VZCZCXRO1290
RR RUEHGI
DE RUEHNJ #0029/01 0141201
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141201Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6005
INFO RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1463
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1375
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1757
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2294
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1640
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0940
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1005

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S/WC, PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM CD
SUBJECT: HABRE TRIAL: "LET IT BE MEANINGFUL AND ACCESSIBLE 
TO CHADIANS" 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a meeting with the Ambassador, Human 
Rights Watch Advocacy Director Reed Brody stressed the need 
for the trial of former Chadian President Hissein Habre to be 
meaningful and accessible to Chadians.  Human Rights Watch is 
urging Senegal to speed up and simplify the process leading 
to the trial in order to bring justice to Habre's victims. 
They are also encouraging the international community to 
provide funding and technical assistance. End summary. 
 
JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Human Rights Watch (HRW) Advocacy Director Reed Brody 
met with the Ambassador and DCM on January 4 to discuss the 
trial of former Chadian President Hissein Habre.  Brody was 
accompanied by Clement Abaifouta, President of the Chadian 
Association for Victims of Political Repression.  Brody 
introduced the meeting by saying that he was not fully up to 
date on other Chad human rights issues, and was there solely 
to talk about the Habre trial. 
 
¶3. (U)  Brody underscored the historic importance of Senegal 
putting Habre on trial -- the first time a developing country 
had taken on such a task. Nonetheless, a year and a half 
later "people didn't know where to begin."  Brody 
acknowledged that Senegal's task was complicated and 
expensive (an initial estimate of Euros 66 million had been 
scaled down to a more realistic 28 million.) But, in the 
meantime, victims were passing away.  The Senegalese proposed 
interviewing some 20,000 witnesses.  In fact, proof of chain 
of command could be found with considerably fewer witnesses. 
 
¶4. (U) HRW has been pushing Senegal to move faster and 
working with the international community on providing 
support.  Brody informed the Ambassador that the European 
Union and Switzerland had promised support.  French President 
Sarkozy had told Senegalese President Wade in July that 
France would work with Senegal on the trial. Brody reported 
that he had urged the State Department's office of War Crimes 
(S/CW) to 1) applaud Senegal's decision; 2) let Senegal know 
that the United States expected it to move forward and 3) 
provide funding or technical assistance for the trial. 
 
SUPPORT THE RULE OF LAW IN CHAD 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) Turning the focus back to Chad, Brody explained that 
HRW hoped that the trial could be "accessible and meaningful" 
so that Chadians would have a chance to understand "what 
justice means." Citing the example of Sierra Leone, he 
suggested that outreach include coverage of procedures by 
radio or TV and having the prosecutor explain the meaning of 
the trial to different groups throughout Chad.  Brody 
recognized the challenges of outreach in Chad given the size 
of the country and the lack of resources available to Senegal 
(compared to those of international courts.) Accordingly, a 
third party such as the UN or an NGO should be encouraged to 
take it up. (Brody explained that neither HRW nor the Chad 
Victims Association could do this as they were parties to the 
trial.  He believed that the Center for Transitional Justice 
might present a proposal.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Brody commented that lack of resources might not be 
the only obstacle to publicizing the trial.  Chadian 
authorities might potentially see an outreach campaign as 
"subversive." That being said, he acknowledged that the 
Government of Chad had cooperated in lifting Habre's immunity 
and inviting the Belgian judge to Chad.  President Deby had 
made public statements in favor of the trial.  Brody mused 
that the President's embrace of the process might come back 
to bite him as he himself had been part of the Habre 
"machinery" before going into rebellion. 
 
¶7.  (U) Commenting on Chad's handling of the Habre years, 
Brody stated that the 1992 Truth Commission had issued a good 
report, but some recommendations were never implemented. 
Individuals named in the report were still high ranking 
security officials.  Victims had filed cases in N'Djamena 
against their torturers, but the cases had not advanced at 
all. Although the major demand of victims was financial 
compensation, a draft reparations bill before the National 
 
NDJAMENA 00000029  002 OF 002 
 
 
Assembly was moribund. Brody imagined that hopes of a 
financial settlement coming from the Dakar trial were not 
realistic, but hoped that the trial and accompanying outreach 
would bring these issues back on the table for victims. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶8. (SBU) In a country where authorities enjoy considerable 
impunity, Post agrees that public outreach and discussion of 
the Habre trial proceedings would set a welcome example of 
justice in action. 
NIGRO