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Viewing cable 08KINGSTON91, FRAUD SUMMARY OCT-DEC 2007 KINGSTON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINGSTON91 2008-01-29 16:12 2011-06-14 06:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kingston
VZCZCXRO4130
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHTM
DE RUEHKG #0091/01 0291612
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291612Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0089
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5875
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0513
INFO RUEHZI/WHA IM POSTS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINGSTON 000091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC 
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC JM
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY OCT-DEC 2007 KINGSTON 
 
REF: A) 07 KINGSTON 01158   B) 07 KINGSTON 01742 
 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  In the first quarter of FY 2008, Kingston's 
Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) uncovered a ring of C1/D fraud that 
resulted in specific information about the applicants' smuggler in 
New York.  FPU also investigated ten H-1B cases of Indian nationals 
who provided fraudulent employment documents from their supposed 
Jamaican employers.  FPU Kingston continues to scrutinize H-1B 
applications from third-country nationals and is working with FPU 
Chennai to verify Indian education documents.  Kingston's FPU 
received 247 Nonimmigrant Visa (NIV) cases, 9 new Immigrant Visa 
(IV) cases, 7 American Citizen Services (ACS) cases, and 111 
external requests (data checks from DHS, airlines, local 
immigration, etc.).  FPU processed an additional 157 walk-in cases 
and entered 129 CLASS records based on I-275 turn around reports and 
other tip reports.  Of all the NIV cases referred, 201 were closed, 
with 91 confirmed fraud (45.3% confirmed fraud).  13 IV cases were 
closed this quarter, with nine confirmed fraud (69.2% confirmed 
fraud).  END SUMMARY 
 
----------------------- 
NONIMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD 
----------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) FRAUDULENT C1/Ds:  In November 2007, FPU intercepted three 
applicants who had previously received C1/D visas to work for Master 
Ships and Navitrans Shipping companies, both of whom are known to 
CA/FPP to be bogus companies.  Two of the applicants were applying 
for the H-2B program and one was applying for an immigrant visa 
through his relationship with his American citizen wife.  In a 
series of in-depth individual interviews with the applicants, FPU 
discovered that the three had all paid the same agent, Mr. Charles 
R. Barrett of Queens, New York, in order to obtain crewmember 
contracts and to make arrangements for their employment.  According 
to these interviews, the applicants claim that they intended to work 
in the shipping industry as tank cleaners or housekeeping staff. 
However, once these applicants reached Miami, each claims that they 
were met by Mr. Barrett or an associate and taken by bus to Queens, 
New York, where they were put to work in restaurants owned by Mr. 
Barrett's friends.  Two of the applicants worked at The Door 
restaurant located at 16307 Baisley Boulevard, Jamaica, New York 
11434. 
 
3.  (SBU) Further investigation into Mr. Barrett's associations with 
visa applicants revealed his sister Rosalee Barrett's visa 
application in July 2006 to obtain a C1/D visa for Panama Shipping 
Lines, a company that has been linked to Master Ships and Navitrans 
as another completely bogus company set up by the same individuals. 
Ms. Barrett had been issued a 12 month C1/D visa, which has since 
been revoked following this investigation. 
 
4.  (SBU) After reviewing CCD records, FPU determined that Kingston 
has issued 34 visas to crewmembers claiming to work for one of these 
companies.  FPU continues to investigate these cases and is 
preparing information to provide to Diplomatic Security in order to 
assist in any investigation they may wish to conduct on Mr. Charles 
Barrett and The Door restaurant in New York. 
 
5.  (SBU) SUSPECT H1B PETITIONERS: In the first quarter of FY 2008, 
the Fraud Prevention Unit investigated ten H-1B visa applications 
that had strong fraud indicators.  The pattern of these applications 
is familiar to Kingston: third country nationals, mostly from India, 
work in Jamaica for one to two years at a small business in computer 
programming or software engineering.  Their friends and associates 
in the U.S. find small companies owned by other Indian nationals to 
petition for them.  These companies are well-prepared to present as 
many legal, financial and business documents as are required by the 
Embassy in order to appear legitimate.  However, upon further 
scrutiny, these companies have all demonstrated fraud indicators as 
well.  Many of their alleged clients do not in fact have direct 
relationships with the petitioners.  Most of the companies have been 
founded by former H-1B visa holders who have recently left their 
original petitioning company.  The majority of the employees at 
these companies are H-1B visa holders who have recently arrived from 
India.  However, the challenge in theses cases lies in finding 
enough strong evidence of fraud to support a petition revocation 
recommendation.  FPU Kingston returns these fraudulent cases through 
the revocation process when possible, but often must issue visas to 
these applicants when the burden of evidentiary proof cannot be 
reached through our investigations. 
 
6.  (SBU) The companies most suspected by FPU Kingston are Delasoft, 
Inc., Tech Arrow, RR Informatics, Hylee Group, and Novedea Systems. 
Since Post began investigating applications from these petitioners, 
Post has not received any subsequent applications from those 
companies.  Therefore, while the process is time and resource 
intensive, FPU Kingston believes that our robust efforts to 
investigate H-1B fraud are reducing the number of suspicious cases 
Post receives. 
 
7.  (SBU) PORTMORE PACESETTERS MARCHING BAND:  The Portmore 
Pacesetters Marching Band is a well-known group of children and 
young adults who perform at parades and events around Jamaica, as 
well as travel regularly to the U.S. to perform at various parades 
throughout the year.  The group is a legitimate marching band, but 
many of their members have overstayed their visas in the past, and 
FPU has received tips that the band XXXXXXXXXXXX has 
taken bribes from new members who have joined the band solely to 
obtain a U.S. visa.  A group of about 80 members appeared at the 
Embassy in December 2007 to obtain visas for the Martin Luther King 
Jr. Day Parade on January 21, 2008, in Tampa, Florida.  FPU worked 
through various channels in order to obtain more specific 
information about members who paid their way into the band, but were 
unable to verify specific names of those individuals.  Because many 
of the group's members use their visas appropriately, it was not 
prudent to refuse the entire group's applications. 
 
8.  (SBU) In order to weed out the mala fide applicants, FPU 
conducted thorough interviews with the applicants who were referred 
to FPU for review.  Through these, FPU cleared 16 applicants who 
convinced us that they are bona fide members of the marching band 
and who overcame 214(b).  FPU will continue to seek information on 
this group and will closely monitor future applications. 
 
-------------------- 
IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD 
-------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) In October 2007, the FPU staff conducted field 
investigations on outstanding immigrant visa cases over the course 
of two days.  Two of the Unit's Fraud Investigators organized the 
trips and invited an entry-level officer (ELO) in the Consular 
Section to participate each day, in order to serve as a training 
opportunity and help orient the ELOs to the work involved in 
conducting a fraud investigation.  The two-day field trip covered 
five of the 14 parishes and resulted in the completion of eleven 
immigrant visa case investigations, of which eight were determined 
to be fraudulent relationships.  FPU plans to continue to organize 
these field trips bimonthly. 
 
-------- 
DV FRAUD 
-------- 
 
10.  (U) Kingston is not a DV post. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
AMERICAN CITIZEN SERVICES AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
11.  (U) FPU continues to investigate passport and CRBA applications 
for the ACS unit by providing Lexis Nexis and other database 
searches on applications in order to assist the ACS officers in 
their adjudication process.  Particularly in the rush of passport 
applications that has followed the implementation of the Western 
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), ACS has brought more cases to 
FPU's attention for verification of U.S. civil documents and Lexis 
searches to verify the passport applicants' claims to citizenship. 
 
 
-------------- 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
12.  (U) FPU regularly investigates adoption cases where the 
applicant's orphan status is uncertain.  Jamaica has a tradition of 
informal adoption without documentation, which makes it difficult 
for Jamaican applicants to establish their eligibility.  Often, an 
applicant's relatives in the United States will adopt the applicant 
despite the fact that the applicant does not qualify as an orphan. 
FPU conducts regular field investigations to the applicants' homes 
in order to determine who is caring for the applicant and whether 
the family meets the poverty definitions of the INA. 
 
----------------------------------- 
ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD 
----------------------------------- 
 
13.  (U) Post's DHS/USCIS Officer-in-Charge reports no asylum cases 
for the first quarter of 2008. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
14.  (U) FPU has set up quarterly trainings at Norman Manley 
International Airport in Kingston and Donald Sangster International 
Airport in Montego Bay to review U.S. travel document requirements 
and basic fraud prevention techniques.  FPU invites every airline to 
send representatives to the trainings, which cover topics including 
facial recognition, detecting imposters, basic document training and 
examination of genuine and fraudulent U.S. visas and passports.  The 
most recent training was completed in October 2007, and the next 
round of training is scheduled for January 2008. 
 
-------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH OTHER EMBASSIES 
-------------------------------- 
 
15.  (SBU) On October 30, 2007, the Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) 
and Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator (ARSO-I) met 
with their British and Canadian counterparts at a lunch meeting 
hosted by the British High Commission.  The British were hosting 
visitors from their Risk Assessment Operations Centre at UK Visas, 
who provided valuable insight into their current fraud operations 
and their plans to expand how they detect and deter fraud.  The 
meeting was held as a part of ongoing consultations between the 
three Missions to work cooperatively and share best practices.  The 
meetings have been extremely successful thus far. 
 
--------------------------- 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------- 
 
16.  (SBU) FRAUDULENT VISA APPOINTMENT LETTERS:  On November 26, 
2007, the FPM and ARSO-I examined 25 cases in which applicants 
presented counterfeit visa appointment letters to the Consular 
Section in order to gain access to the building and bypass the wait 
time for a visa appointment.  The scheme was uncovered by the 
Section's Process Facilitator, who noticed a pattern in the bogus 
letters' printing and then discovered that none of the applicants 
who presented the letters had a scheduled appointment for that day. 
 
 
17.  (SBU) During the interviews, most applicants revealed the name 
of a document vendor who is known to the ARSO-I and who has been 
under surveillance for some time.  These applicants paid the vendor 
up to US $100 for the appointment letter, as well as an additional 
US $400 for other supporting documentation in some cases.  FPU and 
RSO continue to monitor the document vendor and are working closely 
with the Jamaican Fraud Squad to arrest the individuals in question. 
 
 
--------------------- 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------------- 
 
18.  (U) Per reftel B), FPU continues to seek CA/FPP assistance in 
obtaining FSI training for one of our Fraud Investigators whose 
nomination has been previously denied three times.  Post intends to 
nominate this staff member again for training later this spring.