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Viewing cable 08OTTAWA26, S/CRS COORDINATOR HERBST'S MEETINGS IN CANADA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08OTTAWA26 2008-01-07 21:39 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO6361
PP RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #0026/01 0072139
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 072139Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7105
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE 0154
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0370
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS CA HA
SUBJECT: S/CRS COORDINATOR HERBST'S MEETINGS IN CANADA 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: In meetings with Canadian officials to 
discuss areas for collaboration in improving post-conflict 
stabilization and reconstruction, Ambassador John Herbst of 
the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization (S/CRS) heard that there is an emerging 
consensus in Canadian defense circles that the military role 
in post-conflict scenarios is primarily to support the 
development of local governance and that the military will 
often be in a supporting role to civilian agencies in this 
function.  Canadian officials stressed the need for better 
established doctrine and a desire to stay closely connected 
to the U.S. and other international players in the 
development of new joint capabilities.  The Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) briefed Ambassador Herbst on its 
current operations, which includes 166 police trainers and 
advisors in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sudan drawn from a mix of 
the federal RCMP as well as local and provincial police. 
Canadian officials also compared notes on a number of 
bureaucratic stumbling blocks to an effective post-conflict 
response, including funding, organization, triggers, and 
political will.  End Summary. 
 
2. (SBU) S/CRS Coordinator Ambassador John Herbst met with 
Canadian counterparts December 21 to discuss areas for 
further collaboration as the U.S. and Canada improve their 
abilities to respond to post-conflict stabilization and 
reconstruction missions. 
 
DND SEEKS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO POST CONFLICT 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
3. (SBU) Anne Bradfield, Director General for Force 
Development Analysis in the Department of National Defence 
(DND), said there is an emerging consensus at DND that in 
post-conflict stabilization the military should not play a 
lead role, but rather a supporting role to civilian agencies. 
 She described three waves in the evolution of 
thinking about post-conflict operations.  First was CIMIC -- 
civil-military cooperation teams that support military 
operations by garnering local support through civil affairs 
and humanitarian projects.  Next was the 3D approach, 
which sought to integrate diplomatic, development, and 
defense tools in support of a foreign policy objective. 
The emerging concept is for a "comprehensive approach," which 
puts all available tools in support of the center of 
gravity, which is generally governance.  Bradfield said this 
evolution in thinking was on display during recent 
briefings for the commander of the next rotation in the 
Afghan mission.  There was more emphasis on governance and 
an emerging understanding that security operations will be 
conducted in support of governance, and the new commander 
wanted to ensure he had a clear understanding of how this 
shift was playing out in terms of resources and 
responsibilities.  Bradfield said this would change the way 
the PRTs are organized and will change military operations to 
emphasize longevity and staying power, rather than short-term 
offensive operations. 
 
4. (SBU) Bradfield expressed frustration with MNE-5 which she 
said had led to a number of positive tactical gains but is 
lacking an overarching objective and end-state.  She cited 
dismissive attitudes by the chair toward the role of NGOs and 
questioned the logic of bringing in various countries in the 
process who do not have established post-conflict 
capabilities.  She also noted some SHAPE officials dismissed 
a Canadian presentation dealing with the "comprehensive 
Qa Canadian presentation dealing with the "comprehensive 
approach" because it was not yet approved by SHAPE 
headquarters.  Bradfield wondered if, rather than putting our 
heads down and pushing forward, we would not benefit more 
from taking some time out to figure out what we have achieved 
and where we need to collectively go in the MNE process. 
 
5. (SBU) Bradfield also expressed a need to develop doctrine 
that would then be institutionalized and lead to greater 
clarity in training and operations.  She decried the current 
situation where Canadian agencies conduct lessons learned 
exercises and make changes to their SOPs in isolation, and 
seek to push things in a true "whole of government" direction 
with all agencies reading from the same script.  Bradfield 
expressed a desire to continue to collaborate closely with us 
as we develop new doctrines and capabilities, and to achieve 
as much "jointness" in our systems as possible. 
 
PCO SEEKS CLARITY IN ENGAGING THE CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
 
OTTAWA 00000026  002 OF 003 
 
 
6. (SBU) The Privy Council's Assistant Secretary to the 
Cabinet for Foreign Affairs (rough equivalent to an NSC 
Director) Jill Sinclair voiced interest in U.S. efforts to 
plan and organize for post-conflict stabilization, in 
particular the triggers that we use to know when to engage. 
She asked about our planning and perceived role for S/CRS 
teams in current and future hot spots and about our ability 
to achieve inter-agency harmony in the process and 
how we align new capabilities with standing DOD 
organizations.  Sinclair also said she was interested in 
staying in close touch as we work these issues in NATO and 
the G-8. 
 
RCMP KEEPS UP A RESPECTABLE PACE OF DEPLOYMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7. (SBU) The RCMP's Director General for International 
Policing Dave Beer said that the RCMP's goal is to have 200 
police officers in a deployable status (either deployed or 
ready to deploy) at any given time.  There are currently 166 
deployed, including 100 in Haiti, 25 in Afghanistan, and 15 
in Darfur.  They are conducting a mix of training and 
conventional civ/pol duties, some armed and some unarmed, as 
part of international missions.  Between two-thirds and 
three-fourths of the officers are from partner agencies, e.g. 
local police forces, and not the RCMP itself.  The RCMP pays 
all costs for the deployment, including reimbursing the 
sending agency for salaries; personnel are guaranteed their 
jobs will be available when they return. 
 
8. (SBU) Beer described the Afghanistan mission as having the 
highest profile of anything the RCMP is doing abroad, 
although it is much smaller than the Haiti mission.  He said 
the main role is training the Afghan police but there 
is not yet adequate security to deploy a conventional 
civilian police mission, which will require NATO militaries 
to continue their lead role in police development in the 
field for the near future.  He described the slow progress 
in the Afghan police force, who are being killed at a ratio 
of 22 to 1 compared to the Afghan National Army, while 
getting paid only 70% of what a soldier earns, when they are 
paid at all. 
 
TRIGGERS, THE UN ROLE, THE BENCH, AND SUCCESS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Ambassador Herbst later attended a luncheon that 
included participation from the Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Task Force (START), Public Safety Canada, the 
RCMP, DND, PCO, Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT).  Canadian colleagues raised the 
issue of how to develop a system of triggers that can link 
what is happening in a foreign country on the brink to the 
political process and decision-making in our own countries. 
One participant suggested that the UN remains the best place 
to do reconstruction and stabilization and urged the U.S. to 
support efforts to make the UN more effective at such 
missions.  He recounted historical data that indicates UN-led 
missions are more successful than those done unilaterally or 
in coalition. 
 
10. (SBU) There was also a discussion of the development of a 
"bench" of secondary responders for post-conflict 
stabilization, and high-regard for the U.S. effort to 
systematize and fund a robust bench, in contrast to the 
Canadian system, which one participants described as 
"volunteers on paper."  Finally, there was a discussion of 
what constitutes "success" in post-conflict stabilization, 
Qwhat constitutes "success" in post-conflict stabilization, 
and the need to be realistic about what can be achieved. 
 
MIX OF DISASTER AND NON-DISASTER RESPONSE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU) Assistant Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for 
International Security Colleen Swords described some of the 
bureaucratic complexities Canada faces as it develops a more 
robust post-conflict response mechanism.  She said 
triggers remain undeveloped, but even with an approved 
trigger mechanism to highlight an emerging crisis it is not 
a given that the government will see it is in Canada's 
interest to respond.  Swords said that because the START 
team has a role in natural as well as man-made disasters, it 
can often be pulled off in large numbers and expend 
considerable amounts of its budget in what are increasingly 
"routine" crisis.  Funding for both man-made and natural 
 
OTTAWA 00000026  003 OF 003 
 
 
disasters also come from multiple sources, Swords said, e.g., 
only CIDA can fund most Iraq projects, while the helicopters 
for Darfur come from the START team.  There has also been a 
proliferation of task forces to show emphasis to a certain 
issue or area, according to Swords, including for Sudan, 
Afghanistan, and Haiti, but this then creates a new 
bureaucratic dynamic.  Swords reiterated that Canada remains 
eager to increase international involvement and 
synchronization. 
 
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at 
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada 
 
BREESE