VZCZCXRO7236
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0080/01 0211340
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211340Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9741
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000080 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: EL FASHER ARABS DEFENSIVE ABOUT MUSA HILAL APPOINTMENT 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a January 17 meeting with FieldOff, 
representatives of two Arab tribes in El Fasher were defensive about 
President Bashir's appointment of former janjaweed militia leader 
Sheikh Musa Hilal to the post of Advisor to the Minister of Federal 
Rule.  The Arab reps dismissed the posting as ceremonial but 
nonetheless insisted it was a Presidential prerogative with which 
the international community should not concern itself.  Other 
observers note that this appointment could incite tempers among 
Darfurians who suffered at the hands of the very militias Hilal once 
commanded. Reaction among the African tribes will be reported 
septel. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In a January 17 meeting with FieldOff, representatives of 
two Arab tribes in El Fasher, North Darfur - the Itiefat and the 
Mahamid - framed the Darfur conflict in terms of tribal relations. 
(Note: Musa Hilal is himself a Mahamid, though the community is 
reportedly split with one part of the tribe supporting him, and the 
other against. End note).  They echoed commonly-heard themes about 
reconciliation that could be ameliorated only through provision of 
assistance and services by the international community, particularly 
by the USG.  They insisted that the crisis in Darfur was a "normal" 
one in African terms, one that required humanitarian aid until a 
peace agreement could be reached.  However, they expressed 
suspicions about the perceived agenda of the international community 
and especially international NGOs, citing the example of Zoe's Ark 
in Abeche, Chad, as illustrative of the West's "ulterior motives" 
for Darfur.  They complained about the international community's 
"neglect" of the situation in South Sudan in favor of that in 
Darfur. They also questioned the international community's 
commitment to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) fairly, 
since it had imposed sanctions unequally against Arab parties to the 
conflict (they pointed to Musa Hilal, who was sanctioned by the 
United Nations Security Council under resolution 1672, while no DPA 
non-signatory rebel movement leaders had been directly sanctioned). 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Arab representatives claimed that President Bashir's 
appointment of former janjaweed militia leader Musa Hilal to the 
post of Advisor to the Minister of Federal Rule was nothing out of 
the ordinary.  The Arab reps recounted for FieldOff names of other 
Arab leaders given similar posts as part of "normal" appointments by 
the GoS; Jafar Abdel Hakim, the ex-Wali (Governor) of West Darfur; 
and Ibrahim Abdalla Mohamed, the ex-Wali of North Darfur, now 
advisor to the Wali of South Darfur.  They said the GoS had a 
different perspective on human resource matters than did the 
international community, which should respect the GoS' prerogative 
in such internal affairs.  When asked about the responsibilities of 
Hilal's designated post, the reps dismissed it as more ceremonial 
than decision-making in nature and went so far as to speculate that 
Hilal would hold no real power in the GoS. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Arab tribal reps justified Hilal's past campaigns 
against Darfuri populations by saying that he had merely led certain 
groups in defense of his own tribal affiliations during wartime, 
just as rebel leaders do with their movements.  They claimed that 
Hilal held no privileged tribal status, insisting he was "just 
another tribal leader" among many.  The Arab reps also claimed the 
GoS was trying to rein in any remaining influence Hilal might have 
over militias by giving him a posting that would physically remove 
him from his former area of operations and re-locate him to 
Khartoum, where he would be unable to carry out any of the alleged 
atrocities for which he was sanctioned by the UNSC [NOTE: The Arab 
reps also insisted that Hilal was indicted by the ICC, like fellow 
former janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb, but in fact the ICC has not 
issued such a warrant. END NOTE]. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Arab tribal leaders questioned the international 
community's neutrality given its interest in Musa Hilal's 
appointment.  If the world wanted to point fingers at warlords who 
became politicians, they argued, it needed look no further than 
Minni Minawi, who went from being a Sudan Liberation Army rebel 
leader to the fourth highest ranking official in the GoS and the 
head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. 
 
¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: It was clear from this conversation, as from past 
conversations with other Arab reps in El Fasher, that considerable 
loyalty remains between Arab Darfuri tribes and the regime in 
Khartoum.  The most compelling motive for the GOS to appoint Hilal 
as an advisor is no doubt to retain the loyalty of the part of the 
Mahamid tribe that supports Hilal, especially given recent moves by 
some Arab groups to ally themselves with insurgents.  There is talk 
among African Darfuris in El Fasher that the Hilal appointment could 
incite tempers among Darfurians who suffered at the hands of the 
militias Hilal once commanded.  Although some African Darfuris think 
Hilal's position will give him cover for future atrocities, we find 
this argument baseless since Hilal can do less damage in Darfur if 
he is in Khartoum. Additional reaction from the local populations 
will be reported septel. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000080  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ