VZCZCXRO7713
PP RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMO #0153/01 0221218
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221218Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6229
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: A KREMLIN "SPARE:" PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE BOGDANOV 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  Freemason Grand Master and leader of the 
Democratic Party of Russia, Andrey Bogdanov expects to make the 
presidential ballot despite the party's infinitesimal showing in the 
December Duma elections and lack of any public appeal or party 
machinery that would suggest how he collected the requisite two 
million signatures in support of his race.  Political analysts 
insist that Bogdanov is a Kremlin "project" and a hedge against the 
possibility that both Communist Party leader Zyugonov and LDPR's 
Zhirinovskiy could abruptly withdraw from the race.  Such a 
scenario, in the event of former PM Kasyanov's increasingly likely 
disqualification, would leave Putin's heir, First Deputy PM 
Medvedev, without a constitutionally required opponent.  Bogdanov 
told us that he is running in order to cement his reputation as the 
last democratic opposition leader standing, but his personal dislike 
of Kasyanov (who allegedly backed out of a deal to buy DPR) and 
willingness to accuse the former Prime Minister of corruption in the 
petition gathering process makes him a handy foil.  The CEC will 
rule on both Bogdanov and Kasyanov's candidacy by January 26.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Candidate Voted Least Likely to Succeed 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The 38-year old Andrey Bogdanov is an unlikely 
presidential candidate, whose shoulder length curly mane, slightly 
swarthy appearance, and infamy as Grand Master of the Freemason's 
Grand Lodge of Russia overshadow his career as a "political 
technologist," one-time adviser to United Russia, and longtime 
associate of the Democratic Party of Russia.  In a January 17 
meeting at a large, tastefully furnished, but funereally quiet DPR 
headquarters -- which happens to abut the ruling United Russia's 
Moscow regional office -- Bogdanov dated his political activism back 
to 1990, when he circulated leaflets in support of Boris Yeltsin. 
Bogdanov took aim at the failure of rival democratic opposition 
leaders to unite, as well as their predilection to treat political 
parties as vehicles for their political vanity.  Arguing that "no 
other rightist party can boast of a leader like me," Bogdanov 
stressed that he had come up through the ranks, reflecting DPR's 
respect for the "succession" principle of growing its leadership 
from the youth wing.  The fact that he had never served as an 
"A-level" Russian government official (in contrast to Yabloko's 
Yavlinsky, SPS's Gaidar and Chubais, and former PM Kasyanov), 
Bogdanov considered a plus in terms of his long-term political 
prospects, since he did not bear responsibility for the reviled 
1990's. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Describing himself as a political realist, Bogdanov said 
he did not expect Russia to have a democratic president within the 
next ten years, given the continuing fight over the division and 
re-division of state spoils among the elite; instead, DPR would play 
by the rulebook, with his presidential bid a means of attracting 
greater public attention to the party, at a time when traditional 
opposition parties were on the verge of extinction.  "All other 
rightist parties have ceased to meet the democratic demands of the 
people."  Shrugging off DPR's last-place showing in the December 
Duma elections (where it received an almost imperceptible .1 percent 
of the vote), Bogdanov said his goal was to secure three percent in 
the presidential race, which would help in writing-off the party's 
seven million ruble debt for the television airtime it received 
during the parliamentary elections (and, with its less than three 
percent showing, must now reimburse).  In order not to further 
burden the party's coffers, Bogdanov decided to run as an 
independent candidate.   Bogdanov described the process of 
collecting the requisite two million signatures to qualify as an 
independent as easy, but side-stepped any discussion of the 
mechanics.  (Note: Neither we nor political analysts with whom we 
spoke had seen any evidence of a petition collection drive, which 
Kasyanov's aides and former SPS contender Boris Nemtsov had 
described as particularly difficult given the extended Christmas-New 
Year-Orthodox Christmas holiday period.)  Bogdanov readily conceded 
that few Russians were ready for a Grand Master as president, but 
was forthright about his convictions and dispensed both DPR and 
Freemason calling cards.  He'll attend a Freemason convention in 
Kentucky this February. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Bogdanov did not hesitate to declare himself an opponent 
of Putin (something official opposition parties such as Just Russia 
and LDPR eschew), and stressed DPR's rejection of Russia's current 
foreign policy course, with DPR advocating a European agenda and 
Russian membership in the EU.  Noting his one year of service as the 
ruling party's head of public relations, Bogdanov said he was fired 
by United Russia for introducing successful door-to-door membership 
drives in Krasnoyarsk, rather than relying on administrative 
resources to more predictably lock-in the collective votes of 
factories, universities, and other state-influenced bodies. 
Bogdanov avoided discussing his current ties to the Kremlin or 
whether -- as critics charge -- he has an "understanding" over his 
role in this election cycle.  Bogdanov implied that DPR faced less 
official opposition since it was not a "street" party and eschewed 
revolutions of any color.  The Russian populace had endured too much 
 
MOSCOW 00000153  002 OF 002 
 
 
hardship and upheaval, and none of Russia's revolutions had had 
changed people's lives for the better.   Ideologically, Bogdanov 
described DPR as more conservative -- or neo-conservative -- in 
social values than liberal.  For example, while DPR members would 
not condemn homosexuals, no party member would ever participate in 
or condone gay parades. 
 
----------------------------------- 
A Spare to the Kremlin's Heir 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Political analysts, civil society activists, and 
newspaper editors with whom we spoke dismiss Bogdanov out of hand as 
a Kremlin project, alternately designed to "foil" the slight 
prospects of former PM Kasyanov or serve as a far-sighted hedge 
against the unlikely decision of both Communist Party leader 
Zyuganov and LDPR's Zhirinovskiy to withdraw from contention.  In 
the event of Kasyanov's increasingly likely disqualification from 
the race, this scenario would leave Medvedev unopposed, against a 
constitutional requirement for two candidates.  The 
Kremlin-connected Center for Political Technology Deputy Director 
Makarenko is among those who have speculated publicly that Bogdanov 
fills the role played by Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov 
in 2004, describing him as a "purely technical figure - a safeguard 
against any potential blackmail attempts by Zyuganov and 
Zhirinovsky, who might threaten to invalidate the election by 
withdrawing." 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Bogdanov made clear his personal dislike for Kasyanov, 
which he attributed to the former Prime Minister's failed effort to 
highjack DPR at the party convention as the vehicle for his 
presidential campaign.  Other well-placed political insiders argue 
that Kasyanov walked back an agreement to purchase DPR's "brand" 
from Bogdanov for two million usd, presumably after the imposition 
of some unpalatable political conditions.  Bogdanov has led the 
charge in seeking Kasyanov's disqualification from the race, 
submitting disks of signatures to the CEC that were downloaded from 
public records available on the internet, and which he maintains 
match portions of those signature lists submitted by the Kasyanov 
campaign.  The CEC has raised concerns that it has with Kasyanov's 
petition, and Kasyanov petition gatherers face criminal charges in 
two regions for filing false names.  (The difficulty in gathering 
signatures and the likelihood of paid party activists taking 
short-cuts has provided the CEC with a flexible instrument for 
weeding out both political parties and candidates on legal 
grounds.) 
 
------------ 
Comment 
------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Suspicions are necessarily raised when a relative 
political unknown with enormous political liabilities such as 
Bogdanov remains a potential contender in this presidential race, at 
a time when far better known and more electorally proven politicians 
have been sidelined, de-registered, and pushed off of national 
television.  Bogdanov will be nothing more than a footnote to the 
2008 presidential campaign, regardless of whether he is registered 
as a candidate, but is testament to the cynical calculations that 
have undergird every aspect of this electoral process. 
 
BURNS