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RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0016/01 0091536
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091536Z JAN 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7339
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000016 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
 
SUBJECT: Goma Report January 8, 2008 - third day of Kivus Conference 
and military situation update 
 
KINSHASA 00000016  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  A prominent Protestant clergyman who is in 
contact with Nkunda told poloff Nkunda holds to the commitments he 
made with Special Envoy Tim Shortley but is worried about potential 
negative effects of the Kivus Conference.  The clergyman confirms 
that Nkunda is willing to send his forces to brassage without 
requiring they stay in North Kivu, assuming three requirements are 
met:  FDLR is disarmed, CNDP personnel (evidently to include 
himself) are amnestied and assured of adequate military or political 
positions, and return of refugees is ensured.  Meanwhile, Kivus 
Conference president Malu Malu says that the first plenary will take 
place January 9, despite huge obstacles.  International community 
representatives met fifty Mai Mai, who were highly dissatisfied with 
conference arrangements.  End summary. 
 
Runiga's Meeting with Nkunda 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On his return January 8 from meeting Nkunda at Kirolirwe 
(via MONUC transport), Bishop Jean-Marie Runiga Lugerno gave an 
account to MONUC (Political Director Christian Manahl and Political 
Officer Hannah Taylor) and to poloff.   President Kabila, acting 
through his Foreign Affairs Advisor Marcellin Chissambo, had 
dispatched Runiga to Nkunda, and Kabila had previously sent Runiga 
to meet Nkunda in September.  Runiga said that he had continued to 
be in telephonic contact with Nkunda "every few days."  Runiga is 
pastor of the Eglise Jesus-Christ le Seul Sauveur (Church of Jesus 
Christ the only Savior), with churches in several parts of DRC, and 
national president of the "Association des Eglises de Reveil" 
(Association of Churches of the Awakening).  Nkunda attended his 
church in Kisangani in past years. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Runiga said that Nkunda was worried about the Kivus 
Conference.  The CNDP had not been involved in the preparatory 
meetings for the Conference, nor was it represented in its 
leadership positions.  Runiga said that he pointed out to Nkunda 
that the presence of Emmanuel Kamanzi and Azil Tanzi, widely 
considered to be CNDP, in the "Bureau" of the conference certainly 
gave the conference an appearance of CNDP involvement.  Nkunda 
responded that those two were "representatives of the Tutsi 
community" only, not CNDP.  Nkunda told Runiga that he was satisfied 
with his delegation of 12 (10 as conference members, one admin, one 
media handler), whom he had personally designated.  The government 
had sent an invitation to the CNDP, thereby giving the CNDP 
recognition as a party.  (The delegation of 12 is now being 
transported daily under MONUC escort from Kimoka, north of Sake, to 
the conference site.)  Despite the "complete incoherence of the 
conference," Nkunda said he would not withdraw this delegation nor 
cease to abide by the ceasefire which he had called. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Nkunda's deeper worry, according to Runiga, was that the 
conference could veer off in a negative direction, undermining the 
work that Special Envoy Tim Shortley had accomplished in 
mid-December.  At that time, Shortley and he had come to agreement 
on "70 percent of the issues."  He had hoped that the conference 
would be a vehicle to consecrate that 70 percent, but now there was 
a risk of having to start over.  In any case, as the opening session 
of the conference had now taken place and speeches had been made 
there that circumscribed the scope of the conference, it was more 
difficult to see the conference as a vehicle for consecrating the 
agreement.  Nkunda was also concerned that the government had not 
reciprocated his announcement of a ceasefire.  Runiga said that 
Nkunda did not appear to be aware that the Minister of Defense had 
announced a ceasefire for the duration of the conference. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Runiga asked Nkunda what his "real claims" were, to which 
Nkunda cited three.  First, the FDLR had to be dealt with. 
Preferably, its partisans would return to Rwanda.  Alternatively, 
the FDLR would voluntarily disarm and become refugees, to be placed 
at least 150 kilometers from the border within DRC or in third 
countries.  Alternatively, the FDLR would have to be forcibly 
disarmed.  Nkunda was even amenable to the idea of integrating FDLR 
into the Congolese army, although he said the government would have 
to be the one to convince Rwanda and the international community to 
accept the idea. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Second, CNDP personnel, both military and political, would 
have to be fully amnestied.  Military personnel would have to be 
given a concomitant military grade and position of responsibility 
within the Congolese army, and political personnel would have to be 
given a position of equivalent responsibility in the civilian 
hierarchy.  Nkunda did not mention his own personal status, but 
Runiga assessed that Nkunda included himself in this requirement. 
Nkunda himself called for "brassage" of his military forces, saying 
that he would interpose no conditions (e.g., keeping them in North 
 
KINSHASA 00000016  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Kivu) on this integration of his forces if his other basic claims 
were fulfilled.  (Runiga noted that, in the meeting he had had a few 
days previously with Chissambo, the latter had suggested that CNDP 
political personnel might appropriately be named as directors of 
public enterprises.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Nkunda's third requirement was that refugees and displaced 
persons return to their places of origin.  He did not restrict the 
requirement to Rwandophones.  He recognized that if the FDLR and 
CNDP-status issues were adequately addressed, this issue would, 
effectively, be resolved.  Runiga said that he urged Nkunda not to 
stress this issue, as it was the province of the government and 
international community.  He urged Nkunda to focus on status of CNDP 
personnel. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Christian Manahl commented that, while MONUC was itself 
prohibited at present from direct contact with Nkunda, it firmly 
supported Shortley's intermediation and also believed Runiga was 
doing good work.  Runiga said that he fully understood the primacy 
of Shortley's role but stood ready to continue to communicate with 
Nkunda if such contact were deemed useful. 
 
Quiet on the Military Front 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) MONUC's acting Head of Office Gernot Sauer told poloff 
January 8 that he was not aware of any confrontations having taken 
place between FARDC and Nkunda's forces since the beginning of the 
year.  On the other hand, there had been clashes between Pareco and 
Nkunda January 3 and 4 at Kashuga, northwest of Mweso and Kitchanga, 
and the MONUC human-rights team was investigating allegations that 
FARDC (elements of the 2d integrated brigade) had shot into a group 
of people January 2 at Nkokwe (east of Rumangabo, midway between 
Goma and Rutshuru), killing ten, apparently on the ground that the 
group was thought to be giving information to Nkunda's local 
commander Makenga.  Poloff noted that in an earlier conversation, 
Mai Mai had claimed that Nkunda's forces in recent days had occupied 
several areas on the periphery of his control, to include Kashuga 
and Ngungu (near the South Kivu border).  Sauer said that, indeed, 
it appeared that Nkunda had recently reoccupied Ngungu, which for 
some time been a "free zone" surrounded by a Mai Mai, FDLR, and 
Nkunda on various sides.  Poloff also called on MONUC North Kivu 
commander General Narayan, who confirmed that all was quiet between 
FARDC and Nkunda.  He said that there was always "background noise" 
between Mai Mai groups and Nkunda, and he gave those exchanges 
little importance. 
 
Kivus Conference Limping Along 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) There was no plenary meeting of the Kivus conference 
January 8, even to address rules of procedure.  The issuance of 
badges proceeded slowly, with the issuing office (the Electoral 
Commission) inundated with applicants and conflicting lists of 
members.  Self-important personages were constantly bullying their 
way into getting more of their allies accredited.  Badges were being 
sold, according to eye-witness accounts. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In an evening meeting, conference president Malu Malu 
assured international observers that the plenary would commence on 
January 9 even if all members of the conference were not yet 
accredited. (He claimed there were now over 600 accredited, though 
other reports suggest far fewer; he said that he had ordered 
simplifications in the accrediting process.)  Malu Malu said he had 
received the CNDP delegation in the course of January 8, assuring 
them that they would have a serious involvement in the conference, 
which would however not be a negotiating forum. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer emphasized to Malu 
Malu the importance of meeting Mai Mai complaints about poor 
treatment, to which Malu Malu said that his efforts to placate the 
Mai Mai had been complicated by their numerous conflicting claims. 
Manahl raised the issue of public display of weapons in Goma, 
including by FARDC, as a potential accidental flashpoint, to which 
Malu Malu -- evidently overcome by a virus and by fatigue -- said 
that there was not likely much way to handle the issue, though he 
would raise it with the Minister of Interior.  Van de Geer noted the 
disgruntlement that would mount in the conference because only half 
the 800 conference members would have the privilege of being allowed 
in the main hall.  Malu Malu said limply said that everyone would 
somehow have access to discussion via television screen. 
 
Mai Mai 
------- 
 
KINSHASA 00000016  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) At opening of day January 8, international observers led 
by van de Geer, Manahl, and Belgian Special Envoy Jozef Smets met 
for three hours with fifty representatives of Mai Mai groups present 
in Goma for the conference.  Didier Bitake, spokesman for what was 
described as the "Groupes Armees Authochtones du Nord Kivu" (Armed 
Indigenous Groups of North Kivu), gave the principal presentation, 
while many representatives of the four Mai Mai groups also spoke, 
some at great length and with great passion.  Included were the Mai 
Mai Kifuafua, the largest group, active in Walikale, northern 
Masisi, and northernmost South Kivu; Mai Mai Kassindiens, active in 
the Grand Nord; Pareco, recently formed and active in central 
Masisi; and "Mongol," a small group only recently resuscitated. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Speakers were incensed at what they considered to be the 
special treatment afforded Nkunda's forces and their own poor 
treatment -- no security, no transport, no lodging or food, no 
payment of the promised per diem.  On wider issues, speakers tracked 
the themes which Hunde and Nianga deputies had sounded with poloff 
on Janaury 7:  Rwanda was the root of conflict in North Kivu, with 
its support of Nkunda and poor treatment of FDLR returnees.  The Mai 
Mai had arisen as the only true support of the indigenous 
population, as the army and state apparatus were feckless.  They 
rejected the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees to North Kivu.  They 
opposed any military action against FDLR as past practice showed 
that the FDLR would wreak vengeance on the local population, but 
they insisted that the international community ensure FDLR's return 
to Rwanda.  Bitake singled out the United States for special 
criticism as Rwanda's and Nkunda's backer, claiming first-hand 
information on American military supply of Nkunda.  Manahl requested 
that the Mai Mai follow Nkunda's and the Minister of Defense's suit 
in calling for a ceasefire, to which Bitake said he would consider 
doing so reluctantly, given Nkunda's recent reoccupation of five 
villages. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The international observers, with approval of Malu Malu 
and Chissambo, plan to see leaders of several other dissident and 
ethnic groups, to include CNDP, in the coming days, on the margins 
of the conference, depending on its pace. 
 
Garvelink