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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS AF CA
SUBJECT: PM HARPER SEEKS AFGHAN EXTENSION, WITH CAVEATS 
 
REF: A.  OTTAWA 107 
     ¶B.  OTTAWA 124 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: PM Harper publicly voiced his agreement with the 
Manley panel's call for an extension of Canada's mission in Kandahar 
after February 2009 - as long as NATO provides additional troops and 
equipment to help out (ref a).  He pledged personally to take the 
lead to press Canada's allies abroad and promised a Parliamentary 
vote "this spring," likely after the Bucharest Summit.  Liberal 
leader Dion separately called for greater transparency, but 
essentially agreed that Canadian Forces should continue to play a 
role in Afghanistan even after February 2009.  While PM Harper has 
once again underscored the government's resolve to maintain an 
active presence in Kandahar and Afghanistan well beyond February 
2009, he adroitly put the onus on NATO partners to help out more in 
order to enable him to return from the Bucharest Summit with 
sufficient commitments to lessen the vulnerabilities of Canadian 
Forces and win the controversial Parliamentary vote on Afghanistan. 
End summary. 
 
"A CLEARLY COMPELLING CASE" 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In a rare press conference on January 28, Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper praised the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role 
in Afghanistan (aka the Manley panel) for having produced an 
"in-depth" and "balanced" report, which PM Harper said had made a 
"clearly compelling" case for the continuation of the mission -- if 
NATO partners are willing to provide "substantially" more troops and 
additional military equipment in Kandahar.  He underlined the 
importance of the continuation of the mission to the security of 
Canada and the world as well as to Canada's international 
reputation, and cited Canada's obligation to the people of 
Afghanistan and the sacrifices of Canadian troops.  He said that 
Canada had already begun in the past two years to shift emphasis to 
rebuilding, reconstruction, good governance, and democracy in 
Afghanistan, as well as strengthening combat forces on the ground, 
as the panel had called for.  He admitted that the Afghan issue had 
brought him "more headaches and heartaches" than any other issue 
since he assumed office in 2006, and that the situation on the 
ground remained "complex and difficult." 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  PM Harper explicitly endorsed the recommendation of the 
panel that there could be no fixed deadline to Canada's commitment 
in Afghanistan, while he commented that the mission would warrant 
regular reviews, perhaps in two to three years' time. 
 
A DIPLOMATIC "FULL-COURT PRESS" 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) PM Harper nonetheless made clear that an extension of 
Canada's mission was contingent on additional support from NATO 
partners.  He said that the Manley panel's report had provided 
Canada with "tremendous ammunition" to press NATO allies to provide 
more resources for the Kandahar deployment, but said he was 
"optimistic" that NATO would deliver.  He promised personally to 
lead a "full court press" in advance of the April 2-4 NATO summit in 
Bucharest.  He emphasized that NATO's efforts in Afghanistan and 
especially in Kandahar were not adequate, and warned that NATO's 
reputation is "on the line," adding that, if NATO cannot succeed in 
Kandahar, "it will ultimately not do it anywhere." 
 
¶5. (SBU) PM Harper claimed that the Canadian government had already 
ordered new helicopters and UAVs for Canadian Forces, but still 
faced time lags for delivery given worldwide demand.  He promised to 
Qfaced time lags for delivery given worldwide demand.  He promised to 
work to move Canada's needs higher up on the priority delivery lists 
as well as to seek additional equipment from NATO partners. 
 
A PARLIAMENTARY VOTE IN THE SPRING 
 
¶6. (SBU)  PM Harper said that he had begun to prepare the ground for 
a parliamentary vote to extend the mission by reaching out to 
Liberal leader Stephane Dion on January 27, and that he hoped to do 
so again in a few days.  Harper added that the Cabinet had already 
reached a "tentative conclusion" on how to proceed, and would share 
that with Dion to avoid "springing" anything on him.  He said that 
he had not spoken with any other Liberals, notably deputy Liberal 
leader Michael Ignatieff (who had supported the extension of the 
combat mission in 2006), in order to avoid any impression of 
undermining Dion.  He pledged that all parties would have a "few 
weeks" to study and debate the report before the vote.  He admitted 
that some parties might use the issue to play election politics, but 
pointedly appealed to the Liberals to rise above partisanship.  He 
predicted a vote some time "this spring," but promised that the 
Parliamentary debate would begin before the Bucharest Summit. 
 
DION RESPONDS 
 
 
OTTAWA 00000141  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Dion subsequently complained to reporters that the Prime 
Minister had been "vague" and seemed to have provided only "a recipe 
for a never-ending mission."  He called upon the government to 
clarify next steps on diplomacy, treatment of detainees (a hot topic 
in the first Question Hour of the new Parliamentary session on 
January 28), and NATO's plans for rotation of troops, which Dion 
labeled a "test for NATO."  He stated that the Liberal Party 
believes that Canadian Forces should indeed remain in Afghanistan 
after February 2009, but said that it was now up to the government 
to design "something that makes sense" in lieu of the current combat 
mission.  He called for greater transparency from the government, a 
theme also of the Manley panel recommendations.   He said that the 
ultimate Liberal position will depend on what, exactly, the Prime 
Minister formally proposes, but predicted that the House of Commons 
would need to debate and discuss the policy "at great length," 
pointedly citing the six hour limit the government had set before 
the 2006 vote on the mission's extension. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While PM Harper has once again underscored the 
government's resolve to maintain an active presence in Kandahar and 
Afghanistan well beyond February 2009, he adroitly put the onus on 
NATO partners to help out more in order to enable him to return from 
the Bucharest Summit with sufficient commitments to lessen the 
vulnerability of Canadian Forces and win the controversial 
Parliamentary vote on Afghanistan.   With the Bloc Quebecois and the 
New Democratic Party already ruling out any support for the 
mission's extension in any form, the government will need to craft 
an approach that will make the extension palatable enough to the 
Liberals so that they can at least abstain in good conscience, or 
even possibly vote in favor.  It is unlikely that the Liberals will 
want to use this particular vote to bring down the government, 
probably judging that the electorate would rather focus an election 
on economic or environmental issues than on one with national 
security implications.  PM Harper may have boxed himself into a bit 
of corner, however, by stating the government had already placed 
orders for key new military equipment when that procurement process 
is far from complete; he will likely face some tough questioning on 
these acquisitions in upcoming Parliamentary Question Hours. 
WILKINS