VZCZCXRO3212
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMS #0041/01 0160748
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160748Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9155
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0173
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOE/NNSA FOR WKILMARTIN, MBEDKE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR AWYSOCKI, THORTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD EWWT AMGT PTER MU
SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE DISCUSSES TRADE SECURITY AND IRAN WITH 
POLICE, PORT OF SALALAH 
 
REF: A. 07 MUSCAT 900 
     ¶B. MUSCAT 36 
     ¶C. 07 MUSCAT 387 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: A Congressional delegation (CODEL) led by 
Representative David Price of North Carolina -- Chairman of 
the House Appropriations Sub-Committee for the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) -- visited Muscat and Salalah January 
7-9 to assess DHS's Secure Freight Initiative (SFI)(ref A). 
The delegation met with the Inspector General (IG) of the 
Royal Oman Police (ROP), discussing Oman's participation in 
SFI as well as the January 6 confrontation between U.S. Navy 
vessels and Iranian boats in the Strait of Hormuz.  The CODEL 
also toured the Port of Salalah, where the Port's Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) briefed it on the difficulties of 
implementing the 9/11 Act's 100% scanning requirement in a 
transshipment port.  The Members and port authorities 
discussed various ways to ensure the security of U.S.-bound 
cargo.  (Note: Post reported septel on the CODEL's January 8 
meeting with Oman's Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, 
which covered a broader range of bilateral and regional 
issues (ref B).  End note.)  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ROP: Happy with Cooperation... 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) On January 8, CODEL Price met with Malik bin 
Sulaiman al-Ma'mari, IG of the ROP, whose Directorate of 
Customs has been the USG's main partner in SFI.  The Members 
thanked al-Ma'mari for the ROP's support to date, stating 
that the U.S. has received "no better cooperation (in 
implementing the initiative worldwide) than from Oman." 
Al-Ma'mari and his staff commented that preparations for 
SFI's implementation -- which is scheduled to begin scanning 
100% of targeted U.S.-bound cargo at the Port of Salalah in 
early 2008 -- seemed to be progressing smoothly.  They 
mentioned their concern, however, that in the event that 
scanning identifies dangerous radioactive material in a 
container, Oman does not yet have the resources or know-how 
to handle and contain it.  The Director General of Customs 
stated that an interagency team including ROP Customs and 
Civil Defense, as well as the Omani Ministries of Energy and 
Transportation, is working with partners in the U.S. 
Departments of State, Energy and Homeland Security to develop 
an emergency response protocol for Oman.  He added that the 
ROP needs continued technical assistance, as well as 
protective equipment and training for its frontline 
inspectors, in order to develop its capacity to deal with 
radiological threats (ref C). 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
...But Avoiding Comment on Iran 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3. (SBU) In addition to discussing trade security, the CODEL 
pressed al-Ma'mari for his opinion on the January 6 
confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz between U.S. naval 
vessels and Iranian fast boats.  Al-Ma'mari was reticent to 
speak about the incident in any depth, often repeating that 
he did not yet have enough information to comment.  At one 
point he asked the delegation to understand that Oman is in a 
"tough neighborhood," and that it has a long, shared history 
with Iran that it must consider before speaking too quickly 
about events in the region.  He mentioned, however, that he 
had discussed the incident with the Iranian Commander of 
Police -- who was in Muscat with an official delegation at 
the same time as the CODEL -- and that his Iranian 
counterpart had confirmed press reports that the boats were 
under the command of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC).  The IG stressed to the Members that tension in the 
region is high, and that "mistakes" by either side could lead 
to a quick escalation. 
 
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Transshipment Presents Unique Challenges 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4. (SBU) On January 9, CODEL Price traveled from Muscat to 
Salalah for a tour of the Port and a briefing by the Port's 
CEO, Gary Lemke.  Lemke argued that the nature of the 
transshipment business presents unique challenges to 
implementing SFI in Salalah. He stated, for instance, that 
feeder ships carrying cargo en route to the U.S. often do not 
unload all of their containers at the Port.  Unless 
 
MUSCAT 00000041  002 OF 002 
 
 
containers are scanned at the port of load, there could be 
instances in which U.S.-bound containers escape scanning 
before reaching the U.S.  Lemke also showed members of the 
delegation a sample stowage plan of a ship carrying 
U.S.-bound containers.  The containers were scattered 
throughout the ship, organized not by port of destination, 
but by a combination of factors including a container's 
weight, length and need for refrigeration.  A transshipment 
port like Salalah faces a challenge, Lemke explained, in 
identifying U.S.-bound containers among the rest of the cargo 
in incoming ships, and then in off-loading those containers 
for scanning in a way that does not disrupt or slow down Port 
operations. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Instead of mandated scanning at all ports, Lemke 
recommended that the USG focus resources on scanning 
containers at the port of load where containers first enter 
the international shipping stream.  The costs of scanning 
U.S.-bound containers more than once at multiple ports of 
call outweigh whatever security benefits that might be 
gained, Lemke surmised.  As long as transshipment ports 
comply with the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code and, like Salalah, have had their security 
measures assessed and approved by the U.S. Coast Guard, the 
U.S. can have a high level of confidence that the container 
will transit the port without being compromised.  While Lemke 
admitted that a determined person or group could put 
something in a container while it is on board ship, the close 
proximity of the containers and the fact that they are loaded 
based on criteria other than port of destination would make 
it extremely difficult to target and access a U.S.-bound 
container.  Finally, each container is equipped with a seal 
once it has been inspected and scanned, and in most cases, 
the next port of discharge would be able to determine if 
someone had broken the seal en route and opened the container. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
A Possible Alternative 
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¶6. (SBU) The Members discussed with port authorities the 
feasibility of the 9/11 Act's 100% scanning mandate, 
especially in a transshipment port like Salalah.  Their 
concern increased when the Integrated Container Inspection 
System (ICIS) lane that DHS and the U.S. Department of Energy 
had funded and helped install failed during a demonstration 
run, in part because the ROP inspector running the 
demonstration had not been trained on the equipment.  The 
Members and port authorities talked about other ways to 
ensure container security, such as security devices that can 
detect if someone had tampered with or broken a container's 
seal.  Lemke warned that seal technology remains experimental 
and expensive, and that no system can guarantee a container's 
security.  The hope was expressed, however, that shippers' 
would see it in their financial interest, given the 
possibility of expedited access to U.S. markets, to invest in 
developing the technology. 
 
¶7. (U) CODEL Price did not clear this message. 
GRAPPO