VZCZCXRO1413
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHMS #0036/01 0141355
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141355Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9149
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAL IR MU
SUBJECT: OMANI FOREIGN MINISTER REVIEWS PEACE PROCESS, IRAN 
POLICY WITH CODEL PRICE 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (SBU) In a January 8 meeting with a visiting U.S. 
Congressional delegation, Oman's Minister Responsible for 
Foreign Affairs praised close U.S.-Oman ties and the two 
countries' "strategic" relationship.  He applauded President 
Bush's renewed push to help create a Palestinian state, but 
feared that Israeli foot-dragging would result in the peace 
process "starting from scratch" after the President left 
office.  Declaring that the time to end the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was "now," he urged the U.S. to 
use its leverage to encourage Israel to take bold steps for 
peace.  Palestinian President Abbas, he asserted, was ready 
to sign and implement a final status agreement, which would 
be the best guarantor of Israel's future security.  The 
Minister stated that Iran wished to keep the Strait of Hormuz 
open out of its own national interests, and predicted that 
Tehran would not back down on its nuclear policies, despite 
the negative impact of international sanctions, as long as it 
felt threatened by the West.  He did not believe that Iran 
would ever use a nuclear weapon even if it were to acquire 
one, and characterized radical statements by Iranian leaders 
as mere propaganda.  End Summary. 
 
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"STRATEGIC" U.S.-OMAN RELATIONSHIP 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) On January 8, the Ambassador and a U.S. Congressional 
delegation (CODEL) led by Representative David Price (R-NC) 
met with Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef 
bin Alawi prior to dinner January 8 to discuss bilateral 
ties, recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and Iran.  Other CODEL members (in addition to staff) in 
attendance were:  Representative Harold Rogers (R-KY), 
Representative James Moran (D-VA), Representative Dennis 
Rehberg (R-MT), Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton 
(D-D.C.), and Representative Michael Simpson (R-ID). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) After welcoming the CODEL, Bin Alawi emphasized the 
"deep, strong" relations between the U.S. and Oman.  "This is 
not a normal relationship," he explained, "but a strategic 
one."  While noting that these strong ties did not preclude 
differences of opinion, Bin Alawi added that such 
disagreements were "between friends" and reflected a healthy 
candor in the bilateral dialogue. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
THE TIME FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE IS "NOW" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Turning to the Middle East peace process in 
response to a question from Rep. Price, bin Alawi confirmed 
Oman's strong support for efforts to achieve reconciliation 
between Israelis and Palestinians, but cautioned that these 
efforts were still at a "basic stage."  He commended 
President Bush for being "very courageous" in publicly 
recognizing early-on the need for a two-state solution to the 
conflict.  Bin Alawi commented that many Israelis and 
Palestinians appeared to have gradually accepted this 
principle over the past years, which represented genuine 
progress.  Still, he warned, it would be "very difficult" to 
push the peace process further forward before the close of 
the Bush administration. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Bin Alawi also praised the U.S. for seeking to 
secure Arab support for its renewed push to end the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and mentioned that "some Arab 
statesman" were favorably surprised by the President's 
remarks at the Annapolis conference.  Noting that Israeli PM 
Olmert had said "some good things," bin Alawi nevertheless 
claimed that "some Israeli leaders" were not prepared to 
discuss final status issues necessary to create a Palestinian 
state, and were instead insistent on building "even more 
facts on the ground" (i.e., settlements).  Furthermore, while 
Israel often appeared to be supportive of making genuine 
progress in achieving peace, this was usually more talk than 
action.  Bin Alawi said he feared that when a new U.S. 
president assumed office next year, the peace process might 
have to "start from scratch." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The opportunity to create a Palestinian state, bin 
Alawi stressed, was now.  The Minister said it was impossible 
to predict how a new generation of Arabs unaccustomed to 
peace would react to a continuation of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, although he hoped they would 
reject violence.  What was needed above anything else at 
present, he continued, was an Israeli leader who would 
 
MUSCAT 00000036  002 OF 003 
 
 
"follow the path of (former Prime Minister) Begin" by taking 
a brave stand and "making peace."  Palestinian Authority 
President Mahmoud Abbas was ready to sign a peace deal, bin 
Alawi asserted, and was also prepared to fulfill any 
resulting Palestinian commitments needed to reach such an 
agreement.  He argued that Abbas had complied with 
Palestinian roadmap obligations despite the "unhelpful" 
actions of Israeli Defense Forces, and further noted that it 
was "impossible" for all Palestinians to agree to peace 
terms, just like some Israeli factions refused to support a 
peace settlement.  Emphasizing once again that "time is 
short," bin Alawi said he hoped President Bush would use U.S. 
"leverage," even in light of American "political 
constraints," to help convince Israel to take the steps 
needed to bring an end to the conflict. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ISRAELI SECURITY = PALESTINIAN STATE 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Asked how Iran fit into the peace process, bin 
Alawi prefaced his remarks by stating that the Iranian regime 
was "not naive, but sophisticated."  He said that Tehran 
believed that negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians were not producing results and did not want "to 
be associated with failure."  Bin Alawi added, however, that 
if Israel showed a "serious commitment" to withdraw from 
occupied Palestinian territory, Iran could drop its 
opposition to peace efforts. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Regarding Israel's security needs, the Minister 
stated that no Arab government -- as opposed to 
"non-government" organizations -- posed any threat to Israel. 
 Given instability and terrorist plots in Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia and elsewhere, bin Alawi proffered that the "best 
thing" that Israel could do to strengthen its security would 
be to "unite" with other nations of the region to help create 
a successful Palestinian state and to fight terrorism.  He 
underscored that Israel's enemies were also the enemies of 
Israel's Arab neighbors and that combating them could best be 
done together.  Bin Alawi acknowledged that Israel did have 
to live with a "limited threat," including rocket attacks 
from Gaza (which he claimed were not a "major" concern in the 
overall scope of things), but asserted that there was no such 
thing as a "zero threat" environment.  He added that Israel's 
present course of action would not improve its security. 
 
-------------------------------- 
IRAN WANTS STRAIT TO REMAIN OPEN 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Responding to a question on security in the Strait 
of Hormuz, bin Alawi stated that Iran, in keeping with its 
"fairly cautious" nature, did not want to cause any 
"flare-up" that could trigger a conflict in this vital 
waterway.  The reported January 6 incident between U.S. navy 
vessels and Iranian boats in the strait was likely just 
"political propaganda" and perhaps designed to make a 
statement prior to President's Bush visit to the Gulf region. 
 Bin Alawi contended that the Iranian armed forces generally 
"behave in a fair and proper way," although he could not say 
the same thing about the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC). 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Minister explained it was in Iran's direct 
national interest for the Strait of Hormuz to remain open, in 
part to keep its own oil exports flowing, and that the 
Iranians did not yet appear to be trying to develop alternate 
port facilities in the Gulf of Oman outside the strait.  In 
any event, bin Alawi pointed out, closing the strait is 
physically very hard to do -- even sinking a tanker in the 
deep water would not shut down the shipping lanes.  The 
Minister also did not believe that Iran had any intention of 
infringing on Omani territorial waters.  "War, of course, 
could change all this," added bin Alawi. 
 
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PARTNERS, NOT "CLIENTS" 
----------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Bin Alawi advised the CODEL that the next U.S. 
president should seek to work in genuine partnership with 
regional friends such as Oman, rather than view them as 
"clients."  It was "not acceptable," he stressed, for the 
U.S. to announce a policy in Washington and then expect Oman 
and other nations to follow it.  Such a heavy-handed approach 
was "insulting" and made the younger generation, in 
particular, "furious."  Bin Alawi approvingly noted that the 
current U.S. administration's foreign policies had "evolved" 
towards more engagement with Arab countries and he hoped this 
 
MUSCAT 00000036  003 OF 003 
 
 
trend would continue.  The Minister speculated that "some" in 
the U.S. might resist a "true partnership" with moderate Arab 
states, but asserted that this was sorely needed and would 
strengthen the U.S. position in the region.   Asked whether 
he was suggesting a NATO-type of partnership between the U.S. 
and certain Arab countries, the Minister said that such an 
alliance was not necessary as the foundation elements for a 
stronger Arab-American partnership, e.g., strong bilateral 
security agreements, trade agreements, formal and informal 
dialogue, etc., were already in place. 
 
----------------------------------- 
IRAN WON'T BACK DOWN UNDER PRESSURE 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) "Iran will remain Iran," bin Alawi stated, and 
would never accept being treated as a client state or with 
disrespect.  He said that Iran was pursuing nuclear 
technology because it felt that it was being "ignored" by the 
West and that the U.S. viewed it as an "enemy." 
International sanctions only increased Tehran's perception 
that it was "under threat."  Referring to the recent U.S. 
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), bin Alawi suggested 
that Iran may have suspended its alleged nuclear weapons 
program in 2003 because the U.S. invasion of Iraq had ended 
Tehran's conflict with Baghdad and, accordingly, lessened the 
Iranians' sense of being threatened. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Underlying policy-making in Tehran was a belief by 
many Iranians that the West still does not truly recognize 
the legitimacy of the 1979 revolution and wants to topple the 
current regime, the Minister related.  He emphasized that 
Iran would "stand fast" on its policies and would not back 
down under pressure, even though it was being hurt by 
international sanctions (which it was seeking to circumvent). 
 The Iranian people, including the younger generation, "will 
follow their leaders wherever they go." 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Asked if Iran would ever use a nuclear weapon, bin 
Alawi replied that if Tehran were to acquire such a weapon, 
it would be as a deterrent only.  He stated he believed that 
Iran had decided not to pursue "full scale nuclear 
development," but was interested in acquiring nuclear 
"know-how" as long as it felt threatened by the West.  Bin 
Alawi continued that Iran was a big country and did not need 
nuclear weapons to threaten its neighbors if it wanted to. 
Radical statements by Iranian President Ahmadinejad and other 
Iranian leaders were for show and/or propaganda purposes 
only, the Minister asserted. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) In concluding the meeting, Representative Price 
thanked the Minister for sharing his views and expressed 
appreciation for Oman's cooperation with the U.S.  Bin Alawi 
again stressed the importance of U.S.-Oman ties and welcomed 
future consultations with members of the U.S. Congress. 
 
¶16.  (U) CODEL Price did not have the opportunity to clear 
this message. 
GRAPPO