VZCZCXRO2867
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0087/01 0281634
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 281634Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7427
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000087 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM MOPS CG
SUBJECT:  Post-Conference in Goma:  Struggling with Implementation 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  The structure and timing for implementing the 
Acte d'Engagement and recommendations of the Kivus Conference -- 
particularly establishment of the technical committee on security -- 
remain unclear, as the conference leaders and FARDC have different 
approaches.  Most of the heavy-hitters have left Goma, although 
Interior Minister Denis Kalume is now expected in Goma.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Kivus Conference, which had its official closing 
ceremony January 23, carried on with meetings until late January 24, 
when it finally ended.  The main sticking point on January 24 was 
the Banyamulenge demand for a separate territory, an angry dispute 
that was finessed with an agreement to discuss it later.  On January 
25, conference leaders Appolinaire Malu Malu and National Assembly 
President Vital Kamerhe held two meetings with armed groups 
(including CNDP), while the FARDC led by Inspector General Francois 
Olenga convened a separate meeting with the same groups, all with 
the purpose of securing a ceasefire and beginning the process of 
establishing the Peace and Security Technical Committee as 
envisioned by the Acte d'Engagement. 
 
------------- 
Conference Leaders' Vision of Implementation 
------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a meeting January 26 with the international facilitators 
remaining in Goma (EU, UK, and U.S. poloffs), Malu Malu said that 
the FARDC effort had been a failure, while he and Kamerhe in their 
second meeting January 25 had secured the armed groups' adhesion to 
the ceasefire, except for CNDP in North Kivu and FRF (Banyamulenge 
"Group of 47") in South Kivu.  The CNDP delegation returned from 
consultations with Nkunda overnight and, midday on January 26, 
signed a formal ceasefire in Malu Malu and Kamerhe's presence. 
(FRF's signature was delayed but not thought to pose a problem.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) Malu Malu, in his conversation with international 
facilitators, shared the conference leaders' complex concept of the 
implementation structures:  According to this concept, the top of 
the pyramid, under President Kabila, is to be a Committee on 
Follow-Up, Lobbying, and Mobilization of Resources at the National 
and International Level, based in Kinshasa.  Malu Malu said that 
this committee could consist of three or four persons, and he and 
Kamerhe would be available to serve on it.  Under this committee 
would come the Technical Commission for Peace and Security envisaged 
in the Acte d'Engagement, also based in Kinshasa, with 
representatives of all armed groups and ethnic communities in North 
and South Kivu, with two sub-commissions for each province, for 
security and for humanitarian affairs.  The security sub-commissions 
would be somewhat pared down in size, with six armed groups plus 
CNDP and FRF.  Coming directly under the Follow-Up Committee would 
be a Steering Committee (Comite de Pilotage), also in Kinshasa. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Continuing his description of the implementation 
structures, Malu Malu said that at the provincial level under the 
Steering Committee, there would be Management Committees (Comites de 
Gestion) for each of the provinces, under which there would be 
commissions for Security, Development, Pacification, and 
Humanitarian/Social Affairs.  Alongside, there would be 
observatories for Peace and Reconciliation and for Governance and 
Human Rights.  Governors would have a leading role in these 
provincial committees, as would the international facilitators. 
Malu Malu anticipated that President Kabila would issue a decree 
"very soon" naming the members of the Follow-Up Committee, the 
provincial Management Committees, and the Technical Commission, to 
include permanent secretaries.  (On January 27, Malu Malu told the 
international facilitators that Kabila had named Vice Admiral 
Dieudonne Etumba, head of the navy, as co-chairman of the Technical 
Commission.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) To the international officers' question how ceasefire 
violations and other issues pertaining to the Acte d'Engagement 
would be handled in the interim, Malu Malu said the governor would 
convene the existing provincial security committee (governor, 
commander of the military region, police, intelligence, MONUC) plus 
the concerned armed groups and international facilitators. 
 
¶7. (SBU) At the ceremony January 26 during which CNDP signed the 
formal ceasefire, Kamerhe handed out an Implementation Timetable, 
with very ambitious dates for ceasefire and setting up the Technical 
Commission (D-day January 23 plus one), deployment of MONUC 
observers (D plus 5) return of IDPs (D plus 15), cantonment of 
troops (D plus 15-20), brassage (D plus 40), and return of refugees 
(D plus 45).  Noting that the ceasefire was already D plus 3 and the 
Technical Commission was far from being set up, one of Kamerhe's 
assistants commented that the timetable was "just a timetable." 
 
KINSHASA 00000087  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kamerhe announced that Minister of State for Interior Denis 
Kalume would be present in Goma from January 28 to carry on the 
business of implementation.  Kamerhe and Malu Malu planned to depart 
Goma January 26, were delayed by severe storms, and did depart 
January 27, with Malu Malu going on for 10 days to Grenoble and 
Canada.  (Note:  Kalume was present for much of the Kivus Conference 
but played a relatively silent role, neither supportive nor 
negative.)  Meanwhile, Kamerhe told the press on background January 
25 that the arrest warrant for Nkunda had expired, a statement 
generally interpreted to mean that the government had committed 
itself not to pursuing a new arrest warrant, while leaving the issue 
of exile/"vacation outside the country" up in the air. 
 
---------- 
FARDC View of Implementation 
---------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) When Olenga convened the armed groups, including CNDP, on 
January 26, he presented a different timetable, evidently not 
coordinated with the conference leaders, but almost as unrealistic. 
It called for ceasefire (D-day plus one), setting up of the 
Technical Commission (D plus two), deployment of MONUC observers (D 
plus 7), setting up of a Verification Team (D plus 10), deployment 
of MONUC troops (D plus 14), return of IDPs (D plus 20), movement 
toward transit centers (D plus 30), brassage (D plus 38).  The 
documents which Olenga presented to the armed groups envisaged an 
inter-provincial secretariat for the Technical Commission which 
would oversee coordinating bodies for each province made up of 
"cellules" (cells) for Disengagement and Cessation of Hostilities, 
for DDR, for Restoration of State Authority, and for Political, 
Administrative, and Judicial Affairs. 
 
¶10. (SBU) This meeting ended inconclusively, as none of the armed 
groups had received the documents in advance.  The meeting was to 
have reconvened January 27 but CNDP was not present, and the meeting 
has been rescheduled for January 28.  With the appointment January 
27 of Etumba as the FARDC co-chair of the Technical Commission, it 
would appear that Etumba, rather than Olenga, will take the lead on 
the military side. 
 
--------- 
MONUC North Kivu Brigade Deployment 
--------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) MONUC's North Kivu Brigade Commander General Indrajeet 
Narayan gave international facilitators (EU, UK, U.S.) a briefing 
January 26 on MONUC's action plan.  He said that North Kivu Brigade 
had pinpointed 14 "flash points" along the periphery of Nkunda's 
territory where confrontations between CNDP and FDLR, PARECO, or Mai 
Mai were most likely to occur (from southwest moving clockwise, to 
the west:  Ngungu, Karuba, Mushake/Bahambwe, Kimoka/Kingi, 
Katale/Moheto, Kahira; to the north: Kashuga, Katsiru, Tongo; and to 
the east: Nyamilima, Karambi, Ruwanguba, Ntamugenga, and Rugari). 
The timetable Narayan presented was as follows: 
 
January 24 -- SCD (Standing Combat Deployment, smaller and more 
lightly equipped than the existing Mobile Operating Bases (MOBs) 
with 50 troops) at Ruwanguba and Rugari -- already accomplished. 
Narayan noted that MONUC would keep its MOB at Kibumba on the 
Goma-Rutshuru road, to protect the IDP camp there, keep open the 
road, and ensure the protection of Goma.  However, he said the first 
priority was stationing SCDs at Rugari and Ruwanguba (north of 
Kibumba), as these were areas of constant conflict (between FARDC 
and CNDP) and of threat to the civilian population. 
 
January 25 -- SCD at Kahira (western flashpoint with FDLR, PARECO, 
and Mai Mai) and at Karambi and Nyamilima (near Rutshuru, flashpoint 
with FDLR), already accomplished. 
 
January 26 -- SCD at Karuba, Katale, and Moheto (western flashpoints 
with FDLR, PARECO, and Mai Mai), already accomplished. 
 
January 27 --  South African contingent was to have established a 
MOB at Tongo (northern flashpoint with FDLR and PARECO) and SCD at 
Ntamugenga (road to Rutshuru) but its deployment was delayed to 
January 30. 
 
January 28 -- SCD at Kashuga (northern flashpoint with FDLR, PARECO, 
Mai Mai). 
 
January 29 -- HOB (Helicopter Operating Base) at Ngungu (southwest, 
flashpoint with FDLR and Mai Mai). 
 
¶12. (SBU) Narayan said that MOBs would be established at Ngungu, 
 
KINSHASA 00000087  003 OF 003 
 
 
Karuba, JTN (a tea plantation east of Mweso), and Nyamilima once 
additional troops were available, but certainly by February 10.  He 
said that almost 900 new troops were being moved into North Kivu 
(Guatemalans now based in Bunia, Senegalese in Kisangani, Bolivians 
in Kindu, and the Indian 4th Battalion in Katanga), to supplement 
the existing 4,500 troops in North Kivu Brigade.  In addition to the 
SCDs, MOBs, and existing COBs (Company Operating Bases), there were 
now 56 unarmed military observer teams (MILOBS), tasked to pick up 
information on troop movements and conflicts.  Narayan said that he 
had the cellular telephone numbers of all the armed groups except 
FDLR, whose contact lay through MONUC/DDRRR. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The international facilitators asked Narayan if MONUC had 
heard reports from NGOs and OCHA that a major confrontation had 
occurred January 24-25 between CNDP and either FDLR or PARECO in the 
area of Bambu, in the northern sector north of Tongo, resulting in a 
new movement of IDPs toward Rutshuru.  Narayan could not confirm the 
reports, but agreed that the confrontation was likely to have 
occurred and showed that conflict could easily occur outside the 14 
flashpoints conceived by MONUC.  He noted that FDLR was not a 
signatory to the Acte d'Engagement and therefore CNDP was likely to 
argue that its ceasefire undertaking did not extend to FDLR. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Asked whether the North Kivu Brigade had stiffened its 
rules of engagement in order to punish ceasefire violators, Narayan 
said that MONUC's mandate remained as it was before:  to protect the 
civilian population.  It was not MONUC's role to engage in combat if 
armed groups were firing on each other, but only if they were firing 
on civilians. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Narayan said that the Pakistani Brigade in South Kivu had 
simultaneously evolved an action plan, which had been presented to 
the SRSG earlier that day.  As for a timetable for cantonment, 
movement of forces to transit centers, and brassage, Narayan left 
such timetables to the Technical Committee, but asserted that MONUC 
planned to base cantonment on existing MOBs and COBs, without resort 
to the extra step of transit centers. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Comment:  The reality is that the Technical Committee was 
always going to be hard to set up and that elements within the DRC 
government would have conflicting views, including on the extent to 
which the epicenter of action should remain in the Kivus or move to 
Kinshasa.  (The CNDP will have much to say on that subject.)  It is 
good that the conference leaders and FARDC have been thinking about 
timetables, even if these are uncoordinated and unrealistic.  Etumba 
is already in Goma, and if Kalume comes as predicted he could lend 
gravitas and direction to the process in Goma, if Kabila has 
instructed him to play a role of fulfilling rather than undermining 
the spirit of the Kivus Conference. 
 
GARVELINK