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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000312 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: A/S FRAZER,S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT KIBAKI 
JANUARY 5 AND 7 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ranneberger, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Assistant Secretary Frazer, joined by 
Ambassador Ranneberger, met with President Mwai Kibaki on 
January 5 and January 7 to seek a path towards ending the 
political crisis stemming from the disputed December 27 
presidential election results.  She carried with her 
Secretary Rice's message of an end to the violence and an 
 
SIPDIS 
agreement to dialogue among the principals in the electoral 
dispute for a political resolution.  In both meetings, Kibaki 
was fully engaged and in control of his meeting, though 
members of his team comfortably voiced divergent viewpoints. 
In the January 5 meeting, Kibaki and his team focused on the 
need to end the post-election violence and their fear that 
Kikuyus were specifically being targeted.  In the January 7 
meeting, Kibaki was put on the defensive by A/S Frazer who 
sought an explanation and remedy for his naming of a partial 
cabinet on the eve of the African Union Chairman and Ghanaian 
President John Kufuor's arrival to facilitate talks between 
he and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Party (ODM). 
 
¶2. (C) During both meetings, Kibaki said the right things in 
condemning violence and being open to dialogue to end the 
political crisis.  Furthermore, Kibaki agreed in principle to 
forming a government of national unity and reconstituting his 
cabinet following talks with Odinga.  However, his subsequent 
actions clearly suggested that he and his team were also 
moving towards consolidating power and that dialogue with 
Odinga was perhaps a fallback plan in whatever political 
strategy they had to end the political crisis.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) During A/S Frazer,s mission to Kenya from January 
4-11, she met with President Kibaki twice, on January 5 and 
7, to reinforce the message from Washington:  entering into 
dialogue with Odinga to find a political resolution to the 
current crisis is the way forward and an end to all violence 
on all sides is paramount.  A/S Frazer pointed out that 
Kenyans had come out en masse to vote and largely did so 
peacefully in a process that appeared to be clean, up to the 
point of vote tallying.  She emphasized that there were 
clearly problems with the vote count and this should be 
acknowledged and addressed by Kibaki in the interest of 
helping to heal divisions in the country.  She reminded 
Kibaki of the more conciliatory tone he struck during his 
first address to the nation, which acknowledged that Kenyans 
had voted across the spectrum and which was a basis from 
which reconciliation could be built upon.  A/S Frazer argued 
that political dialogue is the most viable way out of the 
current crisis as Kenyan courts are not considered impartial 
by ODM. 
 
¶4. (C) While Kibaki repeatedly said in both meetings he was 
open to political dialogue, his position was quite clear:  he 
won the election fairly; if ODM has concerns about the 
outcome they should take their complaints to court because 
once the Electoral Commission of Kenya makes a call on 
elections the courts are the sole constitutional remedy (and 
his government would obey their ruling, Kibaki said); and ODM 
is to blame for post-election fighting and it is 
orchestrating an organized campaign of violence. 
 
¶5. (C) Kibaki emphasized that the real problem at hand from 
his government's perspective is not the controversial 
presidential election result but the violence that has 
ensued, and he said ending it was their primary focus. 
Kibaki pushed the point that Odinga and other ODM leaders 
need to come out and call for an end to the violence. 
 
¶6. (C) Martha Karua, the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs and clearly one of the hardliners in 
Kibaki's inner circle, attended the January 5 meeting (joined 
by then Foreign Minister Raphael Tuju, Foreign Ministry 
Permanent Secretary Thuita Mwangi, and Advisor Stanley 
Murage) during which she conceded that while some of the 
post-election violence may have been spontaneous, for the 
most part it has been pre-planned, she said. Kibaki echoed 
this point arguing that the youth are being paid to commit 
such acts.  Tuju, a Luo, contended that ODM supporters were 
specifically targeting the Kikuyu, whom he said have 
exercised a lot of restraint up to now, suggesting that they 
could retaliate especially in areas like Nairobi where they 
 
NAIROBI 00000312  002 OF 003 
 
 
are a majority, as Karua pointed out.  Kibaki and his team 
emphasized they would not kowtow to the violence, which they 
consider ODM is using as "blackmail." Mwangi recounted how he 
had to send a vehicle to Eldoret to rescue members of his 
family from the violence in that area.  He claimed the 
post-electoral violence had been instigated by ODM and that 
it would have "unleashed" such violence even if it had won 
the election because of its desire for "majimbo" -- the idea 
of decentralized governance with the connotation that major 
ethnic groups will govern autonomously over their own 
regions. 
 
¶7. (C) A/S Frazer stressed that the USG condemned all 
violence and promised to continue to push the issue with ODM 
to call an end to it.  She, however, asked Kibaki to 
demonstrate leadership by engaging with Raila in dialogue 
even in these difficult times; if former Presidents Nelson 
Mandela and F.W. de Klerk of South Africa could do it after 
years of violence, distrust, and political struggle in South 
Africa, surely he and Raila could do the same to move Kenya 
forward.  After all, they have worked together in the past 
and they do know each other, perhaps too well, she added. 
A/S Frazer noted there were failures in leadership on both 
sides -- that Raila should reign in those committing violence 
and that Kibaki should come out with a statement 
acknowledging electoral problems. 
 
¶8. (C) A/S Frazer asked that Kibaki and Raila issue separate 
statements condemning violence, acknowledging there were real 
problems with the elections, and agreeing to dialogue 
(initially a joint statement was proposed and Kibaki was 
unopposed to it, but Karua and Tuju nixed the idea arguing 
that it would give the appearance of a "co-presidency."); the 
statements would help heal and normalize the country*the 
most immediate need*and are exclusive of the issue of how 
the parties will actually come to a political arrangement on 
governance, A/S Frazer explained.  While Kibaki expressed 
doubt that Raila truly wanted peace and said he was a man who 
spoke in "two languages" -- something he saw as a significant 
obstacle to dialogue -- he agreed to issue a statement, but 
never did.  However, almost immediately after the January 5 
meeting, the Presidential Press Service issued a statement 
that said the government was open to dialogue and forming a 
government of national unity. 
 
¶9. (C) On the eve of President Kufuor's arrival in Kenya to 
help facilitate talks between Kibaki and Odinga, Kibaki 
announced on January 7 the appointment of eight key cabinet 
members.  A/S Frazer met with him that evening to express 
great disappointment and surprise at such action, 
particularly on the day before expected talks between ODM and 
PNU.  She said the cabinet appointments were preemptive, that 
it seemed like Kibaki was taking the issue of cabinet 
positions off the negotiating table and was prepared to 
exclude ODM from any kind of coalition government, and that 
the USG was seriously considering denouncing the government 
should Kibaki not take remedial action.  A/S Frazer also took 
Kibaki to task for not issuing the statement on vote tallying 
irregularities while noting that Odinga had honored his 
commitment to condemn violence and call off rallies given 
current political tensions. 
 
¶10. (C) Kibaki argued that he was not preempting talks and 
that he only announced the partial cabinet to keep the 
government running -- that it was only "logical" to do so, he 
said. Logical as it may be, the timing in naming a cabinet 
was bad faith, A/S Frazer told Kibaki.  In the end, Kibaki 
said that he was open to changing cabinet positions if this 
was decided during talks with ODM, along with having the 
talks deal with a broader range of issues such as electoral 
and institutional reform.  After intense negotiations with 
Kibaki and his team, it was agreed that Kibaki would issue a 
statement explaining why he appointed a cabinet when he did, 
clarifying that the cabinet was subject to change pending 
outcome of talks with ODM, and noting that nothing would be 
ruled out in these discussions.  Francis Muthaura, Secretary 
to the Cabinet, and the newly appointed Foreign Minister 
Wetengula fought the idea of issuing a public statement 
clarifying the cabinet position appointment, but Kibaki was 
decisive in wanting it done; the statement was issued the 
following day. 
 
NAIROBI 00000312  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶11. (C) Comment:  Kibaki and his team are fixated on the 
post-election violence and fail to truly own up to the fact 
that the flawed election results were the impetus to the 
crisis.  They seem almost oblivious to the vote tallying 
problems, treating it as a minor detail that can be brushed 
aside and dealt with through legal means.  Kibaki seemed 
reasonable and could be influenced with a well-argued point; 
members of his team, like Martha Karua, were clearly more 
hardline in their positions and do not seem truly interested 
in dialogue with ODM.  Distrust of ODM was very evident in 
statements by both Kibaki and members of his team during 
these conversations. While Kibaki and his team are quite 
dismissive of ODM protests about the problems with the 
elections, the fact that Kibaki is open to dialogue with 
Raila suggests he has not completely bought into PNU's 
narrative that they won the presidential elections fair and 
square; there may be hope yet that Kibaki will assert 
leadership to pursue a political solution with ODM.  End 
Comment. 
 
¶12. (U) This cable has been cleared by Assistant Secretary 
Frazer. 
RANNEBERGER