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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM69, UNAMID OFFICIAL SAYS GOS NEITHER HELPING NOR HARMING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM69 2008-01-17 14:22 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5007
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0069/01 0171422
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171422Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9723
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE RICHARD WILLIAMSON, S/CRS, NSC 
FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON, D (GDELGADO) 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
 
SUBJECT: UNAMID OFFICIAL SAYS GOS NEITHER HELPING NOR HARMING 
DEPLOYMENT 
 
REFTEL: KHARTOUM 41 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a January 15 conversation with FieldOff, United 
Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Chief of Integrated 
Support Services (CISS) did not paint a picture of outright 
Government of Sudan (GoS) obstructionism to UNAMID deployment. 
Instead, the CISS reported that the GoS was neither helping nor 
hindering UNAMID's progress.  Recent conversations in Khartoum with 
government officials also reflect this mixed assessment (see 
comment). The CISS was not optimistic that the Chinese and 
Bangladeshi units of the Heavy Support Package would deploy by 
January 20 as predicted, although the Fragmentation Order for their 
deployment is expected within the next 24 hours.  Blame for slow 
deployment seems equally divided between the GOS and UNAMID elements 
themselves. END SUMMARY. 
 
SOFA 
---- 
2. (SBU) The CISS reported no real movement on the UNAMID Status of 
Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the GoS.  He did note, however, that 
the GoS refused to renew visas for some UN staff during the past 
week.  The GoS allegedly argued that these staff, working for UNMIS 
on behalf of UNAMID, should have submitted their renewal requests on 
UNAMID vice UNMIS letterhead. 
 
NIGHT FLIGHTS 
------------- 
3. (SBU) While the CISS confirmed that the GoS was nominally 
allowing UNAMID to fly at night, particularly in the case of medical 
evacuations, the GoS is requiring a signed paper indemnifying 
against liabilities in the case of flying without lights.  The CISS 
said UNAMID would engage the Sudanese Civil Aviation Association on 
this issue, which he predicted would be resolved by a UNAMID-funded 
upgrade of the lighting systems at Darfur airports. 
 
LAND ISSUES 
----------- 
4. (SBU) The CISS reported no real movement on the issue of UNAMID 
land procurement from the GoS in Darfur.  He was optimistic, as he 
has expressed in the past, that an agreement on West Darfur land 
would be reached and that it would not become a matter of money.  He 
noted that flights were re-starting east to west between El Geneina, 
Kulbus and Tine after having been halted due to West Darfur 
insecurity caused by rebel groups, and bombing by both Chadian and 
Sudanese aircraft, a resumption that could facilitate finalization 
of the land question in El Geneina. 
 
HSP UPDATE 
---------- 
5. (SBU) The CISS was not optimistic that the Chinese and 
Bangladeshi units of the HSP, bolstered by a Nigerian battalion, 
would deploy to the "Green Field" to begin construction of the super 
camp by January 20.  This view contradicts a statement by the UNAMID 
Chief of Staff (COS) in the January 16 UNAMID Morning Brief that the 
Fragmentation Order for this deployment would be issued within the 
next 24 hours.  The CISS noted that the Chinese had engineered a new 
set of conditions to delay deployment. The latest, according to the 
CISS, is that the Chinese cannot move their containers due to lack 
of access roads.  Correcting this problem will require UNAMID to 
bring in commercial contractors.  [NOTE: To be fair, the UNAMID COS 
also identified this issue as a credible obstacle in the January 16 
briefing. END NOTE].  The CISS predicted, however, that once PAE's 
contract extension expires on January 23, the Chinese and 
Bangladeshi units would be without food and would be forced to move 
from the PAE camp where they have been accommodated since their 
arrival. 
 
6. (SBU) The CISS and the COS confirmed that an Egyptian infantry 
battalion would be the next TCC arrival in Darfur.  The CISS 
stressed that it is incumbent upon UN Headquarters in New York to 
ensure that the battalion arrives in country fully equipped, to 
avoid another China-Bangladesh scenario. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: Recent conversations with government officials in 
Khartoum also indicate a push-pull approach by the GoS regarding 
UNAMID deployment. State Minister al-Samani al-Wasila, in 
conversations with PDAS Linda Thomas-Greenfield (reftel), denied 
that the government was obstructing the SOFA, saying that UNAMID had 
yet to present new terms for the agreement. Regarding land, 
al-Samani said that the GoS had offered several plots of land in El 
Geneina to UNAMID, but all had been rejected. While the government - 
whether through its typically slow bureaucracy or through 
politically-inspired machinations - certainly puts obstacles in 
UNAMID's path, the truth, as usual, probably lies somewhere in the 
middle. UNAMID seems quite capable of "going slow" on its own 
 
KHARTOUM 00000069  002 OF 002 
 
 
without the Sudanese and the Khartoum regime is only grudgingly 
moving towards facilitation of the deployment. 
 
8. (SBU) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ