VZCZCXRO4849
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0042/01 0171142
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171142Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7371
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000042 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report for January 16 - 
            Kamerhe-Shortley Meeting 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: In his meeting with National Assembly President 
Vital Kamerhe January 16, Senior Adviser Tim Shortley urged Kamerhe 
(and similarly Foreign Minister Mbusa, Conference President Malu 
Malu and Conference Moderator Ruberwa) to get the authorization of 
President Kabila (who arrived in Goma January 15) to meet rebel 
leader Laurent Nkunda urgently.  Shortley said that meeting Nkunda 
face-to-face would significantly increase the chances of finalizing 
a peace agreement to end the DRC-Nkunda conflict before the end of 
the conference.  Shortley stressed that discussions between Nkunda 
and senior Congolese interlocutors were the only way to achieve an 
agreement on the most contentious and difficult issues to include 
the status of CNDP leadership (e.g., exile).  Kamerhe welcomed and 
agreed with Shortley's message and stated that he would carry it as 
forcefully as possible to Kabila.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs Tim Shortley opened his meeting with Kamerhe (one of the key 
leaders of the Kivus Conference as Chairman of the Wisemen's 
Committee) by noting the intensified commitment by the United States 
Government to the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past six 
months to bring about the end of conflict in eastern Congo and 
assist the government to deal with foreign armed negative forces. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Kamerhe said that the Kivus conference was a crucial 
opportunity for ending conflict in eastern Congo.  The conference 
had brought together ethnic communities and armed groups, all of 
which had emphasized their respect for the constitution and state 
institutions, but all had decried marginalization, the fragility of 
the government, the inability of government forces to protect the 
population, and the lack of the state's capacity to meet the needs 
of the people.  Armed groups had complained that they were not 
treated equitably in allocation of responsibilities in integrated 
units and that efforts at demobilization had been a failure. 
Kamerhe said that the Wise Men's Committee had met South Kivu 
leaders January 15 to discuss the highly emotive issue of a separate 
territory for the Banyamulenge.  He believed that there would be a 
way to make this happen. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Kamerhe said that the most difficult issue was the 
disengagement of armed groups.  It was essential for the conference 
to agree on the need to reinforce the ceasefire among all armed 
groups.  FARDC, MONUC, and CNDP would have to provide exact 
locations and numbers of troops.  Assembly centers would be set up 
to prepare for brassage or demobilization.  The CNDP would insist on 
some conditions, but the other armed groups were not as complicated, 
as they said they would stop fighting once the Nkunda situation was 
resolved. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The President had now arrived in Goma, Kamerhe said, and 
he would soon be giving directions to the government about the 
extent to which it could negotiate with Nkunda.  Kamerhe said that 
he was convinced that "if discusions with Nkunda go well and if 
there is pressure on Nkunda and Rwanda from the United States, we 
an arrive at a solution."  Kamerhe noted that Nkunda needed a 
guarantee that if he stopped fighting he would not be arrested, but 
it would be difficult for the populace to accept Nkunda's staying in 
Goma or being integrated as part of the army.  South Africa had said 
that it would accept his exile and guarantee he would not be 
extradited to DRC.  Kamerhe stressed that Nkunda could stay in South 
Africa two to three years, depening on his behavior there, and then 
be pardoned; perhaps he would only need to stay one year.  Kamerhe 
said that he and his conference colleagues would try to get 
President Kabila to make the necessary concessions -- it was vital 
to achieve this political agreement, despite the "small 
humiliations" that would be involved. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Kamerhe detailed, as well, the conference's focus on 
issues such as return of refugees (it would be necessary to work 
with UNHCR to identify refugees especially in Rwanda and create the 
necessary security conditions for their return), the humanitarian 
crisis (the conference was producing an urgent plan for ensuring 
return of IDPs), and reconstruction (a project such as rebuilding 
the 150-kilometer Goma-Bukava road would occupy many workers who now 
have no employment and would otherwise be tempted to stay as 
fighters in armed groups). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Shortley noted that the difficult issues for Kabila were 
amnesty and exile.  He also noted that Nkunda was focused on those 
issues as well as integrating his troops with appropriate security 
guarantees.  Shortley highlighted that when he met with Nkunda on 
January 12, Nkunda was wearing a civilian suit and that Nkunda was 
fixated on urgent next steps beyond the conference and beyond the 
paper agreement.  Shortley underscored that Nkunda wanted an 
exchange among his Congolese peers making up the leadership of the 
 
KINSHASA 00000042  002 OF 002 
 
 
Conference.  He wanted to sit with conference leaders Kamerhe, 
Foreign Minister Mbusa, conference president Abbe Malu Malu, and RCD 
leader Ruberwa, together or separately, to have a tough discussion 
about the country's problems, his status, and guarantees for him and 
his forces.  Shortley said that the time had come for the Congolese 
to step up and provide the leadership necessary to end the conflict. 
 Shortley stressed that with the conference ending on Monday, 
January 21, time was of the essence. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Shortley said that Nkunda had made it clear that a key 
component of the agreement was a role for MONUC in protecting the 
population in his area of control and ensuring that his troops could 
go to brassage without fear that FDLR, Mai Mai, and Pareco would 
fill the void.  Shortley highlighted that President Kabila's Chief 
of Staff and Advisers had designed a technical committee that would 
seek agreement in the areas of disengagement, brassage/DDR, and 
other technical matters and deal with political questions such as 
exile and CNDP integration thereafter.  Shortley recommended to 
Kabila's advisers Tshibanda and Chissambo that the participants in 
this technical committee include FARDC/GDRC and CNDP sitting across 
from each other at a table, with the U.S. and MONUC as observers, 
chaired by a senior Congolese. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) However, Shortley said, the presidential advisers did not 
want a senior Congolese to chair the meetings and preferred the U.S. 
play that role.  They did not want the appearance of equality 
between CNDP and the government.  They were pushing for separate 
military and political forums.   Shortley said that he feared their 
approach would remove the government too far from the discussion and 
slow things down or freeze the process as it would demonstrate a 
lack of commitment to the process to end the conflict.  Shortley 
stressed that Kabila did not want to make necessary concessions or 
approve a rapid and direct process, while Nkunda was holding back on 
any concessions until he obtained direct negotiations with Congolese 
counterparts.  Shortley believed that if respected senior leaders, 
such as Kamerhe himself, met Nkunda directly, an agreement could 
come in less than two days.  Shortley noted that it would be 
essential for Nkunda that any agreement be public.  Shortley stated 
that he believed an agreement could be reached by the end of the 
conference January 20.  Shortley noted that the conference could be 
immediately followed by announcing a peace agreement and process, 
and the convening of the technical committee on January 22 for 
implementation, before Shortley's unavoidable departure January 23. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Kamerhe said that he anticipated seeing President Kabila 
in the course of the day.  He would strongly urge all the points 
that Shortley had made to him and hoped that Shortley would also 
have an audience.  Shortley's concept exactly fitted with his own, 
Kamerhe said.  For Nkunda to stop fighting, he would have to have 
guarantees for himself and for his troops and his CNDP leadership. 
Time was very short, and failure to seize the occasion would be a 
disaster.  Failure would prompt the populace to further despair and 
Nkunda would become even stronger, and possibly even spur him to 
take Goma.  Sadly, if the government had had talks with Nkunda 
before December it would now be in a much better position. 
Unfortunately, Kamerhe said, Kabila was surrounded by a "very bad 
entourage."  Kamerhe said that he was used to confronting difficult 
situations such as this one, and he was prepared to confront the 
President and his entourage.  However, in doing so, he joked acidly, 
he  might also need, with the U.S., to prepare his own exile. 
 
Garevelink