VZCZCXRO8795
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0095/01 0231123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231123Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9763
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000095 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: UN, AU ENVOYS PROVIDE UPDATE ON PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 074 
 
¶1. (SBU) Briefing the Khartoum diplomatic corps on January 
18, UN Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson and AU Special 
Envoy for Darfur Salim Ahmed Salim said that increased 
tensions between Sudan and Chad posed the greatest risk to 
the political process at present. They remarked that without 
an end to the Chad-Sudan proxy war there can never be real 
peace in Darfur.  "This is a major concern," said Eliasson, 
"and there must be a decrease in tensions to create an 
environment for talks."  He also posited a link between the 
decline in Sudanese-Chadian relations and the Justice and 
Equality Movement's (JEM) increasing military activity and 
unwillingness to engage in the peace process.  The Envoys 
called on the international community to use its influence to 
resolve the standoff.  The French Ambassador stated that "my 
authorities--at the highest level--are appealing to Sudan and 
to Chad to exercise restraint, come back to dialogue, and 
adhere to the Tripoli agreement." 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Regional Meeting, Arusha II in Six Weeks 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Eliasson and Salim suggested that the UN/AU will 
hold a meeting of regional governments (Chad, Libya, Eritrea 
and Sudan) in N'djamena within the next six weeks, followed 
by an "Arusha II" type meeting to prepare Darfur's fractured 
rebel movements for "substantive talks."  They asserted that 
the rebel movements had consolidated into five clear 
groupings: the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) affiliated with 
Abdulwahid al Nur; SLA/Unity led by Suleiman Jamous, Sharif 
Harir, and Abdullah Yehia; JEM led by Khalil Ibrahim; the 
United Revolutionary Front (URF) based around the 
JEM/Collective Leadership; and the SLA affiliated with Ahmed 
Abdulshafie.  Salim said that the mediation "will not 
tolerate" new groups beyond the "existing five."  The two 
envoys praised and embraced the efforts of the SPLM in 
helping to unite some of the rebel factions (an initiative 
that both envoys sniped at and tried to sabotage over the 
past months).  They noted that Abdulsafie is still very 
skittish about negotiations. 
 
------------------------ 
Opening from Abdulwahid? 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) During the envoys four-day trip--which included 
stops in Darfur and Southern Sudan--SLA/Unity pledged to 
attend an "Arusha II" gathering and both SLA/Unity and the 
URF expressed "their absolute full support for the process," 
according to Eliasson.  In addition, the envoys were 
surprisingly optimistic about the potential for 
SLA/Abdulwahid to participate in the political track, 
characterizing a meeting with Abdulwahid commanders in Jebel 
Marra as "the most impressive opening" of their visit.  They 
attributed some of the progress in the dialogue with 
SLA/Abdulwahid to the decision to have UNAMID Force Commander 
Martin Luther Agwai travel with their delegation in Darfur to 
explain how the peacekeeping force plans to address 
Abdulwahid's concerns about security in the region.  (Note: 
In press reports from January 19-21, Abdulwahid denied any 
opening to the mediation, reiterating his demands that a UN 
peacekeeping force must be fully deployed before negotiations 
begin.  End note.) 
 
------------------------ 
Envoys' Action on UNAMID 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Responding to a question from CDA Fernandez, 
Eliasson said that, in meeting with Sudanese officials, he 
had underscored the importance of an effective peacekeeping 
force to monitor an eventual cessation of hostilities.  He 
had "warned the Government" of the danger of hand-picking 
troop contributors by nationality, noting that the rebel 
movements were making similar demands. The Envoys felt that 
some of these issues could be resolved at a possible 
Ban-Bashir meeting at the margins of the upcoming AU Summit. 
While appealing to the international community to meet the 
UN's request for helicopters, the envoys explained that the 
peace process could not wait for full deployment of UNAMID. 
"We must push forward on both tracks, even if one or the 
other is slowed," said Eliasson. 
 
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"Difficulties" on Civil Society 
------------------------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00000095  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Envoys acknowledged that they were confronting 
"difficulties" in finding a formula for civil society and 
IDPs to be represented in the peace process but said they had 
instructed UNAMID civil affairs to begin outreach to these 
groups.  Cautioning that a focus on Arab tribes risked 
"exaggerating or exacerbating the ethnic divide," they 
nonetheless claimed that they had had "intensive contacts" 
with Arab leaders.  Salim said that it was the "serious 
responsibility" of the Sudanese Government and the rebel 
movements to include Arab voices in the process. They 
suggested that IDPs could be more easily incorporated once 
Abdulwahid is on board with the upcoming talks. 
 
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Comment 
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¶6. (SBU) This briefing by the two Special Envoys seemed a bit 
too rosy and surreal for us. There appears to be no defined 
division of labor among UNAMID civil affairs, the Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST) that supports Eliasson and 
Salim, or the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) 
to execute an effective strategy for civil society outreach 
in support of the peace process nor any indication that these 
three bodies have made progress on this issue in preparation 
for negotiations. There also seems to be too wide of a 
disconnect still between UNAMID implementation and the peace 
talks.  A clear strategy will be critical to moving the 
process forward, as will establishing dates for the next 
steps in the process--with plenty of advance notice--so that 
the international community may begin pressing the parties to 
attend.  End comment. 
FERNANDEZ