VZCZCXRO0897
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0078/01 0250834
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 250834Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7417
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000078 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG
SUBJECT:  Fifth Meeting of Joint Monitoring Group Task Force 
(JMG-TF) in Goma 
 
Ref: (A) 07 Kinshasa 1419 (B) 07 Kinshasa 1426 (C) Kinshasa 0007 (D) 
 
Kinshasa 36 
 
¶1. (U) Reftels are reports on prior meetings of the JMG-TF. 
 
¶2. (U) Summary:  The Task Force of the Joint Monitoring Group had 
its fifth meeting January 18 in Goma.  The Rwandans promised to have 
the list of genocidaires (perhaps over 10,000) ready in time for 
relocation of ex-FAR elements to reception centers in DRC.  The Task 
Force agreed to use the next meeting January 25 to go to Rwanda to 
view Rwanda's efforts to reintegrate ex-FAR returnees.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The fifth meeting of the Task Force of the Joint Monitoring 
Group, held at and chaired by MONUC January 18, saw some of the same 
focus as in previous meetings but some shift as well.  The Rwandan 
delegation (with the same personnel as in previous meetings) was as 
ever well-prepared and very careful about the minutes of the 
previous meeting.  The Congolese side, minus its usual head of 
delegation Col. Mamba (said to be sick in Kinshasa), was even weaker 
than usual, let by his usual number two, Major Ambroise Nanga. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The genocide list continued to take much time.  The 
Rwandans insisted that the minutes not reflect statements that they 
had made at the previous meeting concerning the list of genocidaires 
(though they did not dispute that they had made them), to the effect 
that the process "was taking longer than originally foreseen because 
new evidence was emerging from traditional courts and was being 
verified."  MONUC Political Director Christian Manahl suggested 
that, Rwanda having already delivered to DRC a list of Most Wanted 
Genocidaires, it might consider a temporary measure of delivering a 
somewhat expanded list, but not an exhaustive list.  One member of 
the Rwandan delegation noted that it had urged DRC, for the time 
being, to use the Most Wanted list and wondered how having a "list 
of 10,000 or more" would help DRC in its program of sensitization of 
ex-FAR.  DRC's Major Nanga, in response, insisted on the language of 
the Nairobi communique, which calls on Rwanda to share with DRC and 
MONUC a list of all categories of wanted genocidaires.  The head of 
the Rwandan delegation, Major Franco Rutatengwa, insisted that 
Rwanda was not in violation of the Nairobi communique, since (in 
Rwanda's interpretation of the communique) Rwanda was only required 
to provide a list when ex-FAR were in cantonment.  After much back 
and forth, the Rwandan delegation agreed to the following 
commitment:  "to submit the list of genocidaires in time for the 
beginning of relocation of ex-FAR elements to reception 
centers/cantonment sites in the DRC." 
 
¶5. (SBU) In this meeting, the DRC appeared to abandon its previous 
emphasis on its right to pursue internal negative forces as a first 
priority (note: a reasonable shift given its defeat by Nkunda and 
the then ongoing Kivus conference, with its objective of bringing a 
political solution to Nkunda and other internal armed groups). 
Major Nanga's emphasis was, rather, on the Kivus conference's 
unanimity on the need to expel the ex-FAR/Interahamwe/FDLR.  Manahl 
recommended that Rwanda, having failed to attend the Kivus 
conference's opening January 6, attend its closing, since the 
conference was an effective step in the DRC's program of 
sensitization of ex-FAR.  (Note:  Rwanda did not attend the closing 
ceremony January 23.)  Rutagengwa reviewed the many steps it had 
taken to ensure effective repatriation of ex-FAR, noting that a 
former leader of FDLR was now the coordinator of the reintegration 
program.  Manahl suggested that Rwanda send him and others to DRC or 
use Radio Okapi to help the DRC in its sensitization program. 
Manahl pointed out that, even if FDLR leaders tried tightly to 
control information flow into their camps, there was nonetheless 
some information flow.  Manahl urged Rwanda to help DRC as much as 
possible, given that there were persistent rumors in DRC, perhaps 
instigated by FDLR leaders, that ex-FAR returning to Rwanda often 
faced arrest and imprisonment.  He suggested that Rwanda provide 
factual information on how many returnees had been arrested and 
imprisoned. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Another change of focus was the Rutagengwa's suggestion 
that the Task Force do more operational monitoring.  To this end, 
Rutagengwa invited the Task Force to devote its next meeting, 
January 25, to a visit to Rwanda to review its efforts to 
reintegrate returnees, to which all participants agreed. 
 
¶7. (SBU) MONUC's North Kivu Brigade and the OCHA representative gave 
briefings to the Task Force.  The military briefing indicated that 
the past four weeks had been generally calm.  The OCHA briefing 
underlined that, as a result of that calm, there had been a modest 
return of IDPs to their homes, particularly among residents of 
Mweso, where half the population (some 4-5,000 persons) had fled but 
 
KINSHASA 00000078  002 OF 002 
 
 
had now returned.  OCHA said that after some discord among IDPs in 
Kirolirwe, 200-300 men had moved with cattle to Ngungu.  Meanwhile, 
humanitarian agencies had fully resumed their activities on all 
axes, from Masisi through Rutshuru. 
 
HAYKIN