VZCZCXRO1454
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0037/01 0141434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141434Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7358
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000037 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM MOPS PREL CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report for January 11-13 - ethnic groups 
            get their say; convergence to go after FDLR 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Kivus Conference is moving toward the end of 
its lengthy plenary phase.  Ethnic communities and armed groups in 
both Kivus have, for the most part, had their say and the more 
difficult phase of bringing them together on a concrete way forward 
will soon begin.  Amid the sometimes hateful language and many 
divergences, there were points of convergence, in particular, all 
parties' wish to deal with the FDLR.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Kivus Conference is still projected to conclude 
January 20, even though the plenary sessions are stretching beyond 
the original estimate.  The presentations by ethnic communities 
finally got under way on January 11 with speeches by representatives 
of North Kivu communities, as well as an important speech by 
Presidential Advisor Ngwej on the plan to deal with the FDLR, and a 
speech by Tim Shortley, Senior Adviser to Assistant Secretary 
Frazer, who had arrived January 10.  On January 12, the South Kivu 
communities began their speeches, which were ever lengthier and 
carried over to half of January 13.  The armed groups of North Kivu, 
starting with CNDP, had their say on the afternoon of January 13. 
Armed groups from South Kivu will speak on January 14 and may carry 
over to January 15, meaning that the time for discussion at the 
level of workshops will be compressed (assuming that the closing 
date of January 20 is maintained). 
 
North Kivu Ethnic Groups 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The twelve North Kivu speeches on January 11 were a mix of 
good and bad, though most communities made an effort to get into the 
conciliatory mood of the Conference.   The main exception was the 
Hundes and Niangas of Walikale and Masisi Territories, who were 
aggressively hostile toward the Tutsis, disputing the Tutsis' 
Congolese nationality and seeking to reserve for themselves a 
territory where, effectively, no other Congolese could enter without 
their approval.  The Hutu spokesman, on the other hand, reserved his 
ire for the Nandes from northern North Kivu, while calling for 
return of all refugees (including Tutsi).  The Pygmy speaker 
reminded the audience (now grown to over 1,000 Conference 
participants) that the Pygmies were the original inhabitants and had 
suffered more than anyone else.  The Tutsi, being last 
alphabetically, spoke last, to a largely silent but respectful 
audience, emphasizing their victimization over several decades.  He 
called for a special territory or zone of protection for the Tutsis 
within North Kivu and a system of quotas for Tutsis in government 
and military positions, the only occasion in his speech that the 
audience reacted with loud "Nos." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Common elements in these speeches were a call for 
restoring the authority of the state, condemnation of the army as a 
major human rights violator and call for its reform, call for 
brassage of all armed groups, and the importance of finding a way to 
get the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (FDLR) to go back to Rwanda.  The name 
Nkunda was only mentioned once, but all speakers talked about FDLR. 
There was mostly agreement on the need for return of Congolese 
refugees, so long as those are properly identified, including input 
from village chiefs.   Afterward, international community observers 
debated whether the exercise had done more good than harm.  They 
concluded that it had been a cathartic event, for the most part 
moderate, and therefore a good thing. 
 
Government reiterates call for action against FDLR 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Presidential Advisor Ngwej gave a lengthy afternoon 
discourse on the government's plan, submitted to Rwanda December 1, 
to repatriate ex-FAR/Interahamwe (FDLR) as required under the 
Nairobi Communique.  Ngwej's presentation essentially initiated the 
non-military component of the December 1 plan. Ngwej, a Katangan, 
was one of the few non-Kivusians to address the Conference, but he 
did a convincing job.  The thrust was that all the people of the 
Kivus had to join together in this two-month period of 
"sensitization" (awareness-raising) during which the FDLR could 
voluntarily go to transfer centers and be repatriated to Rwanda or 
outside the Kivus.  He noted that 30 percent of the 6,000 FDLR 
elements were Congolese, and he focused particular importance on the 
Conference as a "sensitization" vehicle.  The voluntary phase would 
end in mid-March, whence would begin the military phase.  He said 
that, contrary to claims by some Congolese, Rwanda's reinsertion 
program was effective.  "Rwanda has made considerable efforts, and 
life in the bush here is unjustifiable."  The threat of FDLR to 
Rwanda was "real," while to Congolese it was "constant."  If there 
were a need for inter-Rwandan dialogue, that was an issue solely for 
Rwanda not for DRC; DRC just needed the FDLR to go home.  DRC would 
turn over any FDLR elements pursued by international justice, as DRC 
 
KINSHASA 00000037  002 OF 003 
 
 
wanted nothing to do with genocidaires. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) International observers agreed among themselves afterward 
that, while there was not the slightest chance that DRC would be 
militarily prepared to take on the FDLR (the most powerful and 
widespread armed group in the Kivus) any time soon, Ngwej had spoken 
well and at a key moment, helping to galvanize Kivusians on this 
subject.  Foreign Minister Mbusa told the observers that it would be 
best for Conference president Abbe Malu Malu, who was a precious 
resource that should not be overused, not to engage the FDLR 
leadership now in talks, but that rather such a role would be 
assumed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. 
 
Special advisor Shortley delivers message 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The final presentation of the day came from U.S. Senior 
Adviser to Assistant Secretary Frazer, Tim Shortley.  He emphasized 
the importance of the Conference and the urgency of acting now to 
end armed conflict in the Kivus.  He called for a durable ceasefire 
and highlighted the international community's willingness to support 
reconstruction in post-conflict Kivu.  Malu Malu concluded the day 
with an emotional gesture, calling the 14 CNDP delegates -- who were 
present in the cramped grand hall and not, as they had been, in one 
of the ancillary rooms connected by television -- to come forward 
and be recognized, which they were with tepid applause. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The spokespersons for the South Kivu ethnic groups spoke 
at much greater length January 12 than had their North Kivu 
counterparts the previous day, and the spirit was less moderate. 
The Bembe and Fulero relentlessly attacked the Tutsis/Banyamulenge 
as being not Congolese, while the Buyu and Bwali attacked the Bembe. 
 The Banyamulenge speaker gave a polished address, more articulate 
than the others, calling for an end of demonization of, and 
discrimination against, Tutsis and the creation of a separate 
administrative territory for the Banymulenge.  Most speakers went 
into history at great length, picking and choosing from Belgian 
archives "facts" most suitable to themselves. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Speaking to international observers afterward, Malu Malu 
said that the Banyamulenge, Bembe, and Fulero constituted a 
"triangle of hatred," to which other South Kivusian ethnicities 
aligned themselves.  He would ask President of the National Assembly 
Kamerhe (a South Kivusian and president of the Conference's Wise 
Men's Committee) to give particular attention to this triangle. 
Mbusa urged the international observers to talk to Azarias Ruberwa, 
a key Banyamulenge member of the Wisemen's Committee, to persuade 
the Banyamulenge against pushing for a separate territory; Mbusa 
said that this demand that would take the Kivus in the wrong 
direction. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Malu Malu said that he hoped the Conference would make 
progress on nationality issues.  It was necessary for the Conference 
to agree, first, that all Congolese were "equally Congolese" with 
equal rights, even if they had just arrived and just acquired 
Congolese citizenship, and second, that all Congolese should have 
the right to circulate and live anywhere in the country.  Mbusa 
pointed out that the new constitution should have resolved these 
issues, but the Ministry of Justice, like the whole state apparatus, 
was so weak and corrupt that nationality status went to the highest 
bidder or according to ethnic prejudice. 
 
Special Envoys Meet on Nkunda 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Senior Adviser Shortley met with EU and Belgian envoys 
and MONUC January 12.  Shortley said that Nkunda was focused not on 
the Conference but on issues that would arise in the technical 
committee that to be established by or after the Conference.  In 
Nkunda's concept, there would be four persons each from CNDP and the 
government on the technical committee, with U.S. and MONUC as 
observers (others, such as EU and Belgium, might be included). 
Nkunda wanted the ceasefire to be extended, and he said he had not 
been responding militarily to FARDC provocations.  MONUC would need 
to increase its presence inside Nkunda's territory as agreed by all 
parties, to ensure protection of CNDP and the populace.  He sought 
brassage for all armed groups, but he wanted CNDP troops to be put 
under brassage only within North Kivu.  This position, Nkunda 
implied, would be open to discussion within the technical committee, 
where he hoped (but was not optimistic) that the government side 
would have members capable of conducting a serious negotiation. 
Nkunda rejected any discussion of exile.  He sought amnesty for 
insurrection and restoration of rank for all the CNDP troops.  He 
said that if the government continued trying the military option, he 
 
KINSHASA 00000037  003 OF 003 
 
 
would, next time, not just stop at Sake but "go all the way." 
Mainly, Nkunda sought serious dialogue. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) EU envoy Roeland van de Geer characterized the Conference 
leadership as effective and said that the Conference could give a 
good impetus to the follow-on technical committee, but van de Geer 
worried that the government in Kinshasa would not be forthcoming. 
The international community would need to bring great pressure on 
Kabila.  Belgian envoy Jozef Smets said that Foreign Minister Mbusa 
had told him the previous day that his standing was fragile and that 
Kamerhe was "in disgrace."  On the other hand, the Conference was 
building up tremendous momentum and might almost take on the force 
of a referendum. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The January 13 plenary opened with lengthy presentations 
by four more South Kivu communities, with the Bashi (Shi) 
presentation being a model of moderation (Presidential Advisor 
Chissambo said later that he had read it in advance) and the Vira 
community wavering between denying Tutsi/Banyamulenge nationality 
and calling for reconciliation. 
 
Armed groups have their turn 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) CNDP opened the afternoon January 13 with the first 
presentation by an armed group.  The address, given by CNDP 
delegation head Kambasu Ngene, a short round man with none of the 
"classic" Tutsi morphology, artfully combined calls for peace and 
reconciliation with a repetition of well-known CNDP demands.  The 
CNDP, he said, recognized the legitimacy of the government after the 
election of 2006, but those elections were not a blank check for 
permanent legitimacy.  CNDP regretted that the government had 
preferred a military option.  The great threat to DRC was the 
ex-FAR/Interrahamwe.  All Congolese outside the country should be 
assured return -- including opposition head Bemba.  (Note:  Mention 
of Bemba was perhaps the greatest surprise in the speech.  End 
note.)  The process of brassage would have to be "completely 
revisited," citizens could not be exiled, and "arrest warrants 
against some military chiefs" would have to be retracted 
unconditionally.  CNDP would accept direct negotiations, with 
neutral mediation, as soon as possible. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) There followed speeches by Pareco and North Kivu Mai Mai 
groups.  The spokesman for the Autochthonous Armed Groups of North 
Kivu, Didier Bitake, followed the pattern of the Hunde and Nianga 
communities but at greater length and with even more pointed 
antagonism toward the Tutsis.  It was the most hard-line speech of 
the Conference, to date.  He called for the removal of FDLR but 
emphasized that that must be accomplished peacefully, else the 
autochthonous peoples would suffer reprisals.  The speakers for the 
more Hutu-oriented Pareco and Mongol Mai Mai were less immoderate, 
focusing on return of all refugees (not to exclude fellow 
Rwandophone Tutsis), the urgent need to deal with FDLR, and the need 
for a special tribunal to investigate the massive killings of Hutus 
in DRC in the post-1996 period.  After these speeches, moderator 
Kamerhe commented that there were several common elements among the 
armed groups, viz., the need to strengthen the Congolese state, the 
need to respect the Constitution, the urge for peace, the general 
feeling of being marginalized, the failure of army integration, 
concerns about nationality and the need for reintegration of 
transplanted populations, problems with hate language and pandering 
to ethnicity, and wanting release of prisoners.  He hoped the 
Conference would be able to build on these points of commonality. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Speaking afterward to the international observers, Malu 
Malu said that when the presentations of the armed groups concluded 
(South Kivu groups would have the floor January 14), the Conference 
would enter its most difficult phase.  The Conference would have to 
produce concrete actions and the populace would need to see 
immediate results.  MONUC representative Steve Jackson described to 
him a plan for immediate stabilization of the region to cover the 
gap between humanitarian and developmental assistance and expected 
that the newly-arrived head of MONUC would come soon to Goma to 
discuss it.  Malu Malu noted that much of the government was in Goma 
or could be quickly summoned there, to discuss this matter.   Van de 
Geer said that the international observers would ponder proposals 
for concrete actions for the Conference and would share them with 
Malu Malu. 
 
Garvelink