VZCZCXRO8766
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0064/01 0231039
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231039Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7403
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG
SUBJECT:    Day of Disappointment at Kivus Conference 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  January 22, the day the Kivus Conference was 
supposed to close, started with optimism in the anticipation that it 
would be the day of signing of an accord to end conflict in the 
Kivus.  The day bogged down, however, as the CNDP went back on its 
commitment of the previous day.  Despite these setbacks, there is 
optimism differences will be resolved.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The thousand-plus participants at the Kivus Conference, 
which began on January 6, gathered at the conference center January 
22 in a predominantly hopeful, even enthusiastic mood, anticipating 
a final plenary session, approval of a long list of recommendations 
to bring reconciliation, and most importantly, the signing of a 
commitment ("acte d'engagement") among the armed groups and the 
government to cease fire and disengage and integrate troops.  An 
airplane was laid on to bring members of the diplomatic corps from 
Kinshasa, and President Kabila was on hand in Goma to preside. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The day of closure had been extended, as the government 
and CNDP had pursued several days' negotiations.  However, midday on 
January 21 the conference leaders met the international 
representatives present in Goma to announce that a compromise 
document had been agreed by the two sides.  Significantly, the 
government had agreed, despite deep reservations, to promise CNDP 
and other armed groups amnesty for acts of insurrection (not crimes 
against humanity).  It had also separated the CNDP out from the 
other armed groups in the document as being a "political-military 
group."  Now it appeared that it only remained for the government to 
negotiate with the other armed groups (Mai Mai, Pareco, and the 
like).  By the evening of January 21, those negotiations were 
complete with no major changes to the document, except for a listing 
of the Mai Mai groups by name. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On January 22, the anticipated day of closure, the 
conference president, Father Apollinaire Malu Malu, never showed up 
at the conference site, Kabila kept to his quarters, the airplane 
carrying diplomats got as far as Bukavu and turned around to go back 
to Kinshasa, the conference plenary only began at 14:30, and that 
plenary only sporadically covered a few conference declarations, and 
adjourned early in disarray. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) From the beginning of the day, Malu Malu, with other 
conference and government leaders, were caught up at the Karibu 
Hotel, two miles from the conference center, in discussions with the 
CNDP delegation.  The CNDP delegation, under instruction from 
Laurent Nkunda, backpedaled on the agreement they had made the 
previous day.  The specific issues that they were raising were not 
immediately clear, as the CNDP delegation leaders were inarticulate 
or intentionally unclear, and Malu Malu (while a superb conference 
moderator) proved to be a poor negotiator, in a government team 
divided by conference moderates and government hardliners.  Several 
hours of the morning were squandered in ineffectual discussion. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Greater clarity began to emerge in the afternoon when EU 
Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer and Senior Adviser to the 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Tim Shortley, with Belgian 
Consul General Hugues Chantry and MONUC Political Affairs Director 
Christian Manahl, were brought into the discussions.  Further 
clarity and energy were infused when National Assembly President 
(and leader of the Conference's Committee of Wise Men) Vital Kamerhe 
joined, and then led, the discussions, and when the new Special 
Representative of the Secretary General Alan Doss arrived on the 
scene.  (Doss came by a special small MONUC aircraft, thinking, like 
others, that he was coming for the conference closure.) 
Discussions went past midnight. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In the end, there proved to be only three points at 
issue: 
 
-- The title and opening of the "Acte d'Engagement" indicated that 
it was an undertaking by the CNDP and other armed groups, not the 
government ("Act of Engagement by the CNDP and the Armed Groups of 
North Kivu for Peace, Security, and Development in the Province of 
North Kivu," modified by the other armed groups to list them all by 
name). 
 
-- The principal consequence of this title and opening was that CNDP 
read the document to indicate that only the CNDP and other armed 
groups were bound by the first article dealing with cease fire, 
although the FARDC was specifically bound to the provisions on 
disengagement in article two and even though the government, with 
international observers, would be signatory to the document. 
 
-- The second article set up a Technical Commission to oversee 
disengagement, brassage, and DDR, and the CNDP wanted it also to 
cover political issues. 
 
KINSHASA 00000064  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The second and third issues were taken care of by 
mid-afternoon.  The government agreed to add to a list of "Political 
and Judicial Guarantees" in article four a new point:  "The 
Government of the DRC undertakes . . . in conformance with the 
pertinent recommendation of the Conference . . . to decree and 
respect the ceasefire, as stipulated in article 1."  To meet the 
demand that the Technical Commission cover political issues, the 
words "mixed peace and security" were added to the clause 
establishing the Technical Commission:  "A mixed Peace and Security 
Technical Commission, under the facilitation of the International 
Community, will be legally instituted by the Government to examine 
and finalize the following questions..." (all having to do with 
disengagement, brassage, and DDR). 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The first issue -- title/opening -- was not resolved when 
the parties broke up after midnight.   The government side, now 
forcefully led by Kamerhe, offered a compromise by which the title 
would read only:  "Democratic Republic of Congo:  Act of 
Engagement," and the opening sentence would read, "We, the CNDP, 
Political-Military Movement, Pareco, Mai-Mai Kasindien, Mai-Mai 
Kifuafua, Mai-Mai Vurondo, Mai-Mai Mongol, UJPS, Mai-Mai Rwenzori, 
and Simba, in the presence of the Government and of the 
Representatives of the International Community, facilitators of the 
present act of engagement, seize this historic opportunity to . . ." 
 The CNDP delegation insisted that "in the presence of" did not meet 
its requirements, while Kamerhe insisted that it was impossible for 
the government and CNDP to be put on the same level in the opening 
of the document, when it was clear that by any reading of the 
document the government was making an unequivocal undertaking.  He 
said that the government had conceded on every other point and it 
appeared that the CNDP was seeking to humiliate it. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) At the end of discussions, with all sides thoroughly 
exhausted, the CNDP delegation initialed the document, agreeing to 
every point except the title/opening.  They said that they would 
travel during the night to Kitchanga to confer with Nkunda and in 
the morning of January 23 they would either return by MONUC 
helicopter with Nkunda's authorization to sign, or they would 
communicate that Nkunda had not accepted. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Comment:  In conversations with Special Advisor Shortley 
early Wednesday morning (January 23), Charge was apprised of 
parallel efforts outside the Conference to influence the CNDP 
delegation and to deal directly with Nkunda.  Shortley emphasized 
that the Conference is not over and there is good reason to believe 
that differences will be overcome and the "Acte d'Engagement" soon 
signed. End comment. 
 
Brock