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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 000310 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM KE
SUBJECT: KENYA'S ELECTORAL CRISIS: EXPLAINING RIFT VALLEY 
VIOLENCE 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 237 
     ¶B. NAIROBI 12 
     ¶C. 07 NAIROBI 4423 
     ¶D. 07 NAIROBI 4235 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. The central region of Kenya's Rift Valley Province, known 
as "Kalenjin land" after its indigenous inhabitants, is the 
scene of the worst violence since the election crisis began 
in late December.  Kenya's history of ethnic politics, land 
pressures, and shifting political alliances explain the 
intensity and scale of the violence in this region.  The 
Kalenjin population has nursed grievances against the more 
widespread Kikuyus ever since President Jomo Kenyatta handed 
over Kalenjin land (some of it formerly occupied by white 
settlers) to his fellow Kikuyus shortly after independence in 
¶1963.  Repeated failures to address Kalenjin grievances by 
subsequent governments, even the government run by fellow 
Kalenjin President Daniel arap Moi from 1978 to 2002, has 
periodically led to violence in the Rift Valley, particularly 
during the 1990s.  Much of the 1990s violence was politically 
instigated by Moi and his lieutenants who funded Kalenjin 
"raiders" to de-populate pro-opposition, Kikuyu-settled areas 
of Rift Valley Province. 
 
¶2. An internationally acceptable solution to the current 
crisis would have to include an acknowlegement by all sides 
that Kenyans have the right to own land anywhere in the 
country regardless of their ethnicity, but this will only 
happen if Kalenjins feel adequately represented in and fairly 
treated by their government.  Strengthening parliament and 
the judiciary, devolving government, and making much-needed 
land tenure and property rights reforms would ameliorate the 
current conflict.  End Summary. 
 
---------------- 
Rift?  Why Rift? 
---------------- 
 
¶3. It may seem counterintuitive that the worst ethnic 
violence in the current crisis -- the aftermath of a bitterly 
disputed Kikuyu vs. Luo presidential contest (see ref B) -- 
would occur in the heart of Rift Valley's Kalenjin country. 
While the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest and most geographically 
dispersed ethnic community, have borne the brunt of the 
conflict wherever it has occurred, anti-Kikuyu violence in 
Kalenjin-dominated Rift Valley has been much more organized 
and severe than elsewhere.  (Note: In Nyanza, the 
Luo-on-Kikuyu violence was reportedly a spontaneous reaction 
to allegations that the election had been rigged in favor of 
President Kibaki (a Kikuyu) over opposition Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM) candidate Raila Odinga (a Luo).  End Note.) 
Some observers, including Human Rights Watch, have concluded 
that ODM leaders and local elders planned and organized the 
violence in the Rift Valley, although we do not yet have 
evidence that the violence was pre-meditated. 
 
¶4. Kenya's history of ethnic politics, land pressures, and 
shifting political alliances make Kalenjin land highly 
susceptible to ethnic violence.  Approximately 250,000 people 
have been displaced countrywide.  While victims have included 
members of many tribes, the vast majority at this point have 
been Kikuyu.  Kikuyus who haved lived their entire lives in 
Rift Valley Province have seen their homes, farms, and 
businesses burned.  The official death toll from the violence 
now exceeds 900.  There are an estimated 83,700 internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in Rift Valley Province alone. (To 
put this in perspective, an estimated one million Kikuyus 
live in Rift Valley Province.) Eyewitnesses have blamed gangs 
of Kalenjin youth, many of whom had just completed initiation 
rites into the traditional warrior society, for the rash of 
looting, burning, and violence. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
The Present of a People is a Sum of Their Past 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. Much of the current Kikuyu-Kalenjin tension can be traced 
 
NAIROBI 00000310  002 OF 004 
 
 
to land issues coupled with a strong dose of political 
manipulation of this issue.  Land issues are also at the 
source of much of Kenya's history of political violence.  As 
a result of white settler confiscation of the richest Kikuyu 
land in Kenya's fertile central highlands and severe 
overcrowding in the reserves on marginal land left for the 
Kikuyu by the British, the Kikuyu mounted the Mau Mau 
rebellion in 1952 with the rallying cry "land and freedom." 
The British reaction to the rebellion was infamously harsh. 
The post-election violence this year is the worst in Kenya 
since that seven year struggle in the 1950s.  Both conflicts 
are essentially over access to land.  (While spontaneous 
post-election violence in Nyanza, Western and Coast provinces 
focused on the electoral dispute, it is clear that much of 
the violence in Rift Valley Province is more directly related 
to land grievances.  To this day, it is exceptionally 
difficult for non-Kikuyu to own land or operate businesses in 
overcrowded Central Province.) 
 
¶6. Outgrowing their rich but densely populated Central 
Highlands homeland, Kikuyu are the only ethnic group that has 
spread throughout Kenya in large numbers.  Kikuyus own farms, 
businesses and properties throughout the country.  The Kikuyu 
have a reputation, whether deserved or not, for being 
unwilling to enter into business partnerships or employ in 
senior positions Kenyans from other tribes.  They are widely 
resented for their wealth and power relative to other Kenyan 
groups. 
 
¶7. The Nilotic speakers of Kenya's southern highlands (as 
distinct from Bantu speakers, such as Kikuyu) include Nandis, 
Kipsigis, Pokot, Marakwet, Tugen, Elgeyo, and Sabaot.  The 
Nandis in particular were renowned for their effective 
resistance to early British efforts to take their land.  The 
British eventually prevailed and successfully occupied Rift 
Valley lands, but only after multiple attempts.  The seeds of 
an ethnic "Kalenjin" identity emerged as members of these 
related but distinct groups served together with British 
forces in World War II.  ("Kale" or "Kole" refers to the 
process of scarring a warrior who has killed an enemy in 
battle, and "Kalenjin" -- or "I tell you" -- and was used in 
Rift Valley wartime radio broadcasts.) The Kalenjin movement 
was begun by a group of students from these groups who wanted 
to distinguish themselves while attending an elite (and 
majority Kikuyu) high school.  The British colonial 
government encouraged the Kalenjin movement as a way to 
foster anti-Kikuyu sentiments, as they were busily trying to 
suppress the Mau Mau uprising and peasant revolt from 
spreading to other Kenyan ethnic communities. 
 
¶8. Kenya's first post-independence president, Jomo Kenyatta 
(a Kikuyu and the alleged leader of the Mau Mau revolt) 
bought land in Kalenjin areas from departing white settlers 
to resettle landless Kikuyu peasants or, in many instances, 
to grant to political allies, cronies, and himself.  While 
this was done with the collaboration of his (Kalenjin) Home 
Affairs Minister Daniel Arap Moi, this was a serious offense 
to ordinary Kalenjins.  In Kalenjin culture, there was no 
such thing as individual land ownership.  While individuals 
could cultivate certain plots, the land as a whole belonged 
to the Kalenjin people.  The transfer of Kalenjin land to 
outsiders was a serious affront. 
 
¶9. When Moi became president in 1978, he did little to 
address the continuing land grievances of common Kalenjins, 
but, after an attempted coup in 1982, he did take bold steps 
to exclude what had become a Kikuyu elite from government 
service and replaced them with his own Kalenjin elite. 
Predictably, many of these Kalenjin elite lost their jobs 
after President Kibaki -- another Kikuyu -- came into office 
in 2002. (Note: Many Kenyans take the attitude toward the 
Kalenjins that since they enjoyed the fruits of power during 
Moi's 24-year rule, they have nothing to complain about now. 
However, Kalenjins reply that, while their community may have 
been grossly overrepresented in the civil and security forces 
during Moi's reign, their region did not receive 
disproportionate budget resources and there was little or no 
benefit to Kalenjins who were not members of the elite.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶10. Frustration over 'outsider' occupation of Kalenjin land 
 
NAIROBI 00000310  003 OF 004 
 
 
turned violent in the 1990s.  President Moi and officials in 
the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) used the idea 
of federalism, or 'majimbo,' (see ref C) to battle opposition 
calls for term limits and multi-party democracy.  KANU 
officials described majimbo as ethnic federalism that would 
require all 'outsiders' to return to their home provinces. 
This led to ethnic clashes that killed thousands and 
displaced hundreds of thousands throughout the decade.  The 
Rift Valley was particularly hard hit, and it was clear at 
the time that the violence was planned, not spontaneous.  The 
then-ruling party, under Moi, armed and organized Kalenjin 
fighters to 'raid' Kikuyu farms and homesteads in Rift Valley 
in order to decrease the opposition votes in those areas. 
Many of the people who were displaced from these clashes 
remain so to this day (and most of them were Kikuyu, who 
largely supported the opposition to Moi's rule).  Those who 
hoped Kibaki would address the problem when he was elected in 
2002 were disappointed -- a comprehensive solution never 
materialized.  On the contrary, isolated clashes in Rift 
Valley continued. See ref D for more background on Rift 
Valley politics). 
 
------------------ 
The Current Crisis 
------------------ 
 
¶11. Ethnic rivalries played a predominant role in the run-up 
to the 2007 election, and ODM presidential hopeful Raila 
Odinga made majimbo (federalism) a key platform of his 
campaign.  Odinga tried to de-emphasize majimbo's negative 
ethnic connotations, saying that the devolution of power to 
the provinces was the only way to ensure equitable 
distribution of resources to marginalized communities.  This 
positive view of majimboism did not resonate with all parts 
of Kenya's electorate, however, and many feared that a return 
to talk of majimbo would mean a return to the violence of the 
1990s.  Whatever Raila's intent, the more sinister version of 
majimbo -- 'outsiders must leave' -- came to pass in the Rift 
Valley Province in the aftermath of the disputed elections 
and the increased antipathy toward the Kikuyu community that 
those events engendered. 
 
¶12. A recently circulated piece of Kalenjin hate literature 
illustrates commonly held frustrations used to justify 
violence against Kikuyus.  The piece describes resentment of 
Kikuyus' perceived unfair occupation of land and 
disproportionate access to government resources for 
education, jobs, and infrastructure.  Kalenjin bitterness is 
not reserved for Kikuyus, however.  There is also no love 
lost for former President Moi, a fellow Kalenjin (who 
supported Kibaki's 2007 re-election bid): "He stole from us 
and did deals with these guys.  He enriched himself so much; 
he is always ready to sacrifice his own people for his own 
benefits...what you guys need to understand is that this is 
all about resource distribution...As if this was not enough, 
they stole our votes and asked us to do what we think we can 
do.  This is right guys, 'Do what you think you can do if you 
are man enough.'" 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
How Can the Roots of This Conflict Be Addressed? 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶13. Many observers blame ODM pentagon member William Ruto, a 
hardline Kalenjin and Moi lieutenant, for the Rift Valley 
violence.  Ruto actively organized pro-Moi Kalenjin youth 
during the violent crises of the 1990s and rumors about his 
involvement in the current crisis abound despite his public 
denials. 
 
¶14. Kalenjin religious leaders recently implored us to look 
deeper than Ruto, however.  Kalenjins, they stressed, make 
decisions by consensus.  Ruto is only representing the views 
of his people -- in fact, he is a prisoner to them, they 
said.  Some have blamed Ruto for instigating violence 
regardless of the election outcome, since violence began 
prior to the announcement of the results.  One leader 
defended Ruto, however, claiming that he learned on December 
28 that the election results had been manipulated in the 
government's favor and that the final tally was already 
decided.  This is why Ruto started raising objections before 
 
NAIROBI 00000310  004 OF 004 
 
 
the results were announced, he said.  (Comment: The religious 
leader claimed that he himself heard the final numbers two 
days before they were announced.  Our own analysis of the 
election results shows that the final tally announced on 
December 30 differs from the sum of the individual 
constituency tallies as provided to us by the Election 
Commission.  End Comment.) 
 
¶15. While empowering hardliners like Ruto has almost 
certainly worsened the situation, arresting him (and those 
like him) who may have organized or encouraged violence 
addresses only a symptom of a much deeper problem.  Any 
internationally acceptable solution would require an 
acknowlegement by all sides that Kenyans have the right to 
buy and own land anywhere in the country regardless of their 
ethnicity.  The only way Kalenjins and other disgruntled 
minority groups would agree to this, however, is if they feel 
adequately represented in and treated fairly by their own 
government. 
 
¶16. Strengthening parliament and the judiciary as well as 
implementing majimbo in its best sense -- 'increasing local 
control over resources and governance while protecting local 
minorities from prosecution by local majorities' -- could go 
a long way toward restoring a sense of ownership and control 
over local affairs by those who have been excluded and 
neglected over the years.  Land tenure and property rights 
reform could also help (see ref A).  No matter how the 
solutions are crafted, they will require the buy-in of the 
Kalenjin community as a whole. (Note: Land reform and 
regional imbalances in national budget allocations are 
specific elements of the former dialog proposed by Kofi Annan 
to reconcile the government and opposition. End Note.) 
 
¶17. Comment: Making progress on these complex issues will be 
difficult.  There is still strong disagreement about the 
conduct and results of the presidential election, and 
hardliners still outweigh more moderate voices.  At present, 
both sides' tactics are making the situation worse, and both 
sides have shown a disturbingly high tolerance for violence. 
If international and grassroots efforts fail, Kenyans living 
in Rift Valley will continue to bear the brunt of the 
conflict. 
RANNEBERGER