VZCZCXRO6888
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0014/01 0081310
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081310Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7336
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PHUM PREF KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  Goma Report January 7, 2008 - 
          Second day of Kivus Conference 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Kivus Conference, which opened January 6 in 
Goma, will probably not get down to substance for a few days and is 
likely to continue later than the projected finish date of January 
¶14.  The relative satisfaction of Tutsis with their prominent role 
in the Conference is in contrast to the dissatisfaction of other 
ethnicities.  Conference president Malu Malu envisions a role for 
representatives of the international community in breaking logjams 
within the 64 sub-commissions.  MONUC flew Pastor Runiga to meet 
Nkunda overnight, at Nkunda's invitation and with Kabila's blessing. 
 End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The second day of the Conference on Peace, Security, and 
Development in North and South Kivu, January 7, proved insufficient 
to finalize procedural issues, despite efforts over the past ten 
days by Conference president, Father Apollinaire Malu Malu, and his 
core organizers to overcome obstacles.  Accreditation of the 800 
attendees is not complete, because the responsible entity, the 
Independent Electoral Commission office in Goma, is unable to 
produce identification cards en masse, though Malu Malu told 
representatives of the international community in an evening meeting 
January 7 that the Conference would begin to get down to substance 
even if all members were not yet accredited.  Armed groups, he said, 
were already fully accredited. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Malu Malu said that rules of procedure would be agreed on 
in the course of January 8, perhaps to include final decisions on 
voting and immunity.  Malu Malu was evasive about how long the 
Conference was likely to go on beyond the projected closing date of 
January 14 but said that his limited budget would necessitate a 
limited delay, entailing possibly leaving undecided issues to a 
separate conclave or commission.  His present budget of four million 
dollars would carry to only January 14.  It already represented a 
considerable expansion over the original forecast, given the 
doubling of numbers of members and of the number of days of the 
Conference. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) On voting, Malu Malu and his colleagues have apparently 
decided that the best approach is to avoid direct voting if possible 
and go for consensus.  Failing consensus, he contemplates an 
"appeal" to the external facilitators -- viz., members of the 
international community present in Goma -- who will perform the role 
of suggesting a way out of any impasse that arises.  Malu Malu did 
not confer with the international community in advance about this 
procedure nor did he discuss it in detail in the evening meeting. 
Failing success with external facilitation, according to his legal 
assistant Bob Kabamba, he contemplates that a two-thirds vote will 
be required on substantive issues, or a majority vote on less 
sensitive technical issues. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Once procedural issues are dealt with, the plan continues 
to be for the Conference to meet in plenary, followed by meetings of 
the two groups (North and South Kivu) separately in sub-plenary, 
followed by meetings of the eight commissions:  peace (7 
sub-commissions for each province), security (11), humanitarian 
affairs (6), and development (8), for a total of 64 
sub-commissions. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) EU Special Envoy Roeland van de Geer underlined the 
importance that the international community attached to the 
Conference and asked Malu Malu's and Foreign Minister Mbusa's 
perspective on how the international community could be most 
helpful.  Mbusa said that its contribution was essential in every 
area.  Van de Geer said that he and his colleagues had informally 
met earlier in the day with Mai Mai and Pareco (who were staying at, 
and openly milling around, the Karibou Hotel) and would meet them 
and other groups, if Malu Malu and Mbusa agreed, in order to 
emphasize the importance of the Conference and unacceptability of 
further armed conflict.  Malu Malu and Mbusa interposed no 
objection.  Belgian Special Envoy Jozef Smets stressed the 
importance of devoting significant time, perhaps a day, to the issue 
of sexual violence and asked how Malu Malu planned to deal with the 
FDLR.  Malu Malu said that the majority of people involved in the 
Conference wanted to invite the FDLR to the Conference, realizing 
the need for a political way forward, and he was seeking an indirect 
way to accomplish the goal.  As for other armed groups, Mai Mai were 
already involved in workshops but would not be involved in meetings 
in the large hall; meanwhile, he was in constant contact with the 
CNDP delegation. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marcellin Chissambo, 
present at the evening meeting (and, he says, in Goma "for the 
duration"), noted that there was not only a CNDP delegation in Goma, 
the CNDP  was effectively involved at the highest level ("bureau") 
of the Conference (Emmanuel Kamanzi and Azil Tanzi).  Chissambo, 
Malu Malu, and Mbusa all noted that the prominence of Tutsis at the 
 
KINSHASA 00000014  002 OF 002 
 
 
highest levels of the Conference had produced keen resentment among 
other groups but had not netted much gratitude from the Tutsis, who 
were themselves badly divided.  Chissambo affirmed that Bishop 
Jean-Marie Runiga had traveled overnight to meet Nkunda, at Nkunda's 
invitation and Kabila's request (conveyed through Chissambo). 
Separately, MONUC Political Affairs chief Christian Manahl told 
poloff that MONUC saw Runiga's effort as useful, if not in the same 
category of importance as U.S. intermediation via Special Envoy 
Shortley.  (Note:  Runiga has delivered a written request for U.S. 
financial assistance, patterned on his similar request to MONUC, 
which poloff will forward to Embassy Kinshasa.  End note.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) At opening of day, poloff received a delegation of Hunde 
and Nianga legislators from Walikale and Masisi (four national and 
four provincial), who provided an insight into the extent of 
dissatisfaction in some quarters.  They said that their constituents 
did not want them to attend the Conference, seeing it as a vehicle 
for special treatment of the Tutsi community.  They bristled at the 
characterization of the Tutsis as an oppressed minority, saying that 
it was they who were the truly oppressed minorities of North Kivu. 
They expressed particular anxiety at the prospect of movement of 
Tutsi refugees to their territories, claiming that a genuine effort 
at identification would show that few had any genuine basis for 
claiming a right to come to Masisi or Walikale.  They characterized 
the U.S. as "Nkunda's backer," under the logic that as the U.S. 
backed Rwanda, and as Rwanda saw Masisi, Walikale, and Rutshuru as 
its "natural" hinterland and had established Nkunda there, therefore 
the U.S. backed Nkunda.  As for the FDLR, they said that they had 
problems only when the FDLR was being attacked; however, they were 
eager for the FDLR to leave their area and go to Rwanda (they blamed 
Rwanda for blocking this return).  Poloff attempted to steer the 
conversation toward how to ensure a positive result in the 
Conference, without any success.  The delegates' entire focus was on 
historical injustice and fear of further dispossession. 
 
Garvelink