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C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA POST:  4TH EDITION -- THE DIRECTOR'S CUT -- 
VOLUME II 
 
REF: A. (A) PANAMA 51 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
     ¶B. (B) PANAMA 72 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS Brian R. Naranjo.  Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
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¶1. (C) The January 17-21 visit of State's Director for 
Central American Affairs John Feeley provided the Panama Post 
an excellent opportunity to touch base with numerous 
political heavy hitters.  Feeley met with all the 
"presidenciables," except for Panamanista aspirant Alberto 
Vallarino who was out of town and on the stump and Minister 
of Housing and frequently cited front-runner for the 
governing Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) presidential 
nomination Balbina Herrera.  (Note:  Ambassador lunched with 
Herrera on January 24 (REFTEL B).)  Several common themes 
emerged from the Feeley's visit: 
 
(a) opposition leaders uniformly stated that they believe 
that ultimately the governing Revolutionary Democratic Party 
(PRD) presidential nominee would be Balbina Herrera, the 
current Minister of Housing; 
 
(b) only Panamenista Party leaders believe that there will be 
an inter-party primary, all other opposition leaders rejected 
it, and not even Panamenista President and presidential 
candidate Juan Carlos Varela mentioned it during his meeting 
with the Director; and 
 
(c) PRD and Torrijos Administration contacts uniformly 
asserted that National Assembly President Pedro Miguel 
Gonzalez (PMG) would not be re-elected. 
 
If Herrera is sincere in her desire to run for Mayor of 
Panama City, not President, then the opposition could be 
preparing to run against the wrong PRD opponent.  The 
universal rejection of the inter-party primary by 
non-Panamenista candidates and Varela's omission to advocate 
for it may suggest that this idea's time has come and passed. 
 While unlikely to take place, the inter-party primary may 
continue to be a political football in intra-opposition 
wrestling. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Ford Concedes Panamenista Preference 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) "I am leaning towards the Panamenista party," UP 
President Guillermo "Billy" Ford told Director on January 17. 
 Ford conceded, UP needed to bargaining to bargain hard when 
negotiating an opposition alliance, in short, whether UP 
would support the CD's eventual presidential nominee 
Martinelli or to support the eventual Panamenista nominee. 
Aware that UP VP Jose Raul Mulino was for all intents and 
purposes already working on Panamanista presidential nominee 
candidate Alberto Vallarino and that UP VP Anibal Galindo was 
coordinating closely with Martinelli, Ford said that he had 
assembled a team of thinkers to develop some "programmatic 
ideas" for which UP would seek the support of an eventual 
alliance partner.  "We need to get the best deal for UP," 
Ford explained.  During the meeting, Ford spotted Delia 
Cardenas, noting that Cardenas was spearheading the work on 
these programmatic ideas.  (Note:  Cardenas, a fellow 
life-long Movement of Liberal Republican Nationalists 
(MOLIRENA) member, jumped to UP with Ford.)  "Ideology is not 
that important these days in Panama," Ford said.  "What 
people want are ideas to solve problems." 
 
¶3. (C) Asked if Endara's early formalization of his status as 
VMP's presidential candidate would limit Endara's ability to 
maneuver and form alliances, Ford, who was Endara's First VP, 
said, "No.  Endara needs the clout that being a candidate 
brings. He will be able to make deals."  Ford said he 
expected that Minister of Housing Balbina Herrera would be 
the PRD's eventual presidential candidate and asserted that 
there would not be an inter-party primary. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment:  Okay, so now UP appears to be headed not 
just in two directions, but rather three.  Mulino is working 
on Vallarino's campaign, Galindo on Martinelli's campaign, 
and Ford is trying to hold his party back from splitting so 
that they can get the best deal from either whoever 
ultimately wins the Panamenista primary or Martinelli.  There 
 
also appear to be three groups working on "programmatic 
ideas:"  former Solidarity Party members led by Mulino, 
former Liberals led by Galindo, and former MOLIRENistas led 
by Ford.  Stay tuned. 
 
--------------------------- 
Martinelli Gets a Face-Lift 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Arriving at the chic Decapolis Hotel bar for drinks 
with Feeley, Martinelli, with two badly bruised eyes, looked 
like he had been on the losing side of a bad bar fight.  Not 
exactly.  Martinelli explained that he had just had a 
face-lift.  Not a shrinking violet, Martinelli strode into 
this very public setting without a care in the world for what 
others might think of his facelift.  That was essentially it 
for news at this meeting as Martinelli went over well trod 
ground providing Feeley with a first-hand opportunity to 
taste Martinelli's confidence, witness his brash and direct 
manner, and to see that, hell or high water, Martinelli would 
run for president. As Ford noted, Herrera would be the PRD's 
eventual presidential candidate, and there would not be an 
inter-party primary, according to Martinelli. 
 
¶6. (C) In an aside to POLCOUNS, Martinelli political advisor 
Jimmy Papademetriu said, "I am very suspicious of Varela.  If 
he wins the Panamenista presidential nomination, I do not see 
how Varela will be able to hold himself back from running for 
president."  Papademetriu confided that he was "working on 
Martinelli" to get him to understand that Varela might not 
follow through on his private pledge to back Martinelli if 
Martinelli is leading the polls as of May 2008.  (Conversely, 
Martinelli had pledged to step down in favor of Varela should 
he be trailing Varela.)  Slowly, Martinelli was coming to 
realize that he might not bring Varela to his side.  As for 
the internal Panamenista race, Papademetriu asserted that 
Varela "was clobbering" Vallarino. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment:  Martinelli values youth and vigor.  His 
advisors are young, he likes to hang out in hip places, and 
now he is trying to appear younger.  While visiting 
Transparency International, Feeley saw a picture of 
Martinelli from 2004.  It was apparent that Martinelli has 
already undergone hair treatment to cover what was a balding 
pate..  Indeed, Martinelli sees projecting an image of youth 
and vigor as essential to his political success and probably 
sought an alliance with Varela in part for his youthful image 
and track record for having revitalized the Panamenista Party. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Endara to Embark on "Listening Tour" 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) "I will begin my campaign with a listening tour," VMP 
Presidential Candidate Guillermo Endara told Director on 
January 18.  Noting that people were tired of "empty 
promises," former President Endara said that he needed to 
hear their concerns.  "We will not be doing big events. 
People are insulted by them because they diminishes 
individuals," Endara explained.  "Instead we will be doing 
smaller events and speaking directly to voters.  I want to 
treat the voters with respect."  Ultimately, the Panamenista 
party would end up tearing itself to pieces, Endara asserted. 
 Ameglio, Varela and Vallarino are going to spill a lot of 
blood in the Panamenista primary," this life-long Panamenista 
claimed.  Furthermore, there would not be an inter-party 
primary; "Only the Panamenista candidates event talk about it 
any more."  As Ford and Martinelli noted, Herrera would be 
the PRD's eventual presidential candidate, and there would 
not be an inter-party primary, Endara said. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  One wonders whether Endara truly prefers 
small gatherings or if he is attempting to make a virtue out 
of the fact that he is broke and cannot afford to hold large 
events.  Absent any clear proposal for what he wants to do or 
how he would govern, Endara is choosing to go listen instead. 
 Endara's strategy appears to be to sustain enough visibility 
to remain alive politically (He pulled seventeen percent in 
2004.), wait for the Panamenistas to collapse, and then ride 
the wave of surging Panamenista faithful looking for a true 
Panamenista to support:  him.  To facilitate coalition 
building, Endara also appears to be refraining from attacking 
other presidential aspirants. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Juan Carlos Navarro Confident Will Secure PRD CEN Seat 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶10. (C) Panama City Mayor and PRD presidential nominee 
candidate Juan Carlos Navarro said that there would not be 
any surprises when the PRD faithful went to the polls on 
January 20 to elect delegates for the party's March 9 
convention.  "I expect that thirty percent of the party's 
membership will turn out," the mayor predicted.  (Note: 
Navarro's expectations were exceeded when some forty-two 
percent of PRD members voted, about twelve percent of all 
voters.)  "I have a good machine and expect to have the 
support of about fifteen percent of the elected delegates. 
That should be enough to secure a seat on the CEN" (National 
Executive Committee) of the PRD.  Navarro went on to add, "El 
Toro (former President Ernesto Perez Balladares) will not do 
well." 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment:  Navarro is probably right that he will be 
able to handily win election to a seat on the PRD CEN. 
Though results of the January 20 PRD election have not yet 
been released, Navarro has refrained from playing the numbers 
spin game.  While Perez Balladares asserted that he had 
"surprised" everybody be securing fifty percent of the 
delegates and Herrera wildly asserted that she had the 
support of ninety-five percent of the delegates, Navarro has 
not thrown out numbers, but has argued that Panama's mayors, 
city councilman, and district representatives form the base 
of his machine.  Navarro asserted that he was being 
conservative in his estimation of his support.  Herrera later 
explained to Ambassador on January 24 that she arrived at the 
ninety-five percent number by subtracting the percentage of 
delegates committed to supporting El Toro (about five 
percent).  Navarro's ultimate goal remains securing the PRD's 
presidential nomination.  He exhibited no loss of confidence 
in his belief that Herrera would support him, not run against 
him, for the presidential nomination. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Varela:  "I am beating Vallarino two to one." 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C)  "I am beating Vallarino two to one, according to 
internal Panamenista polls.  I am getting fifty percent to 
Vallarino's twenty-five percent support," Panamenista Party 
President and candidate for the party's presidential 
nomination Juan Carlos Varela stated on January 21.  Varela 
predicted that the general elections would between Herrera, 
Martinelli and him. 
 
¶13. (C)  Comment:  Varela made no mention of his pledge to 
Martinelli to bow out of the race should he be trailing 
Martinelli in the polls in May 2008.  His mention that the 
race would eventually come down to a three-way race between 
Herrera, Martinelli, and himself suggests that Varela is 
already looking forward to the generals.  As for listening 
for the dogs that do not bark, it is interesting to note that 
Varela did not push the inter-party primary as a way to unify 
the opposition as he is usually wont to do. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Lewis Ecstatic with High PRD Turn-Out 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Meeting with Feeley and DCM the day after PRD members 
went to the polls, First VP and FM Samuel Lewis beamed at the 
high turn-out for the PRD's internal election for delegates. 
"I told you guys on January 18 that about one-third of the 
party's members would vote," Lewis said on January 21. 
"Well, it looks like forty-two percent went to the polls. 
That's more than people that the entire Panamenista party," 
Panama's largest opposition party.  Lewis noted that he had 
not decided whether to run for a seat on the CEN.  Lewis told 
us that PMG would not be re-elected as President of the 
National Assembly.  Believing that PRD centrists had carried 
the day, Lewis asserted that El Toro would not be a force at 
the party's convention. 
 
¶15. (C) Comment:  Lewis may still be nurturing dreams of 
running for president.  Absent popular support, Lewis would 
have to rely on party movers and shakers to line up delegates 
in his favor for a CEN seat.  Depending upon how successful 
he were at securing such a seat, he might then return to a 
presidential run that begins with efforts to lock up the 
support of party luminaries before turning to work its bases, 
where Lewis iss clearly outpaced by Herrera. 
EATON