.2. 
--An Index provided for reference as a separate document from 
the Annex was created and will be updated consequent to each 
update of the Annex. 
 
¶108. (C)  In addition, the TEM discussed at length a U.S. 
proposal to significantly modify how the Regime controls UAVs 
and cruise missiles.  However, despite the majority of 
Partners supporting the proposal, it did not gain consensus. 
Russia did not identify specific technical objections to the 
proposal but objected to it on principle.  As an alternative, 
Russia proposed ) during bilateral discussions -- a 
comprehensive zero-based review of the Regime,s control 
criteria, goals, and purpose for various classes of systems. 
Both Brazil and South Africa said they appreciated the new 
modified format of the U.S. proposal, but did not remove 
their reserves, although South Africa moved from reserve to 
study reserve.  South Africa also proposed modified language 
for the stealth criterion and indicated it has additional 
unspecified concerns about the parameters in general that it 
would discuss if its stealth concerns were resolved. 
Privately, Brazilian officials indicated that they support 
the U.S. proposal, but are still working their interagency 
for approval.  South Africa also indicated privately that it 
remains on reserve because of political concerns about 
isolating Russia. 
 
¶109.  (C)  The Partners took note of the TEM report and 
endorsed the recommendations presented by the TEM Chair. 
 
////////////// 
Other Business 
////////////// 
 
¶110.  (C)  Brazil informed the Partners of the third UN Panel 
on Missiles.  The panel had an organizational meeting in 
2007, and will meet again in February and June 2008.  Brazil 
is serving as panel chair, and hopes the panel will produce a 
good report. 
 
¶111.  (C)  Russia also hoped the panel would produce a good 
assessment of the global missile picture and the challenges 
Partners face in this area.  Russia thought the panel report 
would be a good starting point for the MTCR to begin 
assessing the global missile threat, with a view to 
identifying where the MTCR has been successful in addressing 
the threat and what more must be done to deal with new 
challenges.  In Russia,s view, the MTCR needs to review 
where it is heading and what it needs to do to get there. 
Russia appealed to Partners to give careful thought to its 
suggestion and hoped that the seeds of its proposal would 
find good soil and bear fruit in the future. 
 
¶112.  (C)  Continuing, Russia said it is dissatisfied with 
the organization of the MTCR, especially the IE, and thinks 
there needs to be a review of how the Regime works.  Russia 
is interested in improving the MTCR effectiveness, starting 
with the Plenary agenda.  In Russia,s assessment, the 
Partners spent too much time in Athens talking about outreach 
and not enough time on serious matters.  Russia wants to make 
sure that its views will be taken into account and that the 
Partners will focus on substance at the Canberra Plenary. 
Russia also hoped that Partners would think seriously about 
the information flow within the Regime, and take steps to fix 
it and thereby reduce tensions at the Plenary.  In 
particular, Russia said, it is too much for the Russian 
delegation to be expected to handle all of the last minute 
papers.  Plenary papers, especially IE papers, should be 
circulated at least one month in advance. 
 
////////////////// 
Closing Statements 
////////////////// 
 
¶113.  (C)  Portugal, on behalf of the EU and Norway, was 
disappointed that the Partners had failed to admit the newest 
EU countries to the Regime and urged the MTCR to give 
priority to this issue in the future.  Ukraine fully 
supported the EU position. 
 
¶114.  (C)  Outgoing Chair Fischer thanked Greece for its 
outstanding hospitality and leadership in organizing the 
Plenary.  The UK echoed these sentiments, adding a thank you 
for all the behind-the-scenes staff that made the Plenary a 
success. 
 
/////////////// 
Press Statement 
/////////////// 
 
¶115.  (U) The Partners adopted the following press statement 
for release at the conclusion of the Athens Plenary: 
 
&Press Release 
MTCR Plenary: Athens 
7-9 November 2007 
 
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held its 22nd 
Plenary Meeting in Athens from 7 to 9 November 2007 to review 
its activities and further strengthen its efforts to prevent 
missile proliferation.  The Plenary was opened by H.E. Mr. 
Dimitrios K. Katsoudas, Secretary General for European 
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic 
Republic, and chaired by Ambassador Eleftherios Danellis who 
was confirmed as Chair of the MTCR until the next Plenary. 
 
Partners exchanged information and discussed trends in 
missile developments around the world and acknowledged the 
growing risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery.  In particular, they expressed 
concern over missile proliferation in Northeast Asia South 
Asia, and the Middle East and reaffirmed their determination 
to strengthen export controls, thereby discouraging missile 
programmes and activities of proliferation concern. 
 
Partners noted the direct relevance of UN Security Council 
resolutions, inter alia, 1718, 1737 and 1747 to MTCR export 
controls and expressed their determination to implement these 
resolutions and to exercise vigilance and prevent the 
transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that 
could contribute to WMD ballistic missile programmes of 
proliferation concern, in accordance with their national 
legislation and consistent with international law. 
 
Partners agreed on practical measures, including exchange of 
information, inter alia, on entities and non-listed goods of 
proliferation concern and called on all States to take all 
necessary steps at a national level to fully and effectively 
implement the missile relevant provisions of these 
resolutions. 
 
The Plenary discussed extensively the rapid changes in 
relevant technology which demand the MTCR to continuously 
adapt in order to maintain the accuracy and comprehensiveness 
of its focus on curtailing the missile proliferation threat. 
A number of proposals on this subject were discussed. The 
Plenary agreed on changes to the list of controlled goods 
(the Annex). 
 
In a broader context, the Plenary reiterated its support for 
UN Security Council resolution 1540 declaring proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery a 
threat to international peace and security and obliging all 
UN Member Sates to exercise effective export controls over 
such weapons and related materials.  It reaffirmed the 
willingness of Partners in a position to do so to assist 
non-member states, as foreseen in the resolution, and that 
the Chair should continue to pursue contact with the 1540 
Committee. 
 
Since its establishment in 1987 the MTCR has made significant 
contributions to the international non-proliferation effort. 
The 34 Partners (see below) of the MTCR have established an 
international export control standard which is increasingly 
adhered to by non-members of the MTCR. Partners welcomed the 
growing awareness of the need for export controls and the 
expressed interest by many States in cooperating with the 
MTCR. They confirmed their intention individually and through 
the outreach activities of the Chair to consult and cooperate 
with non-members to promote effective export controls over 
missiles and missile technology.  The Greek Chair was 
mandated to conduct outreach activities with a diverse range 
of non-member States. 
 
Partners welcomed Australia,s offer to host the next MTCR 
Plenary Meeting in the second half of 2008 and to take on the 
chairmanship of the Regime for the subsequent term of office. 
 
Further information on the MTCR can be found at www.mtcr.info 
 
--- 
 
Partners of the MTCR: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, the Russian 
Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America.8 
 
////////////////// 
Bilateral Meetings 
////////////////// 
 
¶116.  (C)  The U.S. delegation held bilateral meetings with 
several countries on the margins of the November Plenary 
meeting: 
 
Australia (11/06): The U.S and the UK exchanged views on 
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the 
U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership, and the U.S. 
proposals on Iranian front companies and outreach.  The U.S. 
also briefed Australia on the results of recent bilateral 
talks with India on export control issues, and discussed in 
detail MTCR procedures and operations.  In addition, the U.S. 
answered numerous questions about the &how to,s8 of 
organizing a Plenary and volunteered to be a resource for 
Australia in the coming year. 
 
France (11/07):  The U.S. and France exchanged views on 
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the 
U.S. UAV/CM proposal, the U.S. proposal on outreach and 
Iranian front companies, two Russian proposals on a 
comprehensive review of the MTCR and globalizing the INF 
treaty, and the EU proposal on Iran. 
 
Germany (11/04):  The U.S and Germany exchanged views on 
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the 
U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership and outreach, 
Germany,s proposals on denial notifications and end-use 
controls. 
 
Greece (11/05):  The U.S and Greece exchanged views on 
Plenary agenda items and Plenary management strategies. 
 
Japan (11/06):  The U.S and Japan exchanged views on Plenary 
agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. 
UAV/Cruise missile proposal, membership, and outreach. 
 
Russia (11/05):  The U.S. and Russia exchanged views on 
Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating to the 
U.S. UAV/CM proposal, membership, and the U.S. proposal on 
Iranian front companies. Russia also discussed its interest 
in circulating the U.S.-Russia joint statement on INF. 
 
South Africa (11/06):  The U.S. and South Africa exchanged 
views on Plenary agenda items, particularly issues relating 
to the U.S. UAV/Cruise missile proposal, outreach, and the 
U.S. proposal on Iranian front companies. 
 
UK (11/04): The U.S and the UK exchanged views on Plenary 
agenda items, particularly issues relating to the U.S. 
UAV/Cruise missile proposal, the UK proposal on payload 
substitution, membership, and the U.S. proposals on Iranian 
front companies and outreach.  The U.S. also briefed the UK 
on the results of recent bilateral talks with India on export 
control issues. 
 
NOTE:  The TEM delegation also held separate, TEM-specific 
bilats with Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine, and the 
UK.  END NOTE. 
 
////////////////// 
DELEGATION MEMBERS 
////////////////// 
 
¶117.  (C)  The U.S. delegation was led by ISN Acting DAS Amb. 
Donald A. Mahley.  Other delegation members were:  Pam Durham 
(ISN/MTR), Ralph Palmiero, (ISN/MTR), Josh Casker(ISN/MTR), 
Kennedy Wilson (ISN/MTR), Steve Clagett (DOC/BIS), Dennis 
Krepp (DOC/BIS), Chantal Laktos (DOC/BIS), Jamie Fly 
(OSD/TNT), Charlie Stubbs (JCS/J-5), Jesse Crump (DOD), 
Timothy Williams (OSD), Geoffrey Buescher (DOD), Anatoli 
Welihozikiy (DOE), Scot Gonzales (DOC/OEE), Dave 
Manglos(DHS/ICE), Rachel Roll (Navy), Helen Smith (Embassy 
Paris), Jeffrey Hovenier and Starr Small (Embassy Athens). 
RICE