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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000053 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO VE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF MEETING WITH ECUADORIAN MOD 
SANDOVAL 
 
REF: A. 07 QUITO...


id: 137595
date: 1/16/2008 20:49
refid: 08QUITO53
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07QUITO2556|07QUITO2570|07QUITO2616|07QUITO953
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OSD / DAN MCDONALD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS SNAR PTER EC CO VE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF MEETING WITH ECUADORIAN MOD 
SANDOVAL 
 
REF: A. 07 QUITO 2570 
     ¶B. 07 QUITO 953 
     ¶C. 07 QUITO 2556 
     ¶D. 07 QUITO 2616 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Linda Jewell, for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Please accept my thanks for receiving Dr. Wellington 
Sandoval, the Ecuadorian Minister of Defense, during the 
Minister's January 23-26 visit to the U.S.  Minister 
Sandoval's visit comes at a time of opportunities and risks 
as Ecuador carries out political and economic reforms through 
its Constituent Assembly.  While the Correa government 
clearly presents some concerns and uncertainties, cooperation 
on counter-narcotics and Northern Border security has in fact 
been very good to date.  Sandoval is pragmatic, positively 
inclined, and well-positioned to play a helpful role on these 
issues moving forward.  I am convinced that dialogue with the 
MOD will maximize our prospects for continuing constructive 
bilateral military cooperation to our mutual benefit.  Our 
goal during the Minister's visit is to demonstrate U.S. 
interest in advancing relations with the Correa government on 
issues of mutual concern. 
 
Fragile Democracy, Correa's Commitment to Change 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶2.  (C) Our top goal in Ecuador is to promote and support 
democratic stability by strengthening democratic 
institutions.  A critical component of this effort is 
limiting the corrosive effects of the regional drug trade on 
Ecuador, as well as the risks associated with Colombian 
guerrilla activity along Ecuador,s Northern border region. 
Ecuador is a fragile democracy caught in a cycle of political 
instability reflecting popular disillusionment with 
traditional institutions.  Inaugurated in January 2007, 
Rafael Correa is the first president since the 1979 return to 
democracy to enjoy popularity in all regions of the country 
and among a broad array of class and demographic groups. 
 
¶3.  (C) Correa won election by successfully presenting 
himself as the "change" candidate to a population frustrated 
by the chaotic and corrupt governments of recent years.  Thus 
far, Correa has proven adept at maintaining public support 
using a combination of confrontational tactics, pragmatic 
deal-making, and programs to assist the poor.  He is seeking 
adoption of reforms through an unbounded Constituent 
Assembly, inaugurated on November 29.  The Assembly is 
rewriting the constitution, which would be approved in a 
subsequent referendum, and adopting laws that take effect 
immediately.  It has declared the Congress, elected in 2006, 
in indefinite recess.  Our position is that constitutional 
reform is an internal Ecuadorian issue, but that it is 
essential that the reform process proceed in a manner 
consistent with the region's democratic values. 
 
¶4.  (C) While Correa is sympathetic to some of Chavez's 
ideas, Correa's policies reflect primarily Ecuadorian 
realities and dynamics.  He is a nationalist first, and a 
leftist second.  He chafes at Ecuador,s traditional 
dependency on the U.S., but is not avowedly anti-American (he 
and other close family members have lived in the U.S. and he 
expresses a genuine affinity for many aspects of U.S. 
society).  He does not want to be seen as following anyone,s 
example, but rather charting his own course. 
 
Northern Border 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Ecuador shares a 400-mile border with Colombia in 
areas of heavy narco-terrorist activity.  USG efforts in the 
area aim to prevent spillover of drug cultivation and illegal 
armed group activity into Ecuador.  They include development 
assistance to improve the quality of life and spur licit 
economic growth; counter-narcotics aid to curb smuggling of 
precursor chemicals, cocaine, and heroin; and 
military-to-military assistance to strengthen Ecuador's 
ability to secure its Northern Border and control its 
territorial waters. 
 
¶6.  (C) The Ecuadorian Army's Fourth Division has engaged the 
 
FARC in a series of operations along the border with Colombia 
since last November (Ref A).  These operations demonstrate 
previously uncharacteristic resolve and coordination by the 
Ecuadorian military to press the attack and to continue 
surveillance and patrolling its border to engage additional 
FARC camps. 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOE's political will to control its Northern 
Border and to remove incursions of armed insurgents within 
its territory appear to have increased after Minister 
Sandoval's fact-finding trip to the Northern Border last 
November.  The MOD was surprised to find a heavier than 
expected FARC presence and a local population unwilling to 
reveal this presence.  Ecuadorian policy under this and 
previous governments is to refrain from labeling the FARC as 
terrorists and to maintain a neutral position on Colombia,s 
internal conflict, not just for ideological reasons but to 
avoid becoming a target of FARC attacks (especially the 
strategic oil infrastructure located near the Northern 
Border).  Yet Sandoval has been unusually outspoken about how 
FARC incursions represent a threat to Ecuador's sovereignty. 
I recommend that you praise GOE efforts along the Northern 
Border and assure the Minister of our continued assistance. 
 
Counter-Narcotics Cooperation 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Ecuadorian leaders have identified narcotraffickers 
and other criminal organizations as a threat to national 
sovereignty, and are focusing the police, military, judiciary 
and others on disrupting and dismantling these organizations. 
 Since 2001, the Embassy's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) 
has provided almost $94 million to enhance the capacity of 
the anti-narcotics police throughout Ecuador, to assist the 
military in providing security for citizens and protecting 
Ecuador's sovereignty on the northern and maritime borders, 
and improve the criminal justice system.  However, the GOE 
has been critical of the cuts in NAS funding, down to just 
over $7 million in 2008 from nearly $20 million in 2004, in 
light of the GOE,s continued anti-narcotics efforts.  It 
would be helpful for you to explain that these cuts are due 
to worldwide budgetary pressures, and do not reflect 
Ecuador,s efforts or cooperation, which has been excellent. 
 
Plan Ecuador 
------------ 
 
¶9.  (SBU) We understand that Minister Sandoval will raise 
Plan Ecuador, which was unveiled by President Correa in April 
2007 as a guide to GOE and international donor development 
activity in the Northern Border region thru 2018.  Long on 
general themes and short on specifics, the Plan lists seven 
goals in development activity (Ref B).  If the Minister asks 
for USG support, your response could be that we appreciate 
the importance of integrating developmental and security 
efforts.  Improved coordination by the GOE of both national 
and donor community programs is useful.  USAID has focused on 
development support in the region for several years, 
providing over $78 million in assistance since 2001. 
 
Manta FOL 
--------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The U.S. military presence in Manta remains 
controversial, and President Correa has repeatedly vowed that 
he will not renew the agreement when it expires in November 
¶2009.  We regard this as a sovereignty-based position linked 
to domestic politics, rather than an indicator of weakening 
GOE commitment to broader CN efforts or bilateral military 
cooperation.  Prior to an intensive Embassy public affairs 
effort over the past year, most Ecuadorians had a limited or 
misinformed perception about the FOL.  Polls in 2006 showed 
that a strong majority of Ecuadorians opposed "foreign 
troops" on national soil.  Attitudes have softened thanks to 
our efforts to create a more informed public.  In an August 
2007 poll, 75 percent of respondents agreed that Ecuador 
should collaborate with the U.S. in the fight against 
narcotrafficking, and the positive answers to FOL-specific 
questions hovered around 50 percent, and higher in Manta 
itself.  Correa is mindful of the FOL,s relative popularity 
in Manta based on economic benefits and is seeking to fill 
 
 
that gap post-2009.  He is pursuing a plan to make Manta the 
"gateway for trade" between East Asia and South America, 
taking advantage of the excellent deep water port and the 
potential offered by the airport (Refs C and D).  You will 
want to emphasize that FOL operations are producing important 
results in the fight against transnational crime, benefiting 
both countries. 
JEWELL 

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